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1. LEARNING AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN FOREST POLICY 
PROCESSES 
1.1. Introduction and Overview  
1.1.1. Learning-oriented Policy Analysis in Community Forestry  
Community-based management systems have become increasingly adopted in national 
forest policies over the past three decades. They exist today in many forms and are treated 
as effective mechanisms to stop deforestation through sustainable forest management by 
offering a self-managed livelihood for local people in forest areas. Common-pool managed 
resources (CPMR) have two defining characteristics: Firstly, it would be costly to develop 
institutions to exclude potential beneficiaries from them (like public goods). Secondly, the 
resources are rivalrous in consumption if harvested (like private goods) and can be 
depleted.  
Collective action theory1 states that collective action is facilitated where people realize that 
they have to get organized because otherwise they would not get any benefit, or less 
benefit that they would if they cooperate. If their management concepts are not capable of 
guaranteeing the future benefits of protective forest use, people do not have an incentive to 
invest in forest protection but will instead harvest immediately2. Mutual benefit in 
collective action thus requires strictly established forms of enforcement that guarantee 
people future benefits by gradual sanctioning of people breaking rules. Facing the 
dilemmas of collective action as illustrated by game theory and Hardin’s Tragedy of the 
Commons3 (1968), institutional structures are key to an effective management of common-
pool resources4. Generally, an increasing body of research in the past years has come to 
identify that legal and political structures have a crucial potential in ensuring a sustainable 
forest use, which is explored below in section 1.2.2. 
                                                     
1 The economic theory of collective action is concerned with the provision of public goods (and other collective consumption) through 
the collaboration of two or more individuals, and the impact of externalities on group behaviour1. It is more commonly referred to as 
Public Choice. Public choice theory focuses on the personal self-interest of the individual behind the stakeholder, therefore viewing the 
assessment of benefits within a sphere of situational and private motivations1 of the bureaucrats and politicians involved in policy-
making.  
2 Deacon 1994 
3 The tragedy of the commons is a central concept in human ecology and the study of the environment. The term was popularized and 
extended by Garrett Hardin in his 1968 Science article. The article has become one of the most cited ever in this journal and led to 
decades of research. The phrase is now widely used to refer to conflicts between individual interests and the common good. One central 
characteristic of such a situation is that the resource is rivalrous in consumption. A second distinction is based on whether others can be 
excluded from access to the resource.  
resource access and 
availability: 
 
rivalrous in consumption 
 
not rivalrous 
- excludable from others private good (cars, books, furniture) public good (bridges, cable TV) 
- not excludable common-pool resource (fish in the sea, trees in 
the forest) 
pure public good (air, national defense) 
Forest resources are depletable and rivalrous in consumption. Depending on the excludability and ownership rights of others, this can 
create an open access situation or a controlled common-pool resource. Community forestry concepts generally refer to the latter. 
Whereas Hardin's example suggested an open access situation, where anyone could bring his cattle to graze on the commons, most 
historical arrangements for such resource use (such as the allmende in central Europe) were actually a common-pool resource which was 
only held by a limited, and defined, number of users. 
4 This might result from a substitutional effect of governmental action, but might also be due to the simple fact that governmental action 
is directed towards those communities where collective action is missing (Pender and Scherr 2002, 20). 
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Typically, the policy process of establishing institutions to overcome collective action 
problems is a highly delicate collective action problem itself5. As community forestry 
develops over time in the formulation of a new forest policy, several external and internal 
issues have an influence. The emphasis on the 'policy process' points out that policies are 
formulated and interpreted in particular social and historical contexts, and that these 
contexts matter – for example, which issues are put on the policy agenda, for the shape of 
policies and policy institutions, for budget allocations, for the implementation process and 
for the outcome of the policies6.  
While economic stakes and financial resources play an important role in the process, they 
are only part of the story. The main problem for CPMRs in the past years has been 
institutional and policy failure: an unhelpful policy environment has tended to catalyze a 
vicious downward spiral of internal factors and external pressures on CPMRs7. An 
increasing body of research shows that community forestry may not be internally 
supported over the years after the initial stimulus such as international funds, a 
development project team, or internal political pressures, disappear from the scene. The 
adoption of new information, values and ideas are highly relevant in the new formation of 
forest policies. 
The focus on learning in policy processes highlights the pivotal role that ideas play in 
influencing (and being influenced by) policy process politics and policy actors' collective 
decisions. Policy learning is a form of collective learning, as policy is designed and 
implemented by a range of organizations. Sabatier (1993, 19) defines policy learning as  
a relatively enduring alteration of thought or behavioural intentions that are concerned 
with the attainment (or revision) of the precepts of a policy belief system.  
Section 2.2. explores the theoretical concept of policy learning in detail and discusses the 
potential influence of learning processes on policy change.  
In policy processes, abrupt paradigmatic changes are usually induced by a shift of the 
dominating power8. However, new available information might also provide an important 
cause of policy change, because new information alters the discourse and may strengthen 
weaker actors. For example, Bandelow (2003) argues that new information can even have 
a rapid influence on policy change, provided that the actors actively pursue a joint solution 
that benefits all (i.e. they do not intend to harm each other despite their different beliefs). 
In this context, policy learning is particularly likely to have a short-term influence on 
policy changes where the policy-makers are from different backgrounds and decide jointly 
through a political forum.  
                                                     
5 Bates 1988 
6 The idea of ‘policy process’ stands opposed to that of ‘policy as prescription’ which assumes that policies are the result of a rational 
process of problem identification by a benevolent agency, for example the state. Please refer to Mackintosh (1992) about ‘policy as 
process’ and ‘policy as prescription’. While the ‘policy as prescription’ approach is still important – both in much of the public 
administration literature as well as in the heads of many policy-makers – there is a fast expanding body of literature that analyses, 
explains or conceptualises the process dimensions of policy.  
7 Richards 1997 
8 e.g., changed majorities in parliament; see Bandelow 2003 
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While great agreement has been achieved in recognizing a large potential of local 
institutional structures to effectively organize forest use on the local level9, there is still a 
substantial knowledge gap in understanding the learning processes that accompany the 
transformation from state-based forestry to community-based forestry. Policy learning is 
shifting more into the focus of research to understand fundamental changes in policy 
programs10. Community-based forest management implies an immense structural change 
for a system that was previously state-based, focused on the benefits of few privileged 
actors, and run by very few decision-makers. The devolution of authority involves a 
considerable shift of paradigm and political values beyond the immediate communal 
arrangements and logging regulations.  
The research addresses three major aspects of policy learning and beliefs that are central in 
this regard. Firstly, it explains the actors' policy beliefs and learning processes over time to 
determine how they shape their positions on tenure and authority rights of state and 
community. Secondly, the research explores the relevance of social as opposed to 
environmental goals among the coalitions who support the transformation towards 
community forestry. Since the rise of community forestry in the 1970s, the idea has 
become increasingly linked with the notion of multiple-use management and sustainable 
forest management. The popularity of community forestry was boosted from the global 
debate over how to tackle deforestation and rural poverty in one combined approach. The 
social and environmental goals have often been, and still might be, intertwined in the 
policy process. The considered merits of the concept and the driving goals in the policy 
processes had, however, partly different roles over the past decades and in each regional 
application. This will be explored in detail in the research. 
Thirdly, the research discusses the learning and beliefs that determine the actors' positions 
between common-pool access and more privatized forms within community forestry. More 
recent developments in community forestry arrangements have shown a stronger tendency 
towards privatization as a means to resolve local conflict over collective action problems. 
Hardin's theory that resources held in common are doomed to over-exploitation since 
resource-users are individualistic has exerted a major policy influence in the tropics11. 
Policy-makers who assessed the inevitable degradation of these areas in the face of 
commercial and demographic pressures have blamed the lack of individual property rights 
over resources for forest degradation in all CPR situations. This stance has contributed to 
policies of resource privatization (to individuals) and/or state control of CPR areas12. 
Another key question is the role of traditional authority versus a competitive management 
of local forest enterprises, which causes conflict in a considerable number of cases. Recent 
privatization trends and their underlying beliefs and learning processes will be explored in 
                                                     
9 see, for example, Ostrom 1995, Thomson 1992 
10 for recent development in learning-oriented policy research, see for example Bandelow 2003 
11 Richards 1997 
12 In many areas state control has been weak, so that de facto open access has been permitted over state `managed' land (covering up to 
80% of forest land in such countries as Bolivia, Brazil, Venezuela, Peru and Panama), when in fact much of it lies in areas subject to 
extensive management by indigenous groups. 
 
 
3
the research, especially for the case of Quintana Roo. 
 
1.1.2. Research Objectives and Conceptual Framework (ACF) 
The primary and substantial goal of the research is to understand why, and how, 
community forestry emerges in forest policy with regard to the underlying influence of 
policy learning and changes of beliefs that affect policy change. It seeks to identify the 
relative roles of external events and policy learning for CF policy change, and thus 
compares the two. The research also seeks to explain if a change of policy beliefs can 
occur without an external stimulus, and if a change of policy beliefs is crucial for a policy 
change towards CF at all.  
With this focus, the research aims to help understand the influence that CF-oriented 
projects and political strategies might have on a regional system. The more specific 
objective is, accordingly, to describe and analyze the policy process that led to the 
individual development of community forestry systems in Ecuador, Mexico and Canada 
from a policy network perspective, based on an empirical application of a learning-oriented 
approach to policy change which is described in detail in chapter 4.2. The causal linkages 
are outlined in the following model.  
 
Figure:  Causal Linkages between the Causes and Effects of Policy Change   
 
External Causes 
    
Local Effects 
     
 
Causes of  
Policy Change 
 
 
Change of  
Policy Belief ? 
 
Institutional  
Effects 
 
     
Policy Learning 
 
   Network Effects 
 
The research employs an empirical application of the Advocacy Coalition Framework 
(ACF). The ACF is an actor-based policy network approach to which allows for a 
particularly strong focus on policy learning and policy beliefs, based on the assumption 
that they condition the performances of policy actors. The analysis also provides a 
historical overview of the policy processes, and explores in detail how the interaction of 
beliefs and actors enables and constrains the ability of policy actors to respond to changing 
external conditions.  
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The analysis is based on qualitative data13 from semi-structured in-depth interviews with 
selected key individuals of the policy network, complemented by informational meetings 
with policy actors and a literature review. The empirical design of the data collection, 
processing and interpretation is described in depth in chapter 2.4.3. The conceptual 
strengths and limitations of the approach are discussed in chapter 2.4.4., and reviewed 
again for a methodological critique of the empirical application in chapter 5.4. 
The main analytical framework of the research is Sabatier’s and Jenkins-Smith’s (1993) 
Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF). The ACF organizes the policy actors according to 
their policy beliefs into advocacy coalitions. The ACF has been chosen as the theoretical 
lens because it provides substantial merits among the existing actor-based policy network 
approaches to policy processes. It has emerged from political research specifically on 
environmental policies that focus on the actors' individual perspectives in a pluralist 
framework14. The framework allows for a broad acknowledgement of learning among the 
actors, and it usefully distinguishes between policy learning and external factors as causes 
of policy change. The theoretical policy analysis approach is described in detail in chapter 
2.2. 
For the focus of the research, it is one of the major advantages of the Advocacy Coalition 
Framework that it explains policy learning as a pluralist process that is embedded in 
different policy beliefs and perceptions15. The ACF postulates that the different 
perspectives of the coalitions are all legitimate, and thus particularly serves to explain 
democratization and devolution processes, as Bandelow (2003) points out. Since 
community forestry itself is a devolution approach deeply rooted in a bottom-up line of 
thinking that supports small-scale action of individuals and groups, the analysis of this 
research similarly follows a perspective from the individual stakeholder rather than the top-
down perspective of the political economy that the local forestry system is embedded in. 
This approach also does not narrow the policy process down to a discussion about the best 
available option, but rather deals with the political conflicts as a natural state that is 
inevitable and necessary16.  
The ACF has been increasingly used in policy analysis across numerous policy fields since 
the 1990s. Generally, the framework has not yet been widely used in developing countries, 
while a significant number of applications exist for industrialized countries17. Sabatier and 
Jenkins-Smith report that, since 1988, there have been over twenty-five applications 
publicized from scholars working in a diversity of fields and countries, and of the four 
Canadian applications alone, three concerned the forest sector18. In forest-related policy, 
the framework has generally been increasingly applied to explain recent changes, 
                                                     
13 The qualitative analysis of interviews and documents represents a particularly valuable tool for policy analysis where the quantitative 
alternatives would be either extremely costly (for example, market-based surveys), lack the detailed documentation for a quantitative 
content analysis, or might not provide the necessary access to politically sensitive information. See, for example, Bandelow 1999. 
14 see also Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1996 
15 Bandelow 2003 
16 Bandelow 2003 
17 e.g., USA, Canada, UK, Australia, Germany 
18 Lindquist and Wellstead 2001, 434 
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particularly where a wider discourse and network of actors was involved. For example, 
forest certification has been analyzed through the ACF. As a very comprehensive example, 
Elliott (1999) has undertaken an in-depth study on the forest certification processes in 
Sweden, Indonesia, and Canada.  
Especially British Columbia has been a regional focus in several ACF studies on forest 
policy19. Lertzman, Rayner, and Wilson (1996) employ the framework to outline the values 
and belief systems of the 'development' and 'environmental' advocacy coalitions, and 
demonstrate how the environmental coalition developed strategies that forced changes on 
the development coalition. Wellstead reviewed forest policy change in Alberta and 
Ontario, and his findings were consistent with the hypothesis that policy change tends to 
occur at the secondary aspect of belief systems rather than at the core. However, these 
studies do not employ a systematic analysis of the actors' policy beliefs, but scrutinize the 
learning processes and coalition behaviour through punctuate valuable examples.  
Although the ACF has been increasingly used as an analytical framework for forest-related 
policy change, there are not yet many empirical studies on the actual changes of policy 
beliefs and learning processes in community forestry, despite its significant influence on 
forest policy over the past decades. The research employs a case-study based application of 
the ACF—supported by a literature analysis—across different policy processes in their 
regional contexts. It employs an empirical study on the changes of secondary policy 
beliefs20 and learning processes of the coalitions towards community forestry. For this, it 
uses the ACF as a selective analytical tool for specific aspects around the learning and 
beliefs of the policy process. By doing that, the research seeks contribute to an 
understanding of the utility of the ACF in Latin American forest policy, and to empirical 
applications of the ACF in general.  
 
 
1.1.3. Empirical Analysis of Ecuador, Mexico and Canada 
The research compares CF policy processes in three different countries across several 
decades to draw lessons on their political driving forces. Each case study is explored 
individually at first to analyze the causal mechanisms that lead the individual community 
forestry process from one stage to another in the policy process. This provides the basis for 
the systematic comparison, and is also used to discuss case specifics in their historical 
process. 
 
 
                                                     
19 Hoberg 1996a, Lertzman et.al. 1996, Wellstead 1996 
20 The core beliefs are particularly difficult to determine and require psychological and epistemological data, preferably across several 
years or more than a decade. The secondary policy beliefs have a more operational character and are easier accessible. Besides, they are 
the ones that are much more likely to change, and are more likely to indicate changes in the short and mid term. Please see chapter 2.2.2. 
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Figure 1: Overview of the methodological approach    
 
Case Study Analyses  
 
 
Canada 
British Columbia 
(process since late 1980s) 
 
 
Ecuador 
Esmeraldas 
(process since early 1990s) 
 
Mexico 
Quintana Roo 
(process since early 1980s) 
 
Advocacy Coalition Framework applied to each case study to determine the parameters: 
• Coalitions and their policy beliefs over time 
• Policy learning and external events during the policy process 
• Local effects and network effects over time 
• Causal linkage between the identified causes and effects, and related changes of 
beliefs 
 
 
 
 
 
Comparative Analysis 
 
Comparison of the identified parameters across the three case studies: 
• Roles of policy learning for the policy process as opposed to external causes 
• Roles of changes of policy beliefs 
 
 
The three case studies in Ecuador, Mexico and Canada have been chosen as three distinct 
types of policy processes in community forestry: British Columbia was driven by a strong 
internal environmental movement that involved the general public in a relatively broad 
discourse. Ecuador represents a rather conventional process with a strong international 
pressure and funds from development projects. Mexico, in comparison, marks a rather 
distinct process that was driven by an institutional restructuring.  
The case studies also show differing levels of decentralization and community 
involvement, differences in the institutional history of actors from the governmental to the 
local level, and different property structures as the providing basis for de facto benefit 
effects. Apart from the distinct character of each process, the selection of the case studies 
was based on a number of criteria: 
a) national and international significance of their forests;  
b) a community-based forest management concept that allows for a decentralized 
property regime, benefit sharing, and decision-making;  
c) considerable differences in the initiative of local and international actors during the 
policy process; 
d) aboriginal land use as a cultural minority within the nation-state, yet locally 
representing the majority;  
e) external policy support or legislative framework of the forest management that 
intends to reflect the local aboriginal context;  
f) availability of ACF-based studies in one region and a new application in the other 
two; and  
g) the determination to increase representation by including both tropical and temperate 
forests in the case studies.  
For each case study, two communities have been investigated in detail to determine the 
local effects of policy change: One community which shows a particularly non-conflictive 
process towards community forestry, and one with a particularly conflictive process that 
reveals underlying conflicts among the actors of the regional system, and allows to identify 
problems in the cause-effect linkage for a successful local implementation. 
 
Table: Overview of the Case Studies – Communities and Data Collection 
 
Case Study 
Esmeraldas 
Ecuador 
Quintana Roo 
Mexico 
 
British Columbia 
Canada 
 
 
community 
with low 
occurrence of 
conflict  
 
Arenales  
- Afro-Ecuadorians 
- 450 members 
- Community Forestry (CF) since 
2001 
 
Santa María de Poniente 
- Mayas 
- 500 members 
- CF since 1986 
 
Esketemc  
- Esketemc-Indians 
- 1200 members 
- CF since 2001 
 
 
community 
with high 
occurrence of 
conflict  
 
Capulí  
- Chachi-Indios 
- 350 members 
- CF planned since 1996 
 
Ejido 20 de Noviembre  
- Mayas 
- 400 members 
- CF planned since 1987 
 
Haida Gwaii  
- Haida Indians 
- total of 4000 members 
- CF planned since 1997 
 
Each fieldstay was conducted in affiliation with a central actor or related institution of the 
policy subsystem, which was in all three cases located in the provincial capital where most 
of the regional actors are based. Built upon the contacts from there, several weeks were 
spent in the communities for local interviews. The fieldwork intervals in Ecuador (Aug-
Nov 2003) and Mexico (Feb-May 2004) were conducted as a collaborative research for the 
GTZ (Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit) in two independent projects for 
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sustainable resource management. The data collection in Canada (Apr-July 2005) was 
based at the POLIS Institute for Ecological Governance with the Eco-Research Chair for 
Environmental Law and Policy at the University of Victoria, BC, generously supported by 
the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD).  
 
Table: Overview of the Case Studies –Fieldwork Stays and Affiliated Organizations 
 
Case Study 
 
Esmeraldas 
Ecuador 
 
Quintana Roo 
Mexico 
 
British Columbia 
Canada 
 
 
Data 
collection 
4 months in 2003 3 months in 2004 3 months in 2005 
 
Local 
affiliation 
 
GTZ-Project MFC-E  
Manejo Forestal Comunitario 
Esmeraldas 
 
 
GTZ-Project PROSURESTE, 
Campeche/Chetumal 
 
POLIS Institute for Ecological 
Governance, University of 
Victoria 
 
1.1.4. Structure of the Thesis 
The thesis is structured into five chapters. The following section explores the historical 
stages that forest-related development paradigms underwent, and outlines how the notion 
of community forestry was modified over the decades in policy practice. Chapter 2 
discusses the theoretical perspective of learning-oriented policy analysis and outlines the 
Advocacy Coalition Framework. It also presents the methodological approach of the 
research as developed from the theoretical basis.  
Chapter 3 applies an ACF analysis in each of the three case studies to identify the causal 
role that external perturbations had on policy change. It identifies the external events and 
the output of the policy process over time. Chapter 4 analyzes the roles of policy learning 
and changes of policy beliefs in each case studies. Its first part explores the development of 
the Community Forestry Coalitions with regard to their policy learning and beliefs, and 
outlines their shift of priorities between social and environmental goals of community 
forestry in particular. The second part scrutinizes the strategic learning responses in the 
political interplay between the two major coalitions, and identifies their influence on the 
policy process. The third part of chapter 4 focuses on the local experiences of the six forest 
communities that have been investigated as local examples of the regional policy process, 
and explores their major lessons that can contribute to policy learning in the process. 
Chapter 5 provides an overview of the conclusions, offers recommendations from the 
policy implications of the results, and reflects on the empirical analysis in a 
methodological critique. 
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 1.2. Lessons in Forest-related Policy Development 
1.2.1. Underlying Concepts and Forest-related Paradigms since the 1970s 
Community forestry became popular in the 1970s as a different approach to the complex 
linkages of people and forests, and it seeked to re-incorporate the close connections that 
local communities and forestry activities traditionally had before the colonial period. Its 
political success was based on different notions and concepts of human-environment 
interaction that addressed social and environmental aspects to different degrees over the 
decades. 
The term community forestry generally refers to a broader concept. It is not limited to 
particular tenure arrangements, form of property rights, forest practices, internal 
management or organization. The fundamental elements of community forestry center on 
community control and local benefit of the people over the local forest, and thus focus on 
the social aspects of local communities.  
The initial concept of the 1970s was based on three elements that was embedded in socio-
economic livelihood aspects: The provision of "fuel and other goods essential to meeting 
basic needs at the rural household and community level", the provision of "food and the 
environmental stability necessary for continued food production", and the generation of 
"income and employment in the rural community"21. This triangle allowed for a broad 
spectrum of linkages between the people and the forest, the socio-economic needs of the 
rural people, and reforestation objectives22. In the same year, FAO (1978) provided an 
initial definition of community forestry as  
any situation which intimately involves local people in a forestry activity. It embraces 
a spectrum of situations ranging from woodlots in areas which are short of wood and 
other forest products for local needs, through the growing of trees at the farm level to 
provide cash crops and the processing of forest products at the household, artisan or 
small industry level to generate income, to the activities of forest dwelling 
communities. 
Almost two decades later, environmental issues were increasingly stressed among the 
spectrum of motives, as well as local empowerment. For example, Duinker et al. (1994) 
focuses on the decision-making aspect of forest management in "a tree-dominated 
ecosystem managed for multiple community values and benefits by the community". 
Notwithstanding the underlying policy goals, the sharing of the resource and its benefits 
thus remain central in the overarching idea of community forestry. Masse (1995) similarly 
stresses the local environmental decision-making in community forestry as  
the control of forest land by a community to provide local benefits. This form of control 
implies the decentralization of authority and, as a consequence, the establishment of new 
types of partnerships for managing forest resources.  
                                                     
21 FAO 1978 
22 Arnold 1991, 3 
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Both Duinker et al. (1994) and Masse (1995) sum up that the greater the involvement of 
the community in forest-related decision-making, the closer it resembles community 
forestry. Democratic and community-based forest arrangements are today strongly linked 
to forest protection and policy instruments against deforestation, as outlined above.  
 
The discourseTP23 PT around environmental policy measures is embedded in a set of values and 
problems which are socially and politically constructed, and depend on various 
determinants. The forest-related discourse is only a subordinate part of the overarching 
paradigms of the international development sceneryTP24 PT. It is strongly influenced by the 
rapidly changing topics of super-ordinate policy issues. The dominating themes of the 
forestry discourse evolve along the agendas of agriculture, forestry, social and education 
sectors and their funding priorities.  
The themes usually develop under the strong temporary dominance of one mainstream 
model which overshadows all other complementary approaches, until it falls into disgrace 
for its failure to function as a universally applicable tool and is replaced by a new preferred 
conceptTP25 PT. In environmental policy development, such fundamental changes of 
perspectives are often referred to as a change of paradigmTP26 PT, which provide the basis for a 
new direction in policy.  
Such a change of paradigm may occur for several reasons. A paradigm may be politically 
overrun by new advocates, or be improved by a thorough reflection of the past lessons. 
Generally, it can be argued that the shift from one paradigm to the next is influenced by 
some form of learning, driven by the policy discourse on the global and regional level to 
various degrees. Both have the access and capacity to draw lessons from the regional 
implementation and local constraintsTP27 PT.  
However, the global change of paradigm is not necessarily the result of learning and 
improvement. The global forest-related paradigm is influenced by a usually larger set of 
actors than the regional level, and politically driven by different institutions and interests. 
Pretzsch (2003) even points out a general weakness and serious constraint in the lack of 
                                                     
TP
23
PT Within the scope of the research, the term political discourse is understood as a bundle of statements that provide a communication 
frame, or a language, for discussing a certain area of knowledge (Hall 1992, 291). Due to its ever-changing nature and bound to complex 
political dynamics, it is mostly "fragmented and contradictory. . . an astonishing collection of claims and concerns brought together by a 
variety of actors. . . a specific ensemble of ideas, concepts, and categorizations that is produced, reproduced, and transformed in a 
particular set of practices and through which meaning is given to physical and social realities" (Hajer 1994). 
TP
24
PT Ljungman and Nair 2000, Pretzsch 2003 
TP
25
PT ibid 2003 
TP
26
PT The term paradigm originates from the philosophy of science to describe the changing sets of practices and perspectives in scientific 
disciplines over time. It is now widely used in the social sciences to describe thought patterns and social phenomena in the sense of 
Weltanschauung. The contemporary meaning emerged from Thomas Kuhn's definition as 
• what is to be observed and scrutinized, 
• the kind of questions that are supposed to be asked and probed for answers in relation to this subject, 
• how these questions are to be structured, and 
• how the results of scientific investigations should be interpreted. 
TP
27
PT Thus, learning and changes on the global level are a highly complex process and would be subject of a different research. The focus of 
the research touches on these issues where they may be reflected in the changing policy goals and interests of the regional actors.  
learning from past mistakes when an old paradigm is hastily replaced. He identifies six 
historical stages of forest-related development paradigms, which describe the different 
priorities and issues that were identified as key components. These need to be 
acknowledged as an underlying context –and possible influence—on the regional systems.  
 
Figure: Historical Stages in Tropical Forest Policy. Source: Modified from Pretzsch 
(2002) 
Traditional Forest Use 
 
 
"holistic" endogeneous 
linkages, local knowledge 
 
Colonial Forest Use 
 
 
 
specialisation, fragmentation 
  
Forests for National Growth 
 
 
 
accumulation of capital 
 
Internationalisation 
 
 
 
orientation towards technology 
learning processes and external political factors 
 
Polarization 
 industrial forestry 
social forestry 
conservation 
learning processes and external political factors 
 
Globalisation 
 
                 ? 
 
democratisation, devolution 
(neo-liberal) privatisation, 
deregulation 
 
These are important to note for an understanding of the regional policy development. The 
Mexican case study process was initiated during the social forestry focus of the late 
polarization phase, while the Ecuadorian and Canadian experience would arguably rather 
fall under the later globalization phase. The stages can be described as follows. 
Stage I: Traditional Forest Use 
Traditional forest use offered an extreme variety of benefits for the rural population. The 
local people developed a strong basis in traditional knowledge on forest use and the 
environmental system. Social forestry and livelihood concepts have their roots in the 
traditional forest use practice. The forest use was embedded in a set of informal rules, 
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religious and symbolic functions which provided a regulatory framework for a sustainable 
use of the forest. Some of the management concepts were rather elaborate systems, for 
example the Mayan forest gardens in Yucatán which simulated the natural tropical forest 
ecosystem28. However, where the internal control mechanisms failed for some reason, a 
destructive cycle of  forest overuse began. This occurred in a considerable number of 
cases, and a detailed understanding of the internal failures has often not been obtained.  
Stage II: Colonial Forest Use  
Colonial forest use provided an entirely new political context which shifted the system to 
an exclusive benefit for the mother countries. Exploitative harvesting practices were used 
for a maximum-yield commercialization on the world market. Large plantations were 
created for the production of mostly export-oriented crops such as coffee, cocoa, oil palm, 
and rubber. The colonial forest use resulted in a deep structural change that dissolved the 
complex traditional forest use systems29. The social organization of the forest communities 
changed, traditional forestry knowledge became partly redundant, and forest-related values 
changed30 with the superimposed value system of the colonial power. The complex and 
holistic character of the traditional forest use systems was replaced by a one-dimensional 
relationship of the colony with the 'motherland', which only acknowledged a narrow 
concept of forest benefits.  
The rural population was drastically denied access or usufruct rights to the forests. Private 
property rights were introduced and transformed the land use concepts from collective land 
use to privatized territorial land rights, through which the few land owners could exclude 
the majority of the have-nots from the landbase. The traditional forest management was 
replaced by European forestry paradigms which focused on a maximized production of 
timber. Taxes, charges and a powerful forest administration were introduced to control and 
regulate the use of the forests. This state-controlled system set in motion the alienation of 
the rural population with the forest, and led to a disruption between the forest and the rural 
livelihood31. The state dominated the rural population and held the exploitative system in 
place. 
Stage III: Forests for National Growth 
The third stage of forests for national growth followed when the decolonized states focused 
on their natural resource assets to accelerate their own economic growth and development. 
The strong power of the forest administration was often maintained, as well as the 
European paradigm regarding forest management and property rights. The main 
                                                     
28 Neugebauer 1986 
29 Pretzsch 2003 
30 A change of the considered benefits and values occurred when the forest products from the forest are equated with goods in the 
`market economy.' This destroys the traditional exchange system between human activity and nature, removes the checks on extractive 
practices, and erodes the reciprocal `gift economy' which provides an the incentive for group cooperation at the heart of CPMRs. An 
individual's status in the gift economy is enhanced by giving away wealth, whereas in the market economy status is enhanced by 
accumulating it, and the latter is normally more powerful when the two systems meet. As younger people, in particular, move away from 
tradition and embrace more individualistic market economy values, this causes `confusion and ambiguity among community members 
over access to resources, usufruct rights and property rights' (Chase Smith 1995).  
31 Pretzsch 2003 
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impediment to economic development was thought to be a lack of capital32. Soon, the idea 
that forests represent a form of capital stock which should be tapped and liquidated, was 
adopted across the industrialized world in the 1960s, including the FAO33.  
At the 6th World Forest Congress, the solution offered to developing countries were a 
massive liquidation of their forests, high capital investments in the timber industries, and a 
later re-investment in plantations to achieve the desired economic growth. Many tropical 
countries did follow the concept, but most failed for reasons of institutional weakness, 
including lack of political support, lack of technical know-how, and bribery34. As a result, 
many tropical countries and especially the rural population were left with deteriorated 
forest resources, a drained capital stock, and disillusioned institutional support. The 
devastated situation of the rural population did not allow for any leverage on new forest 
policies, and learning was mostly focused on growth development in capital-oriented forest 
use. 
Stage IV: Internationalization 
The fourth stage of an increasing internationalization saw an increasing mobility of capital 
and labour in the forest production, while the timber markets became more international 
and less transparent with a growing number of actors in the process. The first multinational 
timber enterprises emerged. Similarly, the development organizations reached a new 
international level, especially the World Bank and the FAO. The new commonly adopted 
paradigm for forest-related development assumed that sound planning and, above all, 
technological know-how are the key that will enable tropical forest management and 
plantation development.  
A noticeable euphoria emerged for large-scale projects and technology-based approaches. 
The rural population was deliberately not a focus because it was argued that they would be 
likely to consume new resources instead of re-investing to accumulate capital and foster 
economic growth. Instead, the poor were to benefit indirectly by a trickle-down effect of 
the leading growth sectors. Accordingly, the international development funds of these 
years were directed at large-scale investment projects which failed for similar reasons as in 
the previous stage, and left the affected countries with significant debts and repayment 
obligations until today35.  
Stage V: Polarization 
Following the previous failures in development concepts, the discourse entered a state of 
polarization in tropical forest policy. It is characterized by broadly diverging policy 
positions and an immense increase of the number of actors in the transnational discourse. 
The economic approaches of the past were now increasingly complemented by social 
                                                     
32 Nurske 1953, Rosenstein-Rodan 1961, Rostow 1960; discusssed by Pretzsch 2003 
33 Pretzsch 2003 
34 Pretzsch 2003; see also Pretzsch 1986 and 1987 for particularly strong cases in Indonesia, Philippines, Liberia and Ivory Coast. 
Notwithstanding, the capital-oriented concept has also been successful in several countries, including Finland, Sweden and Canada, as 
well as some progress in plantations in Brazil and Chile. 
35 Pretzsch 2003 
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aspects, which were incorporated in new development concepts to different degrees. This 
represented the most significant shift in the forest-related development policy of the past 
decades because it replaces the former capital-based strategies of economic growth with 
more pluralist development concepts that also address social and environmental issues36. 
The World Bank development policy coined their new focus 'Redistribution with Growth'37 
in the early 1970s. The livelihood of the rural population—which had been far from the 
centre of policy focus for several phases—was at the centre of a profound discussion of 
how to involve the poor into formal or informal economic activities, in order to provide for 
their basic needs. 
 
The new focus on the livelihood needs of the local population gave way for social forestry 
concepts, which formed the new paradigm in international forest policy. Various lines of 
forest-related projects were launched that incorporated environmental objectives, including 
plantations against the firewood crisis, or agroforestry against soil degradation. In the mid-
1970s, FAO and SIDA commissioned expert groups on Forestry and Local Community 
Development to draw lessons from recent initiatives, especially in India (Social Forestry), 
South Korea (Village Woodlots), Thailand (Forest Villages) and Tanzania (Village 
Afforestation)38. Simultaneously, environmental concerns grew rapidly and boosted the 
significance that was assigned to social forestry in order to stop deforestation.  
The concept of community forestry emerged as a response to joint pressures which 
urgently called for a comprehensive approach to tackle the environmental threat. One 
trigger of the discourse was the fuelwood shortage and public awareness of the dimensions 
of the energy crisis after the Sahelian drought39. Population growth, shrinking state 
budgets40, and deforestation concerns added up to the pressure. At the same time, growing 
criticism emerged against the persisting technocrat development concepts41 and the 
credibility of the forest administration in their technology-driven approaches42.  
Degradation of the forests has radically different meanings for different groups of 
people because of differing consequences, inevitably giving rise to different 
approaches to tackling environmental degradation. The preferred response of many 
planners, politicians, development practitioners, civil servants and heads of industry 
lies in forms of management which are instrumental and (inevitably) top-down. Acting 
on "objective data", managers plan, mobilize and "clear space for action". People are 
"tapped", "mobilized", 'brought out of traditional isolation", "empowered" or cajoled 
                                                     
36 Pretzsch 2003 
37 Chenery et al. 1974 
38 Arnold 2001 
39 Arnold 1991 
40 Ostrom 1999 
41 From the mid-1980s to the early 1990s, the Tropical Forestry Action Plan (initiated by the World Bank and World Resources Institute 
in collaboration with FAO and UNDP) still followed the previous technology-based approach and "failed because of its mono-sector 
approach, relying on a top-down planning mechanism and relatively simple technocratic responses to complex problems, resulting in a 
lack of participation and support of relevant groups of society" (Pretzsch 2003, 6). 
42 One driving force behind the call for devolution is arguably the loss of credibility of state-based forest administration. The suggested 
reasons for this are multifold, for example a growing disillusionment about the achievements of state-based technocratic forestry in the 
past; an increasing isolation of foresters in their technically oriented discipline and internally focused forestry ethos; and an overarching 
shift in attitude and credibility towards governmental powers since the end of the communist regimes and the Cold War. 
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into "collaboration" so that they can carry out the managers' designs - or they become 
"obstacles" to be removed.  
The management of people is justified in the name of environmental protection. 
Meanwhile, the physical environment becomes a terrain to be reordered, zoned and 
parcelled up according to some preconceived "master plan".43  
New public voices for more local control over resource management decisions44 initiated a 
structural discussion on the sources of rural poverty and a degrading livelihood basis from 
the forest resources. The widespread support for the new approaches led to a rapid 
emergence of grassroot initiatives, community organizations and NGO activities which 
were often more successful in their approaches than state-based projects.  
The time of the 1987 Brundtland Report, as part of the UN Commission on Environment 
and Development (Brundtland Commission), marks a significant shift. It identified the 
environmental threat as a joint global priority and functioned as a catalyst for 
environmental policy change.  
One of the main achievements of the Brundtland Report is to have presented the 
environmental case in such a way that it could bring round big institutions like the 
World Bank and the IMF which, in the 1970s, were still considered to be in the 
opposing camp45.  
Since the report (re-)introduced the concept, more than forty working definitions of 
sustainable development have appeared. The 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro was 
another key event which meant to bring forward the diverged voices of the environmental 
discourse on a joint policy towards Agenda 21. However, the Earth Summit rather made 
the political disparities obvious that had slowly diverged the nations' concepts of sustain-
able development and the understanding of how to tackle the environmental threat46. 
Stage VI: Globalization 
The current globalization stage in forest-related development is characterized by two 
different influences: privatization of forests on one hand, and a continuing devolution trend 
of forest authority from state-based administration to local communities on the other 
hand47. Many community forestry projects have failed, and a privatization of the forest is 
regarded as the consequence. It has become evident that community forestry is not a 
general solution, but only a viable option for areas where the forest is still in a state that 
would support an economic livelihood basis for the local people. National governments 
withdraw increasingly from their traditional functions in forest administration and 
management. The current deregulation trend is enhanced by the lack of resources that the 
state forest administrations are often facing, thus seeking to defer costly responsibilities. 
Where the process is not accompanied by a framework that regulates state intervention, 
                                                     
43 Hildyard et al.    
44 Ostrom 1999 
45 Hajer 1994, 12, referring to Sachs 1992. While acknowledging the uniting character of the change, radical critics of the Brundtland 
Report argue that "the whole idea of sustainable development is a rhetorical ploy which conceals a strategy for sustaining development 
rather than addressing the causes of the ecological crisis". ibid 
46 Hajer 1994 
47 Pretzsch 2003 
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however, this might increase the pressures of the market on the forest resources48. For both 
trends, the lessons from the past experiences will be reviewed in detail in the following 
section. 
 
1.2.2. Institutional Arrangements in the Communities and Lessons  
Generally, institutional organization represents a crucial element, if not the keystone, for 
the success of community-based forestry, as has been illustrated above on collective action 
theory and the tragedy of the commons. Although population growth has been shown to be 
positively related to deforestation49, evidence from the local level indicates that 
institutional organization is capable of mitigating the demographic pressure and reducing 
deforestation50.  
Even Malthusian pressure cannot be considered to be more important for the progress of 
deforestation than institutional structures could hold against, as scholars increasingly 
stress. Deacon’s (1994) important work on the relative roles of population pressure and 
institutional variables for their impact on deforestation, for example, shows that the widely 
recognized factor of population density does not account for any higher variance in 
deforestation impact as political and institutional variables. Similarly, Wunder (1999) 
shows that the external macroeconomic conditions were of probably secondary relevance 
for the quick pace of deforestation for example in Ecuador, as compared for example to the 
relevance of its institutional and social structures.  
Other work also shows that the motivation of conflict is often rather “greed” than 
“grievance”, where lootable resource income triggers social dynamics of suppression. 
Hence, land degradation—as it is due to human land use and resource harvesting beyond 
its renewable productivity potential—should, as Blaikie and Brookfield (1987) argue, by 
definition be considered a social problem. Institutional arrangements and the actors' 
willingness to cooperate are, thus, key for community forestry to succeed. 
Historical analysis reminds us that forest management by local people was interrupted and 
distorted by years of centralized control. The idea that devolution can recreate the 
precolonial days of community-based forest management, where it existed, is untenable. 
Many forests have been drastically altered, now dominated by evergreen rather than 
broadleaf trees, depopulated of wild animals, with plant species better suited to 
international markets than local uses.  
The contexts of forest management have changed with new tenure regimes, technologies, 
and new pressures for use. Capacities that existed in the past may not have kept pace with 
these changes. While some local forest management institutions have survived, others are 
now gone, with little local memory of how they functioned, or even interest in recreating 
                                                     
48 Pretzsch 2003 
49 Agrawal 1995, Varughese 2000 
50 for example, Wunder 1995 
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them. This suggests that devolution requires in some places the continued involvement of 
the state in supporting local management. States may struggle with their capacity and 
legitimacy to play such a role, as all four papers suggest.  
Similarly, there are many reports of the breakdown of local institutions during periods of  
state control over forests. Colonial administrations used a mix of strategies to deal with 
local institutions. Often they were quite hostile to institutions embedded in local histories 
and cultures, and undermined their power through “tax policies, land seizures, 
transportation building, and the creation of new leaders accountable to the colonizers.” At 
other times, indirect rule was used to bring existing leaders under colonial influence, often 
redefining their role.  
In either case, common property institutions were badly affected. Such institutions depend 
on high levels of trust among participants, as well as very clear decision-making 
mechanisms that require active maintenance. As states claimed control of what had been 
common pool forests and began punishing local forest users for violating state regulations, 
forest users often turned away from their own institutions and began treating the forest as 
an open access resource. Clearly local institutions have been seriously weakened, distorted, 
or destroyed in many forested areas, and devolution policies that assume their presence are 
likely to fail.  
Debate rages, however, over whether traditional institutions should be re-established or 
new ones created in these areas, and how either task can be accomplished. Many studies 
now indicate that institutions with extended local histories can be terribly oppressive of 
women, ethnic minorities, particular castes and classes, and immigrants. Revitalizing this 
kind of institution would run counter to the (presumed) democratic intent of devolution. 
Yet new institutions often fail to take hold in communities. 
The rise of donor influence on government policy makers over the past two decades is also 
well recognized. Malla (2001) suggests that donor pressure has motivated much of the 
reform in Nepal’s forest policy. Donor funding for social forestry, community-based forest 
management, and other such devolution initiatives has led to a proliferation of projects that 
may have improved forest cover but have provided limited benefits to forest users.  
The rise of forest-based social movements and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in 
recent decades provides states with potential partners for the task, though the persistence of 
elite/subordinate relations at local levels makes every partner potentially problematic, as 
Malla (2001) points out. Forest users themselves have promoted more democratic, 
devolved forest management by mobilizing on their own or, more often, in alliance with 
other civil society groups and progressive government officials. These alliances have been 
around for some time, and have influenced the development of existing devolution policies 
in most cases. Their influence thus far has been limited relative to that of holdover officials 
and local elites. New discourses about democracy, indigenous rights and conservation, 
however, encourage further, more democratic reforms. 
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The research on the institutional design of CF has been increasingly rich in the past years. 
The International Forestry Resources and Institutions (IFRI)51 Research Program launched 
a major research program since the mid-1990s to draw lessons from international CF cases 
on the stability and success of institutional arrangements in forest communities52. It aims to 
gather policy-relevant knowledge and feed it into the policy discourse. On the community 
level, several aspects determine the internal organization of the forest decision-making.  
One important finding for the context of the research is that local autonomy might be 
conducive for collective action, but not a sufficient condition to create a successful 
common-pool resource management. This emphasizes the role of information and 
institutional facilitation. Institutions have an influence on the effects of population 
pressure53, population growth54, social heterogeneity and its related levels of trust55, 
predictability of interactions, the community's socio-economic pace in the diversification 
of income, and the non-economic preferences of the community members56. 
While there is an increasing conceptual understanding on the institutional design of 
community forestry, it is important to note that its implementation is usually an 
unpredictable process that requires a flexible adaptation, as it depends on a complex array 
of factors. This stresses the importance of learning throughout the process, as well among 
the policy actors as also within the communities.  
The local experiences of the policy processes are analyzed in chapter 4.3 in particular. The 
development of the concept of community forestry in the policy process—as it is 
embedded in the actors’ notions on collective action and the priorities of the forest 
arrangements—is explored in chapter 4.1.  
                                                     
51 Indiana University, Bloomington/USA with Elinor Ostrom  
52 Having collected relevant empirical evidence worldwide for more than a decade and the consensus in research that has been reached, 
Ostrom (1999, 7; modified from Ostrom 1990, 90) identifies the central requirements for long-enduring common-pool resource 
institutions: 1. CLEARLY DEFINED BOUNDARIES: Individuals or households with rights to withdraw resource units from the common-
pool resource and the boundaries of the common-pool resource itself are clearly defined. 2. CONGRUENCE: The distribution of costs and 
benefits from appropriation rules is roughly proportionate to the costs imposed by provision rules. 3. COLLECTIVE-CHOICE 
AGREEMENTS: Most individuals affected by operational rules can participate in modifying operational rules. 4. MONITORING: Monitors, 
who actively audit common-pool resource conditions and user behaviour, are accountable to the users and/or are the users themselves. 5. 
GRADUATED SANCTIONS: Users who violate operational rules are likely to receive graduated sanctions (depending on the seriousness 
and context of the offence) from other users, from officials accountable to these users, or from both. 6. CONFLICT-RESOLUTION 
MECHANISMS: Users and their officials have rapid access to low-cost, local arenas to resolve conflict among users or between users and 
officials. 7. MINIMAL RECOGNITION OF RIGHTS TO ORGANISE: The rights of users to devise their own institutions are not challenged by 
external governmental authorities. 8. NESTED ENTERPRISES (for common-pool resources that are part of larger systems): Appropriation, 
provision, monitoring, enforcement, conflict resolution and governance activities are organized in multiple layers of nested enterprises. 
53 Agrawal and Yadama 1997 
54 Varughese 2000 
55 Ostrom 2002s 
56 Gibson and Koontz 1998 
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2. ADVOCACY COALITION FRAMEWORK AND EMPIRICAL APPLICATION  
2.1. Structural and Pluralist Network Theory 
The study of policy processes can offer useful and strategic insights into why and how 
policies are formulated and implemented, and succeed or fail. They shed light on the 
multiple implementation problems, but also on the strategic choices and options, the 
necessity for support/coalition building, and how this could possibly be done. In other 
words, studies of policy processes highlight not only the constraints, but also the 
opportunities and incentives, which one needs to understand in order to make use of them. 
The growth of this body of literature is relatively recent1. This literature is a blend of 
geography, political science, sociology and anthropology. It does not assume that policies 
are ‘natural phenomena’ or ‘automatic solutions’ resulting from particular social problems 
and it does not privilege the state as an actor fundamentally different from other social 
actors.  
Explaining policy development over time requires an abstraction of the process, which 
allows for a categorized structuring of the complex continuum that political systems live 
in. Laswell (1956) was the first to differenciate between stages of the policy-making 
process: intelligence, recommendation, prescription, invocation, application, appraisal, and 
termination. His work on the processes of policy decisions and Easton’s (1965) work on 
the systems model of politics provided the basis for Nakamura’s (1987) stages (or 
“textbook” or “standard”) approach towards policy processes2. The linear model assumes 
that the policy process consists of various subsequent stages: agenda-setting, policy 
formulation, implementation, evaluation, etc. This model has been dominant throughout 
the 1970s and the 1980s3.  
As the more recent discussion of the specifics of community forestry processes suggests, 
the conceptual lens needs to accommodate especially elements that focus on the 
constellation of actors and their relationships of interaction, interests, and power. For the 
purpose of the research, this requires a structural perspective of the network of actors, 
assuming that  
the structure of relationships between actors and the location of individual actors in the 
network have important behavioural, perceptual, and attitudinal consequences both for the 
individual units and for the system as a whole (Knocke and Kuklinski 1982, 13). 
                                                 
1 There are several older studies which fall into this description (and therefore in between the disciplines of political science and public 
administration), but the wider interest in this subject matter and these kinds of questions is a relatively recent phenomenon of, say, the 
last 15–20 years. It would be interesting to investigate the reasons behind the rise of this new sub-discipline. It is likely that it has to do 
with the changing ideas about the role of the state, and the declining faith in planning and in the malleability of society. In the wake of 
the neo-liberal upsurge came an increasing emphasis on (good) governance. After all, and quite ironically, the successful implementation 
of reform policies depends on a capable state – even though the ideology stresses a reduced role of the state. This could well have led to 
more studies on and interest in policies as processes. 
2 see Elliott 1999 
3 deLeon, 1999, 23 
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In order to understand the driving mechanisms of policy change over time, a different 
approach is necessary than a structure-centered analysis of the actors for one point in time. 
The analysis approach of the research is based on a pluralist network of actors, embedded 
in the actor-based model of the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) by Sabatier and 
Jenkins-Smith (1993). 
 
Analytical Shift in Forest Policy from State-centered to Pluralist Approaches4 
Within the social science frameworks, approaches used for forest management contexts in 
the past often employed a state-centered social science perspective of institutional and 
historical focus5. Weber’s institutional approach (1947) focused on the role and function of 
individual government stakeholders, but was increasingly considered unmanageable when 
complexity and interrelatedness of policy making –involving governmental and non-
governmental actors- grew.  
Pluralist approaches, instead, focus on a broader field of influence and suggest that policy 
change emerges from conflict between interest groups who compete to influence the policy 
process and struggle to protect and promote their own interests (Dahl 1967). As Glück 
points out, the former state-centered paradigm fails to acknowledge the increasingly 
pluralistic structures of modern democracies:  
(I)nstead of a uniform decision maker, there are a multitude of political actors 
with varying empowerment, interests and objectives…The new paradigm of 
policy planning focuses on governance processes which take place in policy 
networks or bargaining systems” (Glück 1997, 5). 
The term network describes the notion of channels of communication which perform 
various functions such as information exchange, negotiation, channelling access to 
decision-makers and coordination of actions among its actors6. Using a broader definition 
of “informal groups of interacting political actors”, Glück (1997, 5) uses the term networks 
in a way that embraces the policy development process in a conclusionary manner well 
beyond the hierarchical separation of state-centered approaches. Similarly, the ACF’s 
paradigm of policy networks of actors replaces the former assumption of hierarchically 
separated institutional structures by pluralistic political structures that are comprised of a 
multitude of interacting actors with varying power and interest coalitions7. This paradigm 
shift is particularly relevant in the context of forest management concepts where NGO and 
private sector actors have repeatedly taken a leading role in fast-track influence on policy 
design and development rather than the state, as for example Willets (1996), Bass and 
                                                 
4 It should be noted that the theoretical discussion of policy networks evolves considerably, and might also be subject to particular waves 
of focus. As for example Hoberg (1997, 136) puts it, "for periods of time we seem to single out one significant variable and pay an 
inordinate amount of attention to it, the mist striking examples being interest groups in the 1950s and 1960s and institutions in the 1980s. 
As we seize upon the new variable, we discredit the previous generation of scholars who we claim (sometimes misleadingly) ignored it."  
5 Cubbage et al. 1993 
6 Elliott 1999, citing van Waarden 1992 
7 Glück 1975 
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Hearne (1997), and Elliott (1999) stress. Grounded upon usually consensual policy 
decisions for a locally restricted context, community forestry initiatives are subject to 
specific structures in the constellation of stakeholders:   
[C]onsensual policy institutions are specialized for a particular action arena, inclusive 
of a broad range of public and private stakeholders in the collective-choice process, 
and voluntary in the sense that only those who agree to the terms of the political 
contract are subject to the rules (Lubell et al. 1998). 
Thus, the term policy network is understood as comprised of the policy actors and their 
linkages, which provide channels of exchange for information, expertise, trust and other 
policy resources.  
A policy network is described by its actors, their linkages and its boundary. It includes 
a relatively stable set of mainly public and private corporate actors. The linkages 
between the actors serve as channels for communication and for the exchange of 
information, expertise, trust and other policy resources (Kenis and Schneider 1997). 
Following the structural perspective, the boundary of a policy network "is not in the first 
place determined by formal institutions but results from a process of mutual recognition 
dependent on functional relevance and structural embeddedness" (ibid). In order to 
categorize policy networks, various structural criteria have been suggested as for example 
the number and type of actors, degree of institutionalization, power relations, and actor 
strategies8, or based on the state's strength and strategy whether it is dominantly exclusive 
or inclusive towards new actors9. 
 
Network-based and Actor-based Perspectives  
The ACF clearly puts weight on the role of actors as the initial cause for policy change, 
while the system structure is not regarded as a dominant factor10. This is important for the 
analysis of community forestry processes because it allows more space for less powerful 
actors that would usually appear too restricted in their resources and access to intervene. 
Using the ACF allows to take into account that agents have the potential to change and re-
shape the existing structures through policy learning, which is a clear issue for the 
institutional arrangements and management structures in community forestry.  
Regarding the sources of actor motivation in policy change, the discussed specifics of 
community forestry suggest that institutional arrangements, especially towards collective 
action problems, should be at the center of critical attention in the policy development. 
From a neoinstitutional perspective of actor-based motivation, policy development occurs 
as a “political contracting process between stakeholders who stand to gain from solving an 
                                                 
8 van Waarden 1992 
9 Kriesi 1996 
10 Watt 1997, 897 
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underlying collective action problem” (Libecap 1989). Institutions11 are able to encourage 
cooperative behaviour where collective action problems exist12, but will only emerge if the 
transaction costs of searching, bargaining, monitoring and enforcing are adequate13.  
Similarly, from the neoinstitutional perspective, stakeholders will only cooperate if their 
pareto-benefits under the new institutional agreement are evaluated higher than the ones 
under the status quo14. Thus, again from the neoinstitutional perspective, community 
forestry analysis requires a particularly strong actor-based perspective to understand the 
costs and benefits of cooperation as regarded individually by each actor15. This is another 
central element provided by the ACF, outlined in the following. 
 
2.2. Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF)  
The ACF views the policy process from the sectoral perspective of the policy subsystem. 
One of the four theoretical premises of the ACF is that  
(1) The optimum unit of analysis is the policy subsystem rather than governmental 
institutions.  
Drawing on structural analysis aspects, policy subsystems16 (virtually equivalent to policy 
domains) function as analytical units beyond institutional structures and administrative 
functions, and the ACF policy subsystem is therefore determined by the content that the 
actors are actually involved with. Accordingly, the second of the four theoretical premises 
of the ACF is that  
(2) Policy subsystems will involve actors from a variety of levels, from local to 
national and beyond.  
The reason is not only increasing political devolution to local levels, but also that local 
officials have some latitude on the mode and intensity of project implementation in their 
                                                 
11 The use of the term ‘institutions’ follows Ostrom’s (1999) inclusionary definition as “shared concepts used by humans in repetitive 
situations organized by rules, norms, and strategies. Institutional structures are constructed on a high level of societal organization and 
collective action, and reinforce internalized norms and values in turn11. The conceptual understanding of power to be used for the 
research is an effect-oriented perspective of the capacity of individuals or institutions to achieve goals even if opposed by others. 
Indicators for the existence and use of power will be a) the ability to get people to listen, b) that they, their information, and their 
interests are taken seriously, and c) that their information and judgement is being deferred to. Since Foucault’s work, considerable 
attention has been drawn to the role of knowledge, for power emerges from the knowledge of how people's behavior can be affected11. 
Accordingly, internal knowledge of stakeholders on interaction behaviour and negotiation dynamics is an aspect that is addressed in the 
research.  
12 see Ostrom 1990, North 1990 
13 Heckathorn and Maser 1987 
14 Libecap 1989 
15 Lubell (2000), for example, shows several applications that combine neoinstitutional aspects of collective action with the ACF’s core 
concept of subjective belief systems. He supports the analytic shift from an evaluation of the objective decision-making situation to the 
internal value system of the decision-maker, in order to obtain insight in the stakeholder’s individual assessment of perceived costs and 
benefits towards policy change. 
16 The definition of the term policy subsystem as used in this study, thus, is comprised of the “set of actors with major concerns about a 
substantive area whose actions and preferences on policy events are taken into account by other domain participants” (Elliott 2001, 171).  
Within this framework, actors have been considered within the system based on the criteria of their regional activity, responsibility 
and/or interest in the policy subsystem of community forestry itself. 
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decision authority. Within a policy subsystem, various actors17 from public and private 
organizations are involved who are actively concerned with a particular policy issue. A 
detailed definition of the term actors is given in section 2.1. 
The ACF model views advocacy coalitions as the best aggregational form for organizing 
actors. Advocacy coalitions seek to implement their beliefs into policy by following 
strategies of litigation, lobbying elected governmental actors, commissioning research, 
promoting issues for public opinion changes etc. Sabatier deliberately recategorizes the 
actors apart from their institutional affiliation, whether governmental or non-governmental, 
and organizes them according to their belief systems18. A coalition is pragmatically 
comprised of those actors who "share belief and act in concert" (Sabatier 1996). They 
identify each other as part of the same coalition and cooperate more or less frequently19. 
Their policy beliefs may differ in minor beliefs, but are usually alike in the core beliefs, as 
these provide the basis that other positions are derived from.  
 
                                                 
17 The term actor is used to describe any single entity, which could be an individual person or an institutional entity (Knocke 1990, 1). 
Of course there is no such thing as an exhaustive list of actors that are involved in the complexity of a real-world system. For the 
purpose of its conceptual analysis or strategic understanding, however, the investigated system has been synthesized down to the roles 
and impact of stakeholders that are most pertinent for the immediate system of community forestry, acknowledging the fact that 
additional actors create indirect effects to the arena from behind the scenes.  
The actors considered pertinent to the system will naturally differ depending on the individual actor's perspective. This is 
especially true for the communities, whose access and knowledge on the actors "out there" beyond the immediate reach 
to the often remote forest communities has proven to be extremely limited. On the contrary, numerous institutional 
contacts especially of the primarily active NGOs and governmental agencies have been considered to remain outside the 
analyzed set of actors because of their rather general nature in linkage and support.  
18 Sabatier 1993 
19 In empirical research, coalitions are sometimes hard to identify where there are no clearly polarized groups, and where the differences 
between the policy beliefs of the actors are blurred. As the concept defines that coalitions act in concert, one crucial criteria is that they 
know each other and identify themselves as a group of a certain degree of cooperation. Government-related authority are part of a 
coalition if they are equally identified by their fellow actors as part of the coalition. It is important to note that Sabatier and Jenkins-
Smith (1999, 153) stress that "the ACF assumes that legislators are members of coalitions only if they have considerable expertise in a 
specific policy area". Generally, not all actors necessarily belong to a coalition. If present but inactive, actors are referred to as latent. If 
an actor demonstrates brokerage and not advocacy activities, he is a policy broker who facilitates conflict resolution and mitigation. 
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Figure: Conceptual Overview of the Advocacy Coalition Framework. Source: 
modified from Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993. The bold elements indicate the 
central aspects of the research. 
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2.2.1. Belief Systems and Bounded Rationality in the ACF 
The model is based on the assumption of people entering politics in order to turn beliefs 
into policy. The third of the theoretical premises of the ACF states that 
(3) Belief systems are central; advocacy coalitions are made up of actors sharing 
beliefs.  
The ACF perspective organizes actors according to their motivation and belief behind their 
action, and structures the surroundings of policy development into coalitions of actors that 
share belief and act in concert20. Coalitions are comprised of actors of a policy subsystem 
who share basic policy beliefs and cooperate strategically over time. The actors organize 
themselves into advocacy coalitions in order to interact and seek to gain influence on 
policy decisions.  
The table below shows the ACF’s central concept of belief systems among actors in a 
hierarchical structure. The ACF assumes that abstract core beliefs are more resistant 
towards change than specific secondary beliefs. Following the hierarchical pattern of belief 
systems, the ACF also views governmental programs and policy in a hierarchical structure 
of policy cores and secondary aspects. Public policies and programs can be conceptualised 
accordingly when extending the belief system structure to advocacy coalitions.  
 
                                                 
20 Sabatier 1988 
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Table: Structure of Belief System of Actors in the ACF model. Source: Sabatier 1993 
 
 
Deep (Normative) Core 
 
Policy (Near) Core 
 
Secondary Aspects 
 
Defining 
Elements 
Fundamental normative 
axioms 
Fundamental policy positions 
concerning the basis 
strategies for achieving core 
values within the subsystem 
Instrumental decisions and 
informational searches 
necessary to implement 
policy core 
Scope Part of personal philosophy.  Across all policy subsystems Specific to subsystem Specific to subsystem 
Suscepti-
bility to 
Change 
Very difficult; akin to a 
religious conversion 
Difficult, but can occur if 
experience reveals serious 
anomalies 
Moderately easy; this is the 
topic of most administrative 
and even legislative policy-
making  
Illustrative 
Compo-
nents 
1. The nature of man: 
    i) inherently evil vs. socially 
redeemable  
    ii) part of nature vs. 
dominion over nature 
2. Relative priority of various 
ultimate values: freedom, 
security, power, knowledge, 
health, love, beauty etc. 
3. Basic criteria of 
redistributive justice: whose 
welfare counts? Relative 
weights of self, primary 
groups, all people, future 
generations, no humans etc. 
 
 
1. Proper scope of 
governmental vs. market 
activity; 
2. Proper distribution of 
authority among various 
levels of government 
3. Identification of social 
groups whose welfare is most 
critical  
4. Orientation on substantial 
policy conflicts eg. 
environmental protection vs. 
economic development 
5. Magnitude of perceived 
threat to those values 
6. Basic choices concerning 
policy instruments eg. 
coercion vs. inducements 
7. Desirability of participation 
by various elements of 
society eg. public vs. elite 
8. Ability of society to solve 
problems in this policy area 
9. Definition of the problem 
(added: Elliott 1999, 284) 
1. Most decisions concerning 
administrative rules, 
budgetary allocations, 
disposition of cases, statutory 
interpretation and even 
statutory revision. 
2. Information concerning 
programme performance, 
seriousness of the problem 
etc. 
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With the central emphasis on belief systems, the ACF employs an actor-based perspective 
of the policy process where subjective values and perception are vital components of the 
network behaviour. For the theoretical concept of individual decision-making behind this, 
bounded rationality, as conceptualized first by Simon (1955, 1979), is a central point of 
reference in the ACF. Although individuals intend to think and act rationally—as rational 
choice models assume21—their ability to assess goals is bounded by limited information 
and cognitive capacities22. Hence, cooperative behaviour and collective action as grounded 
on the assumptions of the ACF depend on the stakeholders’ subjective perception of the 
costs and benefits of policy change. 
 
2.2.2. Policy Learning as a Source of Change 
Within the developed ACF model23, policy change can be the result of two different 
processes. The first source of change is external. Non-cognitive events that lead to a 
change of the power constellation among the competing advocacy coalitions and thus 
allow the rising coalition to push forward their goals. The assumption of the ACF is mainly 
that policy change is triggered by these external events that cause perturbations on the 
system, which have an impact on the hegemonial constellation of the actors. The second 
source of change is policy-oriented learning. Policy learning can occur within an advocacy 
coalition, or it can involve actors across different advocacy coalitions. It can emerge from 
different sources, such as lesson-drawing from own experience or a knowledge transfer 
from others. The learning can relate to political issues of CF or strategic behaviour, as well 
as to ecological issues and substantial management practices.  
Policy learning can be viewed as a constant process of learning and adaptation, and it 
includes learning from the global policy discourse on one hand, as well as an internal 
adaptation towards environmental changes on the other hand. Both might be closely 
connected in a complex interplay of learning factors that contributed to the learning 
process, given that many factors typically occur at the same time around the same topic. 
This is a rather complex internal process, and assumed to be very slow and cumulative24. 
Accordingly, the policy perspective of the ACF stresses the importance of slow and 
cumulative policy process over time, and assumes long periods of time to develop change. 
The third of Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith's (1993) theoretical premises states that   
                                                 
21 The concept of bounded rationality goes beyond the theoretical assumptions of a perfect market in rational choice theory which is 
based on the homo oeconomicus who acts solely in economic self-interest, and assumes a competitive market with full information 
about the involved actors (and as such cooperates in collective action where it follows his own interest; see Olson 1965 and Hardin 
1968). 
22 for a further discussion see Lubell 2000 
23 For the development of the ACF, Sabatier (1988) and Jenkins-Smith (1988) have acknowledged policy learning—with reference to 
Heclo's (1974) early work—as a central point of departure. Heclo argued that policy change is not the result of individual changes in the 
system, but rather a process of learning among the actors. Thus, where policy change is the result of policy learning—yet Heclo sees this 
as a possibility at all—, it is more than the direct response to one stimulus, but rather a diffuse and "relatively enduring alteration in 
behaviour that results from experience" (Heclo 1974). 
24 Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier 1993, 5 
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(3) In order to understand policy change, the time frame of a decade or more is 
required. 
Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993, 226f.) thus clearly stress the necessity of a time-oriented 
perspective to understand the dynamics of a policy network. Especially from the structural 
perspective of the policy process, the analysis requires an understanding of the historical 
context and network structures. Recognizing the powerful role of historical specifics and 
personal profiles in policy development comes together with acknowledging the role of 
human agency in policy development, as opposed to putting “structure over agency”25. As a 
valuable tool for network analysis, a historical understanding of policy processes can 
provide important information for an integrated agent-oriented and structure oriented 
perspective towards the development of structure and agency over time26.  
Emphasized by the ACF's slow development over time and its strong focus of belief 
systems, policy learning and knowledge development are highly interesting issues in the 
ACF system, and in fact considered a core aspect of the model's policy process27. Policy 
learning resembles a cognitive process that requires a subjective interpretation of the actors 
about the lesson and the message behind the perceived experience. Sabatier identifies three 
key factors that contribute to policy learning.  
• Learning is facilitated by informed conflict. The fact that it has to be informed 
shows that both actors need to have the necessary resources or access.  
• Learning requires a relatively neutral arena "where the experts of the respective 
coalitions are forced to confront each other" (Sabatier 1987, 679).  
• Learning is easier with problems for which quantitative performance indicators can 
be found and where natural systems are concerned, because in this case the critical 
variables do not behave strategically, which facilitates controlled experimentation28.  
Learning is about knowledge, which is not the same as information. Information is a set of 
structured signals that enter human consciousness through the senses; it is a message 
containing structured data29. Knowledge is information that is meaningful to 
knowledgeable agents. This means that knowledge is processed information; in the 
processing, meaning is attached to information by connecting it to existing processed 
information.  
It is important to stress that learning is not a purely informational process, but involves 
                                                 
25 see Watt 1997. In the past, network and coalition approaches were often criticized concerning an imbalance between the individual 
actor-orientation and a structural perspective. Rhodes and Marsh’s (1992) work on policy networks was criticized as a descriptive 
approach from a structural perspective that underestimates the role of agents (see, e.g., Watt 1997, 896). Where insufficiently 
acknowledging the role of agents, the perspective might fail to account for case specifics such as historical development and contextual 
reasons for change  (ibid). 
26 Watt 1997, Elliott 1999 
27 see, for example, Richardson 1996, Elliott 1999 
28 Sabatier 1987 
29 Cowan, David and Foray 2000 
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filters on several levels. People filter and manipulate information flows30: employees avoid 
passing on negative information to their superiors, they try not to be too closely identified 
with new projects in case they fail, and managers involved in decision-making frequently 
employ information selectively in order to legitimate decisions31. 
There are different kinds of knowledge. For the focus of the research, Johnson and 
Lundvall (2001) offer a particularly useful distinction between 
• Know how: the ability to do something 
• Know what: knowledge about facts 
• Know why: knowledge about principle and laws 
• Know who: knowledge about who knows what 
All four kinds contain valuable information for actors and advocacy coalitions who not 
only need to be informed about the substantive policy issues (i.e., facts, principles and 
laws), but also about the operational possibilities of how to act in the policy network, and 
how to advance their policy goals most effectively among the competing coalitions .  
Other concepts distinguish between codified and tacit knowledge32, generic and specific 
knowledge, personal knowledge and collective knowledge33. Collective knowledge is 
shared and generally encoded in institutional forms, such as norms, habits, or laws. 
Another important distinction is drawn between individual learning, organizational 
learning and social learning. Organizations are understood as the social groupings of 
individuals among which learning occurs, and the institutional forms that stabilize and 
transmit the resulting lessons. Social learning is often concerned with values and other 
‘higher-order’ properties such as norms, responsibilities, goals, and the framing of issues in 
terms of causes and effects selected for attention.  
The types of policy learning can also be distinguished according to their level of cognitive 
reflection involved. 
• Instrumental learning represents a form of technical learning about instruments – 
about effects how the instruments may be improved to achieve set goals. This type of 
learning represents single-loop learning. It does not question the fundamental design, 
goals and activities of the organization; 
• Conceptual learning or problem learning is concerned with the cognitive process of 
seeing things from a different evaluative viewpoint (in a ‘new light’) with the 
development or adoption of new concepts, principle and images. This is a form of 
double-loop learning34.  
                                                 
30 Argyris and Schon, 1978 
31 Easterby-Smith 2000, 1092 
32 Cowan, David, and Foray 2000; and Johnson and Lundvall, 2001 
33 Johnson and Lundvall, 2001 
34 Argyris, 1976 
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• Social learning describes learning about values and other ‘higher-order’ properties 
such as a norms, responsibilities, goals, and the framing of issues in terms of causes 
and effects selected for attention. Hall (1993, 278) defines social learning as  
a deliberate attempt to adjust the goals or techniques of policy in response to 
past experience and new information. Learning is indicated when policy 
changes as a result of such a process. 
This is a form of double-loop learning that leads to a re-thinking of the valid theories. 
Double loop learning usually requires a crisis or revolution because organizational 
actors are acculturated to be primarily single-loop learners35.  
Learning approaches generally hold that institutions can learn from their experience and 
change their action based on the lessons they draw from past events36, but the question 
arises if the so-called lessons have been the 'right' ones, and who should be to choose the 
'right' lessons at all. The ACF suggests a combination of interest- and knowledge-based 
aspects where perception and experience are both taken into account. As Sabatier (1993, 
19) points out, the focus is on the instrumental use of information according to the actor's 
own interests: 
Policy-oriented learning refers to relatively enduring alterations of thought or 
behavioural intentions that result from experience and are concerned with the 
attainment (or revision) of policy objectives. . . The [AC] framework assumes that 
such learning is instrumental, that is, that members of various coalitions seek to better 
understand the world in order to further their policy objectives. They will resist 
information suggesting their basic beliefs may be invalid or unattainable, and they will 
use policy analyses primarily to buttress and elaborate those beliefs (or attack their 
opponent's views). 
The recognition and framing of problems is thus embedded in a value-based system which 
determines the relevant ideas that would contribute to learning. This is a major aspect in 
the ACF and marks a difference to the concept of epistemic communities. The latter are 
primarily knowledge-based and focus mostly on the existence of a singular epistemic 
community, while advocacy coalitions are primarily value-based coalitions and suggest a 
stronger separation of their learning processes.  
As each coalition tries to learn more about possibilities to reach its policy objectives in the 
first place, most research is advocative research. It therefore contributes primarily to 
learning within the coalition, and re-enhances the existing knowledge rather than 
questioning it37.  
The ACF presents several specific assumptions on cross-coalition learning. It assumes that 
an intermediate level of informed conflict is conducive to learning. A similar condition for 
learning is the presence of professional forums which are prestigious enough for members 
                                                 
35 Argyris and Schön, 1978 
36 Bennett and Howlett 1992, 276 
37 Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier 1993 
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of opposing coalitions to participate in38.  
Actors tend to reject any cognitive information that would delegitimate or question their 
core beliefs, especially when confirming their interpretative views among the coalition 
members. Thus, holding that the core beliefs are highly resistant to change, policy learning 
is more likely to affect the peripheral issues of the actors' belief systems, and not change 
the core policy beliefs which are more strongly defended by the actors. Hence, for a major 
policy change, the ACF suggests that non-cognitive events would be necessary to shift the 
advocacy coalitions' competition of power. As Hoberg (1996, 144) argues, learning 
resembles an important factor in the ACF and ideas represent basically a "type of power 
resource".  
Apart from the policy-oriented learning within the advocacy coalitions, there is also the 
aspect of policy learning among the coalitions, which goes beyond the interest-driven use 
of information by one coalition alone. In the theoretical ACF debate on policy change, it 
remains controversial how strong the effect of intra-coalition policy learning can be. 
Sabatier maintains that it would not lead to any major policy change beyond the internal 
lesson-drawing39 of coalitions, and that it would require an external shock to have an effect. 
Applied research, on the other hand, suggests a strong link between "interest- and 
knowledge-based approaches to policy change.  
Advocacy coalitions exist to promote their adherents' interests, but they can do so 
effectively by engaging in serious policy debate with competing coalitions."40 This 
indirectly supports the possibility of a paradigm shift, if not a major policy change, without 
external shocks41. Bandelow (2003) also suggests that policy learning can have a central 
role in policy change, but stresses that it needs to be considered in the context of the 
specific policy field42. In policy fields where the outcome of important decisions is 
uncertain, and where controversial values are involved (e.g., genetic engineering), policy 
learning is assumed to be very likely, as several studies suggest43. The learning process 
depends on whether new information is available about alternative policy programs, which 
might be promoted especially by groups who have an interest in a change of the status 
quo44.  
The role of policy learning as a cause of policy change is explored in detail in chapter 4. 
 
 
                                                 
38 ibid 
39 as Bennett and Howlett, 277 phrased 
40 Lertzman et al. 1996, 115 
41 for example, Lertzman et al. 1996, Kübler 2001 
42 see also Sabatier 1996 
43 Bandelow 2003 
44 Bandelow 2003 
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2.3. Analytical Stages of the Policy Process 
In order to allow for a conceptual comparison of the different case studies over time, the 
policy process has been structured into three basic phases: Preconditions, implementation, 
and consolidation of community forestry. They are distinguished according to the position 
that community forestry has as a policy arrangement in its implementation.  
• PRECONDITIONS: Stage I describes the situation before community forestry is 
implemented or even considered in the regional policy subsystem.  
• IMPLEMENTATION: Stage II describes the increasing accommodation of 
community forestry arrangements in the regional policy subsystem, starting from 
the initial moment of being addressed to being slowly established as a community 
forestry arrangement in policy practice.  
• CONSOLIDATION: Stage III describes the normal operation of community 
forestry as an arrangement in practice, which increasingly aims to achieve a state of 
self-sufficiency from external funds and support.  
The vertical axis of the figure is not attributed to specific economic or political indicators, 
but rather seeks to provide a rough orientation on how ‘far’ the process develops away 
from its previous status quo, most likely state-based forestry. 
 
  
Figure: Conceptual Process Phases in the Policy Development of Community Forestry 
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Although utilizing a simplified model, the methodological approach does not suggest a 
linear, one-directional progress. The case study analysis rather tries to address the complex 
linkages throughout the process over time, and acknowledges that such a sequency of 
stages does not necessarily reflect the political reality of the process. Linear approaches 
have been criticized by a number of policy scholars, and alternatives have been developed 
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which emphasise that policy is contested at all levels or stages45. Within these limitations, 
the use of three basic stages within the complex policy process is used as a reference point 
for the conceptual comparison between different moments in the policy process, as well as 
for comparison among the different case studies.  
To identify the stages in the real-world processes, the analysis uses a set of indicators. 
Generally, the structuring of the policy development is based on the judgement of the 
involved interviewees and actors who are deeply familiar with the big picture of the overall 
process. Their consideration provides the basis for the interview data that are accordingly 
grounded upon the actor-based theoretical lense.  
Recent and Ongoing Policy Processes 
An analysis of the policy processes in a case study context of only recently implemented 
policies relies on very recent and therefore partly limited information. However, by making 
this lack of information and source material explicit, this research has the potential to point 
out insufficient or unsatisfactory aspects of community forestry, both in terms of 
governmental regulation as well as public discussion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
45 Independent “streams” of ideas, opportunities, problems and triggers flow through the system simultaneously, as Kingdon (1984) 
argues. Hence, “advocacy of solutions often precedes the highlighting of problems to which they become attached” (ibid 1984, 215). 
Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier (1993) also clearly criticize the assumed linear sequency of stages. The textbook model, Jenkins-Smith and 
Sabatier argue, breaks policy development into distinct temporal and functional stages or subprocesses that do not reflect the complex 
and non-linear cycles that are significant for policy making, including learning processes, feedback and interactive input among 
stakeholders and functional steps. For this reason, Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith prefer the term “stages heuristic” (1993, 1) for the 
textbook approach because of serious conceptual limitations, while continuing to use the form of process steps to explain change from 
one policy moment to another.  
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2.4. Methodological Approach 
2.4.1 Research Objectives and Parameters 
The research bases its analysis on the regional perspective of an actually evolving system 
of resource management. Within the policy subsector of community forestry, the ACF-
based model categorizes two main sources of policy change: changes induced by external 
events (such as socio-economic or political change beyond the subsystem), and through 
policy learning from within the policy community.  
The change of policy beliefs is a central assumption in the policy change over time, but 
neither a necessary requirement nor necessary output related to the actual policy change. 
The causal linkages of external events and policy learning to the change of policy beliefs 
are not yet fully understood and will be focused on. Based on the theoretical premises of 
the ACF and the objectives of the research, the process parameters are built around the 
individual aspects of policy events (external causes, policy learning) and the institutional 
arrangements (local and network effects). In order to explore their specific linkages in 
detail, the cause-effect linkages have been explored based on the following conceptual 
point of reference: 
Figure:  Research Parameters (A) – (E) and their Cause-Effect Linkages  
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2.4.2 Research Statements and Indicators 
The two aspects that are explored in the form of statements shed light on the relative 
importance of internal shifts, namely policy learning and changes of beliefs, compared to 
the role of external causes to induce policy change. 
The first statement focuses on policy learning. ACF theory generally holds that policy 
learning alone cannot induce a substantial policy change. Actors tend to reject any 
cognitive information that would delegitimate or question their core beliefs, especially 
when confirming their interpretative views among the coalition members. Thus, holding 
that the core beliefs are highly resistant to change, policy learning is more likely to affect 
the peripheral issues of the actors' belief systems, and not change the core policy beliefs 
which are more strongly defended by the actors. Hence, for a major policy change, the 
ACF suggests that non-cognitive events would be necessary to shift the advocacy 
coalitions' competition of power.  
The first research statement reviews this assumption for the three case studies, and 
explores the underlying roles that policy learning might have for the policy process. The 
analysis distiguishes between the effects on the policy network—as conceptualized in 
different indicators descibed below—and the institutional changes in the local 
communities, in order to grasp the different effects that may vary in their intensity or 
timing.  
 
Research Statement 1:  Policy Learning as a Cause of Change 
1.1. Policy learning alone cannot induce network effects without the influence of an external event. 
1.2. Policy learning alone cannot induce local institutional effects without the influence of an      
       external event. 
 
The second statement P2 explores the related changes of beliefs that may occur among the 
actors. The causes and direction of policy learning are not well understood on a conceptual 
level. Especially the causal relationship between policy learning from the cognitive 
experience to a potential change of belief, and possibly a related policy outcome into the 
system, remains unclear. As above, the question differenciates between network and local 
effects to allow a better view on the changes over time.  
 
Research Statement 2:  Change of Policy Beliefs 
2.1. External events can affect the network or local institutional arrangements without a change of  
       policy beliefs. 
2.2. Policy learning can affect the network or local institutional arrangements without a change of  
       policy beliefs.  
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Research Indicators 
According to the theoretical premises of the ACF, the stakeholders’ subjective perception 
of interests, beliefs, and coalitions represented in the system is key in determining their 
relative position towards each other and towards change in general. As a methodological 
consequence, the research indicators mainly focus on the subjective consideration of the 
individual actors when explaining the causal effects of certain events, the formation of 
coalitions, and the considered progress of the devolution process in general.  
For the analysis of the case studies, the indicators are used as open indicators providing the 
range of possibilities from which the actors identify the ones that were actually relevant in 
the process. This means that not all indicators are addressed in detail in the case study 
analyses if the actors considered them irrelevant. Nonetheless, all indicators have been 
systematically covered in the process of the data collection.  
In the first step, the data was sorted to determine the causes and effects of the policy 
process. These were in the interviews identified and assessed by the actors themselves, in 
order to grasp their subjective perspective. A systematic review of the interview data 
identified the prevalent statements which outline the process as viewed by the majority46 of 
actors. Each section in the case studies presents an overview table of the prevalent 
interview statements. The causal relationship between the causes and effects were also 
based on the prevalent statements of the actors. They are presented in each case study in 
overview tables as well. The review was combined with a broad literature review of 
existing academic research on the three policy processes. This also served to balance out 
unproportionalities from the range of actors that could be interviewed.  
The second step of the data processing was the analysis of the actors' policy beliefs. The 
issues of the secondary policy beliefs (see list below) were discussed systematically with a 
strong reference to the specific issues of the case study. The core beliefs were discussed 
through this specific reference as well, and interpreted more generally from different 
statements on the secondary beliefs. Questions were then asked to reconfirm the general 
position given. Triangulation was particularly important for the actors' policy beliefs.  
Some actors may have a strong interest to conceal their true motivation in their political 
action, and may respond strategically to the interview questions. Some of these situations 
were pointedly clarified by their fellow actors, if they had no interest to protect an actor. In 
other situations, however, it remains open whether a group of actor could cooperate well 
enough to cover a particular political motivation collectively. Especially non-
environmental core beliefs are sensitive in this regard, as they run contrary to a number of 
favoured projects. The validity of the data is, thus, relatively high at the secondary policy 
beliefs, and is lower at the core beliefs where approaching politically sensitive issues—
such as project funding or personal support networks across the political ranks—which 
may be concealed well by a small group. 
                                                 
46 usually at least two-thirds of the statements, unless noted otherwise 
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Table: Overview of Research Parameters and their Indicators. Source: 
modified from Sabatier 1996. 
(A) External Events Indicators 
1. socio-economic or legal 
change 
 
socio-economic change (livelihood basis, employment, concessions, 
revenue) relating to forest use 
legal change (legislation, jurisdiction) relating to forest use 
2. change in the political 
context 
new actors, resources or influential individuals enter the policy system 
change in the political agenda 
(B) Policy Learning Indicators 
1. network-related and 
strategic issues 
indirect learning from policy discourse  
direct lesson-drawing and knowledge transfer in the coalition 
2. CF-related and 
environmental issues 
indirect learning from policy discourse  
direct lesson-drawing and knowledge transfer in the coalition 
(C)  Local Institutional 
Effects in the Forest 
Communities 
 
Indicators 
1. institutional capacities 
for local forest-related 
decision-making 
communal goals in forest-related management  
capacity for forest-related knowledge  
communal access to forest experts  
2. institutional capacities 
for local benefit 
distribution 
communal influence on forest-related employment  
communal influence on forest-related income of individuals and 
community 
3. community-based 
organization of authority 
levels of community-based authority for forest-related decision-making 
communal control mechanisms for forest-related decision-making  
(D)  Network Effects      
in the Policy 
Community 
 
Indicators 
1. Hierarchy Levels and 
Formality 
hierarchy levels (regional, administrative) of different policy actors and 
their activities 
importance of personal and informal networks (personal and informal 
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contacts used outside the formal institutional procedures) 
2. Accessibility of the 
Network  
information of actors on environmental decision-making  
power of actors to intervene and contribute to the policy discourse 
(E)  Changes of Policy 
Beliefs              
Indicators 
1. Deep Core Beliefs  the nature of man: part of nature vs dominion over nature 
basic criteria of distributive justice: whose welfare counts? relative 
weights of self, primary groups, all people, future generations, 
nonhuman beings, etc.  
2. Policy Core Beliefs orientation on substantive policy conflict: environmental protection vs 
economic development 
Hierarchical structures and proper distribution of authority among 
various levels of government 
Network cooperation and desirability of participation by various 
segments of society: public vs elite, experts vs elected officials 
3. Secondary Beliefs: 
Secondary Beliefs related to the local institutional organization of community 
forestry: 
3.1 forest decision-making forest management goals and decision-making criteria 
economic relevance of timber and non-timber forest products for the 
communities and the market 
3.2 benefit distribution  
 
roles of individual and collective income from forest resources 
roles of local employment between private enterprise benefit and 
community 
3.3 organization of    
       authority 
indigenous rights to resource use and land title 
communal rights and capacity to govern the forest lands 
role of traditional authority for environmental decision-making 
Secondary Beliefs related to the structure of the CF policy network: 
3.4 hierarchical structures 
and formality 
desired hierarchical structure (in regional and administrative levels) in 
institutional decision-making 
communal capability to sound environmental decision-making 
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3.5 network cooperation 
and information access 
information of actors on environmental decision-making 
power of actors to intervene and contribute to the policy discourse 
 
ad (E) Changes of Beliefs 
• Deep Core Beliefs 
The deep core beliefs as defined by ACF theory are fundamental normative axioms that are 
part of the personal philosophy of an actor. Due to their fundamental character, changing 
them is extremely unlikely, if not akin to a religious conversion. Similarly, the policy core 
beliefs are fundamental positions that define the understanding of the policy subsystem. 
Changing these is also very difficult, although it might be more likely given serious 
perturbations of the actors' experience. Before giving up the foundations of their policy 
beliefs, actors would generally first re-adjust their secondary beliefs where evidence forces 
them to rethink their position, and try to fit the new information into their existing set of 
beliefs:  
Once something has been accepted as a policy core belief, (…) powerful ego-defense, 
peer-group, and organizational forces create considerable resistance to change, even in the 
face of countervailing empirical evidence or internal inconsistencies47. 
This has two major implications on the research. First, a change of secondary beliefs is 
assumed to be much more likely than a major shift of the core beliefs. Second, where the 
secondary beliefs have not changed among the actors, it is extremely unlikely that a change 
of the core beliefs has occurred. 
The methodological approach of the research is accordingly focused on the changes of the 
secondary beliefs and their tangible effects. To explain an actual change of the deep core 
beliefs, a different framework would be necessary. Scrutinizing such a fundamental change 
over the decades would require a strong focus on psychological and sociological indicators 
that explore the individual values further48. The methodological scope in the research 
neither provides adequate nor sufficient data to analyze such delicate changes of the deep 
core beliefs. Where detected in interviews or literature, the research accordingly suggests 
an indication of change, not evidence.  
 
 
                                                 
47 Sabatier 1993, 33; citing Festinger 1957, Argyris and Schon 1978, Janis 1983 
48 Each individual has a core of underlying absolute values that contribute to our system of beliefs, ideas and/or opinions. Integrity in the 
application of a "value" ensures its continuity and this continuity separates a value from beliefs, opinion and ideas. In this context a 
'value' (e.g. Truth or Equality or Greed) is the core from which we operate or react from. Societies have values that are shared between 
many of the participants in that culture. These beliefs encompass ethics (good, bad, moral, immoral, amoral, right, wrong, permissible, 
impermissible), aesthetics (beautiful, ugly, unbalanced, pleasing), doctrines (political, ideological, religious or social beliefs and values). 
A value system is in essence the ordering and prioritization of the values (usually of the ethical and ideological varieties described 
above) that an individual or society holds. 
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For an overall picture of the actors' positions, the deep core will be identified as far as 
possible within the methods, to provide an understanding of the underlying concepts that 
the other policy beliefs around community forestry are related to. 
• Policy Core Beliefs 
In the substantial conflict over policy orientation, where is the goal of policy-making 
between environmental 'protection' and economic 'development'? One central indication in 
this regard is how 'protection' and 'development' are perceived by the actors. Both have 
several possible meanings, revealing underlying beliefs even in the actors' interpretation 
alone. This aspect also indicates the value that actors attribute to forests, and how forests 
should be used by humans? Different possible meanings create a challenge to define the 
core beliefs correctly, but also offer an additional understanding of the underlying 
assumptions of the actors when referring to the term 'values' of the forest, since it can be an 
economic value or an ideal49.  
A similar term in this category of policy beliefs is also exploitation. In political economy, 
economics, and sociology, the term exploitation refers to an economic or social 
relationship in which some organization or institution treats human beings as a resource 
with little or no consideration for their well-being. 'Exploitation' as used for open 
interpretation in the interviews can have two different meanings: For one, it can suggest a 
victimization, meaning to take advantage of something for one's own use or benefit, 
especially in an unethical manner. Secondly, it can suggest  development, meaning to 
employ something to the greatest possible advantage which makes something more 
profitable or productive or useful.  
• Secondary Policy Beliefs 
Secondary policy beliefs are instrumental decisions and information searches necessary to 
implement the policy core. They are specific to certain policy areas and subsystems. Their 
susceptibility to change is moderately high; this is the field of most administrative and 
legislative policy-making50. To reflect this, the secondary policy beliefs have been selected 
to address those management and authority issues that have been shown to be of crucial 
significance in community forestry. According to the ACF, policy change is based on the 
subjective perception of the participating actors that act upon their personal consideration 
(bounded rationality). Consequently, all indicators are based on the subjective perspectives 
of the actors. For the data collection, this requires a qualitative approach that takes the 
subjective consideration of the actors as the basic measure: it is up to his perception 
whether a particular aspect has improved in the network or local community, or what role a 
particular event had on the policy process. 
                                                 
49 ‘Value' as used for open interpretation in the interviews can have different meanings: For one, it refers to the amount (of money or 
goods or services) that is considered to be a fair equivalent for something else. Thirdly, it refers to an ideal accepted by some individual 
or group; the idea of something that is perfect; something that one hopes to attain. 
50 Sabatier 1993, 31 
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o forest decision-making 
The first aspect is the actors' policy beliefs on the goals and priorities of forest 
management, and on the criteria of decision-making in the communities. The aspect is 
determines the actors' policy beliefs on the relative importance of timber and non-timber 
forest products in the communities. This includes the role of subsistence, small-scale 
family income and monetary communal income in the communities.  
o benefit distribution 
The first aspect is the actors' policy belief on the relative role of communal funds as 
opposed to individual income, the purpose and decision-making criteria for the use of 
communal funds, and the institutional measures taken to control wlhat happens with the 
funds in the community. The second aspect is the actors' policy beliefs on the relative 
economic importance of forest-related employment for the communities as regarded 
desirable by the actors.  
o organization of authority 
The first aspect is the actors' policy beliefs on the rights of indigenous people to use their 
local natural resources: What resources may they use, and where is a higher authority 
required to grant access? The second aspect is the actors' policy beliefs on territorial 
authority of indigenous communities: Are they inherently entitled to own their traditional 
lands? Should they be accommodated? The third aspect is the actors' policy belief on what 
role traditional authority should have in the communities' forest-related decision-making.  
o hierarchical structures and environmental devolution 
The first aspect is the actors' policy beliefs on the institutional structures of decision-
making authority: Who do the actors regard as capable and should be entitled to authority? 
It, thus, determines the potential of change towards environmental devolution: How much 
devolution do the actors really believe in, and how much power are they really willing to 
hand down to communities? The second aspect is the actors' desired hierarchical structure 
as regarded ideal by the actors. Where between top-down and bottom-up do they really see 
the ideal concept? For one, the indicator measures if the actors are content with the 
hierarchical levels at present, if they would prefer more or less. Secondly, the aspect takes 
into account where the core of decision-making and the core of regulation should be 
located according to the actors' visions, whether on the local level, the regional level, or 
more centralized. This aspect determines the actors' policy beliefs towards two different 
aspects. One is the status quo of communal management capacities as seen by the actors: 
What capacities do the actors currently see in the communities? The other is the potential 
capability in the long run: How much expertise, sound interests in sustainable 
management, and non-corrupt benefit sharing do the actors believe the communities are 
capable of?  
As a result of the two, the policy belief indicates how promising the actors consider the 
policy options of community forestry. 
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o network cooperation and network access  
The first aspect is the actors' policy beliefs on how much information should be exchanged 
among the coalitions, and how much is indeed exchanged. This indicates the actors' policy 
beliefs on pluralist interaction in the policy discourse. It also explores the potential of more 
accessibility in the policy discourse, between open access and closed networks. The second 
aspect determines the actors' policy beliefs on the rights and power of actors to intervene in 
the policy discourse. This explores the potential of a pluralist policy discourse, depending 
on the beliefs and willingness of the actors on how open the policy discourse is, and how 
open should it be. 
 
2.4.3 Data Collection: Sources and Procedures 
The research is based on interviews and literature. In-depth interviews with the actors 
identify the most relevant issues and events of the policy process, and determine their 
causal linkage to other policy effects. Literature and informational visits with other actors 
are then used to describe the policy event in detail and provide a political context. 
Field Research 
The primary field data is drawn from interviews, discussions and other information from 
local stakeholders during fieldwork. The fieldwork phases are described in detail below for 
the length of stay, institutional affiliation, and other local support. The interviews are 
complemented by qualitative in-depth information from the historical context of policy-
relevant documents and secondary literature. These sources were used for a more detailed 
analysis of those policy events that had been identified as relevant by the interviewees. 
As outlined above, each fieldstay was conducted in affiliation with a central actor or 
related institution of the policy subsystem. Built upon the contacts from there, several 
weeks were spent in the communities for local interviews.  
 
Table: Overview of the Case Studies – Communities and Data Collection 
Case 
Study 
Esmeraldas 
Ecuador 
Quintana Roo 
Mexico 
British Columbia 
Canada 
Data 
collection 
4 months in 2003 3 months in 2004 3 months in 2005 
Local 
affiliation 
GTZ-Project MFC-E  
Manejo Forestal 
Comunitario Esmeraldas 
GTZ-Project  
PROSURESTE, 
Campeche/Chetumal 
POLIS Institute for 
Ecological 
Governance,  
University of Victoria 
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Literature Sources 
The literature encompasses historical reviews of political development and indigenous self-
determination, governmental and non-governmental reports on environmental decision-
making practice, research articles on policy changes and development, political and 
economic analyses, economic and social statistics, forestry regulations and surrounding 
legal framework, research articles on traditional environmental knowledge and values, 
environmental psychology and behaviour, governmental economic regulations and 
agreements, executive and reviewer publications on environmental decision-making in the 
respective administrative areas, and literature on methodological approaches in policy 
analysis. These books, articles, reviews, laws, regulations, workshop reports, minutes of 
meetings and other literature were collected and drawn from the actors well as from 
academic and other public sources. 
Identification of Actors  
In the ACF, actors are categorized apart from their institutional affiliation, whether 
governmental or non-governmental, and organized according to their belief systems51 (see 
section 2.2.1). In order to allow for a pluralist incorporation of all possible actors, the 
actors were identified in a snowball system from the most active participants of the process 
to the more peripheral actors. All were thus constantly verified as 'actors' through all 
interviews across the network. The results are listed in detail in Annex 1 and 2.   
Identification of Interviewees 
The interviews were set up through a systematic coverage of the responsible key persons 
for particular fields, which then allowed for further contacts with other officials and locals 
involved with closely related issues. The interviewees were then selected based on their 
institutional (formal) position as well as based on their internal (informal) standing as 
advised by fellow actors of the network. In this two-step process, the key informants were 
identified as those individuals with the most experience and recognition among the actors 
of the network, including those representing the local communities. In Ecuador and 
Mexico, the literature and public information does not cover all actors to the same extent as 
in Canada. There, other actors were visited for their detailed knowledge on a particular 
aspect of the policy process, or for an overview and a systematic coverage of the actor 
network. 
Semi-structured Interview Approach 
The interviews were conducted in a semi-structured manner. The format was designed to 
adapt to aspects that the interviewees felt were of particular relevance. The direction of the 
interviewees' interests mostly reflected the field of responsibility and practice of the 
authority and interviewed individual, which also gave valuable information on their policy 
beliefs. The questions were asked interactively in an open format.  
                                                 
51 Sabatier 1993 
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The research indicators (causes of policy change, policy learning, etc as described above in 
section  4.2) were determined through the interviews a three-step process:  
Step 1: Open Interview Questions 
Core questions were asked in order to trigger new interactive open-structured interview 
sections about the different aspects of the policy process.  
Step 2: Grounded Interview Responses 
The interview response was then repeated and reformulated as a form of grounded 
qualitative research. The interviewer offered a categorized answer that would cover the 
indicators more specifically. The interview respondent was thus given an opportunity to 
choose and weigh the possible responses, and correct possible misunderstandings. 
Step 3: Grouping of Statements 
For the analysis of the collected data, all interview responses were counted in groups 
(according to the content) to find the most prevalent answers to each indicator. Where at 
least two-thirds of all interviewees had identified an issue as relevant, it was understood as 
the most balanced perspective of the policy process. Where at least one-third of all 
interviewees had identified an issue, it was acknowledged in the analysis as a side aspect of 
the indicators. For a detailed overview of the regrouped interview responses, please see 
Annexes 3 and 4, as well as Annex 6 for an in-depth example of the interview process.  
Since many issues of the policy process might be politically or personally sensitive, a 
minimum level of personal trust needed to be established before asking questions, for 
which an interactive semi-structured discussion was used to establish that relationship. 
Some areas were approached in different sessions and from different angles to give the 
interviewee the possibility to give more answers in a slightly different context. Also, 
confidentiality needed to be granted to all interviewees's responses in both Ecuador and 
Mexico due to the politically sensitive issues around forest- and project-related concerns.  
Identification of the Coalitions and their Policy Beliefs 
The advocacy coalitions were identified on the basis of their policy beliefs and concerted 
action. As defined in section 2.21, an advocacy coalition is pragmatically comprised of 
those actors who "share belief and act in concert"52. They identify each other as part of the 
same coalition and cooperate more or less frequently53. Thus, a mutual recognition of the 
actors was the most important criteria for the determination of the coalition, combined with 
the actors' agreement that they cooperate more or less frequently.  
                                                 
52 Sabatier 1996 
53 In empirical research, coalitions are sometimes hard to identify where there are no clearly polarized groups, and where the differences 
between the policy beliefs of the actors are blurred. As the concept defines that coalitions act in concert, one crucial criteria is that they 
know each other and identify themselves as a group of a certain degree of cooperation. Government-related authority are part of a 
coalition if they are equally identified by their fellow actors as part of the coalition. It is important to note that Sabatier and Jenkins-
Smith (1999, 153) stress that "the ACF assumes that legislators are members of coalitions only if they have considerable expertise in a 
specific policy area". Generally, not all actors necessarily belong to a coalition. If present but inactive, actors are referred to as latent. If 
an actor demonstrates brokerage and not advocacy activities, he is a policy broker who facilitates conflict resolution and mitigation. 
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As a second major criteria, actors of the same coalition share policy beliefs. These may 
differ in minor beliefs, but are usually alike in the core beliefs, as these provide the basis 
that other positions are derived from54. Both criteria are determined by the interviewees 
through their responses about themselves (direct data) and through their responses about 
their fellow actors (cross-examination or triangulation). In order to rule out strategic 
responses of the actors about themselves, triangulation has thus been widely used55. Firstly, 
the actors were asked to characterize their own policy beliefs and those of their fellow 
actors. Secondly, the actors were asked to identify their positioning in advocacy coalitions, 
and to identify fellow actors who they consider to be part of the concerted action of the 
coalitions56 as well.  
 
2.4.4 Strengths and Limitations of the Approach 
Synthesizing a policy process from the inevitable complexity of the real world into a 
conceptualized model naturally bears the danger of leaving out important inter-connections 
between artificially distinguished elements. However, a conceptualized approach offers 
systematic clarity and thoroughness of all those steps addressed in the analysis. Thus, such 
a systematic approach is necessary to provide a structure to the interacting and multi-
layered elements of the policy process.  
The focus on the changes of beliefs and policy learning seeks to contribute to the 
understanding of the internal development process of community forestry. Both, policy 
learning and changes of beliefs, are difficult to differentiate where they both emerge 
around the same topics, and gradually over time. This is especially the case where actors 
are asked to identify both of them. Policy learning is a process, while the change of belief 
is rather perceived as an outcome once it is established. The causes that induce the changes 
of policy beliefs are on deeper layers of the actors' subjective perception and would require 
more psychologically based methods of research.  
The research does not suggest to explain the process, it rather identifies its outcome as 
relevant for the policy subsystem. Similarly, the assumption that external events and policy 
learning are independent causes of policy change is an analytical instrument that has been 
used to simplify the process. However, it has to be noted that policy learning could initially 
have been induced by an external event.  
 
 
                                                 
54 These two criteria worked well in the case studies of British Columbia and Ecuador. In Mexico, a slight drift apart has been detected 
for the policy beliefs of the actors, which is explained in detail in Annex 4. Nonetheless, both criteria were basically fulfilled in this case 
study as well. Some actors may represent impartial positions in the network, which is identified in detail in Annex 2 where this is the 
case. 
55 see also below in section 4.4 
56 For the purpose of the comparative analysis, the advocacy coalitions have been given standardized names ("State Forestry" AC and 
"Community Forestry" AC) in order to reflect their fundamental policy positions in relation to each other. 
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Scope and Relevance of the Results 
The comparative analysis seeks to find common patterns of the CF policy processes by 
investigating different types that represent examples from a broader spectrum. The 
research rather aims to contribute to the conceptual understanding of CF policy 
development by pointing out particularly striking patterns of how CF policy emerges. It 
cannot provide generalizations of the cause-effect linkages for any other CF policy process 
because the research is deeply grounded in the complex specifics of each case study. The 
approach can, however, provide valuable insights of which large-group samples might be 
oblivious, and help to generate hypotheses to advance further research.  
A discipline without a large number of thoroughly executed case studies is a discipline without 
systematic production of exemplars, and (…) a discipline without exemplars is an ineffective 
one. (Flyvbjerg 2006, referring to Kuhn 1987) 
As Beveridge argued in Kuper (1985), “more discoveries have arisen from intense 
observation than from statistics applied to large groups”. The comparative case study 
approach, if systematically applied, may bridge the gap between the in-depth exploration 
and an exemplary understanding of overarching processes. The thesis also offers a 
methodological framework for a comparative analysis of CF policy development, and a 
review of the theoretical concepts therein.  
Pluralist Network Approach 
The theoretical assumptions of the ACF provide a pluralist view of the network. This 
perspective  offers a new understanding of the policy network, embraces heterogeneous 
and informal actors, and thus incorporates actors that might otherwise remain hidden from 
an institutional approach. Of course there is no such thing as a clearly defined set of actors 
or stakeholders in a real-world system that are separate from other land use systems, 
networks or related policy fields. However, by identifying the network from an actor-based 
perspective, the approach makes sure that all those actors are addressed that interact 
internally in any form and thus recognize themselves as playing a role in the CF policy 
field.  
Qualitative Interview Data 
The methodological difficulty behind grasping the interests and policy beliefs of individual 
actors from their each and own distinct perspective is that neither of them are quantifiable, 
nor objectively comparable. Instead, they contain mostly subjective and qualitative data 
that is extremely contextual in its foundation and consequences. On one hand this makes 
transparency and a systematic documentation of the involve interests difficult, on the other 
hand it is the very subjectivity and actor-based consideration that represents the strength of 
the methodological approach to understand the reasoning behind the network. 
Semi-structured Interview Format 
The semi-structured and interactive format of the interviews offered several strengths to 
the data collection. In general, the interview questions usually required the informants 
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some time to think themselves into an abstract perspective of the process before 
developing their key answers. This was possible by gradually developing the interview 
through the semi-structured approach. Also, the education level of local interviewees made 
an interactive and careful conversation in some cases especially important, without 
confronting the interviewee too bluntly with particular questions and see him back off from 
the willingess to talk. And naturally, not all interviewees were knowledgeable about all 
fields or phases of the process57. Their fields of experience and memory could be explored 
carefully through the interactive setup.  
Selection of Interviewees 
Relying on field data bears the natural bias potential of the selection of key informants, and 
may be an additional subject to another implicit distortion. Powerful individuals and 
organizations have access to publication and the raising of their voices in public. The 
actor-based approach provides for many different, thus heterogeneous, views of the 
process. Its strength is that it enlights the process from various angles and allows for 
discussion of the causality of events, including compiled information from all actors that 
might come close to being representative considering the range of views. A systemic 
difficulty can, thus, be that it is difficult to weigh a possible distortion among the different 
actors' evaluations towards an objective consideration –if such an option exists at all.  
 Strategic Responses and Triangulation 
Some issues, especially for example the true interests of a particular individual in the 
process or non-environmental policy beliefs might be very sensitive issues with regard to 
their possible consequences on the project funding and actor cooperation. Hence, it is 
likely to receive some strategic responses from the interviewees. Triangulation is used here 
to verify the responses and to reduce this distortion. Such cross-examination questions 
were used systematically to verify interview responses and get more information from 
others who do not share the actor's own interest to keep some issues to himself.  
Policy Core Beliefs 
The deep beliefs encompass psychological aspects that can only be demarcated in part 
through the data collection of the research, in order to compare different coalitions in their 
basic perspective. The research is mostly directed at the secondary policy beliefs where 
changes are more likely to occur58. Consequently, the methdological approach is more 
designed to determine the latter. The data is more reliable towards the operational and 
issue-oriented secondary policy beliefs. As long as secondary beliefs do not change, a 
                                                 
57 One major challenge in the collection of the data was to collect them in a comparable quality among the three case studies that would 
allow for a weighted comparison. All three show considerable differences in the standards of general education as well as cultural 
specifics of how to respond to a possibly critical question; how to allow an outsider into the communal life and their personal areas of 
concern; and how problems and benefits are valued regarding their personal values and social perception at all. For these reasons, the 
collection of the data was during the process shifted to a more open and accessible interview format, realizing that even simple ranking 
and evaluation questions (as, e.g., how much does the community have an eye on the leader's management decisions on a scale from 1-
10?) otherwise would have brought a considerable risk of systemic distortion of the data.  
58 see section 2.2.1 for the basic assumptions of the ACF 
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change of the deep beliefs is unlikely, according to the ACF. There was no strong 
indication for a change of core beliefs in any of the three case studies.  
Advocacy Coalitions 
The research uses advocacy coalitions as a facilitating concept to understand policy 
processes over time. However, coalitions may be difficult to determine in a real-world 
policy subsystem where information is intransparent, concerted action constrained, staff 
changes quickly from one actor to another, or where hidden personal networks dominate 
the interaction patterns beyond policy beliefs. As part of the policy process, policy beliefs 
of a coalition may change and evolve over time, and lead to phases where they are difficult 
to identify as the boundaries to other coalitions are blurred.  
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 3. POLICY PROCESSES AND THEIR EXTERNAL DETERMINANTS  -                 
THE CASE STUDIES IN CANADA, ECUADOR, AND MEXICO 
3.1. Introduction: External Events in the Policy Process  
As explored from a theoretical perspective in chapter 2.2, the Advocacy Coalition 
Framework assumes that policy change can usually only be induced by events that are 
external to the policy subsystem. In short, the ACF assumes that policy change is induced 
by external events that cause perturbations on the system because they have an impact on 
the hegemonial constellation of the actors. Policy learning is assumed to have a secondary 
role because actors tend to filter and reject any cognitive information that would 
delegitimize or question their core beliefs, especially when confirming their interpretative 
views among the coalition members. Thus, for a major policy change, the ACF states that 
non-cognitive events are necessary to shift the advocacy coalitions' competition over 
power.  
This chapter analyzes the role of external events for the policy process in each case study.  
As stated in chapter 2, the analysis requires an understanding of the historical context and 
network structures, especially from the structural perspective of the policy process. Based 
on the empirical data, the chapter explores the prevalent view of the actors about how the 
forest-related policy changed in each system, and discusses the causes and effects that the 
interviewees identified.  
The analysis focuses on three aspects of the policy process in this chapter, which refer to 
three of the five major research parameters1 presented in chapter 2.4. Firstly, it explores the 
external events that the interviewees identified, and provides a political context from the 
literature. External events are, according to the ACF, changes of those factors that are 
outside the realms of the defined policy subsystem. This can be socio-economic changes, 
new actors or funds, a new political context, or legal reforms that were made outside the 
regional policy subsystem. 
Secondly, the chapter discusses the network effects that the policy events had on the policy 
subsystem. As outlined in chapter 2.1, the term network describes the notion of channels of 
communication which perform various functions such as information exchange, 
negotiation, channelling access to decision-makers and coordination of actions among its 
actors2. These have a crucial relevance within the policy system because, from to the 
pluralist network perspective, 
policy change emerges from conflict between interest groups who compete to influence the 
policy process and struggle to protect and promote their own interests (Dahl 1967). 
                                                 
1 As outlined in chapter 2.2, the remaining two parameters determine the policy learning of the actors and their changes 
of beliefs during the policy process. These two parameters are the focus of chapter 4. 
2 Elliott 1999, citing van Waarden 1992 
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From a neoinstitutional perspective of actor-based motivation, policy development occurs 
as a “political contracting process between stakeholders who stand to gain from solving 
an underlying collective action problem” (Libecap 1989). Institutions are able to encourage 
cooperative behaviour where collective action problems exist3, but will only emerge if the 
transaction costs of searching, bargaining, monitoring and enforcing are adequate4. 
Accordingly, the network effects seek to grasp those internal changes that affect the actors' 
"channels for communication and for the exchange of information, expertise, trust and 
other policy resources" (Kenis and Schneider 1997). Again, the interviewees' actor-based 
perspective is employed to determine the changes that occurred among the policy network. 
As the third aspect, the chapter addresses local institutional effects that the policy process 
has on the overall development of community forestry in the case studies. Again, their 
analysis is based on the empirical data from the interviews, complemented by literature. 
The institutional experiences of the research's six forest communities are explored in 
chapter 4.3., where their key local problems and adaptive measures are explained in depth 
to identify key lessons. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 see Ostrom 1990, North 1990 
4 Heckathorn and Maser 1987 
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3.2. International Cooperation – The Case of Esmeraldas, Ecuador  
3.2.1. Key Parameters of the Policy Subsystem  
3.2.1.1.Forest Economy and Benefit Sharing  
With a deforestation of about 189,000 hectares annually, Ecuador is the second most 
critical country in Latin America5. The northern province of Esmeraldas is home to partly 
pristine forest ecosystems with one of the last existing coastal tropical rainforest and 
mangroves with a considerably high biodiversity that ranks among the ten most diverse 
regions in the world, known as the Chocó Pacífico bioregion. The forest cover of the 
province encompasses a diminishing estimate of 400,000ha, representing around 20% of 
the province. The largest part of the forest by far remains in the north in the districts of San 
Lorenzo and Eloy Alfaro, where the investigated communities are located. Some larger 
protected areas exist, yet the most significant part of the forest is found on indigenous 
lands of local Chachi, Awá and Afro-Ecuadorian communities. Timber, and thus the forest, 
represents the most prominent source of monetary income for the communities, especially 
for rural and remote areas, often Chachi or Afro-Ecuadorian communities.  
Even for Latin American and Ecuadorian standards, Esmeraldas' tropical lowland 
rainforests are under a particularly heavy extraction pressure. Approximately 70% of all 
national-market timber enterprises around Quito get their raw materials from Esmeraldas6. 
National timber enterprises heavily rely on Esmeraldan timber for as much as about half 
their raw material input7. As a governmental response, the northwestern part of the country 
has assigned an official 800,000 hectares for forest harvesting8. However, the public 
revenues from the high levels of extraction hardly feed back into the province at less than 
8%9. Timber processing is also mostly done in other provinces, reducing the Esmeraldan 
economic benefits to the margins of resource extraction. Forest exploitation in Esmeraldas 
is, thus, an issue of considerable interest for the national economy, and was strongly 
protected by the commercial actors to defend their stakes.  
The national economic structure is hardly diversified and -at 90%- still strongly based on 
primary products, including agriculture, fish and especially petrol. Manufactured goods 
reach an export relevance of less than 16% of the GDP. The general economic 
development even shows a recessing trend. The GDP of 1998 is 3.6% below 1997, and the 
one of 1999 is again another 2.6% below the level of 1998. The national debt jumped from 
                                                 
5 see Larria 2001. In 1962, around 58% of the country were covered with primary forests, a total of about 15.6 million 
hectares  (Cifuentes et al. 1989 cited by Vásquez, M.&R. Ulloa.1996). 34 years later, the remaining forest cover had 
decreased to 4.6 million hectares in 1996. 68.1% of all natural ecosystems have already disappeared on the Ecuadorian 
coast; 47% of the mangrove areas have gone, and 82.7% of the forest cover had disappeared by the mid-1990s (Larria 
2001).  
6 GTZ 2000, 2 
7 55% in 1992 as GTZ 2000 reports, 48% in the mid-1990s as Morales et al. 2001 report 
8 Morales et al. 2001 
9 GTZ 2000, 2 
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US $ 513 million in 1975 to 6.6 billion in 1982, making Ecuador one of the most critical 
economies in Latin America.  
Export barriers were a characteristic element of the Ecuadorian interventionist forest policy 
as well as of its general trade policy in Ecuador. In the mid 1980s, the policy shifted 
towards liberalization, implemented for example in the 1989 Ley de Facilitación de 
Exportaciones which raised the export limits of timber products10. Tariff- and non-tariff 
trade barriers were dismantled during the late 1980s and early 1990s when Ecuador 
abandoned its strategy of import-substituting industrialization (ISI) and pursued trade 
liberalization11. Recent export tariffs for forest products vary between 5.5% and 20.5%12. 
Favouring exploitative harvesting practice, this discouraged sustainable management 
practice, investment for technological improvement, and the re-organization of land 
property rights towards a strengthening of the local population.  
 
3.2.1.2.Tenure System and Regulatory Framework 
The legal framework of forest harvesting, forest management and land tenure was strongly 
based on national rather than provincial laws. Before the decentralization process was 
launched, the administration of the forest sector was centrally organized on the basis of 
national authority, while the provincial agencies served as extended outposts for policy 
implementation. However, the regional proximity of the administrative actors with the 
actual forest management developed an independent policy arena in terms of de facto 
policy, comprised of varying legal interpretation and silent approval practices. The 
decentralization process and its problems are also addressed in section 4.2.3. 
The Ecuadorian forest administration is characterized by minimal management, technical 
support, and control by the State13. An estimated 75% of the entire timber volume in 
Ecuador is harvested without state control14. The National Forestry Direction reactively 
receives information on mobilized timber through three kinds of processes: harvesting 
licenses (in cubic metres to be harvested from the forest), mobilization guides (harvesting 
volume and type of timber product) and patents on industrial harvesting methods15.  
There is no systematic means of administrative control or data collection16, not to speak of 
an active monitoring of industrial processing or economic flows in the forestry sector17. An 
early attempt to tighten administrative measures failed due to lacking enforcement. The 
                                                 
10 Salazar et al. 1998, 23 
11 Wunder 1997 
12 Salazar et al. 1998, 45 
13 for example, Ministry of Agriculture 1990 
14 GTZ 2000, 4 
15 Morales et al. 2001 
16 Most statistic numbers available on the forestry sector are provided by the Central Bank, not the Ministry itself. 
17 Morales et al. 2001 
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1982 Law on Forestry and Conservation of Natural Areas and Wildlife had officially 
established such a system of tighter administrative control18. However, this induced an 
adverse effect in policy practice by turning the new policy into a "paternalist" and 
eminently "centralist" one19, since failing to establish effective control mechanisms for the 
strengthened state authority at the same time. Institutional inefficiency and internal fights 
deteriorated the existing constraints of lacking state resources further, continuing to do 
so.20  
Community forest tenure became increasingly popular by the improved legal recognition 
of indigenous land property in the mid-1990s. It had already existed for decades as 
Indigenous communities could already gain land title if they form cooperatives to claim 
their territorial rights21.  However, their community tenure was considerably restricted by 
the 1939 Comunas Law. The 1994 Agrarian Reform recognized indigenous cooperatives as 
stronger legal entities to hold land property and facilitated the application process. This has 
led to a considerable adjudication process over the past years that is still underway. 
Ancestral indigenous or Afro-Ecuadorian communities can receive formal indigenous land 
title that is treated as privately owned land with the restriction that it is collectively owned 
and used for collective benefit22.  
Recently, about 4.5 million hectares of potential production forests were allocated 
nationwide to indigenous communities (ancestral indigenous or Afro-Ecuadorian)23. The 
remaining productive forest area is mostly in farmers’ plots, which generally range in size 
between 30 and 60 hectares; the process by which these farmers might be granted land 
tenure still needs to be clarified24. Even earlier between 1971 and 1992, about 240,000ha of 
land property were adjudicated, despite the higher bureaucratic hurdles. More than half of 
                                                 
18 First forest conservation initiatives had formally shaped the 1985 Tropical Forestry Action Plan of the national 
government, funded and conducted by the FAO. These marked the beginning of the reform intervals of the National 
Forest Action Plan process (Wentzel 1998, 2). By the mid-1990s however, it had become clear that it had missed the 
intended impact completely (Heindrichs 2000). For example, in a popular emergency action in November 1996, seven 
species of tropical timber were prohibited to harvest and export, but the provinces of Esmeraldas and Sucumbío were 
exempted temporarily from this regulation in July 1997, stressing again their immense economic relevance to the 
Ecuadorian markets. 
19 Morales et al. 2001 
20 For example, the PAFE personnel increasingly claimed that it had no influence and voice been given by the Sub-
Secretariat on Forestry and Natural Resources, and that the available political implementation strongly compromised the 
objectives of the plan (FAO 2003). In 1992, the PAFE institution was fusioned into the INEFAN, however resulting in no 
improved impact either. 
21 This caused several problems as the cooperative did not reflect their traditional political structure and had been 
discouraged in the earlier decades. See Davis 1994 
22 Art 87. Reglamento a la Ley Forestal y de Áreas Naturales y Vida Silvestre: « La adjudicación se efectuará como 
cuerpo cierto a favor de la organización, y el área adjudicada no podrá ser fraccionada en beneficio de sus socios ni 
enajenada en favor de terceros...». The 2000 Ecuadorian Strategy for Forest Sustainable Development has added to the 
legal provisions of the communities to guarantee the sustainable management and conservation of the allocated forests. 
23 Rival 2004 
24 ibid 
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the adjudicated lands were assigned to colonos and not indigenous communities25. About 
10 Chachi communities were among the indigenous groups who received legal land title 
from the Ecuadorian government before 1992, for approximately 89,500 hectares26. The 
land was distributed in proportion with the number of families and the size of the area of 
the respective community.  
Generally however, vast majorities of land transfers were handled outside governmental 
regulations before the 1994 Agrarian Reform in order to avoid the immense legal and 
bureaucratic hurdles where own resources and legal advice allowed27. Weak property rights 
and enforcement hindered new investment incentives in the Ecuadorian forestry sector in 
general and provided neither formal adjudication of property rights nor other protection 
from land invasion. The previous 1939 Comunas Law had virtually banned all land 
transactions: communities did not have the right to buy or sell real estate. Thus, comunas 
had not only been in a considerably weak position for acquiring and holding legal tenure, 
but partly even been completely “legislated out of existence” (McKean and Ostrom 1995, 
3).  
Table: National adjudication process by INDA. Source: Francescutti 2002. 
Land Use or Adjudication area in ha 
 State area of Ecuador in total  27 166 700,0 
Patrimonio Forestal of the state 1 161 956,2 
Patrimonio of INDA (adjudicable areas) 9 876 080,3 
Area yet to be adjudicated 2 627 508,9 
Adjudicated Lands until 1998 7 862 949,7 
Adjudicated as individual property 5 081 046,1 
Adjudicated as collective property 2 781 903,6 
Protected Forest Areas 2 289 713,2 
Natural Areas 4 617 665,6 
Urban areas, roads and other land use 1 358 335,0 
 
As a result of the 1994 reform, public lands were increasingly adjudicated as collective and 
individual property28. The reform established market arrangements as the main mechanism 
                                                 
25 of which about 128 000 ha for colonos, 62 721 for Chachis, 30 351 for Awá and 18 304 for Afro-Ecuadorians. see 
Morales Fejióo 2005. Paralegales comunitarios y la tenencia de la tierra. FAO  
26 Gamboa 1999. The two investigated communities of Capulí and Arenales, however, received their land title in 1996 
and 1997. 
27 Vogelgesang 1998, 21 
28 Land parcels of less than 5 hectares represent 70% of the land owners, but only around 10% of the land (FAO 2003). 
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of land transactions and strengthened the legal status of formal tenure. By 1998, more 
than 7,800,000ha of the state’s 27,000,000ha had been adjudicated, of which 5,000,000ha 
to individuals and 2,700,000ha as collective lands (see table above). However, about two-
thirds of the adjudicable lands of Ecuador are yet to be assigned29. In Esmeraldas, 39% of 
the land were yet to be legally recognized (172.013 ha of 443.209 ha rural areas of the 
province in total)30. As the adjudication was yet to be completed, there is a considerable 
development to be noted, despite the lengthy process. 
 
3.2.1.3. Forest Policy Network and Belief Systems 
For the early stages of the policy process until the early 1990s, no defined community 
forestry coalition could be detected. Instead, the established network of actors was 
described as a tightly organized around exploitative forest harvesting.  
As stressed by nearly all sources, the provincial level plays an important role in the de 
facto implementation of policy, e.g., silent approval of malpractice, blocking 
administration procedures, or enhancing --respectively buffering—policy effects from 
other sides. Facing corruption and virtual absence of the state (lacking enforcement of rules 
and security) in the remote forest areas, distrust towards the forest administration was 
common and left the rural communities alone with their problems. For example, the 
Ministry of the Environment had in a number of cases not complied with its responsibility 
to control the deforestation process in the State Forest Heritage lands. Examples in the 
Esmeraldas context are common and even recent, including major court cases of corruption 
with regard to an illegal awarding of Patrimonio Forestal lands by INDA (National 
Agrarian Development Institute) to the timber companies ENDESA and BOTROSA, 
members of the Pena Durini group, one of the most powerful groups in the country31. 
The private forestry sector is characterized by a large number of medium- and small-scale 
timber enterprises whose production lacks quality and standards. Due to technology 
deficiencies, the production process is largely inefficient (timber harvesting; drying and 
processing the timber; final construction of products) which increases the resource pressure 
on the forests immensely32. Harvesting is not possible in the rain season, calling for high 
in-stock reserves to meet international market demands. Heavy involvement of 
independent intermediaries raised the price level for the commercialization of timber for 
local communities. The commercial actors of the regional policy network are scattered 
around the powerful Durini Group as an amalgamate of timber enterprises (Endesa, 
                                                 
29 This means that 37% of the state area are yet to be legally adjudicated, which represents more than 9.8million hectares 
that are currently held under the Patrimonio Forestal. Francescutti 2002 
30 ibid 
31 CCCC 2001 
32 Ministry of Agriculture 2002 
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Botrosa, Setrafors etc), the commercially-run (but NGO-labelled) Forest Foundation33, as 
well as coordination units such as AIMA and COMAFORS. Within these, informality and 
personal networks of binding trust and reciprocity are key, and in this regard mirror the 
political actors in order to interact accordingly34.  
The State Forestry Coalition of the commercial actors aims to maintain and defend the 
status quo of forest exploitation. With intransparency as the overarching key element in the 
commercial actors' network strategy, described by the interviewees, personal trust and 
informal reciprocity serve to overrun an external impact and legal changes that would 
otherwise enter through formally authorized individuals–representatives, lawyers etc—
outside the network. Showing the same patterns of internal organization, the intermediaries 
are interwoven in a network of high complexity and little systematic patterns, based on 
various levels of formal and personal linkages35.  
 
Table: State Forestry Coalition in Esmeraldas 
 identified by most actors 
(i.e. at least two-thirds) 
identified by some actors 
(i.e. at least one-third) 
n = 22 15-22 statements  8-14 statements 
national D actors • Endesa Botrosa • Fundación Forestal de  
 • COMAFORS     Endesa Botrosa 
regional D actors • Forestry Department, MoE36 
Esmeraldas 
• Escuela Ingeniera Forestal 
 • Forest Administration Unit 
Esmeraldas, MoE Borbón 
 
local D actors • colonos (non-community 
settlers on Río Onzole) 
• Junta Parroquial (district 
administration) 
 • intermediaries on Río Onzole  
 
 
                                                 
33 Fundación Forestal 
34 The commercial actors describe themselves as competitors who naturally cannot cooperate on the market, not even 
exchange much information. However, they confirm their focus on personal links and informal networks for higher 
operative flexibility. Until today, all triangulation data from the interviews with non-commercial actors manifested a 
close cooperation among the listed as an integrate alliance, even though not officially confirmed. 
35 For example, among all interviews, it was the commercial informants who explicitly differenciated between the formal 
and informal intermediaries, local and regional ones. This reflects the heterogeneous and informal structures of the 
commercialization channels on the Río Onzole timber market that the high resilience of the forest sector is based on, as 
several interviewees reported. This observation is also the focus of a learning process that is outlined in chapter 4.1.3. 
36 Ministry of Environment (Ministerio del Ambiente) 
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Table: Community Forestry Coalition in Esmeraldas 
 identified by most actors 
(i.e. at least two-thirds) 
identified by some actors 
(i.e. at least one-third) 
n = 22 15-22 statements  8-14 statements 
transregional actors • GTZ Quito • CARE-Subir 
 • Ministry of Environment • Fundación Natura 
 • DED Quito • FLACSO 
 • CAIMAN  
 • Jatun Sacha  
regional  actors • MFC-E • FECCHE 
 • FEPP • UONNE 
 • DED Esmeraldas • AIMA 
 • Unidad Coordinadora37 • PRODEPINE 
 • Fundación Altropico  
local actors • forest technicians  
 
Table: Belief Systems of the Advocacy Coalitions in Esmeraldas 
 State-directed and Private  
Forestry Coalition (SFC) 
Community Forestry  
Coalition (CFC) 
n = 22 15-22 statements 15-22 statements 
1. Deep Core Beliefs  
human dominion over nature; forest 
represents natural resource for 
economic use and entrepreneurial 
benefit (18) 
human benefits from rich values of nature; 
forest represents ecological value for 
biodiversity and as a carbon sink (16) 
2. Policy Core Beliefs 
state-based: the government is the 
legitimate authority (16) 
people-based: the local people are the day-
to-day decision-makers and the state 
provides the rules (18) 
 
3. Secondary Beliefs: 
 
Secondary Beliefs related to the local institutional organization of community forestry: 
                                                 
37 The UC coordination unit represents the regional platform for the CF actors and their SF counterparts, and was founded by members 
of both sides. It serves an important bridge function between the two advocacy coalitions, and thus suggests the function of a policy 
broker according to the Advocacy Coalition Framework (Sabatier 1993). However, more than two-thirds of the actors clearly identified 
the UC as a relevant actor of the community forestry coalition. For this reason, it has been acknowledged as a CF actor within the 
coalition. For the detailed conflict of interest around the UC's network position, please refer to section 6.3.3. 
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3.1 forest decision-
making  
large-scale logging in valuable old-
growth areas is most cost-efficient; 
high price competition requires 
strategic relocation and expansion (20) 
ecological protection of the rainforest (18) 
3.2 benefit 
distribution  
private enterprise-driven forest use and 
benefit; monetary income (16) 
local small-scale forest use and benefit; 
livelihood income (15) 
3.3 organization of    
authority 
the state is the legitimate owner of all 
lands unless private property is granted 
within legal recognition (16) 
indigenous groups have ancestral rights to 
their lands, but need to ensure that their 
forest use would not harm the ecosystem  to 
claim land ownership (18) 
 
Secondary Beliefs related to the structure of the policy network:: 
3.4 hierarchical 
structures and 
formality 
centralist top-down structures (20)  
where state fails to enforce rules, there 
is no collective self-regulation but 
entrepreneurial exploitation of the 
business options (17) 
the government is responsible to provide 
regulations to secure conservation and 
sustainable benefit (20) 
where the state fails to enforce rules, there 
should be collective regulation (19)  
3.5 network 
cooperation and 
information access 
maintain closed network for majority of 
operations (20) 
as much as possible to optimize collective 
regulation mechanisms (18) 
as much information exchange as possible to 
strengthen knowledge in the region (17) 
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3.2.2. Implementation Phase (since mid-1990s): International Project Boom  
3.2.2.1.External Perturbations and Policy Change 
The Ecuadorian community forestry process started mostly in the early 1990s. Until the 
1990s, the national forest-related policy was focused on the economic stability of the 
Ecuadorian timber market. Then, a shift occurred which was motivated by the alarming 
deforestation and possible approaches to poverty reduction, which paired sustainable 
development efforts with a new focus on forest tenure rights. Three major external events 
occurred in the early 1990s which affected policy change in two aspects: Firstly, the 
hegemonial constellation of actors between environmental and economic interests, and 
secondly the political and legal framework of forest-related tenure. 
Both aspects brought important dynamic system changes that gave way for policy change 
towards community forestry. All 22 interviewees38 agreed that the change of the policy 
course was induced by these external events, rather than by internal changes. 21 of the 
interview respondents regarded the influx of international environmental actors as the 
major source of change for Esmeraldas' de facto policy practice. 20 interviewees identified 
the national forest-related reforms as highly important. The national indigenous movement 
for land rights, addressed by 16 respondents, is rather regarded as providing an underlying 
pressure on policy change, particularly combined with the environmental protection efforts 
in rural communities. The following sections describe the relevance and interplay of the 
external events with other factors of the policy process. 
 
External Event I: Boom of International Environmental Activities  
The most important singular external event was that new actors and funds entered the 
network of policy actors and created an environmental coalition as a counterweight to the 
state-oriented forestry actors. The ACF assumes that policy change is induced by 
perturbations that have an impact on the hegemonial constellation of the actors in the 
policy subsystem. This was clearly the case during the 1990s when a large number of 
government-related development projects and non-governmental organizations entered the 
policy network and started a more pluralist discourse of environmental policy on the 
national level.  
The strong international influence on Ecuadorian national policy represents an external 
perturbation from the ACF perspective, because they affect hegemonial changes occur 
outside the spheres of the regional policy network. Elliott (1999) discusses this issue as 
well in the context of a strong international influence on Indonesian forest policy, and 
similarly concludes the following:   
The Indonesian case study has shown that the ACF can be used to study public policy change 
in a developing country. It can now also incorporate private actors at the national and 
                                                 
38 for a complete list of interview partners see Annex 1,  for interview responses see Annex 3.  
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international levels. International actors and changes are introduced in an economical manner 
by including them in external system events, rather than adding a whole new level to the 
framework.  
Making distinctions between actors and events inside or outside policy subsystems (or 
domains), rather than at the national or international level is not only consistent with the 
original formulation of the ACF. It is also consistent with a globalized world where the 
distinctions between national and international levels are increasingly blurred.  
With a growing green coalition waiting on the immediate doorstep of the government, a 
participative policy development process evolved that opened up for an—official—
involvement more or less over 3350 actors of the forest-related policy sector39. The 
hegemonial constellation of the actors was significantly changed and resulted in more 
political weight—and voice—of the environmental interest groups. For example, the 1991-
1995 version of the Ecuadorian Forest Action Plan (PAFE) was closely supported by FAO-
Netherlands cooperation40. The 1995 Forest Policy and the Strategy for Sustainable 
Development, adopted shortly after by the National Forestry Institute INEFAN in July 
1995, then marked a significant starting point for an inter-institutional working group on 
forest policy and legislation which had accumulated international pressure and 
considerable offers of support. The new pluralist discourse gave way for a number of 
policy changes regarding protected areas and sustainable development, which are described 
in the following section as legal changes in the national forest-related policy domain. 
The boom of environmental actors also had an immediate impact on Esmeraldas and 
transformed the regional policy network. In fact, it provided the key external perturbation 
that boosted the regional Community Forestry Coalition (CFC). Esmeraldas' pressured 
situation between heavy industrial exploitation and state neglect had become a focal point 
of direct international efforts in the early 1990s and led to an environmental project boom. 
Since the Rio Conference in 1992, various international initiatives had become 
increasingly active in Ecuador to promote structural changes in forest policy and the forest 
resource economy in the state.  
Similar to its structural effect on the national policy level, the new funding boom turned 
Esmeraldas into a heterogeneous field of non-governmental and government-related actors, 
ranging from ambitious international projects to small-scale local organizations that had 
applied for funding. Especially major World Bank grants in the early 1990s triggered the 
establishment of the majority of today's existing local secondary organizations in the 
region and produced a denser picture of institutional representation, as three Esmeraldan 
key interviewees sum up. 
As compared to the more general environmental concerns at the national stage, the regional 
                                                 
39 see FAO 2003 
40 in a lengthy negotiation and counselling process until finally adopted in late 1994 as the new national reference 
framework by the national government (see, for example, FAO 2003) 
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actors soon created a regional environmental coalition that directly focused on community 
forestry. From the ACF perspective, Esmeraldas developed a regional policy subsystem 
which focused on community forestry.  
According to Sabatier (1999), the most likely reason for the emergence of a new subsystem 
is when a group of actors become dissatisfied enough with an existing subsystem and its 
neglect of a particular problem that they initiate a separate forum on their own. In 
Esmeraldas, two aspects led to the emergence of the regional policy subsystem. Firstly, the 
national environmental policy discourse could not sufficiently address the tenure and local 
organization aspects that community forestry needed to rely on. The regional practice was 
mostly based on de facto policy and little enforcement of the formal regulations, for which 
the regional community forestry actors needed to tackle different problems than those 
addressed on the national level. Secondly, the growing set of regional actors formed 
coalitions on the provincial level in order to create higher local organization capacities to 
address their specific problems directly with the individuals that were involved.  
The regional concerns had also been subject to direct international attention since the early 
1900s. Esmeraldas had been a central area of concern for the international attention due to 
its alarming deforestation and growing biodiversity concerns coupled with reports on the 
situation of the rural population. The commercial enterprises' territorial "shopping around" 
in indigenous communities in Esmeraldas, as some CF interviewees described it, also 
increasingly raised attention and protest of social NGOs, which then joined the CF actors 
in their coalition against the expanding private sector. While formerly rather uncontrolled 
in their harvesting on State Heritage lands (Patrimonio Forestal) and illegal but occasional 
invasions on traditional lands, the timber enterprises' changed strategy towards systematic 
concessions created a new field of indigenous consultancy and legal support for NGOs.  
The international attention was transformed in more and more projects and NGOs moving 
in, which were made possible through the national policy change that created political 
space for Community Forestry actors to intervene. USAID and CARE-Subir, GTZ, 
Conservation International, Fundación Jatun Sacha and others entered Esmeraldas in a 
growing wave of attention to the alarming situation of the region, in order to strengthen the 
local population in defending their stakes against the timber enterprises.  
In short, the large influx of environmental actors during the 1990s provided a significant 
external perturbation on the policy system as it changed the policy network, the resources 
of the actors and the hegemonial constellation of the actors. The development of the 
regional community forestry policy network is analyzed in detail in section 3.1.3. 
 
External Event II: National Forest-related Reforms 
The above described pressures towards a new environmental framework added up to a 
catalyst situation on the national level and encouraged major legal changes. From the ACF 
perspective on the community forestry policy subsystem, they represent external changes 
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from another policy field. The key external events as they occurred around the national 
forest-related policy domain are illustrated below. 
 
Figure: Key External Events around the National Forest-related Policy Domain  
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The 1994 Agrarian Reform introduced several key changes in the legal framework as it 
recognizes social functions of the lands and stresses that they have to be shared among the 
population41 and explicitly allows for resource management based on individuals, families, 
cooperatives, associations, communities, self-management and society-based systems42.  
The reform also gave way for individual property rights within the community land title, 
allowing community members to acquire individual tenure within their community 
holdings43. It explicitly recognizes the rights of indigenous, Afro-Ecuadorian and 
montubios (coastal peasants) communities to ownership of their ancestral land44. The land 
title is to be awarded free of charge under the condition that beneficiaries respect the local 
traditions of cultural and social life as well as the environment.  
The Agrarian Reform introduced a collateral use of the real estate in communities, and at 
the same time introduced communal rights to purchase and sell real estate. Only major 
estate transactions still require official approval from the Ministry of Agriculture. 
Indigenous peoples are also able to acquire other than their ancestral lands collectively, but 
not free of charge. Communal forests granted directly by the government are non-
transferable, inalienable, indivisible and unseizable45. 
The 1995 Constitutional Reform was the first national statement to establish environmental 
protection as a national goal, focusing on its combined ecological and social function as a 
resource basis and turning environmental conservation into a citizen right46. This 
manifested a constitutional re-definition of forests from a resource to an environmental 
asset and signals a main shift in the framework of core beliefs as manifested in the nation 
through its constitutional values. In light of the policy signal of the constitutional re-
definition of forests from resource to environment-based, the significant issue for actual 
policy networks was how the policy change occurred and what new policy-making 
dynamics emerged at the time in the national arena: The discourse increasingly widened to 
a multi-actor arena moving towards consensus dynamics.  
Further changes towards more extensive control measures47 and more state intervention 
adds on the significance of the 1995 policy shift in the forestry sector. These control 
measures now offered a framework for monitoring and control of timber transportation and 
use. Their implementation practice, however, has strongly been criticized for its 
intransparent and corrupt practice48 and will be reviewed later on. In general, the recent 
ambitious changes towards the legal framework led to a chain of policy effects where the 
                                                 
41 Art. 20 
42 Art. 1 Ley de Desarrollo Agrario 
43 Southgate 2000 
44 Article 36 of the Agrarian Development Law 
45 for more detail, see Ministry of Agriculture 2002 
46 see, for example, GTZ 2000 
47No. 16-RD-RO/618 from Jan 24 1995 
48 Salazar et al. 1998, 25 
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formal institutional implementation could sometimes not catch up with the de facto 
situation in the policy network49. 
The 1999 National Strategy also focused on a re-structuring of the policy arena of actors, 
moving towards more consensus-based action50 as the 1995 working group dynamics had 
triggered. The 1999 Environmental Management Law therefore raised the rights and 
responsibilities of environmental policy actors, public as well as private, to a legally 
recognized level. Hence, the 2003 National Plan on Forestation and Reforestation was 
created in April 2003 under consultancy and participation of 450 actors including 
governmental institutions, NGOs, local organizations, and the private sector51.  
The 1998 Priority Objectives of National Forest Activity officially announced forestry to 
be a national priority52, manifesting the national sign for re-orientation and opening 
towards the environmental front of actors. The decrete focused on developing a system of 
economic incentives for forest conservation and sustainable management. Realizing that 
the available governmental capacities would inevitably fail to fulfill heavy control 
functions, state policy increasingly focused on economic mechanisms instead of 
administrative control mechanisms for forest protection, as Morales et al. (2001) sums up. 
This also made way for the policy change towards a tercerization of services, officially in 
order to incorporate civil society as a (paying) collectively responsible actor in the process. 
Paying for environmental services such as forest conservation was recently considered to 
be a key future mechanism of a national income re-distribution in Ecuador, paired with 
socio-economic development in rural areas53.  
Subsequently, the 1999 National Strategy for Sustainable Forest Development of Ecuador 
was shaped, whose primary objective was to stop further loss of primary forests. The more 
concrete 2003 National Plan of Forestation and Reforestation focused its 20-year action 
plan on a re-organization of the forestry sector. Replacement of resources had been taken 
out of the principle objectives of the national forest policy, replaced by a "rational 
management of environmental goods and services (…) on intervention levels that do not 
impede their natural regeneration" (FAO 2003). A 2001 ministerial agreement had already 
clarified before that the forest harvesting rate may not exceed the expected regeneration 
rate of the forest product54.  
Within the ACF perspective from the regional policy subsystem, these legal changes 
represent an external event because they stem from the national level and from other forest-
                                                 
49 For example, the related forest law reform failed legislative approval in the same year of the constitutional shift, the 
newly emerging Ministry of Environment implemented a set of changes through administrative regulations instead, to 
confirm de facto changes as far as possible.  
50 FAO 2003 
51 FAO 2003 
52 Decreto Ejecutivo No. 340, R.O. 77, Nov 30 1998 
53 FAO 1998 
54 acuerdo ministerial 131, R.O.N. 249, Jan 22 2001 
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related policy domains beyond the realms of community forestry.55 The provincial 
implementation of these national policy changes is discussed in the following sections. 
  
External Event III: National Uprise for Indigenous Land Rights  
While the international activity induced important changes outlined above, the national 
government was also increasingly pressured towards policy change by national interest 
groups. National advocacy groups called for a reform in indigenous land ownership and 
land use56. Since the late 1980s, indigenous land rights had gained a stronger political 
momentum on the national level and affected the access of rural communities to formal 
forest tenure. They created a change of the political context for the forest policy domain.  
Induced by heavy legal tenure restrictions that would keep rural communities from 
securing their land and resource base, CONAIE was formed in 1989 as the mayor national 
indigenous organization when a variety of indigenous peoples realized the need to unite for 
a stronger political representation. Indigenous territories then became increasingly 
recognized under president Rodrigo Borja Cevallos (1988-1992). Especially during Sixto 
Durán Ballén’s presidency (1992-1996), CONAIE and other indigenous movements 
organized widespread demonstrations to protest against land development laws. In order to 
raise national attention and public discourse, it started a seven-province uprising with 
seized oil wells and military hostages. The demands focused on the legal return and 
recognition of traditional communal lands and the compensation for environmental 
damage57. 
The position of the national and provincial government was increasingly pressured, as the 
degradation of the forest had shown to upset the political stability of the rural population.58 
Significant results were achieved at the 1994 Agrarian Reform as outlined above. Even 
beyond the territorial rights granted then, the National Assembly of 1997-98 recognized the 
existence of further communal rights for indigenous people in Ecuador.59 
                                                 
55 It is important to note that the national forest policy changes were formally important because the provincial legislative 
capacities were weak at the time. At the same time, however, the regional enforcement and implementation of the 
national regulations was also strongly hampered, for which the national changes had a rather limited relevance for the 
provincial policy practice. 
56 see, e.g., Janet 2002, 23 
57 triggered by specific concerns on oil projects in the Amazon; Janet 2002, 50 
58 Especially in remote areas close to the state boundaries, the state had an interest to stabilize indigenous communities in 
order to maintain the population distribution in balance, to keep up territorial buffers to the threatened boundaries of 
Colombia and Peru, and to calm down the emerging social conflict that proved to grow to an enormous potential.  
59 In 1998, the National Congress of Ecuador introduced public consultation of indigenous communities as a legal 
requirement before new projects in resource exploration and exploitation (Wentzel 1998, 3). Both gave way for a 
constitutional self-definition of Ecuador as a pluricultural country (Dávalos 2001, 6). Subsequently in July 1999, the 
national government, social organizations and CONAIE signed an agreement that confirmed a closer dialogue between 
CONAIE, Ministry of Environment and the National Institute for Agrarian Development INDA which contributed to the 
clarification of indigenous land rights. The indigenous uprise continued though, still fuelled by social and tenure 
concerns. For example, in January 2000, during the severe economic recession and in reaction to the decision to replace 
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Within the ACF framework, the movement represents an external event that had an 
underlying causal role as it developed slowly over several years, and continues to 
strengthen the arguments of the community forestry coalition. Its momentum was reflected 
in the 1994 Agrarian Reform which brought a sudden legal change from the national level 
to the policy subsystem. It strengthened land property rights and revived the adjudication 
process of formal land title across Ecuador, which contributed considerably to the legal 
recognition of community-based forest lands. 
 
External Event IV: Institutional Restructuring of the Governmental Authorities 
The wave of legal changes from the national level was accompanied by an institutional 
restructuring to adjust to the changing responsibilities of the government bodies. Several 
interviewees regard this as an important aspect of the political context of the policy 
subsystem, because it determines the structures of the administrative bodies and coalitions 
in the network. The key events were twofold: Firstly, the forest-related authorities were 
shifted from the Ministry of Agriculture to the Ministry of Environment, which allowed for 
a new constellation of the resources and interests that drove the policy-making process. 
Secondly, the environmental decision-making was increasingly shifted to the provincial 
level within a larger decentralization process.  
The Ministry of Environment was founded in Oct 1996 as the first of its kind in 
Ecuadorian history. Its existence was based on a governmental decrete60. However, it was 
not based on a law as other ministries are, and thus could be dissolved or fusioned 
anytime61. As some interviewees report, this constitutional weakness was a result of the 
fact that its establishment had developed under such a powerful momentum of change 
within the re-structuring of the state that the involved parties were willing to proceed 
quickly and use the timing well, and chose the quicker way of a governmental decret.  
With the new ministry growing stronger through the international support, the new multi-
actor involvement and consensus-based policy discourse failed in policy practice where 
authority conflicts blocked the process. Especially the decentralization process to the 
provincial level was hampered by the personal interests of the government staff, and often 
led to clashing governmental positions between the national Ministry's support and the 
provincial Ministry's approval, if there was an provincial involvement at all.  
As several interviewees report, institutional inefficiency, lacking coordination and systemic 
corruption problems had been an internal constraint to change for long, not only in the 
                                                                                                                                                    
the country’s currency with the US dollar, indigenous peoples who were supported by military officials and led by 
CONAIE stormed the presidential palaces and overthrew the then-president Mahuad in a bloodless coup. The uprising of 
the Inti Raymi in January 2000 was a major event in a whole series of events in the indigenous struggle that had started in 
1990. The uprising of February 2001 referred to these roots of political intentions that the Indios had declared in 1990.  
60 Decreto Ejecutivo No. 195 – A, R.O. 40, 4 – 10 – 1996 
61 GTZ 2002 
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ongoing decentralization process but between different sectors as well.62 For example, it 
took years of internal struggle until the INEFAN National Institute of Forestry, Natural 
Areas and Wildlife63 was dissolved in early 1999 and its responsibilities incorporated into 
the Ministry of Environment64, in order to facilitate and bundle efficiency in the new 
authority65.  
 
Summary: External Events and Policy Change 
As described, the perturbations had a strong impetus on the policy subsystem. Their roles 
for the ACF process are relatively clear: 
• CAUSAL DRIVER OF CHANGE: It can be concluded that the international 
boom of activities provided the single most important factor for policy change, as it 
affected the hegemonial constellation of actors on the national level and introduced 
a more pluralist network. It also contributed significantly to the regional CFC 
which emerged during these years. 
• EXTERNAL EVENTS: The national indigenous movement caused additional 
pressure on the government to allow for policy change. The national forest reforms 
and institutional restructuring are important external changes of related policy 
domains and the national level, and provide key changes of the regulatory 
framework to allow community forestry to develop. Both events did not drive the 
process, but rather created better circumstances that facilitated the policy process 
during the 1990s. 
 
3.2.2.2.Effects on the Policy Subsystem  
Accessibility of the Network: Policy arena diversified with E groups and local initiatives 
The majority of interviewees identified an immense diversification of the policy network 
during the project boom. 21 out of 22 interviewees identify this as one of the major 
network effects during the 1990s. Non-governmental organizations gained profile as actors 
                                                 
62 Even procedural complaints of authorities and the local population could often not clear such issues consequently: 
Complaints were legally investigated by the same authority, turning the suspect into judge and part at the same time. 
63 Instituto Ecuatoriano Forestal y de Areas Naturales y Vida Silvestre 
64 Decreto Ejecutivo No. 505, R.O. 118, January 28 1999 
65 Budget problems had created further problems and thus pressure on the government towards a sound re-structuring. By 
the mid 1990, it had become clear that the budget concept for state authorities in forest management and reforestation had 
failed. For example, the 1982 Forest Law had stated that the state's responsibilities for forest management and 
reforestation would be entirely paid by its own sector-related revenue from taxes, licenses etc. (see, for example, FAO 
2003), but this now led to accumulated deficits that required an exploding external budget help. For example, 7.5 million 
sucres in 1992-1994 and 34 million sucres (plus 325,000 US$) in 1995-1996, as FAO 2003 states. This called 
international attention to the field, but the Ecuadorian public partly rejected the discourse and argued that their rights on 
resource use should already be paid off through general taxes.  
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in the region especially since the early and mid-1990s, and heterogeneized the 
institutional network of Esmeraldas in favour of environmental and social issues. They 
formed a growing Community Forestry Coalition in the province. This was particularly 
important because it opened the tight spheres of influence that the SFC had established 
over the years. The set of actors and initiatives made the network more accessible (21 out 
of 22 statements)66 and grew across all hierarchy levels (18), from national to local. The 
coalition is identified in detail in Annex 2.2.  
Indigenous organizations benefited considerably from the regional development support 
and consolidated their institutional presence for a few years. As a response to the virtually 
rocketing projects and international funds in the region's environmental conservation 
during the past decade, the primary objective of regional organizations in Esmeraldas—
especially indigenous organizations—had been to channel available development money 
into social projects at the local level and use the opportunity of the moment to reclaim land 
and legalize its ancestral tenure through land rights67. The Union of Black Organizations of 
Northern Esmeraldas UONNE68 for example provided official backing to seven Afro-
Ecuadorian communities to achieve land title until 1997. The Chachi organization 
FECCHE, already founded in 1978, got increasingly involved in the regional development 
strategies of private sector actors as well as social organizations. The organization was 
working on a three-year project which would help communities through a World Bank 
financed and PRODEPINE implemented program69.  
After the regional funding boom of the mid 1990s levelled off, many secondary 
organizations struggled to survive and refocused their activities to the most probable new 
sources of funding, rather than following a coherent strategy to address the problems of the 
region. The Afro-Ecuadorian organization UONNE was strongly struggling with funding 
and capacities and was then considerably supported by CARE-SUBIR until 1999 to revive 
its activities. The Chachi organization FECCHE similarly experienced a weak interval after 
the initial funding boom of the early 1990s. Their activities, thus, disappeared without any 
major impact on the local situation in the forest sector70. 
 
Hierarchy Levels and Formality: Network cooperation diversifies increasingly between formalized 
and personal agreements  
Another important network effect that the interviewees identified for the hierarchy levels 
and formality in the policy network was that the cooperation among the actors increasingly 
                                                 
66 An overview of the interview responses can be found in Annex 3. 
67 Encalada et al. 1999, 18 
68 original: La Unión de Organizaciones Negras de Norte Esmeraldas (UONNE) 
69 Encalada et al. 1999, 17-18 
70 The majority of the interviewees acknowledged the value of indigenous organizations for the political representation of 
the forest communities in theory, but criticized the activities of FECCHE and UONNE as intransparent, inactive, and 
biased by personal benefits and corruption. 
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diverged: Some actors shifted to a more formalized level of interaction, while others 
maintained an informal way of communication. It became clear during the grassroot 
actors' struggle over funding and corruption as described above that the functionality of the 
network was heavily constrained. The communication between the actors could range from 
approved legal agreements to loosely informal and de facto arrangements. As 18 out of 22 
interviewees state, this caused an increasing confusion among the actors, and a 
considerable challenge to coordinate activities especially between the locally based actors 
in the policy network on one hand, and the nationally supported organizations on the other. 
Most interviewees state that this was a clear development from the overwhelming project 
boom of the 1990s, and could hardly be avoided. 
13 interviewees argue that informal agreements are often not reliable among the actors, 
while 13 others stress that it is often a lack of education or legal training that prevents a 
more formalized way of coordination. On another note, some CFC-related interviewees 
clearly criticized the SFC's strategic use of informal personal agreements to prevent legal 
consequences where they would not comply. This issue is addressed in detail in chapter 
4.2.3. as the SFC's strategic response to the entering CFC activities in the region. 
 
Local Institutional Effects  
As described above, the new CFC actors in the region launched numerous projects in the 
forest communities and created a very heterogeneous landscape of local advocacy and 
implementation. Individual communities received funds and expertise to build up general 
education, community-based forest management, fight for indigenous land claims, and 
defend their rights against invaders. The local effects vary considerably depending on the 
communities, since most projects focus on very few for a pilot project concept with spill-
over effects in the region. The MFC-E became most active on the Río Onzole and targeted 
two pilot communities in order to create the necessary institutional capacities that would 
empower community-managed forest management and commercialization. FEPP and 
several other NGOs cooperated in the area to create a broader range of communities that 
could benefit from the capacity building and forest-related training.  
On this note, it is important to state that the local institutional effects of the community 
forestry process in Esmeraldas showed a very broad range, and depended strongly on the 
specific action of the CFC actor that was involved in the area. Thus, the specific 
development of Capulí and Arenales—as the two local examples of the case study—is used 
to identify some of the local changes, but cannot suggest valid conclusions for forest 
communities in Esmeraldas in general. Regarding the three focused aspects of local 
institutional effects71, the local development of the communities is outlined below. 
 
                                                 
71 see chapter 2.1 
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Forest-related Decision-making: Increasing formalization and control of logging and timber 
trade 
Since the late 1990s, the forest-related decision-making in both communities was 
increasingly formalized and became subject to more control of the logging activities and 
timber transports, as 20 out of 22 interviewees point out. 13 interviewees specifically 
identify the forest-related training that the MFC-E offers in the communities, especially for 
technical forest know-how and agroforestry to diversify the forest income activities. 
Legally approved management plans and a possible forest certification in the future are key 
expectations of the more formalized forest management in the communities72. At the same 
time, 14 interviewees identify continuing deficiencies in the communities' capacities to 
establish the legal procedures for approved logging because they lack the necessary 
training to write the formal logging plans.  
In fact, large groups within the communities cannot read or write to a degree that would 
allow them to control the legal logging procedures that the community would be involved 
in. This also leads to internal conflicts of authority and information access, as explored in 
detail in chapter 4.3.3. Some interviewees describe an important progress that the 
communal territory was zonified into different forest use areas, but only 8 out of 22 clearly 
identified that the people started to use the communal forest as a regular form of collective 
activities beyond their privately managed fincas73.  
 
Organization of Authority: Communities gain local control over their resources  
The capacities of the communities to exert their own authority have become much better, 
as most interviewees identified more local control over the forest resources (19 out of 22 
statements74), including the formal land title and boundary conflict resolution (12), and an 
increased local involvement of community members in communal meetings (8). Since the 
mid-1900s the communal character of land use shifted more into the focus of attention of 
both communities. Both achieved a formal recognition of indigenous land title in 1994-
1996, and had their territories divided into a communal forest as well as private land 
parcels for the families (fincas).  
The formal adjudication process in combination with the new projects has initiated an 
                                                 
72 Since 2002, the national government also tertiarized the control of logging and timber transports to the Swiss 
environmental service provider SGS, in order to make the control system less vulnerable to bribery. This was intended to 
provide a more formal standard and started to become active in Borbón as well. The tertiarized service was, however, in 
2003 claimed to be constitutionally incompatible with the key responsibilities of the state over its natural resources. As a 
result, the national policy efforts towards an impartial, transparent and formalized control system of the SGS in logging 
and timber transports failed before they could achieve a structural impact on the local level. 
73 In the past, most families considered their fincas to be much more important than the communal forest. Please see 
chapter 5.3.2. for the internal organization process towards common-pool resource use, as opposed to privatized forms as 
the fincas suggest.  
74 For a detailed overview of the interview responses, please refer to Annex 3. 
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increased interest in the communal territory and stronger internal management in both 
communities, as all interviewees report. Several cases of boundary and land conflict have 
been confronted and partly resolved, although some logging invaders still exist. The 
communal forests have been restructured in an ecological zonification process, which also 
trained the locals to a more comprehensive understanding of the forest in its composition 
and harvesting value. The communities have received considerable training in forest-
related know-how, especially on agroforestry for a more diversified forest use, low-impact 
logging techniques, financial management, logging plans and their legal approval process, 
and the communal planning process to logging activities.  
At the same time, most interviewees identified several constraints in the internal 
organization, especially that the authority was still intransparent and lacked the capacities 
to a sound forest management. In particular, some interviewees criticized the strong 
priorities of the young leaders in Arenales who preferred an immediate forest benefit over 
long-term forest protection. For similar reasons, Capulí's forest technician was assumed to 
have left over night after intransparent logging activities that the broader community was 
not informed about. Forest subsecretaries dissolved, and the cabildo was questioned for its 
impartial control. All are accused of intransparent logging activities that the broader 
community is not informed about, which hampers the general motivation for collective 
action in both communities. 
 
Benefit Distribution  -no change detected- 
Generally, the project goals of the MFC-E targeted education and capacity-building as a 
priority, which is clearly reflected in the progress of the forest-related decision-making and 
the internal organization. However, as mentioned above, community forestry had not been 
fully launched as a collective source of income. Several constraints were yet to be 
overcome within the communities. Thus, the local benefit and its balanced distribution of 
the income in the communities were not yet established for the forest use as a common-
pool source. Accordingly, more than two-thirds of all interviewees stated that no major 
effect has taken place yet.  
As the shift of the benefit distribution to the community level provides a key element to 
indicate an operating community forestry system, it is concluded that the policy process 
has not reached the end of the implementation stage. Most interviewees similarly stress the 
ongoing and pilot character of the community forestry activities in Esmeraldas, and agree 
that the implementation stage is yet to be concluded. Chapter 5.3.2. explores the local 
effects and constraints of the implementation phase in detail.  
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3.2.3. Summary and Outlook: Identified Gaps for Policy Learning   
It has been shown that the new actors and funds of the environmental project boom had 
the most immense effect on the policy network. The national legal reform complemented 
the local changes by providing a standardized improvement. However, when comparing 
the powerful external perturbations and the effects on the policy subsystem, it becomes 
obvious that the comprehensive changes of the national forest-related policy domain have 
not yet transformed into a regional de facto implementation.  
The heavy institutional constraints have been identified within the policy subsystem, both 
with regard to the internal structure of the coalitions as well as for the local capacities to 
manage change. The immense difference between the officially announced policy and the 
de facto policy practice in Esmeraldas has become clear, and it has been shown that there is 
little incentive on the regional level to change this. 
This gap between written and de facto policy brings the regional policy actors into a 
stronger focus. The province’s policy implementation, including its interpretation and 
underlying interests, is even more dependent on the regional actors’ policy beliefs than 
elsewhere. This suggests a significant importance of the policy-related learning, and 
changes of beliefs among the regional coalitions. Both is analyzed in chapter 4.1.3 and 
4.2.3 to review the actual roles of these processes. 
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3.3. Internal Political Restructuring – The Case of Quintana Roo, Mexico  
3.3.1. Key Parameters of the Policy Subsystem  
3.3.1.1.Tenure System and Regulatory Framework 
The Mexican ejido system provides a particularly strong legal basis for community-based 
forest policy. It has clearly defined groups of resource users within a legally constituted 
territory, and state-recognized communal decision-making authorities in which elected 
individuals are accountable to the communal assembly. With more than 28,000 ejidos and 
indigenous communities all over the country, more than 70% of Mexico's forest area is on 
communal lands. Only about 15% are privately owned, and 5% in public ownership75. On 
average, each community has 7,000 hectares of forest land, although in reality there are 
many ejidos than have less than 300 hectares and others that have up to 450,000 hectares. 
The World Bank estimates that some 5,148 communities (between ejidos and indigenous 
communities) use their forests commercially in Mexico. 
The ejido land title grants life-long usufruct rights to the legally recognized members 
(ejidatarios) of the community, while the land ownership remains with the state. Buying, 
selling or renting ejido lands in parts or as a whole was illegal. Ejidos consist of both 
communal lands as well as individual plots. Forest lands remained under collective tenure 
and were assigned to ejidos for a community-based benefit76, whereas agricultural lands 
could be granted to individual families. Mexican ejidos manage their forests for timber 
with many decisions being made autonomously, but also under a strong regulatory 
framework provided by Mexican forestry law and the Mexican environmental agency 
SEMARNAT77. 
In the 20th century, several policy shifts occurred that pended between two different basic 
concepts of land management78, including a shift to large national and international 
concessions in the early decades, then back to small Mexican concessions in the 1950s, and 
transferred into parastatal forest enterprises under Díaz. The 1927-29 Agrarian Reform had 
established the first ejidal lands79, and further ejido entitlements followed. The 1934-40 
Cardenas period implemented a pioneering policy in the land process: ejido lands were for 
the first time titulated according to forest-based criteria. Focused on the extensive 
harvesting of chicle in the forests, the land titles encompassed a vast land title of around 
420ha per ejidatario80.  
The 21 forest ejidos of the Zona Maya in the central  part of the state have about 350,000ha 
land in total. Several forest associations of forest ejidos manage as a group more than 
                                                 
75 Castilleja, 1993 
76 Förster et al. 1993, 29 
77 Secretaria de Medio Ambiente y Recursos Naturales 
78 Klepeis 2000, 235 
79 Galletti 1999, 2 
80 Galletti 1999, 2 
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250,000 ha of lowland tropical forest81. The ejido system remained unchanged during the 
Plan Piloto Forestal since the 1980s, as they already provided community rights to more 
than 70% of the state forest area. Instead, the ejido system was used as a strong unchanged 
basis that the new community forest benefit was established upon, as outlined in the next 
section. 
 
3.3.1.2.Forest Economy and Benefit Sharing  
In Quintana Roo, about 4,700,000ha of the total state area (5,100,000ha) are covered by 
forest. They have been under heavy timber exploitation pressure for centuries. The 1600s 
until 1890 had been marked by open access timber extraction, mainly by British colonial 
interests based in British Honduras and Jamaica. The state's exclusion of the ejidos from 
income and decision-making over their own forest lands also provided the basis for 
growing conflict among the ejidatarios and the concession holders, as well as regional 
protest against the state who deprived them of their communal forest benefits. Immense 
migration and new settlements in southern Quintana Roo and Campeche added 
considerable pressure on the land use policy and among the communities82.  
The Southern Yucatán Peninsula provides a particularly challenging context for the 
formulation of natural resource policies because of the Mayan strive for independence and 
the struggle to maintain control over boom-period resources83. Especially the Zona Maya 
was an area of constant political conflict and local resistance against the oppressive 
exploitation of the state, in which forest politics played a heavy role over the decades. It 
was increasingly difficult for the government to contain the growing unrest and resistance 
of the rural population to the exploitative practices of the state-sponsored industries, and 
young reformists occupied more and more key positions in the state agencies to question 
the existing system of the state governance from within84.  
As a joint approach to both issues of conflict at the same time, a stronger local livelihood 
base increasingly thus became an issue in the policy discourse. The 1972 National Forestry 
Development Program suggested a revised concept of resource use as a livelihood basis for 
the local communities85 in that it “satisfies the needs of campesinos and workers, generates 
                                                 
81 Bray et al. 1993 
82 The population of Quintana Roo jumped immensely from about 27,000 in 1950 to 260,000 in 1985. The underlying 
settlement policy of the government was driven by three main motives: Firstly, the migration trend relieves tensions over 
the distribution of land in politically conflictive regions such as Veracruz and Michocán. Secondly, the population influx 
serves to effectively occupy the unsecured southern border, especially regarding the long-standing struggle of Guatemala 
and Great Britain over Belize. Thirdly, the population growth and its development programs in agriculture supported 
Quintana Roo’s new-to-be statehood status that was finally approved in Oct 1974. The tourism boom in the Cancún area 
since the 1980s added even more pressure. 
83 see, for example, Klepeis 2000 
84 Wilshusen 2003, 234 
85 The swayering conflict emerging from the forest-rich communities had motivated a policy response that originally 
aimed to settle the growing unrest reactively, yet apparently triggered a much bigger shift: “Although the move appeared 
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employment, and increases living standards for the rural masses”, including joint 
participation of communities and the state in operating the forest enterprises86. The new 
community-oriented policy was to be institutionally implemented through the new Forestry 
Development Department that, after several months of informal operation, was officially 
integrated in the Forest Service under León Jorge Castaños, widely recognized as a key 
reformer in the forest administration87.  
Only a few years later, the reform space that had opened up within the forest service saw 
another opportunity. In 1976, the newly elected federal President José López Portillo 
(1976-1982) appointed Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas as Undersecretary of Forestry and 
Wildlife88. Castaños and Cárdenas increasingly worked as a reform-pushing political team 
that promoted new policies towards social equity and community-based forestry 
enterprises. Being aware of the concessions that were about to expire in the late 1970s and 
early 1980, they prepared a new institutional organization around a stronger local basis for 
the forest communities.  
Pending between two different basic concepts of land management, the 20th century saw 
several significant policy shifts89: from large national to large international concessions in 
the early decades; from large international concessions back to small Mexican concessions 
in the 1950s; a transfer of national lands to ejidos with split access between the ejidos 
(chicle and agriculture) and Mexican concessions (logging); and, among others, a land 
reform in 1992 that provides ejidatarios with the option to obtain private title to their land.  
Based on the ejido system, the benefit sharing of the forest was rather stable over the first 
decades. The ejidos that participated in the Plan Piloto Forestal had previously been 
overruled by the enterprise's dominance in all regional forest activities. The timber 
enterprise Maderas Industrializadas de Quintana Roo (MIQROO) had been granted a 
large-scale concession of about 500,000ha forest areas. The MIQROO-related state 
corporate control of the forest resources had managed to keep the local unrest 
comparatively low90. As opposed to other communities that were entirely excluded from 
state-directed timber profits, the concessioned ejidos had annual contracts that fixed certain 
profit percentages from the harvested timber volumes.  
These funds were administered by the agrarian reform ministry which held approximately 
2/3 of the dividend payments in a communal fund and divided the remaining third among 
                                                                                                                                                    
to be only a minor concession, it perhaps unintentionally allowed for growing space for a new breed of reform-minded 
forestry professionals who would use the opportunity to promote a more socially equitable approach to forest 
management and production in Mexico”. Wilshusen 2003, 235 
86 Subsecretaría Forestal y de Fauna 1972. Reprinted in EMF 31(8-20). Wilshusen 2003, 235 
87 Wilshusen 2003, 235; Subsecretaría Forestal y de Fauna 1972. 
88 Son of the former president, Cárdenas was a central figure in the center left opposition party (PRD), including PRD 
president candidate in 1988, 1994 and 2000.  
89 Klepeis 2000, 235 
90 Wilshusen 2003, 237 
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the ejido members. The FONAFE program coordinated investments for them such as 
trucks, harvesting equipment and sawmills. The six ejidos were permitted to sell the 
lumber that was not appropriate for the MIQROO factory. Similarly though, the constant 
logging pressure on a considerably high level threatened to deplete the region's rich forest 
resources, putting the local communities' livelihood base at risk. The timber extraction of 
the private enterprises in the region aimed at maximum-yield and short-term profits, often 
described as mahogany "mining". The forest management plans of the small private 
logging enterprises in the ejidos were often called "essentially works of fiction", "set 
arbitrarily to achieve target profit levels" and basically "used to justify high volume cuts"91. 
As Wilshusen (2003, 239) describes, the region's forest policy during the MIQROO 
concession was not the result of "structured dialogues" but rather a "series of exchanges 
over time in which community members sought to navigate numerous waves of 
development programs". 
 
3.3.1.3. Forest Policy Network and Belief Systems 
As the oldest and longest process among the three case studies, Quintana Roo shows a 
particularly complex development of the actors over time. Based on the interests and 
tensions that developed over the history of forest exploitation, the policy network of 
Quintana Roo had developed into a strongly state-oriented system of very few actors. 
Calakmul has been an integrate part of the Quintana Roo policy network for almost two 
decades and is regarded as part of its policy subsystem, but show important differences in 
the PPF success92. During the implementation phase of the policy process, there were no 
strongly defined coalitions involved in a formal policy discourse to compete over policy-
making pushing either towards development or environmental goals. All data sources 
pointed out that the process was initially advanced by very few actors, as opposed to the 
two other case studies. Based on the ACF perspective that the actors organize themselves 
according to their policy beliefs and concerted action to advance their policy interests, the 
process suggests an overwhelming majority of regional actors with development-oriented 
forest policy beliefs, while a very small CFC coalition appeared in the trigger phase to 
stimulate a policy shift towards community forestry. The interviewed actors and identified 
members of each coalition are listed in detail in the annex, in order to keep the process 
analysis more accessible.  
 
 
                                                 
91 Wilshusen 2003, 239 
92 One of the major differences in the starting conditions were that the valuable timber stands were heavily exploited in 
Calakmul, while the Zona Maya still had a considerable harvesting potential left after the large-scale concessionary 
pulled out in the mid-1980s. Calakmul has since become a major target of policy input and international environmental 
attention, but with limited success.  
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State-directed and Private Forestry Coalition (SFC) 
The SFC is comprised of the vast majority of actors who administered, and benefited 
from, the initial concession system. The forest sector was very closely arranged around the 
state administration, which held a particularly powerful position as authority and land 
owner. The state-based enterprises that held the forest concessions, the state government as 
the legal decision-maker, and the administrative intermediate levels who were the 
beneficiaries of the forest revenue structures, all shared economic development-oriented 
beliefs in the forest sector and represented the dominant SFC with the policy interest in 
maintaining the concession system.  
For as long as there was no strong political counterbalance of actors with opposite policy 
goals, these actors did not regard themselves as a coherent coalition because there was no 
urgent need to unite against outside pressures. Instead, the political structure was rather 
characterized by a considerable authority struggle and policy differences between the 
national and state levels of government, which include conflicts of interest as well as 
divided areas of power and influence depending on the personal networks. In some cases, 
these provide CF actors with political operational leverage between the two93. Especially 
the activities of the Agrarian Reform Ministry were regarded as rather counterproductive if 
not destructive within the regional network, considering their corrupt practices as 
intermediaries who bribed community leaders in favour of timber enterprises' interests94. 
Taking into account the institutional key position of the agrarian reform ministry, the 
ejidos' discontent and political unrest was deeply rooted in a perceived helplessness 
towards the state intervention in forest exploitation. 
 
When the Plan Piloto Forestal was implemented in the mid-1980s, the dominance of state-
based forestry was busted virtually over night in the region. The smaller commercial actors 
in timber commercialization quickly found new role within the ejido-based community 
forestry and forest societies. Since then, privatization has received more political 
supporters, as described in chapter 7.  
As opposed to the previous state-based actors from the times of the MIQROO concession, 
the commercial opposition of social forestry is since the late 1980s mostly comprised of 
private and other non-community groups of forest users. Several commercial actors now 
call for reliable state support and more planning security in forest use to strengthen private 
forest users. This includes more state support, administration and subsidies, as a state-
directed framework—as opposed to stronger local control.  
The commercial actors do not form a strong coalition with a joint political representation, 
and are not identified by the interviewees as a strong coalition. However, they share a 
                                                 
93 Förster et al. 1993, 72 
94 Wilshusen 2003, 237 
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distinct policy belief, are known for their policy beliefs, and cooperate where necessary to 
support their interest in commercial forestry matters. Thus, they form a loosely organized 
group that fulfils the basic criteria of a coalition within the ACF framework.  
Table: State-directed and Private Forestry Coalition in Mexico 
 identified by most actors 
(i.e. at least two-thirds) 
identified by some actors 
(i.e. at least one-third) 
n = 22 15-22 statements  8-14 statements 
transregional E actors • (MIQROO - before mid-1980s)95  
regional E actors • sociedad de promotores 
campesinos asesores 
• sociedad de productores 
ecológicos de chicle 
 • intermediaries • Amanecer en el campo 
local E actors • loggers • Forest Service Providers96 (since 
mid-1980s) 
 • productores de chicle • productores de chile 
 • productores agroforestales • apicultores 
 
Community Forestry Coalition (CFC)  
Quintana Roo is an example where only very few actors resemble a CFC, having entered a 
strategic coalition to implement their policy beliefs with clear long-term environmental 
goals. Before the trigger of the CF policy process, there was no environmentally motivated 
group of actors in the policy network. Even throughout the policy process, the 
institutionally concerted action of a Community Forestry Coalition remained very limited, 
if identified as such by the actors at all.  However, the strong cooperation axis of the Plan 
Piloto Forestal (PPF) and individuals from highest ranks of the state government from the 
trigger phase on was precisely based on shared policy beliefs, and provided a strategic 
opposition to the dominant coalition of the network. Thus, within the systematic ACF 
perspective, this small group of strategic cooperation is regarded as a CFC among the 
fellow actors, however rather small97.  
                                                 
95 Two of the identified actors existed in different periods without overlap. This shows the loose character of the 
identified coalition. MIQROO is mentioned as a key actor before the mid-1980s, while the service providers came into 
existence no earlier than in the mid-1980s. Apart from these two, most other groups represent private forest users that 
constantly formed a source of opposition for the community benefit goals of the social forestry coalition.  
96 Some forest providers have been identified as part of this coalition by some interviewees, although other groups of 
forest providers have been assigned to the community forestry coalition (see previous section). The regional groups show 
different attitudes towards private forestry. This shows the ambiguous role of the service providers between the needs of 
forest management and support for the ejidos, which is resolved differently and by different people. 
97 With respect to the theoretical assumptions of the ACF, advocacy coalitions need not be large. They do not need to 
encompass many actors of the network, as long as their concerted action and policy beliefs make them a distinct group of 
actors with palpable effects. 
  
 
 
80
 
The launch of the Plan Piloto Forestal in the early 1980s represented a major policy shift. 
It replaced the dominant state-based system in the region and introduced a quickly 
growing group of social forestry actors. It may thus be concluded that the policy process 
was initially not driven by a direct competition of coalitions as the ACF assumes. 
However, as most interviewees stress, the growing number of actors around the PPF did 
form a larger advocacy coalition once the process had been started in the early 1980s. 
Notwithstanding the complex emergence of coalition, the actors was acknowledged 
relatively clearly by the 22 interviewees, identified below. 
 
Table: Community Forestry Coalition in Quintana Roo and Calakmul 
 identified by most actors 
(i.e. at least two-thirds) 
identified by some actors 
(i.e. at least one-third) 
n = 22 15-22 statements  8-14 statements 
transregional actors • CONAFOR  • GEF 
 • CONANP • INAH 
 • Corredor Biológico • CONABIO 
 • ECOSUR • PROCAMPO 
 • GTZ • PRONARE 
 • PRONATURA • Unión de Comunidades y  
 • SEMARNAT    Ejidos Forestales 
regional D actors • PPF Sur • SECTUR Secretaría de Turismo 
 • PPF Zona Maya • Consejo Arte-Ecologa-
Agropecuario 
 • OEFPZM  • Mundo Maya 
 • SPEFQR • SEDARI 
 • Asambleas Ejidales • UQROO-Proyecto Forestal 
 • Consejo de Participantes de la 
Reserva de Calakmul 
• CRIP 
• Municipio 
 • Reserva de la Biósfera Calakmul • Fondos Regionales de Solidaridad 
 • CRASX • Consejo Técnico Consultivo 
Forestal del Estado de QR 
(CTCFQR) 
local E actors • Bosque Modelo Zoh Laguna • Forest Service Providers 
 • Proyectos de Ecoturismo  
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The coalitions’ policy beliefs are determined on the basis of 22 interviews across the 
coalitions98. They show opposing views with regard to the central notion of local benefit 
rights from the forest. While the SFC denies any local participation as cost inefficient, the 
CFC sees local forest benefit as an inevitable right, as well as an effective instrument for 
forest protection. The presented policy beliefs derived from the interviews are consistent 
with those found in the literature, especially publications and media statements from the 
immediate actors. No major controversies were identified for the issues within the 
coalitions that would indicate important subgroups99.  
 
Table: Belief Systems of the Advocacy Coalitions in Quintana Roo100 
  
 
 State-directed and Private  
Forestry Coalition (SFC) 
Community Forestry  
Coalition (CFC) 
n = 22 15-22 statements 15-22 statements 
1. Deep Core Beliefs  
human dominion over nature; forest 
represents natural resource for the 
benefit of the legal owner (15) 
humans are part of nature; forests have a 
rich value for ecological balance and for 
the livelihood of humans (15) 
2. Policy Core Beliefs 
state-based: the government is the 
overarching authority to regulate 
forest use (19) 
people-based: the local people are the 
day-to-day decision-makers and need to 
be directed by a higher level of authority 
(16) 
 
3. Secondary Beliefs: 
 
Secondary Beliefs related to the local institutional organization of community forestry: 
3.1 forest decision-
making  
logging needs to be cost-efficient 
(22) 
forests require expert protection and 
management (16) 
Change of policy beliefs in Stage II: 
local forest benefit is essential (20) 
Change of policy beliefs in Stage III: 
but requires long-term sustainability 
of the forest resources (17) 
 
                                                 
98 interview data analysis see Annex 4 
99 complete list of the identified members of the coalition see Annex 2  
100 As in the previous sections, the policy beliefs are based on the 22 interviews across the coalitions. The two significant 
changes of policy beliefs are marked in bold; please refer to sections 7.3.2 and 7.4.2 for a detailed analysis. The coalitions 
are listed in detail in Annex 2. 
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3.2 benefit 
distribution  
private enterprise-driven forest use 
and benefit; monetary income (21) 
local people should receive benefit  
because it is their ejido right (19) 
local people should receive benefit 
because local forest benefit is essential 
to motivate long-term forest protection 
(12) 
3.3 organization of    
authority 
communal decision-making can 
limit the capacities of communities 
to deal with forest management (20) 
indigenous groups have resource rights 
as ejido members; ejidos make them 
local decision-makers and thus key (18) 
 
Secondary Beliefs related to the structure of the policy network:: 
3.4 hierarchical 
structures and 
formality 
state-based top-down structures for 
efficient administration from the 
state (19) 
people-based forest use with strong 
institutional support to ensure sound 
decision-making (16) 
 
3.5 network 
cooperation and 
information access 
closed network of the stakeholders 
is the most efficient (17) 
small efficient circle of experts; ejidos 
need good exchange of information with 
top levels to make both sides work (17) 
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3.3.2. Implementation Phase (1983 - early 1990s): The Plan Piloto Forestal   
3.3.2.1. External Perturbations and Policy Change 
The community forestry process in Quintana Roo started in the early 1980s and was 
triggered by three major external events, as nearly all interviewees agree101. First, a small 
independent project team around the Plan Piloto Forestal (PPF) was established and 
brought an innovative institutional approach to the regional policy system. Their strategic 
operations brought a change of the systemic governing coalition in the policy subsystem as 
explained below. Second, a large-scale forest concession ended in 1983 and offered a 
considerable immediate turnover of forest use areas to the ejidos without a long 
organizational interim period. This provided a sudden change of the socio-economic 
conditions that affected the policy subsystem. Third, the political interests shifted towards 
more environmental goals and prestige in the mid-1980s and introduced a new 
government. This brought a change of the political context to the policy subsystem and 
affected the favoured goals for the policy development in Quintana Roo. 
 
External Event I:  Small independent project team (PPF) established 
Since the late 1970s, a small group of experts had formed  in southern Mexico, personally 
linked through contacts in a research group in Chiapas which was sent by the federal 
Ministry of Agriculture. The activities of the Plan Piloto Forestal (PPF) project team for 
community forestry underwent different stages, starting from a very informal level where 
the information was gathered and the personal networks established that the project was 
later based on102. From 1983 on, the first formal PPF project was introduced in Quintana 
Roo with political support from the federal as well as state government, and funding from 
the GTZ and the Acuerdo México-Alemania (AMA). The PPF task force remained 
institutionally rather independent in their strategic planning and activities, although 
officially subordinated to a federal agency (INIF). 
As opposed to the international project boom which initiated the community forestry 
process in Ecuador, the Mexican policy process was not boosted by a large number of new 
environmental actors that created a pluralist network. Instead, the process was directed by 
very few key individuals around the PPF and their political contacts. As most interviewees 
describe, the strategic planning of the PPF is characterized as centrally planned, non-
participatory, and thus highly adaptive. It focused on the politically practicable options 
rather than on what would be technically feasible103. This suggests a strong relevance of 
internal learning processes, and shifts the policy beliefs of the few involved actors into 
focus. These are analyzed in chapter 4.2. 
                                                 
101 see Annex 3 
102 Förster et al. 1992, 56; outlining an establishment phase from 1978-1982 
103 see also Pretzsch et al. 1991, 8 
  
 
 
84
 
When the large-scale concession of MIQROO was about to expire, the PPF team 
intervened to turn the ending concession into an opportunity to launch community-based 
forestry in the involved ejidos, as the next section explores.  
 
External Event II: Large-scale forest concession ended  
The state-based timber enterprise MIQROO held a major forest concession on ejido lands 
for about 500,000 ha in southern and central Quintana Roo. The concession had been 
granted for 29 years and was about to expire in 1983. The end of the MIQROO concession 
provided a significant window of opportunity for community forestry in the region, 
because it made a relatively large forest area available at once. However, this opportunity 
had to be seized in opposition to the dominant coalition at the time. Sabatier and Jenkins-
Smith (1999) point out that  
external perturbations provide an opportunity for major policy change, but that change will 
not occur unless that opportunity is skilfully exploited by proponents of change.  
Here, the proponent refers to the minority coalition. The PPF promoted the turnover of the 
concession lands to the forest ejidos for a community-based management of the area. It 
proposed the change and succeeded, although the Community Forestry Coalition was much 
smaller and less established than the State Forestry Coalition. The policy decision thus 
cannot be explained by the event alone and instead involves several factors. The decision 
to turn the concession area into the hands of the forest ejidos was the product of a rather 
iterative process among the governmental actors and the PPF.  
When the concession rights were about to expire, the logging operations of MIQROO were 
temporarily maintained by the state, since the realistic prospects of the concession area 
were yet unclear. The PPF supported this decision.104 It can be concluded that the end of 
the concession represented a sudden perturbation on the system. This differs from a 
catalyst event. As opposed to the latter, the end of the concession did not cause an 
automatic change of the systemic governing coalition in the system, but still had to be 
skilfully exploited by the coalition. 
Encouraged by the PPF, the Dirección de Desarrollo Forestal soon agreed to an ejido-based 
management of the area and decided that the MIQROO concession would not be renewed 
                                                 
104 The PPF also regarded MIQROO as a useful transition instrument and supported to maintain the concessionary 
operations in the short run. The enterprise had increasingly suffered from economic weakness in the previous years, lost 
its subsidies and price monopoly, struggled against insolvency, and was taken over partly and then completely by the 
state with the support of the governor to buffer the socio-economic impact of these years on the local forest harvesting 
activities. By guaranteeing to buy 50% of the produced volume, the state had also tried to oblige MIQROO to harvest a 
wider range of timber species for a lower ecological impact.  
The economic struggle of the enterprise had encouraged an increasing interest among the local communities to establish 
their own timber processing in order to be more independent and be prepared for the last days of MIQROO. This made 
the idea of a more community-based management of the ejidos appear more realistic.  
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after 1983105. The latter had been founded within the Subsecretaría Forestal of Quintana 
Roo in order to accommodate the new environmental policies of the state, which provided 
the key political agenda to prioritize community forestry over state-based forests interests. 
In conclusion, this incremental change was motivated by the shift towards environmental 
protection (see below) and facilitated by the strategic approach of the PPF which is 
explored in detail in the following chapter.  
 
External Event III: Shift of political interests towards more environmental profile and prestige 
The mid-1980s experienced a general shift of the government's interests towards 
environmental policy goals, which was initiated by changes on the federal level. The 
government was increasingly pressured to respond to the alarming forest resource 
depletion, triggered by the resistance among the local population and increasing attention 
from the federal government. Environmentally oriented experts were increasingly entering 
key positions in the governmental administration, and the policy discourse thematized the 
deforestation in the region more and more. When the magnitude of the degraded forests 
pushed forward the new protected areas policy, the protected area Sian Ka'an was soon 
established in southern Quintana Roo to conserve some of the forests along the Caribbean 
coastline.  
Furthermore, the 1986 state government elections in Quintana Roo introduced a new 
governor to the state. Since the new government was highly interested in environmental 
issues as a means of developing a distinct political profile towards the federal government 
as well as for international reputation, large-scale and prestigious projects such as protected 
areas shifted more into focus. The political shift towards the new state government implied 
two aspects for the actor constellation: Firstly, the new governor shared new environmental 
policy beliefs that support a policy change towards sustainable forest management 
approaches. Secondly, he was ambitious to strengthen his political reputation for a further 
career on the national stage. This offered a considerable spin-off from pursuing an 
environmental policy success in Quintana Roo.  
In summary, the three external perturbations culminated in a major policy change that 
established community-based forestry in the ejidos of the previous MIQROO concession 
area, implemented by the Plan Piloto Forestal which had promoted and induced the change 
initially. The end of the state-based forest concession was a political window of 
opportunity that needed to be skilfully exploited by the actors, as the ACF states. This was 
particularly difficult for the PPF because it was much smaller than the established State 
Forestry Coalition at the time. The state government was leaning towards more 
environmental protection goals at the time, which facilitated the sovereign’s support for 
community forestry.  
                                                 
105 see Arguëlles et al. 2004, 46 
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It can be assumed that the PPF’s success to utilize the opportunity of the timing 
successfully was not only based on the external events, but strongly depended on their 
internal capacities  to influence the sovereign decision. Their assets include considerable 
resources from the Acuerdo México-Alemania AMA and their personal contacts to highest 
political ranks. The PPF’s strategic approach and learning is suggested to play a significant 
role106. 
Figure: External Perturbations on the Community Forestry Policy Subsystem 
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Advocated by the PPF and facilitated by the political shift towards more environmental 
protection, the 1986 Forest Law Reform introduced several structural changes of 
significant impact for the forest sector, and lay the grounds for the new importance of 
forest societies because it shifted the technical forest services to them. This provided these 
                                                 
106 see chapter 4 
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secondary organizations with a key influential role for the social participation of the forest 
communities. The shift manifested a new pivotal role for civil forest societies. The new 
law required the ejidos to delineate permanent forest areas (AFPs) and to conduct forest 
inventories. Only the Plan Forestal Estatal (PFE) was able to conduct these forest 
inventories with a forest society. This marked a key event for the institutional 
establishment of the new PFE, and a major incentive for the forest ejidos to join a forest 
society107. Further legal changes108 in 1988 asserted that the land use must be directed 
towards the conservation of ecological balance, i.e. land use in general must be sustainable.  
 
In conclusion, the following roles can be attributed to the external events: 
• CAUSAL DRIVERS OF CHANGE: The entry of the Plan Piloto Forestal (PPF) 
caused a significant change as it slowly transformed the policy network and its 
institutional structures. It represented the actual driving force of the policy process 
in Quintana Roo.  
• UNDERLYING EXTERNAL EVENT: The political shift towards more 
environmental protection provided a favourable environment for the policy changes 
that the PPF seeked to implement, and thus represents a facilitating event to the 
policy process. While it is difficult to determine the process without a political 
support for environmental goals, all interviewees agreed that it was the institutional 
approach of the PPF that induced the change. 
• SUDDEN PERTURBATION: The end of the concession caused a sudden 
perturbation that allowed for considerable change in the policy subsystem. It did 
not cause an automatic change of the systemic governing coalition in the system109, 
but still had to be skilfully exploited by the coalition, which it successfully did110.  
 
3.3.2.2. Effects on the Policy Subsystem 
Accessibility of the Network Diversification of the policy network through forest societies 
As described above, the 1986 forest policy change introduced forest societies as a central 
implementation tool for the launch of community forestry. This started a tremendous 
development of the policy network. In the progress of the PPF activities, four forest 
societies were founded111. Most interviewees describe the process as a very dynamic stage 
                                                 
107 Kramer 2001, 13 
108 Changes include Art. 27 of the Constitution; Ley General del Equilibrio Ecológico y la Protección al Ambiente 1988 
(amended in 1996)  
109 as a catalyst event would do; see section 3.4.3.1 for the 1991 change of government in British Columbia 
110 This shifts the importance of the CFC’s strategic performance into focus, outlined in chapter 4.2.4.  
111 Sociedad Sur SPFEQR in Chetumal was the first one to emerge after the end of the MIQROO concession, covering 
the forest ejidos of the old concession areas mostly in southern Quintana Roo with 13 ejidos, with Petcacab (and Santa 
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of new planning decisions and institutional arrangements. As several societies were 
founded within a few months, even a race for membership agreements occurred in some 
ejidos and was often decided by the personal contacts of the society staff with the ejido 
leaders112. This dynamic stage contributed significantly to the growth and diversification of 
the CFC, as the growing numbers of forest societies and the expanding PPF activities 
diversified the network. This consolidation of the forest societies was also important 
because the PPF was a temporary entity which called for a long-term solution for the 
institutional structure.  
 
Accessibility of the Network Stronger network representation of the local base 
Nearly all interviewees pointed out that the establishment of the forest societies had an 
immense effect on the access of the forest ejidos to get forest-related information, and on 
the possibilities of being heard in the regional policy network. The forest societies visited 
the ejidos regularly and provided them with forest-related training and services. At the 
same time, they were a new regular source of information for the forest ejidos on the 
current policy activities and discourse in Chetumal. Through the visits of the societies' 
forest technicians, the ejidos received a more direct access to influence the regional policy 
discourse, and a more direct way to make their voice heard if they did not approve the 
regional decision-making. This direct form of communication between regional network 
and the local ejidos was enhanced by close personal contacts through the forest societies, 
as most interviewees point out.  
The PPF process also shifted the focus of the regional policy discourse stronger on the 
local forest benefit113. This was boosted by the new forest societies in their roles as 
representatives, which knew from their own experience about the problems and concerns at 
the local level. The forest societies formed a new level of institutional support and advice 
for the ejidos, outside the previous state-based administration which held its own interests 
in the forest lands.  
Within the ejidos, the communities' forest management training was aimed at adaptive 
capacities and flexibility. This stressed the importance of periodic decision-making to 
respond to changing timber prices and conditions of the timber production. Internally, 
however, the PPF intended to control, limit or rather to channel, local initiatives of the 
ejidatarios, rather than to empower grassroot dynamics on the local activities as a whole. In 
cases where the locals' initiatives pursued a (possibly short-term) benefit which did not fit 
into the overall strategy of the PPF, it was discouraged by the PPF leaders. The PPF would 
                                                                                                                                                    
María de Poniente) as one of the few member ejidos in the Zona Maya. The forest society OEPFZM was founded shortly 
after in Felipe Carrillo Puerto for most other forest ejidos in the Zona Maya, and in 1990 followed the new forest 
societies Chaktemal (Organización de Ejidos Forestales de Quintana Roo) and Tumben Cuxtal (Sociedad de Pueblos 
Indígenas Forestales de Quintana Roo). 
112 For example, Petcacab joined the Sociedad Sur due to its close connections to the Director Alfonso Arguelles. 
113 see section 4.1.4. on the prioritization between social and environmental goals 
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use its institutional position to limit self-help initiatives among the local villagers where 
the latter would counteract with the long-term goals of the project114. The governor and 
especially the initial PPF team were close enough –on a personal level—to cooperate on 
this, for which the governor used his political standing with the locals to campaign against 
the local ideas and thus facilitate the PPF team's own goals115.  
 
Benefit Distribution  Community benefits of logging increased and distribution system established 
One of the major effects that all interviewees stressed was the restructured community 
benefit, which was virtually established over night after the MIQROO concession ended116. 
The start-up costs for community-based logging activities were relatively low. Roads and 
infrastructure already existed. The ejidos had basic technical know-how from previous 
logging employment with the concession company117. Timber reserves remained with 
commercially valuable timber due to the scientific management plan of MIQROO.  
The sudden shift to community-based forest management imposed an immense 
management pressure on the ejidos and the PPF, and called for strong short-term priorities 
in order not to fail during the launch phase118. Since the logging was to be taken over 
immediately from the prior concession holder, the focus was on continuity rather than a 
completely new approach. This was resolved by a short-term prioritization between the 
economic returns and the ecological long-term management of the forests, as several 
interviewees point out. Ecologically sustainable harvesting was considered secondary to 
getting the harvesting stable on a community-managed basis at all.119 Immediate and 
                                                 
114 see Förster et al. 1993, 89 
115 see Förster et al. 1993, 89. The strategy of the PPF is discussed in detail in chapter 4.2.4. 
116The economic problems of MIQROO had been worsening over the years and had generated an increasing interest of 
the ejidos in their own industrial forest harvesting. The state of QR mitigated MIQROO's economic instability by buying 
49% of its stock, and forced the concession holder to negotiate timber deals directly with each ejido (Wilshusen 2003, 
288). The timber price of the communities was later negotiated centrally between the responsibles of the PPF 
commercialization and two delegates from each ejido, which facilitated the transition period. 
117 Wilshusen 2003, 287: "Ironically, the MIQROO period created certain baseline conditions that facilitated 
establishment of community forestry enterprises under the Plan Piloto Forestal." 
118 The transition period proved to be difficult as the forest ejidos were left without a contracted buyer after MIQROO 
withdrew. They also did not possess any secondary processing equipment, for which it became vital to acquire new 
industrial machinery for the ejidos (Pretzsch et al. 1991, 28). During the restructuring process, the different economic 
sectors of timber production, logging and processing in the communities were designed as economically independent 
'profit center' that should stand for themselves. This was part of the PPF's strategy to disrupt the economic dependency of 
the communities with the forest administration and the state-based enterprises (Pretzsch 1991, 28), and reach a higher 
efficiency depending on their own resources. This local efficiency then proved to be key in overcoming the initial 
difficulties. 
119 In order to make the transition as smooth as possible and not jeopardize the forest area and capacities of the loggers 
involved, the prior logging system of MIQROO was maintained at first, including higher logging volumes. The high 
immediate returns were achieved by a strong focus on mahogany logging, as well as by selection criteria that were based 
on a minimum diameter for the trees that reflect commercial goals instead of ecological ones. Several local interviewees 
noted that the PPF strategy under the Sociedad Sur resulted in an adverse impact for the communities´ forest protection 
when utilizing one timber species at a time for a more focused successful commercialisation. In this manner, the selective 
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relatively high returns from logging were considered essential for the success of the PPF, 
because the regional actors would only support the institutional restructuring if would 
prove to offer forest returns for the communities soon.  
At the same time, most of the interviewees who identified the trade-off considered it an 
essential compromise for the success of the early implementation stage. Later, micro-
credits were granted to the ejidos to encourage investment in more productive logging 
operations and a diversification of timber species for harvesting. 
 
Organization of Authority: Community-based decision-making immediately encouraged after end 
of the concession 
Another local effect that most interviewees noted was the establishment of collective 
income funds for re-investment, which was designed to provide the forest ejidos with an 
independent economic tool. These local changes in the distribution and management of 
funds were, however, based on the existing ejido rights of the community. The project 
activities of the PPF were explicitly directed towards the legally recognized ejidatarios. 
This was part of the strategy to launch community-based forest management as quickly as 
possible, based on the given ejido rights. The livelihood impact of other community 
members without formal ejido rights were not addressed in the process120, which caused 
conflict in some communities.  
While the intermediate level of the forest societies was in a larger process of institutional 
development, the local ejido structures were mostly given and maintained as a basis for the 
new areas of decision-making121. For example, the ejidos already had an appointed 
communal chief who was in charge of the forest operations (jefe de monte) from the 
concession period.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
timber harvesting led to an exhaustion of individual species which led to problems in the eco-management and 
commercialization contingency of the ejidos (interviews with UNORCA and CONAFOR representatives).  
120 Förster et al. 1993, 105 
121 The major progress that the interviewees noted in the communities' internal decision-making was to initiate forest 
inventories and a communal zonification of the land use. Both were required to get a logging permit. Permanent forest 
areas (areas forestales permanentes) were defined as part of an internal zonification of the ejido lands. This process was 
encouraged and assisted by the forest experts, but mostly defined by the communities themselves to make sure that the 
local people would support the communal decisions on their land use. 
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3.3.3. Consolidation Phase (since early 1990s): The Forest Societies and the 
End of the PPF  
3.3.3.1.External Perturbations and Policy Change  
Change of actors and funds: Plan Piloto Forestal ends 
Nearly all interviewees clearly identify a new stage of the policy process in the early 1990s 
when the PPF withdrew its activities and funds, and the forest societies and ejidos 
developed further on their own. The withdrawal of the Mexican-German cooperation 
project (AMA) marked a new phase for community forestry in Quintana Roo, as it was 
now left without the steadying influence of a well-connected foreign donor and their 
technical and political support. Thus, the early and mid-1990s imposed some major new 
challenges on the system while refining the local institutional organization and, most 
importantly, the forest societies.  
When the PPF left the Zona Maya in 1998, it especially left a void in the political network 
and the coordination functions that the PPF held together122. Most team members remained 
in the region and took over key positions in the network, based on the know-how and 
social capital they had accumulated over the years. This development is outlined below 
with regard to the increasing hierarchy levels of forest-related decision-making.  
 
New actors and funds: Increase of environmental projects 
The 1990s also brought a general increase of environmental programs and actors to the 
region. This external event was not identified as a major cause of change, but 
acknowledged as a development that diversified the actors and programs in the policy 
network – and motivated new environmental aspects among the CFC.  
The federal government had adopted stronger environmental goals which attracted new 
project activity in the region, especially in Calakmul. Environmental protection goals were 
now more essential for the actors if they were to receive governmental funding.123 This 
resulted in new challenges for land use planning and new concerns about environmental 
protection. Tourism put a higher incentive on forest protection, as Quintana Roo was eager 
to present itself as a beautiful holiday destination with intact tropical ecosystems124 and 
                                                 
122 Additionally, Bray (2000) points out that these years also brought a new impact of the state-level politics in Quintana 
Roo, where the governorship of Mario Villanueva Madrid (1993-1999) brought a "more intensely authoritarian political 
style to the state than had been the case with earlier governors". 
123 Calakmul experienced an immense increase of environmental actors. Quintana Roo also faced new challenges with the 
heavy boom in tourism on the northern coastline around Cancún. New private investors reshaped the northern coastal 
areas, including road and hotel construction or the restoration of Mayan ruins. However, as Quintana Roo already had 
established structures for community-based forest management, the Zona Maya saw more a change in the goals of the 
existing actors, rather than new actors actually coming in. 
124 The Sian Ka'an protected area on the southern coast of Quintana Roo was established in a non-conflictive and well 
supported decision,  especially because it was established on federal lands and had their full environmental support. 
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pristine forests125. In short, community forestry was regarded as a means of greeting 
tourists, as Bray (2000) paraphrases, and became a welcomed aspect of numerous 
environmental programs. 
 
Figure: External Perturbations on the Community Forestry Policy Subsystem in Quintana Roo 
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Legal change through Agrarian Reform: Deregulation and de facto Privatization 
The third serious perturbation of the phase was the 1992 Agrarian Reform. Under President 
Carlos Salinas de Gortari, Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution was amended to make it 
legal to sell ejido lands and allow peasants to put up their land as collateral for a loan. It 
also introduced a new possible division of communal tenure in the ejidos. Before then, 
                                                 
125 The tourism boom in northern Quintana Roo also raised the regional demand or construction material and labour, and 
resulted in rural migration for employment in construction and the service sector. In Santa María de Poniente and 20 de 
Noviembre though, the immediate impact was as rather limited because the communities are rather far from the 
development areas. Migration to the United States of America, on the other hand, was perceived as a much bigger threat 
for the social integrity of the community, as numerous workers had left their families behind. Having noted that, the 
actors did not identify neither of these issues as direct causes of change for the policy process. 
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communal partnerships with ejidos were illegal, and collective lands were inalienable. 
The 1992 Constitutional Reform to Article 27 now provided ejidatarios with the option to 
obtain private title to their agricultural land, while maintaining some collective ejido lands.  
The state-level politics of Quintana Roo considerably supported the new parcellation 
policy of the ejidos126, and the SFC benefited from the shift. They argue that this more 
flexible arrangement has also strengthened the community tenure. It even allowed for 
foreign corporations to enter commercial partnerships with ejidos.  
The change generally encouraged privatized forms of land use. Officially, the new 
parcellation law was only concerned with agricultural lands, and forest lands still could not 
legally be divided and, if the ejido chose to dissolve, would automatically revert to the 
state. However, the new possibility of a private title to agricultural lands created new 
pressures on de facto divisions on forest lands. It has been shown that this has created a 
considerable incentive to deforestation in order to convert community lands into dividable 
agricultural land parcels127. As for example Boege (1999) and Bray (2000) stress, the field 
implementation (by PROCEDE) of the 1992 law has either explicitly encouraged or 
tolerated de facto divisions of forest lands. One of the new forest division concepts that 
emerged is that of "work groups" (grupos de trabajo) which are described in section 7.4.4. 
for their impact on the local level. 
The 1992 Forest Law also caused a serious perturbation on the system in that it 
dramatically deregulated the forest sector and challenged the role of the forest societies. 
The legal requirement for secondary organizations as forest service provider was removed 
again, after it had been introduced only six years earlier in 1986. Management 
responsibilities were shifted from the state to the forest owner, and forest services were 
based on private contracts. This eliminated the former rationale for the creation of the 
second-level forest societies, which had launched a considerable process in Quintana Roo. 
Instead, the forest technical services were almost entirely set free to the market. This 
granted the ejidatarios free choice of their service provider, as long as they were 
approved128 and registered by SEMARNAP.  
 
• SUDDEN PERTURBATION: The 1992 Agrarian Reform caused a serious 
perturbation that challenged the established institutional structures (forest services, 
communal decision-making) of the community forestry system.  
                                                 
126 Public actors such as SRA, RAN and PROCEDE even supported the option of a complete parcellation of an ejido, if 
this were the free decision of the ejido's general assembly (see Bray 2000). 
127 Study at University of Berkeley; see Nigel Key, Carlos Muñoz-Pina, Alain de Janvry and Elisabeth Sadoulet: Social 
and Environmental Consequences of the Mexican Reforms: Common Pool Resources in the Ejido Sector; cited by Bray 
2004, 77. Until 2004, no ejido had made use of the division of ejido lands into privatized land parcels yet, and several 
actors stressed the positive effect of the higher flexibility of the communal arrangements. 
128 The service provider could be a natural or a legal person. 
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• CAUSAL DRIVERS OF CHANGE: The fact that the Plan Piloto Forestal ended 
caused a considerable change in the policy subsystem. Without the PPF 
withdrawal of activities and funds, the actors would not have seeked to consolidate 
the established institutional structures to the same degree129.  
• UNDERLYING EXTERNAL EVENT: The increased political support for 
environmental projects provides a facilitating and underlying force to the policy 
process, rather than driving significant change.  
 
3.3.3.2.Effects on the Policy Subsystem 
Hierarchy Levels and Formality: Added levels of organization between the ejidos and the state 
Smaller and more recent changes seeked to adjust or refine the previous described shift 
towards deregulation and privatization of the 1990s, although the general policy remained 
basically unchanged130. The local communities developed a strong tendency to privatized 
forms of forest management through work groups and business-managed timber 
enterprises131. The new open market of forest services provided too little regulation, as for 
example Galletti (1999) criticizes. There is no limit for the service providers on the 
maximum forest area they could operate on. Official norms exist on the federal level about 
these forest services, but they are too general to derive specific regulations and operative 
procedures for day-to-day decisions in forest services Besides, the state failed to establish 
regional criteria, minimal operative procedures, and management standards for the service 
providers (ibid). The service providers depend economically on the forest owners, for 
which they have a strong incentive to make effective short-term decisions that favour the 
short-term profit of the forest. Impartial ecological expertise and technical quality have 
been negatively affected, as Galletti (2000) stresses. 
The second major deregulation impact was a shift away from a strong communal authority 
and control over the communal forest activities. Forest operations were no longer required 
to be overseen by the overall community leaders. The reform also reduced required 
documentation of the forest-related operations to the community leaders. The shift 
encouraged enterprise-based forestry structures as it removes forest management decisions 
                                                 
129 It is important to note, however, that it was the unfortunate combination of the PPF withdrawal and the 1992 Agrarian 
Reform that caused the observed intensity of the challenge. 
130 One central constraint that numerous actors identified is the limited applicability of federal forest policies to the 
tropical forests of Yucatán. For example, the 2003 Reglamento de la Ley had been criticized by the regional forest actors 
for its inability to adapt the federal regulation down to regional needs in terms of the ecological specifics of the tropics, 
the long-standing political issues among the Mayan population, and the commercialisation structures of the Yucatán 
Peninsula. Most actors therefore stated that it would be better not to establish a legally binding application of the 
Reglamiento on the state level at all, considering the questionable impact of the federal regulation if approved by the 
state. The overall strategy within the state government therefore consisted of postponing the state response to the federal 
regulation, and to interpret the existing regulations for their better merit in Quintana Roo. 
131 analyzed in detail in chapter 5.3.3. 
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from the collective influence of the community. Later implementation programs132 seeked 
to buffer the adverse impact of these policy changes in Quintana Roo, but the general 
trend towards privatization and deregulation remained. 
The forest societies that had been established during the implementation stage of the 1980s 
were experiencing heavy challenges after the PPF withdrew. Many actors argued that the 
power vacuum left by the withdrawal of the AMA created a new condition that make 
another level of collective action necessary to coordinate and represent their members' 
interests, now that the previous external support had faded away133. Thus, a third-level 
organization was initiated in 1999 on the state level of Quintana Roo134, as had also been 
attempted earlier without success. The Coordinadora de Organizaciones Campesinas 
Forestales de Quintana Roo (COCAFORQ) was initiated to pull together the five major 
community forestry organizations in the state135. It was founded to provide better 
information of the ejidos on the top levels, for all ejidos among each other, transparency on 
prices and forest regulations, as well as a joint managed pool of information and human 
resources. All interviewees agree that the new organization could not step into the previous 
functions of the PPF, nor provide support to the same extent. At the same time, an 
overarching coordination unit was regarded by most as a welcomed hierarchical level.  
As a second central platform of the network, the State Forest Council136 was founded. It 
recognizes the major actors of the regional network, but does not support an open-access 
structure of cooperation and information in the policy network. Small landholders, ejidos, 
municipalities and individual stakeholders were not incorporated in the council as of 
2004137. The composition of the State Forest Council shows the minor role of non-
                                                 
132 The 1997 Forest Law later maintained large parts of the 1992 reform, but re-regulated several aspects of forest 
management. This goal was particularly targeted by new programs. PRODEFOR subsidized community forestry 
management and strengthened the service providers who had to cope with the 1992 policy changes. It was originally 
lobbied by several forest organizations in order to create a counterpart to the agricultural subsidy program PROCAMPO 
(intended as compensation for the negative effects of NAFTA; see Bray 2000), which could otherwise affect the forest 
negatively. The program strengthened the service providers because it was available to the formal forest owner, i.e. the 
ejido, but is required to be processed by a forest service provider. The third land use program PRODEPLAN, in contrast, 
fostered new plantation development through industrial subsidies for the private sector. It aimed to provide more security 
to private investors in forest plantations.  
133 Bray 2000 
134 see Bray 2000 
135 Given the central importance of personal contacts, spatial distance is an important issue for the interaction patterns of 
the policy network. The institutional centrality of Chetumal has strategic network merits that the Zona Maya with Felipe 
Carrillo Puerto, as well as Calakmul with its network hubs in X-Pujil and Campeche, does not have for the upward 
affiliation with regional actors. Instead, the actor representatives of the Zona Maya and Calakmul compensate this 
through personal bridge functions with the staff in Chetumal135, and visit regularly to compensate their institutional 
absence. Calakmul is five hours by car from the state capital Campeche, while Chetumal is only three hours away and 
represents the major hub for the regional policy network that reaches across the state borders of Quintana Roo and 
Campeche. 
136 Consejo forestal estatal de Quintana Roo, established on the basis of Art.157 
137 The political proportions of the stakeholder representation was an issue discussed at length for the credibility of the 
council as an institutional platform. Similarly, neither the regulation framework of the council nor the outcome had been 
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governmental CF actors within the recognized network that would advocate ecological 
protection from a different angle. 
 
3.3.4. Summary and Outlook: Identified Potentials for Policy Learning   
It has been shown that the enormous task of the quick PPF launch was the result of both 
timing and people, where a sudden perturbation was skilfully exploited to induce policy 
change. Almost all actors described the end of the MIQROO concession as a significant 
new political ‘space’ or opportunity that allowed for the creation of new institutional 
structures in ejido-based forest management.  
The successful exploitation of the political opportunity suggests that the strategic approach 
of the CFC was key for the implementation stage, and that a learning process might have 
contributed to this move to make their actions more effective. Political connections were a 
crucial element, through which they managed to shortcut and undermine the existing 
institutional hierarchies and replace them by new structures. One important issue for this 
success was the internal structure of the PPF. This is analyzed in chapter 4.2.4. 
The consolidation stage of the 1990s brought considerable challenges for the community 
forestry system, especially the 1992 Agrarian Reform and the withdrawal of the PPF team 
from activities in the region. These external events imposed significant problems that the 
young established CF system needed to overcome. This suggests a considerable potential 
for the role of policy learning. The policy actors had to cope with the adverse 
perturbations, which is discussed in detail in chapter 4. Their learning was vital to adapt to 
the changes and stabilize the system. This included organizational and operational aspects, 
as well as substantive forest-related issues138.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
published officially in the past years (the last official operation report was published in 1995) which limits the 
information access of outside actors to their personal networks with the council members. This made the close 
cooperation among the members of the forest societies even more important, as stated above. 
The Council is comprised of 25 representatives in total, of which seven are governmental actors (SEDARI, SEMARNAT, 
CONAFOR, Corredor Biológico, SEDESOL, PROFEPA, of which only SEDARI and Corredor Biológico are not federal 
actors), three academic organizations (research units of INIFAP and the University of Quintana Roo) six forest societies 
(Chaktemal, Zona Maya, Sur, Chicle Natural, Noh Bec and COCAF) and only one non-governmental organization (TRC 
with strong personal links to the governmental actors through its director), four enterprises and several forest technicians.  
138 The CFC's gradual shift towards environmental goals is analyzed in chapter 5.1.3. and also discusses the policy 
learning and prioritization that motivated the strategic approach of the PPF. 
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3.4. Grassroot Environmental Movement –The Case of  British Columbia, 
Canada 
3.4.1. Key Parameters of the Policy Subsystem 
3.4.1.1. Forest Economy and Benefit Sharing  
Forestry is by far the most important industry in British Columbia. BC covers roughly the 
size of France and Germany combined (95 million ha) and contributes about 8% of the 
total industrial harvest139 worldwide. The prevalent characteristics of the BC forest sector 
are economic dominance of forestry for the regional economy, export dependency, revenue 
dependency, and a dominance of large-scale corporate businesses. The forest industry in 
BC is heavily dependent on export markets. Forest products account for as much as half of 
total BC exports (e.g., in 1998, 51.2%),140 mostly softwood141. Forestry is the leading 
industrial employer, providing around 18% of the province's workforce142 and more than 
116 communities primarily dependent on forestry143. 
Almost all of the wood in BC is softwood, used to produce lumber, plywood, shakes, 
shingles, newsprint, and pulp and paper products. In fact, about half of the softwood 
produced in Canada comes from BC and forest products are the province's most important 
export commodity, accounting for more than half ($15 billion, or 52%) of the province's 
total exports in 1999144. 
 
Figure: Declining Role of the 
Forest Industry in the BC 
Economy. Source: Statistics 
Canada 2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
139 FAO 1996, cited by Wilson et al. 1999, 85 
140 Stanbury 2000, 29.  
141 As Statistics Canada states, almost all of the wood in BC is softwood, used to produce lumber, plywood, shakes, 
shingles, newsprint, and pulp and paper products. About half of the softwood produced in Canada comes from BC and 
forest products are the province's most important export commodity, accounting for more than half ($15 billion, or 52%) 
of the province's total exports in 1999. 
142 Price Waterhouse Cooper 1996, cited by Wilson et al. 1999 
143 Wilson et al. 1999, 82 
144 Statistics Canada 2006  http://www.guidetobceconomy.ca 
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The forest industry's role in the economy is declining. It now accounts for only 6% of 
total GDP and 5% of employment. During the 1990s, GDP growth in forestry was well 
below the provincial average (Statistics Canada). Between 1985 and 2000, the industry's 
GDP increased 14%, compared to cumulative growth of 58% in all industries. 
 
3.4.1.2. Tenure System and Regulatory Framework 
About 95% of BC forests are owned by the provincial government as Crown lands. These 
lands are for the most part under official administration of the Ministry of Forests145. In 
light of the immense proportion of Crown lands in BC, the Ministry of Forests traditionally 
holds a very strong position in governing the forest sector146. The BC government, thus, 
not only holds all constitutional functions of management and decision-making authority 
for the forest, but is also the residual claimant to the economic potentials of the forest lands 
and holds an immense direct economic interest in its wealth. As opposed to the industry's 
net earnings that are bound to fluctuating global markets, the province can rely on rather 
stable annual revenues from stumpage payments147.  
      Figure: Land Tenure in British Columbia. Source: BC Ministry of Forests and Range148 
  
                                                 
145 92%; see Wilson et al. 1999, 85 
146 Other governmental agencies hold not much beyond advisory functions. The Ministry of Environment, Lands and 
Parks, on the other hand, is mandated to protect provincial lands and wildlife on the area that is not concerned with forest 
harvesting. 
147 Between 1994 and 1998, for example, the direct revenues such as stumpage fees and royalties paid to the BC 
government as the owner of the land averaged around Can$1.630 billion per year. 
148 http://www.bcforestinformation.com/maps/frames.htm 
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Based on this ownership, the BC tenure centers on cutting rights rather than territorial 
rights. The system was designed to create long-term security to encourage and protect 
investment in the forestry sector. It is organized in two dominant forms of tenure, 
established under the 1979 Forest Act: area-based Tree Farm Licenses (TFL) which cover 
about 24% of the Annual Allowable Cut (AAC), and volume-based Forest Licenses (FL) 
that cover about 57% of the AAC. TFLs are granted for 25 years and can be extended 
indefinitely based on revised agreements, while Forest Licences are limited to 15 years. 
Although operating under the same regulations, the ecological and economic interests of 
the licence holders are different because the TFL holders actually manage the forest lands 
through all phases of rotation, while the Forest Licence holders are only involved in a 
rather static replanting requirement after logging149.  
 
Figure: Tenure Licenses  in British Columbia since 1860s. Source: Cortex 2001. 
 
 
The traditional BC tenure system does not acknowledge multi-use interests of other 
potential forest users—such as local small-scale businesses, municipalities, first nations, 
tourism operators, NTFP manufacturers etc—, which are considered secondary to timber 
                                                 
149 Burda et al. 1997, 34 
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extraction.150 Over 86% of BC's public forest lands are held by 20 corporations, while 
23% are even just held by 3 companies alone151. Small-scale tenures such as woodlots 
with a range between 400-600 hectares account for less than 1% of the allowable annual 
cut (AAC) in the province. 
Community forestry is not new in BC, but very small without a community-specific tenure 
concept. Three community forests came into existence since the 1960s through private land 
acquisition or TFL, FL or woodlot licences (WL).152 However, they cover less than 0.1 
percent of the province's forests153, and did not receive community-based rights outside the 
existing tenure license structures. The strong industrial orientation of the tenure system was 
heavily under debate in the 1990s and called for a shift of focus from timber to ecosystem 
management154.  
Since 1997, a new policy package of the Community Forestry Pilot Plan has been 
introduced through a long process of policy debate in the province. This process has led to 
a new option of community tenures within the existing tenure system, implemented in 11 
communities with 246,000ha and 431,000m3 timber (which represents only 0.4% of BC’s 
forest area and less than 0.3% of the province’s Annual Allowable Cut) since 2004. 
Another 14 communities are in the process of negotiating a community forest agreement 
with the Ministry of Forests, but even if awarded this would add up to less than 1% of the 
provincial AAC. Thus, the extent of community tenures is very restricted in British 
Columbia, or has not become broader for particular reasons during the policy process. The 
tenure debate and its outcome are explored in section 3.6.3. 
 
3.4.1.3. Forest Policy Network and Belief Systems 
Until the 1980s, British Columbia's forest-related policy network was characterized by a 
very unequal relationship between the state and organized interests, in which clientele 
associations had a key role in providing information and political representation to the state 
agencies155. Adapted to the long-standing tenure system, large, vertically-integrated forest 
                                                 
150 Burda et al. 1997, viii 
151 Burda et al. 1997, 2 
152 There are three community-based TFLs in BC: Mission TFL 26, Tanizul Timber Limited TFL 42, and Revelstoke 
TFL 56. Mission TFL 26: 10,400 hectares (1,200 ha municipal land, 9,200 Crown land); established in the1950s after a 
Municipal Forest Reserve from 1948. Tanizul Timber Limited TFL 42 is 49 394 hectares, with a productive forest land 
base of 45 207 hectares or 92 percent of the total area. Revelstoke TFL 56: private corporation established in 1993 with 
the City of Revelstoke as its sole shareholder (Revelstoke Community Forest Corporation); largest community forest in 
BC at 119,505 ha 
153 Hoberg 2001, in: Cashore et al. 2001 
154 see, for example, Clogg 1997, Raizada 1997, Cashore 1998, Harshaw 2000, Boyd 2003, Burda 1997 
155 Cashore 1998, 10; referring to the clientele pluralist network as one of Coleman and Skogstad's (1990) five general 
types of policy networks: clientele pluralist network as explained above; pressure pluralist network with an autonomous 
state agency; corporatist network with a strong and autonomous state agency and an associational system that 
compromises a few large and powerful groups; the concertation network similar to the previous but with only one social 
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companies had emerged that provided the large-scale output to maintain BC's export 
economy156.  
The BC forest sector is represented by a strong group of timber enterprises whose 
economic goals and contributions make them powerful and close allies to the provincial 
government. With the structural dependence of BC on forestry and the capital-intense, 
long-term investment nature of the industry, a symbiotic relationship developed between 
the government and the industrial actors. This collaboration –both for the sake of the 
company as well as for the province's prosperity—led to major forestry issue networks that 
resemble concertation networks, if not company states [with a] favourable environment for 
the operations of large companies157. 
In correspondence to the assumptions of the ACF, two coalitions were found in which the 
actors formed opposing coalitions in the community forestry policy subsystem. The state-
oriented actors—mostly industrial forest sector—formed a coalition which was identified 
by the 16 interviewees across both coalitions.  
 
                                                                                                                                                    
organization involved in policy-making; and the state-directed network in which the state agency is strong and 
autonomous, dominates the policy sector and largely decides on its own 
156 Cashore 1998 
157 Wellstead 2003 
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Table: State Forestry Coalition in British Columbia158 
 identified by most actors 
(i.e. at least two-thirds) 
identified by some actors 
(i.e. at least one-third) 
n = 16 11-16 statements 6-10 statements 
 
transregional SF 
actors 
• Weyerhaeuser 
• Canadian Forest Service 
• National Network of Forest 
Practitioners 
• FPAC Forest Products Association 
of Canada  
 
 
regional SF actors 
• Ministry of Forestry, Resource 
Tenures and Engineering Branch 
• Council of Forest Industries 
• Forest Alliance BC 
• BC Forest Service  
• Forest Department at University of 
British Columbia UBC 
• First Nations Forestry Program 
• ABCPF Association of British 
Columbia Professional Foresters 
 
local SF actors 
• Ministry of Forests – Forest District 
Queen Charlottes 
• West Fraser Timber 
• Husby Timber 
• Western Forest Products 
• Esketemc First Nation Forest 
Products Ltd. 
• Esketemc First Nation/Alkali 
Resource Management Ltd 
 
Environmental groups had existed in British Columbia before the 1980s, but had not 
reached the political voice they were about to develop as a powerful environmental 
movement in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Especially environmental conservation and 
small-scale restoration projects for recreational purposes were the focus of the existing 
environmental groups until the 1980s. As a slowly forming response to the industrial 
logging pressure, several local groups started to focus on forest degradation and possible 
political solutions. These initiatives were mostly limited to a regional activity and not 
coordinated as a joint political force. There is no discernible Canadian environmental 
advocacy coalition on the federal level because the jurisdictional and land ownership issues 
are mostly in the hands of the provincial authorities. British Columbia developed a strong 
environmental advocacy coalition that is clearly identifiable and is restricted to the 
boundaries of the province, based on the regional concerns about the forest sector159.  
                                                 
158 10 of the state forestry actors have a more central or active position in the coalition, as they were identified by more 
than two-thirds of the interviewees (i.e. by more than 11 statements). 9 actors of the state forestry coalition were 
interviewed. The numbers of the actors and the interviewed representatives differ at some points because some 
individuals represent more than one actor at the same time.  
159 Cashore (2003, 223) 
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Table: Community Forestry Coalition in British Columbia160 
 identified by most actors 
(i.e. at least two-thirds) 
identified by some actors 
(i.e. at least one-third) 
n = 16 11-16 statements 6-10 statements 
transregional CF 
actors 
• Greenpeace • n/a 
 
regional CF actors 
• Dogwood Initiative 
• Ecoforestry Institute 
• Friends of Clayoquot Sound 
• POLIS Institute for Ecological 
Governance  
• Sierra Club of Canada – BC Chapter 
• West Coast Environmental Law 
• CFAC Community Forest Advisory 
Committee  
• Western Canada Wilderness 
Committee 
• Silva Forest Foundation 
• Robin Clark Inc. 
• British Columbia Community Forest 
Association BCCFA  
• BC Coalition for Sustainable Forest 
Solutions 
• Community Planning Forum; 
affiliated with the Ministry of 
Sustainable Resource Management 
 
local CF actors 
• Gowgaia Institute 
• Council of Haida Nation 
• ICSI Haida Island Community 
Stability Initiative 
• Esketemc First Nation 
• Pacific Forestry Centre 
 
The internal structures and development of the two advocacy coalitions are explored in 
chapter 4, where their policy learning and changes of beliefs are analyzed in detail. For an 
overview, the policy beliefs of the two opposing coalitions are presented below.  
The table shows their belief systems before the implementation phase of the community 
forestry policy process developed. It indicates a strong polarization of both positions 
between centralized authority vs. decentralized grassroot structures, as well as resource 
abundance vs. scarcity of valuable old-growth forest. 
 
                                                 
160 The interviews identified the below listed 19 actors as part of the community forestry coalition. Of the 19 members, 13 
actors have a more central position. They were identified by more than two-thirds160 of the 16 interviewees (i.e. by more 
than 11 statements). 10 actors of the state forestry coalition were interviewed. They were chosen by the regional 
relevance of the actors for the investigated communities in Esketemc and on Haida Gwaii. 
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Table: Belief Systems of the Advocacy Coalitions in British Columbia161 
 
State-directed and Private  
Forestry Coalition (SFC) 
Community Forestry  
Coalition (CFC) 
n = 16 11-16 statements 11-16 statements 
1. Deep Core Beliefs  
natural resources for economic use 
and entrepreneurial benefit (12) 
abundance of natural resources 
through territorial expansion (11) 
ethic responsibility to spare and 
protect wilderness (14) 
humans are intruders if they exploit 
for economic profit (14) 
2. Policy Core Beliefs 
centralized governmental authority 
to coordinate exploration and 
resource use and to provide 
planning security for businesses 
(15) 
decentralized local authority to secure 
long-term interests in sustainability 
and local employment (13) 
 
3. Secondary Beliefs: 
 
Secondary Beliefs related to the local institutional organization of community forestry: 
3.1 forest decision-
making  
conversion of old growth rainforest 
to more productive second growth 
forest to protect economy (14) 
protection of old growth rainforest to 
preserve pristine wilderness (12) 
 
3.2 benefit 
distribution  
BC forests are 95% on Crown 
Lands, so there is no focus on 
communal rights (12) 
local benefit secondary to nature 
conservation (14) 
 
3.3 organization of    
authority 
Crown Lands Æ no communal 
rights; many indigenous groups 
have no legal basis so far (11) 
local authority more for nature 
conservation than for exploitation 
(15) 
 
Secondary Beliefs related to the structure of the policy network:: 
3.4 hierarchical 
structures and 
formality 
the provincial government is the 
legitimate authority (15) 
regional sub-administration provides 
a faster approval of logging plans 
(14) 
local initiatives complements 
transparent administration (15) 
 
                                                 
161 As in the previous sections, the policy beliefs are based on the 22 interviews across the coalitions. The two significant 
changes of policy beliefs are marked in bold; please refer to sections 7.3.2 and 7.4.2 for a detailed analysis. The coalitions 
are listed in detail in Annex 2. 
  
 
 
105
 
3.5 network 
cooperation and 
information access 
closed efficient network between the 
only legally authorized decision-
makers: provincial government and 
industry (13) 
cooperation across local initiatives 
(16) 
 
 
3.4.2. Implementation Phase 1991 - 2001 
3.4.2.1. External Perturbations and Policy Change 
Nearly all interviewees identify the initial phase of the community forestry process in the 
early 1990s, when several shifts occurred that imposed external changes on the policy 
subsystem. All interviewees identified the immense BC environmental movement (16 out 
of 16 statements) as one of the most powerful events, during which BC's large-scale 
industrial logging had become subject to international boycott campaigns against the 
leading timber industries, and brought global attention to the state of the Pacific temperate 
rainforest. Equally, all interviewees (16) identified the declining local benefit from the 
forest as a major external influence on the policy subsystem, as it mobilized the general BC 
public in search for a better employment and tenure structure in BC forest communities. 
Especially, the rapid technological change in the forestry sector (9) and the shift towards 
large-scale logging industries was perceived as a threat on the forest employment and 
community benefit. 
The BC government was taken over by the National Democrat Party (NDP) in 1991 which 
replaced the Social Democrat Party. This caused a major rupture to the policy subsystem 
and was also identified as the one sudden trigger of change by all interviewees (16). 
Behind the trigger, all interviewees identify the driving force of change as the ongoing 
environmental movement that grew from grassroot to international campaigns during the 
early 1990s, and also thematized the local benefit that trickled down from large-scale 
industrial logging to the local communities. As another important event, aboriginal title 
cases (13 out of 16 statements) had increasingly developed influence as they won the first 
court cases against the Crown and pressured for a change of the BC tenure rights.  
As the BC environmental movement had become immensely active during the 1990s, the 
policy network became more open, diverse, and accessible. Tenure and the economic 
prospects of the forest sector were scrutinized with an unprecedented public involvement, 
as all 16 interviewees state. Virtually over night, the new NDP government had opened the 
door to a policy sector which previously resembled a closed clientelist network.  
The hierarchical procedures of decision-making were unchanged in the policy field though, 
which remained a major determinant of the changing policy network, and was identified by 
14 out of 16 statements. 8 interviewees explained that this resulted from the quick pace of 
changes that the NDP was pressured to take, making it impossible to implement all 
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changes through systematic and comprehensive reforms. 7 interviewees also identified the 
large number of policy issues as a restriction to profound changes, because the NDP had 
to address too many different issues—beyond community forestry—at the same time. Both 
effects are described in detail below. For the interview statements in detail, please refer to 
Annex 4. 
 
External Event I: Environmental Movement 
British Columbia has become a prominent example for an environmental grassroot 
movement that called for local governance. The first environmental campaigns emerged in 
BC in the late 1980s after several studies drew attention to toxic effluents of BC's pulp 
mills162. Later on, especially the clearcutting of old-growth forests proved to be a sensitive 
and emotional issue163 that generated public involvement. The previous perception of an 
endless abundance of the forest which had dominated since the frontier years in Western 
Canada vanished, and the public realized the environmental vulnerability of the forest 
resources. The ecological impact of logging soon had an influence on the awareness of the 
public about resource extraction in the province. The aesthetic and cultural aspects of 
nature, such as a spiritual attachment to the land, beauty and ancestors consequently turned 
into primary goals in the motivation of the regional NGOs, as most CFC interviewees 
recall. The environmental groups started public campaigns in the province which at first 
concentrated on punctuate conservation efforts in their local area.  
The opposition to industrial logging climaxed in the 1993 international protests against the 
logging plans at Clayoquot Sound, one of the significantly valued old-growth areas of 
coastal temperate rainforest on Vancouver Island. They highlight the political momentum 
and immense impact that environmental issues had on the forest policy of the 1990s. 
 
 
                                                 
162 Greenpeace and the US Environmental Protection Agency released data in 1987 that revealed dioxin traces in the pulp 
mill effluents; a subsequent 1988 investigation then boosted the emerged environmental campaign by showing that 
actually most pulp and paper mills did not meet the environmental standards of the 1971 federal Pulp and Paper Effluent 
Regulations (Raizada 1997, 167; cited by Cashore 1998, 21) 
163 Among others, Greenpeace was founded in Vancouver 1971 and was among the first to call attention to the state of the 
temperate rainforest on the Canadian Pacific Coast. The rise of the environmental movement in BC developed along an 
increasing notion of scarcity and vulnerability of the forest. As the colonization settlement moved into more peripheral 
areas, and the logging industry expanded its operations closer to settled areas, encounters between the two led to a 
growing awareness as people experienced the clearcutting on a more tangible level (Lertzman et al. 1996, 120). Some 
interviewees described that, until the 1980s, the public focus of environmental criticism was primarily on BC Hydro, the 
corporate hydropower industry and their placative large-scale projects that were easier to grasp in their scale of impact 
and perceived as such. With the expansion of settlement frontiers on one hand and an expansion of industrial logging on 
the other hand, a sudden notion of scarcity kicked in among the population. Due to expanding logging roads in areas used 
for recreation, people were suddenly face to face with vast clearcuts and logging activities on a level of personal 
experience. 
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The 1993 Clayoquot Sound Protests 
Clayoquot Sound contains the largest area of intact (unlogged) temperate rainforest left on 
Vancouver Island and covers an area of about 3,500 km² in total (land and water area). After 
several years of resistance, the 1993 'Clayoquot Land Use Decision' of the BC Ministry of Forests 
announced that it had approved the logging of most of the old-growth forest of the sound by the 
timber enterprise Weyerhaeuser164. The BC environmental movement reached its climax in public 
attention when thousands of people, from the province and internationally, protested against the 
decision. More than 800 protesters were arrested from a whole variety of backgrounds. It became 
the largest event of civil disobedience that Canada has seen. 
The CFC initiated large-scale international boycott campaigns. They targeted an indirect pressure 
on the trade relations of the forest sector, public awareness, and pressure towards a stricter 
international regulation. The campaigns pushed forward the environmental protection as a matter of 
global interest. International ENGOs165 joined the protests and strategically aimed at two goals: 
firstly, an indirect pressure campaign from abroad towards a response from the forest industry; and 
secondly, towards more environmental awareness in the province that would change the 
population's social values towards more conservation. Especially Greenpeace turned the protests 
into an overseas campaign as part of their international strategic focus. British Columbia was 
paraphrased as the "Brazil of the North", and international boycotts of BC timber put the regional 
forest industry under heavy pressure.  
 
Clayoquot Sound became synonymous with the environmental protests and the destructive 
image of logging166. The case had gained a high international news coverage, and it had 
become an outstanding example of environmentalist action of the urban population that 
traveled far to participate in Clayoquot Sound. The BC public was now sensitized for the 
aesthetic and ecological damage of large-scale logging, and mobilized against the dominant 
structures of the forest sector. In the years that led to the protests, sustainable logging and 
environmental protection had clearly become important issues that were backed by large 
public pressure.  
 
External Event II: Declining Local Benefit from the Forest 
Across all actors, the decline of forestry employment and an increasing marginalization of 
BC rural communities was identified as another of the key concerns that raised criticism 
among the BC public and thus contributed to a wider policy debate. While the economic 
                                                 
164 As an important example for the multinational scenery in BC, Weyerhaeuser has become a particularly known name 
since the environmental debate of the 1990s. The company made its first investment in Canada in 1964, added 
significantly to its holdings and became Canada’s largest forest products company with the purchase of MacMillan 
Bloedel Limited in 1999. 
165 for a review of the significant roles of German ENGOs in BC (e.g. Greenpeace Germany), see MacKenzie 1996 
166 The Land Use Decision still stands today. Clayoquot Sound was designated a World UNESCO Biosphere Reserve in 
2000. The designation brought World recognition of the ecological importance of Clayoquot Sound, and a monetary fund 
to promote ecological economic alternatives. However, it brought no new environmental regulation or protection. 
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structures were still designed around the needs of timber extraction, the industry was 
declining in its relative importance for the BC economy167. One major change over the 
years was the general context of socio-economic conditions and the dominant values of 
society, from superabundance to shrinking pie, as Wilson (1997) paraphrases: 
Over the course of two decades the province shifted from a mood of superabundance to a 
mood of limits, from the easy politics of allocating an expanding pie among a limited list of 
adversaries who shared many key values, to the much more difficult politics of allocating a 
shrinking pie among a longer list of adversaries who were divided by value differences.168 
This had several effects on the public opinion and policy positions around the forestry 
sector: The decline created a gloomy situation in which the BC forest economy was 
considered to need a recovery that addressed its structural weaknesses. At the same time, 
the new notion of scarcity and vulnerability of the BC forest resources raised 
environmental awareness among the public, which led to a boost of the debate about 
sustainable logging, 'healthier' small-scale logging, and the long-term benefit for the 
communities.  
As old growth forests are clearcut and replaced by second growth, the public realized that 
there would be an inevitable decline of the AAC as the second growth would bring less 
timber volume per area than the old growth. This had long been acknowledged by the 
government and industry actors as "fall down effect". The paradox between a sustainable 
yield on one hand and considerable reductions of the AAC on the other hand has caused an 
immense conflict with the public169. It made the critics come together from different 
backgrounds, as well from community employment as well as the environmentalists. 
Furthermore, the rise of the tourism industry to the second biggest economic sector in the 
province emphasized the recreational and aesthetic values of the forest. This created 
diametrically opposed policy goals towards the forests with regard to the formulation of a 
comprehensive land use policy170. 
The forest sector became increasingly competitive and was struggling with the growing 
dominance of large multinational enterprises, and increasing legal and economic 
complexity that unfolds in rapid and large-scale takeovers. The forest sector had 
experienced a considerable economic concentration and pressuring competition among the 
multinational timber enterprises. In 1990, the degree of concentration of tenure had grown 
considerably over the past two decades. The largest tenure holder now controlled 17% of 
the committed harvesting rights (13% in 1975), and the 20 largest controlled 86% (from 
74% in 1975)171. For example, Weyerhaeuser added considerably to its holdings and 
became Canada’s largest forest products company with the purchase of MacMillan Bloedel 
                                                 
167 from 13% in 1970 to 8% in 1994, for details see Gunton 1997 
168 Wilson 1997, 95 
169 Cashore 1998, 278 
170 Gunton 1997 
171 Forest Resources Commission 1991: The Future of Our Forests; for a discussion see Cashore 2002, 376 
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Limited in 1999. The Canadian branch of the international company now holds 
renewable, long-term licenses on 13.2 million hectares of forestlands in five provinces 
and owns 269,000 hectares.  
 
External Event II: National Democrat Party (NDP) takes over Government 
All 16 out of 16 interviewees identify the change of the provincial government as one of 
the major external events that initiated the process towards community forestry. The 
provincial elections in 1991172 provided the key catalyst event that allowed for the growing 
environmental criticism to unfold. The NDP replaced the Social Credit Party and suddenly 
created the political space for change that the growing community forestry coalition had 
prepared for in the previous years.  
Entering the policy arena at this stage that called for an environmental shift, the NDP was 
ordered to implement an extensive reform package in forest policy. The NDP found a 
considerable body of work already in the blueprint drawer after it had been prepared in the 
past years by the forest administration and Community Forestry Actors. 
Harcourt's first Minister of Forests, Dan Miller, found an extensive menu of reform designs 
(…) in considerable part a result of the far-reaching policy development work done by the 
bureaucracy (and, more generally, by the policy community) in the years prior to the NDP's 
1991 victory.173 . . [T]he Party came into office on a detailed platform of which about one-
half the specific measures listed referred to changes in forest policies or environmental 
issues.174 
From the ACF perspective, the 1991 elections represent the key perturbation of the policy 
subsystem that shook the power constellation of actors and caused a change of the systemic 
governing coalition. Environmental concerns had been one of the major reasons of public 
dissatisfaction that had induced the governmental takeover. As a result, the NDP had a 
strong interest to proceed quickly with a coherent reform agenda to show results and 
consolidate the young government.  
At the same time, forest policy opened up "interesting dilemmas"175 for the NDP, because 
its coalition and voters encompassed both environmentalists and labour supporters176. The 
NDP had reasons to be reluctant to fundamental policy change177 which would lead to an 
unknown outcome regarding their voter support. Thus, the change of the government 
                                                 
172 Of 75 seats, the NDP only received a slight majority of 39 seats as opposed to the considerably strong Liberals with 33 
seats, and other parties with only 3 seats in total. BC Provincial Election results in 1996. 
173 Wilson 1997 
174 Stanbury 2000, 248 
175 Hoberg (1996, 141)  
176 As Hoberg (1996, 141) further stresses, "developing a 'greener' forest policy was essential to the party's electoral 
strategy of moving beyond its core base of labour to capture white-collar, middle-class urbanites. 
177 discussed in detail in the following section 
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clearly did not represent the causal driver of change, but rather the catalyst event that gave 
way for the momentum of the environmental movement and the declining local forest 
benefit.  
Figure: External Perturbations on the Community Forestry Policy Subsystem 
External 
Perturbations 
 External 
Event I: 
External 
Event I: 
External 
Event II:  
   
        
  Environmental Declining  Change of  sudden perturbation affecting 
  Movement Local Forest Government  the systemic governing coalition 
   Benefit to NDP    
        
        
      
     growing public support     
Community       
Forestry  Community  State Forestry    
Policy  Forestry Coalition Coalition    
Subsystem       
       
  Policy Decision by Sovereign    
        
        
   Policy Output:    
        
        
  1992 government establishes the First Nations Forestry Council (FNFC)   
Policy Output  1992 (until 1996) consensus-based CORE land use planning process 
commissioned to re-design land use regulations with broad participation of 
Community Forestry actors 
 
            
          1994 Forest Renewal BC established as a policy forum for industry,      
          labour, Community Forestry actors, aboriginals, local government, and   
          public servants.  
 
                               
                     1997 Community Forestry Initiative (CFI) and Pilot Plan CFPP  
 
                               
 
Review and Discussion: Policy Changes 
Above listed policy output represents the key changes that affect community forest tenures 
in BC. The 1997 Community Forestry Pilot Plan (CFPP) represents a key instrument 
introduced to accommodate the communities' demand for a form of local forest tenure. It 
was the government's first major modification to the forest tenure system since the 1978 
Pearse Commission178. The 1998 Bill 34 Forest Statutes Amendment Act subsequently 
                                                 
178 Burda 1999, 1 
  
 
 
111
 
introduced the legislation to implement and test community forest agreements. The CFPP 
advisory committee recommended a new tenure model which was area-based, long-term, 
and would convey stewardship rights and responsibilities beyond timber management. The 
length of the local lease in the 1997 CFPP tenure was extended to 99 years (as opposed to 
15-25 years for FLs and TFLs).179 The established model introduced a five years pilot, then 
eligible for a long-term agreement of 15-99 years. However, it is important to note that the 
CFPP did not reform the BC tenure system, but rather formed an add-on program for 
specific communities which was managed by the Ministry of Forests. 
Beyond the realms of community forestry, the 1990s saw a major policy shift towards 
forest protection, reduced industrial logging, and public participation in land use planning, 
which led to a large number of changes in the forest-related policy domain: 
 
Table: Major Changes in forest-related policy making and administration. See 
Cashore 2002, 336ff 
1990  Provincial Old Growth Strategy initiated, with an interdisciplinary public process established to develop a 
framework for managing old-growth forests (recommendations made in 1992)   
1991  (Feb '91 before change of government to NDP): public hearings on a BC government plan begin to study sites 
for more than 115 new parks and 62 wilderness areas on Crown lands   
1992  government establishes the First Nations Forestry Council (FNFC) 
1992  Forest Sector Economic Strategy formed to address stakeholder concerns 
1992  new public consultation process initiated by Ministry of Environment to develop a new Environmental 
Assessment legislation 
1993  Protected Areas Strategy 
1994  Forest Renewal BC established as a policy forum for industry, labour, Community Forestry actors, aboriginals, 
local government, and public servants 
1994  Forest Land Reserve Act 
1994  Forest Practices Code 
1994  Office of the Forest Jobs established by the BC Cabinet to mitigate CORE land use decisions to address 
stakeholder concerns for adverse CORE effects (loss of rural jobs) 
1995  all new TFL licences have enhanced provisions for public participation in planning and aboriginal consultation 
1997  Jobs and Timber Accord (JTA) 
1998  Bill 34 Forest Statutes Amendment Act 
 
Since the change of government in 1991, most substantial eco-forest policy fields 
underwent comprehensive changes, as outlined above. Especially the 1994 Forest Practices 
                                                 
179 The timber rotation cycle is about 80 years (Mitchell-Banks 1998). Therefore, in order to create incentives for the 
community to optimize the ecological management and silvicultural investments on one hand, and consolidate long-term 
planning in forest-related business and employment (Harshaw 2000, 5) on the other, the government granted a longer 
lease than the traditional tenure system allowed for. 
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Code introduced a comprehensive set of logging standards180, which seeked to respond to 
the public concerns over unsustainable industrial logging. It introduced a systematic set of 
clearcut size regulations that replaced non-mandatory regional guidelines. It also launched 
an internal recalculation of the inventory of standing timber available for logging, which 
resulted in a reduction of the annual allowable cut to help regenerate areas with prior 
overuse. Additionally—in  response to the negative environmental image that BC had 
become known for during the protests—the BC government introduced North America's 
toughest pulp mill effluent standards.  
It is important to note that the government’s response to the environmental movement 
prioritized promptness over structural consequence in some cases. Especially the first 
waves of environmentalism had not led to a significant policy change in the industrial 
logging system and reforestation181, but rather to a rushed change of the sustained yield 
system and the annual allowable cut (AAC). In a similar attempt in 1992, the province’s 
Chief Forester ordered a 34% reduction of the AAC right after the environmental protests 
to respond to the public concerns as immediately as possible, while the calculation system 
of the AAC, however, was not changed towards a stricter definition of sustainability in 
general182.  
The policy changes of the 1990s also introduced a new involvement of local communities, 
while not passing down actual decision-making authority. They established several 
measures that offered the communities new funds to mitigate the effects of industrial 
logging, and protected more forest areas to secure the communities' resource base in the 
long run. For example, for forest licences and tenure, the replacement period for tree farm 
licenses (TFLs) was reduced from 10 to 5 years in 1993, in order to respond better to local 
socio-economic needs and environmental concerns. From 1995 on, all new TFL licences 
were issued with enhanced provisions for public participation in planning and aboriginal 
consultation. Most interviewees argue that these policy changes were clearly motivated by 
the declining local forest benefit that had outraged the communities and triggered the local 
initiatives and regional debate. This, again, suggests a reactive character of the policy 
changes as an immediate response to specific pressures, rather than a structural reform. The 
reasons are discussed in detail in the following section. 
 
Overall, the external factors on the policy events of the 1990s can be synthesized as 
follows. 
• CAUSAL DRIVERS OF CHANGE: The BC environmental movement generated 
an immense background of public interest, which heavily changed the actors and 
pressures of the policy field. It can be summarized as the most important external 
                                                 
180 for an overview, see, for example, Cashore 2002, 336ff. 
181 The 1978 Forest Act had already made reforestation a statutory requirement much earlier. Cashore 1998, 276 
182 as opposed to other policy systems for example in the Pacific West of the United States Cashore 1998, 277 
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event that drove environmental policy change in BC.  
• UNDERLYING EXTERNAL CAUSE. The decline of the employment and local 
benefit from the forest industry also motivated public criticism about the BC forest 
industry significantly; especially once the process was started and the CFC had 
formed. 
• KEY CATALYST EVENT: The change of the provincial government in 1991 
caused a strong perturbation that changed the systemic governing coalition in BC. It 
represents the sudden trigger for the implementation phase because it introduced a 
high level of expectation for environmental policy change. 
• POLICY OUTPUT: The BC environmental policy saw an immense change during 
these years. Despite the far-reaching change of environmental regulations and 
logging standards in the 1990s, however, most changes did not touch on the 
existing structures of administration, decision-making, or tenure. In particular, 
community forestry policy was much less changed than related environmental 
fields. The CFPP did not lead to a reform of the overall tenure system as the 
community forestry coalition had called for, but offered an add-on program that 
responded to the community initiatives that had increasingly called for a stronger 
local benefit and a community-based tenure. 
 
3.4.2.2. Effects on the Policy Subsystem  
Accessibility of the Policy Network: Policy arena opens to a multitude of new actors  
The 1990s transformed the BC forest policy network significantly. The environmental 
movement opened up the policy arena to a multitude of new actors and thus boosted the 
accessibility of the network. By the early 1990s, the policy debates—previously called the 
'dialogue of the deaf' era—had grown to be more productive, as the external events above 
suggested. The many grassroot-based actors were becoming increasingly institutionalized 
into established organizations with growing resources, employees, and different means of 
representation. This formalization process occurred within the individual organizations as 
well as across the coalition towards a more institutionalized network. During the 1990s, the 
network accessibility thus changed significantly through the numerous ENGOs, indigenous 
and community-oriented initiatives that were entering the arena since the beginning of the 
environmental movement.  
All interviewees (16) noted an immense change in the policy network that allowed better 
access to the discourse. Most interviewees agree that the change of the government had 
created a rupture among the existing network, which allowed more policy actors into the 
arena. Several add that the arena of the discourse had evolved from closed government-led 
spheres towards a more open arena of criticism among the interested public because of the 
widespread public interest of the environmental movement. In conclusion, the new 
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government had been the key trigger to this, while the environmental movement had 
generated the policy actors and necessary public pressure for this.    
The result of the network shift in the early 1990s was the access of new interdisciplinary 
and interactive forums for a more pluralist participation in forest policy, involving different 
stakeholder and expert groups. Both coalitions formed united representation bodies to 
prepare for the more publicized discourse and higher competition. The Community 
Forestry Coalition (CFC) formed an internal coalition called BC Wild, characterized as an 
"effective elite group lobby" (M'Gonigle 1997, 48) to secure protected wilderness areas. 
The State Forestry Coalition (SFC) established a joint representation body called the Forest 
Alliance. It was founded in 1991 at the peak of the environmental protests to act 
strategically as a stronger united voice in political and public relation campaigns. 
Both coalitions were struggling to succeed. The State Forestry Coalition was severely 
pushed by the CFC with their increasing power in resources and public support, through 
which the SFC had long been forced into a counter-active position in order to defend the 
forest industry in BC against the environmental pressures, rather than being free to push 
ahead the coalition's own agenda proactively.183 The Community Forestry Coalition, on the 
other hand, faced internal challenges. The immense environmental movement had 
developed a rather heterogeneous structure, which embraced a whole range of different 
environmental concerns and policy beliefs. This represented one of the main strengths of 
the coalition, since it could address many different groups in the general public and raise 
funds from various sources. At the same time, the heterogeneous composition and internal 
incongruence has been largely identified as one of the major internal constraints to the 
CFC.  
 
Hierarchical Structures of Decision-Making: Formal framework unchanged 
Despite the immense momentum of actors and new policy issues in the 1990s, most actors 
(14 out of 16) sum up that the actual framework of decision-making did not change 
significantly. The hierarchical structures of the decision-making184 in forest administration 
and policy-making remained virtually unchanged. This is particularly interesting because 
the provincial government did introduce a considerable list of forest- and environment-
related policy changes towards public participation and community consultation, as 
outlined above, but either failed or avoided to reform the responding decision-making 
structures. 
The implementation of the forest policy shift caused criticism from both coalitions who 
saw their goals compromised. The SFC claimed that the NDP's stricter environmental 
standards were threatening the economic competitiveness of BC forest products on the 
                                                 
183 Clarke 1998 
184 research indicators for policy network effects; see chapter 2.3. 
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international timber market. The CFC, on the other hand, increasingly accused the 
provincial NDP government of half-hearted changes and a lack of systematic policy-
making. Most importantly, a reform of the existing tenure system had not been addressed, 
and the law continued to grant monopoly access to significant parts of the public forest 
lands. For this reason, the actual sources of concern for community well-being and socio-
economic prospects had not been resolved185.  
Community forests, long a favourite alternative with environmentalists and 'new foresters', 
are nowhere to be seen, even though the 1991 Forest Resources Commission recommended 
that existing corporate tenures be cut back by 50 percent, and replaced with a variety of new 
arrangements. Instead, 17 of the ubiquitous Tree Farm License tenures, which provide the 
industry giants with a secure contractual base of supply, have been 'rolled over' into new 25-
year terms without public hearings or public debate.186 
The changes in community participation did not replace state-based decision-making, but 
merely provided a voluntary involvement of the local base, as some CF interviewees 
criticize. The actual decision-making hierarchy and its legal framework were also basically 
maintained, although the environmental standards were significantly improved, as 
described below. Critics argued that some of the policy changes could not achieve the 
necessary shift in the forest sector because of the overwhelming dominance of the existing 
institutional structure and the same individuals in charge: 
[T]he new Forest Practices Code continues to grant huge levels of discretionary decision-
making authority to forest ministry District Managers, the same managers who have, in the 
past, often been closely aligned to the industry they were intended to regulate.187 
Accordingly, widespread criticism emerged among the communities—and the interviewees 
of the community forestry coalition—that the new law did not embrace a more 
fundamental change. As several interviewees put it, the intense time of change in the 1990s 
had generated hope for more change than was actually implemented along the way. They 
criticized the government of "reacting with subsidies and programs to prolong volume-
based industrial forestry"188, as opposed to a policy that would pass the decision-making 
authority back to the people in BC: 
This is clearly an impressive list of governmental initiatives, and is widely regarded as the 
crowning achievement of the NDP's term of office. Nevertheless, taken together, these 
initiatives amount neither to a structural attack on the problem of centralist unsustainability 
in the British Columbia forest economy, nor to a strategic initiative to mobilize public 
sentiment in favour of such action.189 
Devolution, as nearly all Community Forestry interviewees argue, was during the 1990s 
                                                 
185 M'Gonigle and Parfitt 1993, 15 
186 M'Gonigle 1997, 43 
187 M'Gonigle 1997, 42 
188 Burda 1999, 105 
189 M'Gonigle 1997, 41 
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considered as an external feature of forest policy change, it was not applied to the internal 
structures of the hierarchy levels in decision-making:  
This dependence constrains the autonomy of the BC state when addressing fundamental 
restructuring of its industry. Thus, a distinction must be made between polices aimed at 
fundamental restructuring of the industry, and eco-forest regulations that constrain, but do 
not radically alter existing economic relations (Cashore 1998).  
The government's reconfirmingly centralist position was motivated by two different 
reasons, as several interviewees suggested. Firstly, the tasks on environmental conservation 
and forest restructuring were considered urgent right after the 1991 election; there was no 
time to be lost with lengthy participative discussions that would attempt to bring all actors 
together, and yet the political expectations were particularly high at that time:  
The government deserves marks for having pulled this off in an era when state authority and 
capacity is everywhere in decline, and at a time when media induced panic seems to be 
almost a necessary condition for the 'accomplishment' of any major public policy end."190 
Quick success and visible policy outcome was preferred and demanded by the public. 
Since the new emerging concerns on forest degradation, loss of old-growth forests, rural 
unemployment, and diminishing economic perspectives were calling for immediate 
attention of the new government, they addressed the problems by stricter regulations that 
would rehabilitate BC forestry as quickly as possible.  
Decentralization was, as especially the Community Forestry interviewees stress, an area of 
secondary concern, because it would not provide quick improvement to be shown as a 
successful policy output. Similarly, the 1990s saw a wave of invited participation of third 
parties, such as Community Forestry supporters or indigenous groups. They were, 
however, more designed for punctuate events, rather than to provide a new but slow 
decentralization effect of the decision-making process. Even the prominent CORE process 
of land use planning was considered to fall into the same category of voluntary 
involvement rather than devolution: 
The consensus-based CORE process was hailed as a new way of making decisions outside 
the old closed-door political forum. Backed with neither sufficient financial resources nor 
political authority to empower new groups, however, the process encountered a forest 
industry (both corporate and labour) that largely bided its time in the negotiations, blocked 
consensus, and then waged an old-style political campaign to influence Cabinet in its 
decision-making after the CORE reports came out.191 
Community Forestry picked up momentum as a policy goal in the mid-1990s. In 1996, the 
NDP was re-elected, while the Liberals remained in the opposition. The Liberals were 
strongly supported by the forest industry during the election. With their freshly confirmed 
political support, the NDP now allowed for more policy development towards the 1997 
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Community Forestry Initiative (CFI) that was designed to address the pressuring socio-
economic perspectives of rural BC communities.  
Part of the pragmatic political tactics was that the new sustainability programs of the NDP 
had to be supported by both the forest sector and local stakeholders from the logging 
industry. This explains the second reason for the hesitant response of the NDP government. 
A structural reform of the legal framework—against the support of the SFC—was 
considered too risky and politically costly, because the actual political support of the CFC 
after such a profound impact on the power structure were uncertain. The SFC had a strong 
basis in the policy network and among the voters, because over the past decades it had 
been the key economic power for the BC economy. Environmental policy changes were 
only considered a feasible option as a bargain with other changes that were beneficial for 
the BC forest economy. 
Accordingly, the Community Forestry Initiative (CFI) had its roots in the 1997 Job and 
Timber Accord (JTA) which was mostly concerned with the local socio-economic stability 
of rural communities in BC.192 The JTA announced clearly that "the Government will 
design and pilot at least three community forest tenures, where AAC is available, to allow 
resource communities and First Nations (including through joint ventures) to participate 
directly in managing the forest to create sustainable employment"193. 
Overall, the JTA was designed to accommodate the interests of both the government and 
forest industry to create 37,000 long-term jobs in direct and indirect forest-related areas by 
2001194. One central interest behind the principles of the JTA was to secure forestry 
investments by fostering an increase in the output (growth, yield, and value) of BC's 
available timber195. Another important issue was that the government needed to give in a 
little to the recent community forestry initiatives and public pressure, but at the same time 
restricted and postponed a larger implementation to win time for substantial research about 
it196. 
In conclusion, the NDP government strategy can be described as relatively centralist, 
conflict-avoiding, and moderate between the heavy pressure from both coalitions. They 
were careful to balance their political basis of support between economic interests and 
environmental support, as also several scholars point out:  
 (T)he upturn in the market and profit cycle which began in 1993 did not translate into a shift 
towards more radical agenda. Given its commitment to finding the deal needed to keep the 
                                                 
192 introduced in June 1997; see for example Harshaw 2000, 3 
193 BCMoF, cited by Harshaw 2000, 3 
194 Harshaw 2000, 3 
195 Harshaw 2000, 3 
196 see Harshaw 2000, 4: "At the announcement of the CFI, the BCMoF claimed that the initiative would fulfill a 
government commitment to investigate alternative methods of managing BC's forests while increasing community 
involvement (…) [although] the opportunities for community forestry would be limited, and (…) communities would be 
encouraged to explore other forest management options". 
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sustainability initiatives afloat, the government did not want to jeopardize the oncoming flow 
of revenue.197 . . .  This smooth updating of tenure is the price which the government has had to 
pay for the industry's acquiescence to other changes; it will help to lock in, for another 
generation, the corporate control of the land-base for the final liquidation of the provincial 
forest.198  
Why was the Harcourt Government so adverse to addressing tenure reform and fundamental 
structural change? The risk adversive course chosen was completely in keeping with the pre-
election emphasis on inoffensiveness. No-one in the government (…) believed that it should 
risk becoming bogged down in a nasty and prolonged battle with the industry. .. It had been 
accepted that in order to keep the sustainability initiatives afloat, the industry had to be 
coaxed into the forest renewal idea.. . .  The tenure reform forces have a lot more work to 
do.199 
 
Ironically, it is thus suggested that it was the urgent public pressure that prevented a 
structural change of the decision-making framework in conclusion. Since the government 
was apt to provide quick policy outcome towards environmental conservation, it opted for 
the less conflictive way of centralist decisions to form a stricter environmental policy, 
instead of allowing time for a more participatory process to reform the decision-making 
hierarchies.  
This constellation created a glass ceiling for fundamental reforms during the busy phase of 
policy change in the 1990s. In summary, the following can be concluded for the internal 
dynamics of the policy network. 
• HIERARCHICAL FRAMEWORK: The rushed entry of the new government—
although much anticipated—contributed to the fact that the formal decision-making 
framework was not reshaped. Although the environmental movement had initially 
triggered the immense turnover of actors, issues and the policy discourse, its 
massive wave possibly did not allow for sufficient political space and time to foster 
a fundamental restructuring towards devolution during the peak years of the public 
pressure. This was especially true for a government whose voter basis may not be 
very secure, which makes it dependent on the very outcome of its short-term policy.  
• ACCESSIBILITY OF THE NETWORK: The previously closed network opened 
to the new community forestry advocacy coalition and created a pluralist network 
with a public discourse. The community forestry coalition utilized the increased 
public pressure to force the policy network to open. Thus, this change was driven 
by the environmental movement and triggered by the change of government as a 
catalyst event.  
                                                 
197 Wilson 1997, 94 
198 M'Gonigle 1997, 43 
199 Wilson 1997, 92 
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3.4.3. Consolidation Phase since 2001: Community Forestry Agreements  
3.4.3.1. External Perturbations and Policy Change 
A new stage of the policy process started in 2001 when the provincial government changed 
from NDP to the Liberals, as interviews suggest across both coalitions. It shifted the 
community forestry policy from an implementation stage—where concepts are defined, 
expanded, and debated—to the consolidation stage where the agreed concept becomes 
institutionally consolidated over the daily forest activities in the communities.  
Interviewees from both coalitions agree that the policy process towards community 
forestry reached a state in 2001 where its extent and legal concept had settled in form of 
individual agreements (CFPAs) with the Ministry of Forests200. The Community Forestry 
Pilot Program (CFPP) continues in its revised form and offers a form of community tenure 
as an alternative to the dominant tenure system of TFL and FLs. It remains a small 
program with strong restrictions from the Ministry of Forests. Until 2005, the BC Forest 
Service issued a Community Forestry Pilot Agreement (CFPA) to 11 communities, with a 
total approved harvest of about 580,000m3 in a area of about 250,000ha. Three 
communities have been offered a CFPA, of which only Haida Gwaii was rescinded. 
Another 12 communities have been directly invited by the Forest Service to be considered 
for a CFPA201, which usually takes a few years to proceed in the planning process. 
 
External Event I: Change of Government to Liberals in 2001 
In 2001, the National Democrat Party was replaced by the Liberals202, who re-introduced a 
rather protective attitude towards the forest industry. All 16 key interviewees identify the 
win of the Liberals in the provincial elections of 2001 as the most important external event 
in the policy subsystem. Most interviewees state that the Liberals' takeover brought a 
considerable external change regarding the underlying policy beliefs of the decision-
making in the policy subsystem, as well as on the strategic behaviour towards 
communities203. In fact, several CF interviewees suggest that, if the NDP had stayed in 
power beyond 2001, the CFC would have managed to foster the structural tenure reform 
that the NDP had been reluctant to implement in the 1990s204.  
                                                 
200 As discussed above on the tenure reform debate of the 1990s, the transition of the community forestry concept into a 
consolidated stage is not hailed by both coalitions, however. The CFC interviewees see the new stage as a sharp 
interruption of the further development potential of community tenures in BC. They argue that the Liberals ended the 
process of an expanding community forestry policy, while it could have otherwise become further expanded under the 
NDP. 
201 among them the non-aboriginal community Masset (invited in Dec 2004) which was singled out from the rescinded 
attempt of the whole island of Haida Gwaii 
202 Out of 79 seats, the Liberals received 77 and the NDP only a devastating number of 2 seats. BC Provincial Election 
results 2001. 
203 see chapter 4.3.2.  
204 see chapter 4.2.2. 
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With the Liberals instead, the community forestry process was considered to level off at 
what it had accomplished so far, with no further momentum to proceed towards a tenure 
reform as debated under the NDP over the past decade. The controversy between state-
based and community-based tenure continues between the coalitions. During these years 
that ended the previous 1990s wave of environmental reforms, the Liberals were also 
increasingly pressured by the aboriginal movement towards more land rights (12). First 
Nations had gained a stronger political voice (8) and won significant court cases (8) with a 
high media profile. This put the government into a defensive position, and the state forest 
coalition struggled to maintain the tenure system to protect the forest industry at this point. 
The SFC's ongoing strategic adjustment to the community forestry debate is analyzed in 
detail in chapter 4.2.1. 
 
External Event II: Debate over economic perspectives and returns 
As in review to the policy changes of the 1990s, a debate over the BC forest economy 
continued about its economic perspectives (14 out of 16 statements). As opposed to the 
earlier public pressure and environmental movement, the new debate was complemented 
by the more protective attitude of the Liberals government. Over the past decade, the forest 
industry had lost its relative importance for the regional economy. For example, as 
Statistics Canada report for the period from 1985 to 2000, the GDP growth in forestry was 
well below the provincial average, although still increasing. Between 1985 and 2000, the 
industry's GDP increased 14%, compared to cumulative growth of 58% in all industries. 
Thus, the public concerns that had emerged in the 1990s were now translated into a further 
debate about how to plan for the softwood economy and BC industrial returns (9 
statements) and the ongoing rationalization (9) in the future. Additionally, the softwood 
lumber dispute205 which had persisted in several phases since the mid-1980s, again 
provided a central argument for the SFC about the vulnerability of the industrial actors in 
the international competition. 
 
External Event III: Aboriginal Rights Movement 
While the political leverage of the environmental movement had levelled off, the issue of 
aboriginal rights gained increasing interest in the BC public, as all interviewees noted. The 
                                                 
205   The United States-Canada softwood lumber dispute has been ongoing since 1985. Its core conflict is the claim that 
the Canadian lumber industry is unfairly subsidized by the federal and provincial governments, because the Canadian 
stumpage fee is set administratively (by the Ministry of Forests for Crown Lands) rather than through a competitive 
auction, as is often the practice in the United States. The United States claims that the provision of government timber at 
below market prices constitutes an unfair subsidy. Wikipedia 2006. The current softwood lumber dispute (Lumber IV) 
started right after the end of the former agreement in 2001. From May 22, 2002 to Dec 20, 2004 most Canadian softwood 
lumber exported to the US was subject to a combined countervailing and anti-dumping duty of 27%, collected by US 
Customs. From December 20, 2004 to December 12, 2005 the duties collected were 20%.  On December 12, 2005, the 
duties collected at the border were reduced to 10.81%. BC Forest Services 2006. 
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early 2000s saw a rise of aboriginal land claims and consultation that affected the forest-
related discourse in BC, as 12 (out of 16) interviewees point out. The new political issues 
were based on the earlier environmental discourse: Tenure and local land use concepts 
were increasingly formed into more sustainable and holistic management concepts; 
aboriginal campaigns on social rights were launched to increase the awareness of the 
public; and court cases—for the first time—had confirmed a stronger legal basis for 
aboriginal land rights as opposed to the previous interpretation of the Crown. At once, 
aboriginal land claims turned into an increasingly pressing issue all over Canada, and 
especially in BC where more than a hundred aboriginal claims had yet to be resolved.  
One of the most significant court decisions that lay the grounds for the new legal 
acknowledgement of aboriginal land rights was the 1997 Delgamuukw case, which is 
outlined in the following.  
 
Aboriginal Land Rights and the 1997 Delgamuukw Decision of the Supreme Court 
Formal accreditation of territorial power has played an important role throughout the colonization 
process of Canada206. In the opening period of European colonization of North America, the British 
Crown’s land policy was to achieve formal land cessions from the Aboriginal population207. From 
the 19th century on, these treaties were increasingly focused on ownership of land and resources208. 
This was an important initial step prior to issuing Crown land grants to arriving immigrants, 
because it seeked to the status and therefore the credibility of the Crown’s grants. This land policy 
lasted as long as to the 1920s, when the last of the Mackenzie treaties were signed209.  
The recent framework of the BC land property rights was still based on a western interpretation of 
existing treaties210. Since the perception and argumentation of land rights were based on existing 
regulations within the state’s legal system, the federal government assumed that Aboriginal land 
claims were not assertable against the rights of the Crown given that there had been no treaty 
signed211. However, in the 1997 Delgamuukw case, the Supreme Court confirmed for the first time 
the existence of Aboriginal territorial rights within Canadian law - even without a previous treaty. 
This made way for Aboriginal land claims not only in British Columbia, the site of the principal 
test case, but also everywhere else in Canada, allowing at least a legal possibility for Aboriginal 
land claims to be assertable without former land cession treaties212.  
                                                 
206 Peters and Hawkes 1987 
207 Fenge 1992, 116 
208 Fenge 1993, 24; Usher et al. 1992; Notzke 1994 
209 Zlotkin 1991 
210 Morse 1985 
211 Tennant 1991; Fenge 1992, 116 
212 Fenge 1992, 116. Critics, especially among the local and Community Forestry Coalition actors suggest that even in the 
aftermath of these changes, the governments of British Columbia and Canada perceived this aboriginal land right rather 
as a legal construct than an existing feature of the land (Persky 1998). For environmental as well as social justice aspects, 
Canada’s aboriginal policy has been repeatedly criticized both internationally and nationally for violating the human 
rights of aboriginal peoples. The criticism continues among the CFC and imposes a considerable political pressure on the 
provincial government to address First Nation demands and socio-economic development in aboriginal communities.  
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The increasing popularity of First Nation issues and their land rights through public 
campaigns and court cases generated new political pressure on the BC government that 
led to a new round of accelerated treaty talks. After decades of opposition where the 
unresolved land claims had been able to be kept at a low political profile, the government 
was now increasingly urged to take action.  
 
Figure: External Perturbations on the Community Forestry Policy Subsystem in BC 
External 
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  CFPAs213 (between 2001-2005)  
 
The three major external changes present the following conclusions for the consolidation 
phase: 
• POLICY OUTPUT: The 2001 change of government led to a different political 
situation under which the community forestry process levelled off, instead of 
expanding further. The CFPP was consolidated as a community program, but with 
stronger restrictions.  
• SUDDEN PERTURBATION: The change of the government provided the key 
cause for the policy process to level off. It led to a change of the systemic 
governing coalition, under which the SFC was more favoured and the CFC lost 
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influence.  
• KEY CAUSAL DRIVER: The aboriginal movement significantly strengthened 
the Community Forestry Coalition, and steadied the relevance of community 
forestry in the discourse. Its constitutional successes forced a governmental 
response towards more community rights, although mostly individual agreements 
were used to accommodate changes. 
• UNDERLYING EXTERNAL EVENT. The community forestry coalition 
weakened after the environmental concerns were overlayered by an economic 
debate over the future economic stability of the BC forestry, which fuelled a 
stronger position of the SFC.  
 
3.4.3.2. Effects on the Policy Subsystem  
Accessibility of the Network:  Shrinking CFC Activities 
The change of government and its new agenda received clear responses within the network. 
Nearly all interviewees identified a decrease in the activities of the Community Forestry 
Coalition (15 out of 16), compared to the peak of the debate in the 1990s, as a key effect of 
the recent policy changes. As 7 interviewees of the community forestry coalition specified, 
many environmental groups withdrew from larger campaigns because they did not see any 
future potential for policy change under the Liberals government. Several SFC 
interviewees, in contrast, argued that the CFC had already accomplished a considerable 
improvement of the environmental standards during the 1990s, and were thus less urgent in 
their activities. Seven others across both coalitions also argued that the public attention for 
environmental conservation issues had levelled off after the long wave of the 1990s, and 
aboriginal rights were now increasingly shifting into focus. As a result, several 
environmental groups developed a joint focus with aboriginal community initiatives under 
the growing public movement for aboriginal rights, as described above. 
 
Hierarchy Levels and Formality:  CF containment in policy niche 
The new stage of the policy process brought two key changes which set an end to a further 
expansion of communal authority and tenure reform in BC. The most important change of 
the consolidation phase was that community forestry was now settled into a defined policy 
program.  
Community-based forestry programs were established and expanded, but remained based 
on a strong provincial authority. Community-based tenure was now possible within the 
new CFPP arrangement, but without an overarching structural reform of the tenure system. 
Instead, the new tenure arrangement was an exceptional status granted by the Ministry of 
Forests, and could be extended to a tenure length of up to 99 years. Since the new tenure 
was based on an annual review and approval of the Ministry of Forests, the 
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community forest introduced only limited additional local authority, and a continuing 
strong governmental access to regulation and intervention.  
While acknowledging the overall progress of community-based tenure options, 13 out of 
16 interviewees state that this had put an end to the previous tenure debate. As the majority 
of CF interviewees criticize, the initial tenure reform debate was channelled into a niche of 
carefully designed community-based tenures, while the advocated structural reform of the 
tenure system was never implemented. From their perspective, the CFPP was an 
instrument to accommodate the growing CF demand of forest communities, while 
preventing an overall structural process towards devolution214. The SFC interviewees, in 
contrast, regard the small CFPP program as a consolidated add-on to the existing tenure 
structure, and welcomed it as an option where economically feasible.  
The move of the Liberals served two purposes, as interviewees from both coalitions 
explain: for one, a give-in appeasement to the Community Forestry Coalition and the forest 
communities which called to maintain the commenced path of change. At the same time, 
the Liberals' new policy helped to contain the structural criticism on forestry policy to local 
communities and accommodate it without threatening the old system in place. It re-
strengthened the industry's economic tenure base and secured their long-term planning for 
another decades. This was also motivated by the increased economic pressure and 
competition of the logging industry, as described above.  
The government’s defensive position on new community rights was also fuelled by the 
new aboriginal movement and their recent successes in court, as explained above. Several 
interviewees suggest that the government assumed a possible slippery slope when giving in 
too far. The government—as the landowner and revenue holder—and the SFC shared a 
strong interest to protect the long-term planning security of industrial tenures. Accordingly, 
several interviewees from both coalitions state that the government gave in to the punctuate 
areas of concern where it was appropriate after specific court decisions, while defending 
the overall system. 
It was unclear how any legal exemptions215 could fit into the existing forest policy and the 
equal treatment of all communities when the first nations' land claims became legally 
acknowledged216. Some outstanding exemplary cases were assumed to possibly redefine 
                                                 
214 As several actors remarked, the newly granted CF tenures were often those that otherwise would not have survived, 
not have been lucrative for industry, or needed community development funds on top of existing forestry arrangements.  
215 Both the National Aboriginal Forestry Association and the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples recommended a 
new legal category of forest tenure for aboriginal communities, calling for a more holistic approach to eco-system-based 
management without volume-based or time-limited production requirements (Burda et al. 1997, xi).  
216 The British Colonial government of BC had declared all as Crown lands and abandoned any treaty negotiations with 
the native people in the mid-19th century. They neglected any first nation ownership of the newly sovereignity territory 
ever since. Only after the recent Delgamuukw decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in 1997, indigenous land 
ownership was legally recognized again within the federal sovereignity of the Canadian state territory. In this decision, an 
aboriginal title was for the first time ever proven successfully in a Canadian court.  
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the legal status of land title on granted TFLs (e.g., Haida Gwaii217) or aboriginal 
consultation for TFL transfer (also on Haida Gwaii). Another central and unsolved 
question in the process of land tenure reform and indigenous territories was the 
compensation for resource extraction, existing licences, and damages since the colonial 
past, in other words who compensates whom218.  
The Haida Gwaii court decision over their community consultation rights during the TFL 
39 transfer is a particularly interesting and recent example. It highlights the legal 
implications and the perceived risks for the BC government for a possible slippery slope 
effect for the future extent of aboriginal consultation during a tree farm license transfer. It 
is explained in detail in chapter 5.3.2. However, it is important to note that, despite their 
legal progress for aboriginal governance in the recent years, the Haida struggled 
considerably over internal authority issues, which are analyzed in detail in chapter 5.3.1.  
 
Organization of Authority: Community forestry program expanded but channelled  
The response of the provincial government to the communities’ demands was, accordingly, 
an increasingly broad range of individual arrangements with aspiring communities, as 
already identified for the implementation stage. 11 out of 16 interviewees identify 
community tenures under the CFPP, for example joint-ventures, as a considerable 
improvement of the options for the communities. They provide new opportunities for local 
forest management, although they depend on individual arrangements and the leverage of 
each community. 9 identify the Forest and Range Act as a significant aspect. In 2003, 
Forest and Range Agreements between the government and rural communities were 
introduced to re-arrange more revenue-sharing and forest tenure opportunities for 
indigenous communities.  
Especially indigenous communities had to draw a decision in this regard which several 
interviewees described as a pitfall: The program was intended to secure the economic 
investment conditions for the forest sector, especially in light of pending indigenous land 
                                                                                                                                                    
Before this exemplary case, aboriginal communities only had the option of treaty negotiation with the government, 
without being able to question the government's decisions and defend their rights in court. The 1997 Delgamuukw 
decision thus set a starting signal to a new wave of aboriginal land title. The second exemplary case, the Nisga'a 
agreement in BC, was the result of separate negotiations with the government, dating back to 1973. 
217 As opposed to the other five communities of the research, the Haida Gwaii case shows more stimulus from the local to 
the regional level than the other way around. In fact, the Haida Gwaii court case on the aboriginal land title might turn 
into an exemplary case for other First Nations on how to accommodate territorial rights and community-based 
governance in BC. Several actors anticipate that the Haida case might even turn into a slippery slope for the government 
to give in more to the First Nations' recent demands. The Haida case, thus, reflects several issues in the larger 
environmental and indigenous movement in BC that the regional actors watch closely to track policy change. 
218 While the BC government regards their Crown lands as legal ownership of the general public, and timber companies' 
licences thus as legally binding, First Nations argue that such tenure changes would represent a mere "quid pro quo for 
removing historic social contract obligations"218, for which no compensation would be payable to timber companies nor 
the public (BC Coalition for Sustainable Forest Solutions, in their draft citizens' legislation declared before the provincial 
election in May 2005) 
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claims. While a Forest and Range Agreement was in place, a land claim would not be 
pursued further by the First Nation. Thus, the agreements provide a valuable tool for the 
government to stabilize the economic situation in the rural communities and providing 
constant economic support to the communities, while preventing bigger structural change. 
Timber volumes would be granted out of unlogged volumes from existing timber licences.  
 
Hierarchical Levels and Formality:  Deregulation process 
The second major policy change of the consolidation phase was that the changed 
constellation of the coalitions gave way for a deregulation process, which shifted a whole 
set of forest management responsibilities from the governmental authorities to the 
industrial actors. Again, this shows the strict limitations that had now been set on the 
previous calls for devolution in the 1990s.  
Most interviewees (14 out of 16) sum up that this was the most important forest policy 
shift under the Liberals. As a result of the recent pressures on the timber market and  
decreased revenues of the forest sector, the Ministry of Forests reduced its costs and 
handed key administrative tasks (6)—and accountability (9)—down to the forest 
industry219. Several monitoring and planning responsibilities were shifted from the 
governmental authority of the Ministry of Forests to local forest technicians and forest 
companies. The Liberals initiated a whole package of forest-related deregulation since 
2001. Based on a considerable reduction of monitoring personnel, the changes centered 
around a withdrawal of governmental control and enforcement out of the forests220: 
 
• REGULAR CONTROL: Forest Stewardship Plans (landscape level operational plans) are 
now processed only every five years instead of annually, and require less detailed 
information on planned operations. 
• CHANGE OF TENURE: The Ministry of Forests no longer has the ability to insert 
conditions when a forest tenure is sold or transferred. 
• APPURTENANCY: The appurtenancy requirement was terminated221, i.e. licencees are no 
longer required to operate local mills and process wood (which previously served to 
guarantee local employment). 
• ENVIRONMENTAL STANDARDS: Licencees can now opt out of default requirements 
in the Forest and Range Practices Act and establish their own environmental standards222, 
as long as they comply with certain basic objectives and do not "unduly reduce the supply 
                                                 
219 closely related to a local institutional effect explained below  
220 see West Coast Environmental Law (WCEL) 2004 Legal Backgrounder 
221 January 2005 
222 for which the legal requirements have been criticized of being "vague and involve judgements on issues that are both 
controversial and inherently political"; WCEL 2004, 2 
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of timber"223. 
• ENFORCEMENT: There is no penalty for logging companies that operate under a plan 
that does not comply with the Forest Act. 
This shifted a considerable list of management decisions from the ministerial staff to local 
forest experts who work more closely with the timber licence holders and processing 
industry. The motivation was to make the forest administration more efficient, as well as 
more embedded in local expertise.  
However, several CF interviewees regard the deregulation as dangerous where the forest 
companies would no longer be monitored by the –more impartial— staff of the Ministry of 
Forests. The legal accountability of the private companies might not be able to cover 
ecological damage or adverse socio-economic effects in the forest communities, as several 
local actors criticized as well.  
 
Forest-related Decision-making: Authority and accountability shift to the forest industry 
For this reason, the deregulation process was also identified as a strong local institutional 
effect by all 16 interviewees. While the implementation of the deregulation is relatively 
recent and has yet to unfold its full local impact on the communities, as several CFC 
interviewees remark, several interviewees from both coalitions identify a clear shift of the 
communities' legal options when they would object to the decisions of logging operations 
in their area. It weakened the forest communities’ position because the new regulations 
limited the accountability of the government in case of adverse environmental effects and 
conflictive decision-making. 
 
Benefit Distribution: Community-based joint ventures supported 
Notwithstanding the strong provincial regulation of the CFPP, the local benefit prospects 
of the forest communities were positively affected by several of the policy changes in the 
past years, as most interviewees report. New tenure arrangements usually required a set 
standard of local employment to bring back forest benefits into the community. Especially 
those forest communities were likely to be accepted into the new program which already 
had an existing industrial partner for logging on the local level, along with the necessary 
experience and established industrial structures. As for example in the case of Esketemc, 
an already existing form of a local enterprise provided the basis for a new joint venture (see 
below in the following section) between the industrial partner and the community as the 
new tenure holder.   
Further changes granted the communities an easier access to launching local forest 
businesses. In January 2005, the appurtenancy requirement was abandoned by the Ministry 
                                                 
223 for a discussion of the MoF changes see Haida Nation Network 2005 
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of Forests, after realizing the often adverse community effects alongside with it. With the 
previous forest policy oriented towards large- and medium-scale industrial timber 
extraction, appurtenancy had traditionally been part of the timber tenures. Through this 
clause, the tenure licensee was required to establish a saw mill or pulp mill in the area of 
timber extraction in order to foster community income and employment. However, despite 
the community-strengthening intention of the policy, the consequence of the appurtenancy 
clause had been that enterprises were pressed to increase the harvesting level in order to 
make the mills more efficient and cover the fix costs of the mills. Relieving the 
communities of this requirement was key in improving their start-up position because it 
lowered their start-up costs considerably and allowed them to find the best price for their 
timber at a mill of their choice224.  
 
The internal changes of the policy network and their causes can be summarized as follows. 
• ACCESSIBILITY OF THE NETWORK: The change of systemic governing 
coalition affected the policy network noticeably, as the new government entered in 
favour of the SFC. Several community forestry actors reduced activities due to lack 
of prospect. The policy discourse and information access, however, maintained its 
pluralist character. 
• HIERARCHICAL FRAMEWORK: Community forestry was consolidated as a 
governmental program in a policy niche under administrative authority. This was 
motivated by the change of systemic governing coalition which had strengthened 
the joint interests of the government (as the landowner) and the SFC. The 
deregulation process reduced the government’s accountability and increased the 
industry’s planning security, partly at the cost of local communities. The aboriginal 
movement and its recent successful court cases had contributed to the policy 
response, as the government seeked to defend planning security in BC forestry. 
• LOCAL INSTITUTIONAL EFFECTS: The communal rights to forest 
management and organization of authority were partly weakened by the 
deregulation process. However, the implementation of community forestry 
arrangements was improved within the limitations of the program. The community 
forestry program also provided stronger benefit arrangements for the participating 
forest communities within the limitations of the program. The local changes 
resulted from the strategic implementation of the channelled community forestry 
program by the changed government. 
 
 
                                                 
224 Harshaw 2000, 6 
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3.4.4. Summary and Outlook: Identified Gaps for Policy Learning   
It has been shown that the environmental movement created the by far most important 
cause that initiated the community forestry process in BC. It was complemented by a 
serious decline of local forest benefit which had caused public concerns and a debate about 
the structural dependence of the BC forest economy. These two external events already 
imply a strong importance of discourse-related processes in the BC public and the policy 
network. Thus, it can be assumed that policy learning and belief-based changes have a 
potentially large role, especially during the early stages of the policy process when both 
movements had their most powerful momentum. 
This assumption is supported by the effect of the 1991 change of the provincial 
government. The new government entered under a strong environmental agenda and high 
public expectations for policy change. It caused an immediate change of the systemic 
governing coalition, which indicates that it was a key catalyst event that set off an immense 
momentum of previous discourse and public concern.  
The 2001 change of government reversed the previous hegemonial shift and supported the 
SFC again, for which the community forestry process levelled off markedly. The SFC’s 
shift back to power may suggest a strong struggle between the advocacy coalitions, while 
the old and new dominating coalition contest their resources before settling again. This 
could motivate operational learning. 
For the consolidation stage, it has been shown that the aboriginal rights movement was the 
most important driving force that stabilized the community forestry despite the change of 
government. Similar to the environmental movement of the 1990s, its political success 
gained from public opinion and discourse. As it underwent a considerable progress in 
constitutional court cases and community protests, it can be assumed that policy learning 
had a potentially important role. This is scrutinized in chapter 4. 
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3.5. Summary: External Perturbations and Policy Change 
The table below presents an overview of the roles that the external events played in the 
processes. The BC process was clearly driven by social movements in both phases, and 
reshaped by changing economic debates of the forest sector. These represent strong 
internal processes that strongly involve public opinion and discourse. The beginning of 
both phases is marked by a change of government as a sudden perturbation which changed 
the systemic governing coalition of the policy subsystem. 
 
Table: Role of External Perturbations on the Policy Processes; compiled from chapter 
  
 
Canada Mexico Ecuador 
 Role of 
external event: 
Implementation 
Stage II 
Consolidation 
Stage III 
Implementation 
Stage II 
Consolidation 
Stage III 
Implementation 
Stage II 
Consolidation 
Stage III 
su
dd
en
 ev
en
t 
Sudden 
Perturbation 
change of the 
government 
(new systemic 
governing coalition 
opened towards 
CFC) 
change of the 
government  
(now favoured SFC 
again)  
end of the 
state-based 
forest 
concession 
legal reform -- - not yet 
reached-  
Causal 
Drivers of 
Change 
(primary role 
for change) 
environmental 
movement 
aboriginal 
movement 
entry of the 
small PPF 
project team 
end of PPF 
project 
boom of 
international 
actors 
n.a. 
slo
w 
ev
en
t 
Underlying 
External 
Causes 
(secondary 
role for 
change) 
decline of local 
benefit and 
forest 
employment 
economic 
debate over BC 
forestry 
political shift 
towards more 
environmental 
protection 
increase of 
environmental 
projects 
national 
indigenous 
movement 
national forest 
reforms 
institutional 
restructuring 
n.a. 
 
The process of Quintana Roo was clearly driven by the Plan Piloto Forestal, whose 
presence defined the different process phases. This does not indicate much policy learning 
as there is no larger discourse involved. Environmental efforts provided a facilitating 
external change of the political conditions. Both phases saw sudden perturbations that 
caused new socio-economic or legal conditions. This indicates a strong need for policy 
learning to skilfully exploit the sudden opportunities that the perturbations may hold.  
The Esmeraldan process was driven by a boom of international actors, facilitated by the 
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national indigenous movement, national forest reforms, and an institutional restructuring 
process from the national level. This gives little insight in the internal learning processes 
in the policy subsystem. However, it suggests a strong need for learning in order to transfer 
the national changes into a feasible implementation on the regional level. 
The potential importance of policy learning has been identified. The actual roles of policy 
learning are analyzed in the following chapter. 
 132
4. POLICY LEARNING AND CHANGES OF BELIEFS – THREE KEY ISSUES 
4.1. Priorities between Social and Environmental Goals: Beliefs and Learning of 
the Community Forestry Coalitions  
4.1.1. Introduction: Theoretical Perspective 
As elaborated in chapter 2.3, policy learning occurs on different cognitive levels and may 
concern a broad field of issues, from paradigmatic changes of the substantive policy goals 
to operational information about how to gain influence in policy-making and the network. 
This section analyzes the learning that occurred within the Community Forestry Coalitions 
(CFCs) over time. As new actors in the policy network, they formed a coalition and 
developed their internal structures and beliefs. All three case studies show that the CFCs 
underwent a tremendous development.  
It can thus also be assumed that their policy goals encountered considerable challenges and 
lessons over the years as the policy changed. In particular, the section scrutinizes the 
importance that the CFCs assigned to social goals (local forest benefit) and environmental 
goals (forest conservation). The two goals are particularly interesting for the CFC’s belief 
systems because they had changing roles in the overarching development paradigms since 
the 1970s, and define key aspects for the implementation of community forestry concepts. 
The coalition's priorities between social and environmental goals are affected by different 
types of learning1 on different cognitive levels. Basically, social and environmental merits 
are both central elements of community forestry, and complement each other conceptually, 
as explored in chapters 1.1 and 1.2. The popularity of community forestry was boosted for 
this combined strength in international development since the 1970s, as outlined in chapter 
1.2. According to Sabatier's (1993) definition, the actors' orientation on the central merits 
of community forestry is part of the policy core beliefs because it determines their  
fundamental policy positions concerning the basic strategies, . . . (more specifically the) 
orientation on substantial policy conflicts, e.g. environmental protection vs. economic 
development. 
Policy core beliefs are extremely difficult to change because they will “resist information 
suggesting their basic beliefs may be invalid or unattainable" (Sabatier 1993), for which 
changes can only occur if experience reveals serious anomalies2. Thus, it is derived from 
the ACF that the advocates of community forestry generally support both social and 
                                                 
1 see chapter 2.2.2. The analysis mostly refers to Johnson and Lundvall’s (2001) distinction between 1) Know how: the 
ability to do something; 2) Know what: knowledge about facts; 3) Know why: knowledge about principle and laws; and 
4) Know who: knowledge about who knows what. These offer a use-oriented distinction regarding the types of 
knowledge, as well as their ability to improve operational aspects as opposed to those that shake higher policy beliefs.  
Referring to the ACF perspective of the research, it can be assumed that the know-why and know-what aspects of 
learning usually relate to core or forest-oriented secondary beliefs, while the know-who and know-how learning relate to 
more operational issues which only contribute to network-related secondary policy beliefs or even less substantial daily 
practices. 
2 see Sabatier (1993) 
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environmental goals to some extent, and the data supports this3. 
In the policy process over time, however, one goal may be prioritized over another for 
more practically oriented or strategic reasons, as the case studies indicate. This could be for 
different reasons, and part of different learning processes. It could stem from a learning 
process in which the coalition adopts new policy-oriented information on the social or 
environmental perspectives of community forestry. This could indicate a double-loop 
learning4 which involves a re-thinking of the valid assumptions.   
A shift between social and environmental goals may also be the result of a strategic 
reorientation of the coalition, which would represent a form of operational learning5, 
without adopting new knowledge about facts in Johnson and Lundvall's (2001) learning 
categories. Retricted resources or political opportunities may call for strong priorities of 
one goal over the other during the policy process, to which the CFC could respond by 
pragmatically prioritizing on the actually feasible. This shift would rather involve a form of 
instrumental learning, which improves the ability to do something6.  
Sabatier defines the secondary policy beliefs as "instrumental decisions and informational 
searches necessary to implement the policy core" (1993). These encompass most decisions 
concerning administrative rules, program performance, and the perceived seriousness of 
the problem. The secondary policy beliefs could theoretically be affected by both of the 
above stated examples and lead to network- or policy-oriented changes of the CFCs' 
positions.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 see Annex 4 for the detailed statements about the three CFC’s policy beliefs, which all address both social and 
environmental aspects over time 
4 see chapter 2.2.2. Double loop learning is a form of conceptual learning or problem learning that is concerned with the 
cognitive process of seeing things from a different evaluative viewpoint (in a ‘new light’) with the development or 
adoption of new concepts, principle and images.  
5 understood as learning related to a working method, which does not consider issues related to a domain that are more 
general 
6 relating to "know-how"; see chapter 2.3 about the different types of learning 
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4.1.2. Canada: The Environmental Movement and Grassroot Local Benefit  
The immense environmental movement of the 1990s, combined with a new government 
that was open towards forest-related reforms, encouraged a lively phase of policy discourse 
and public engagement in BC. Numerous environmental campaigns were founded to 
participate, and became increasingly professional in their forest-related knowledge and 
political campaigns. This was identified as the most significant learning process of the 
1990s, named by 15 out of 16 interviewees. Especially urban groups were new to be 
mobilized (7 statements out of 16) by the environmental actors, as they provided a new 
substantial source of donations and a new group of voters for political pressure.  
 
Policy Learning I: Professionalization of the Community Forestry Coalition 
Across both coalitions, all interviewees stress that the Community Forestry Coalition 
became much more professionalized in their political actions over the 1990s, and shifted 
their focus of activities. They transformed from local and grassroot initatives with 
punctuate environmental concerns to a more institutionalized network of actors with 
increasing resources and funding. As nearly all interviewees describe, the environmental 
organizations developed quickly from grassroot initiatives to formal institutions with full-
time professional staff, which transformed their network abilities and connections 
significantly.  
Although the network was still organized around the same key individuals, the challenge to 
coordinate them all grew. The learning progress included the acquisition of project 
funding, public campaigns, and facilitating information platforms for all of BC. This 
represents a large amount of operational learning regarding the know-who and know-how 
of the political interaction in the policy subsystem. During this stage, the Community 
Forestry Coalition created several internal platforms7 to facilitate the cross-sectoral 
coordination of stakeholders in the forest communities. 
The process that the Community Forestry Coalition underwent also encompassed more 
substantial aspects of learning (know-what and know-why): the accumulation of knowledge 
and a shift in focus. The growing coalition soon accumulated more and more ecological, 
economic and social knowledge with growing involvement in the environmental policy 
discourse between the 1970 and 1990s. The rapid learning process of the Community 
Forestry Coalition resulted partly from their own lesson-drawing and self-taught experts, 
partly from an increase in personnel from the growing field of environmentally 
sympathetic experts and the diversification of academic specializations in environmental 
                                                 
7 The Tin Wis Coalition of 1991 provided a regional forum of stakeholders from aboriginal, labour, social and 
educational interests and led to a proposed Stewardship Act (Tin Wis Coalition 1991, Forest Stewardship Act, Draft 
Model Legislation of the Forestry Working Group). The Bowen Meeting was another initiative to strengthen the 
regional network and brought fifty multi-sectoral stakeholders together to develop a common vision and concept. The 
two-day meeting took place in November 1997, one month before the CFPP was introduced by the government in 
December (The meeting was coordinated by the Eco-Research Chair in Victoria and formed part of a larger research and 
action initiative. For the Bowen Meeting see Burda 1997: Report of the Bowen Meeting, Report to BC Wild and 
funders. Eco-Research Chair, University of Victoria).  
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research8.  
As part of the professionalization, the Community Forestry Coalition developed a more 
comprehensive ecological critique since the 1980s, as several interviewees point out. After 
1985, a gradual shift occurred in the set of new themes when the concept of biodiversity 
trickled down from the international arenas of changing environmental paradigms, as some 
CF interviewees recall9. The environmental actors soon based their arguments to protect 
old-growth forests on the loss of natural biodiversity. This eventually led to the adoption of 
a more comprehensive preservationist perspective, moving away from the previous goals 
of protecting isolated islands of old-growth forest until the late 1980s. Secondly, the 
improved knowledge facilitated a refinement of the strategic focus and brought the focus 
of concern from punctuate conservation efforts to a more structural criticism of forest 
policy and the tenure system, through which the CFC managed to delegitimize the 
economic justification that the SFC was grounded upon.  
The CFC's growing sophistication resulted in a significant change in the line of political 
argument. Based on the rapidly gained expertise and professionalism through the 1970-
1990s that had created a more sophisticated counter-position against the State Forestry 
Coalition, the Community Forestry Coalition increasingly adjusted their strategies towards 
the weaknesses of the enemy. They focused more and more on the structural impacts of the 
forest industry on the long-term livelihood in BC, and started to criticize the forest 
industry's impacts along their own lines of socio-economic arguments in order to 
dissemble the industry's position in public. 
Any forces which corrode public confidence in sustained yield automatically shake the 
tenure pillar, call into question the devolution of public authority to companies and 
professional foresters, and threaten the rationale for the entire liquidation-conversion 
project. . . On the whole, the Community Forestry Coalition implemented this strategy 
successfully in the 1970s and 1980s. It quickly began to score points.10 
The strategy culminated in a strong public initiative of the CFC to advocate an overall 
reform of the BC tenure system in the late 1990s. This comprehensive call for a structural 
change that had clearly left the punctuate conservation efforts of the beginnings. Instead, 
the CFC's learning process had shifted the perspective to a structural criticism on BC forest 
policy, as Burda et al. (1997, x) point out: 
Community-based control of forest land within the constrains of an ecosystem-based 
aproach provides a comprehensive, workable alternative to the unsustainability of 
industrial forestry. This solution cannot, however, be achieved only by creating more 
community tenures within the existing system, but requires a re-allocation of forest land 
to community-based tenure holders within a comprehensive planning and legislative 
reform process. 
 
 
                                                 
8 for a detailed description, see Lertzman et al. 1996, 121 
9 see, for example, M'Gonigle 1997, Burda 1997 
10 Lertzman et al. 1996, 118-120 
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As several CFC interviewees described, the shift of argument partly resulted from a form 
of conceptual learning in which the identified problem was evaluated from a new 
perspective, a ‘new light’ as paraphrased in chapter 2.2.3. The forest-related policy 
learning was therefore strong, as well as the change of forest-related secondary policy 
beliefs. 
At the same time, the rephrased argument was also an operational move to fight the SFC 
with their own arguments, and thus suggests an improved instrumental use (know-how) of 
the new pieces of knowledge (know what and know why) that were acquired during the 
professionalization of the coalition. 
The shift of focus in the political argument was accompanied by an adjustment towards the 
strategic attention of the public media, as several interviewees and literature sources point 
out. This stresses the instrumental aspect of learning, as stated above. Especially since the 
Clayoquot Sound protests11, the clearcut of old-growth forest had virtually become an 
emotional issue for the interested public. In order to foster the increasing public support for 
environmental protection, the CFC consequently incorporated emotional images into their 
campaigns in support of their goals. As Stanbury (2002) argues, some of the campaigns 
were, thus, strategically directed towards the assertive interest of the public rather than a 
purely object-driven discourse over the immediate environmental concerns: 
One of the more disturbing issues (…) is that there appears to be declining respect for 
rationality in making major public policy decisions in BC relating to environmental and 
forestry issues. The E groups make a more extensive use of emotion than reason in trying 
to gain the support of the public.12 
Negative criticism emerged from the SFC about the strategic instrumentalization of 
emotional imagery in the discourse. The CFC's use of the media and the public interest 
indicates a strong strategic learning process of the coalition about how to acquire public 
interest, donations, and international support. This outcome clearly empowered their 
leverage within the network, as several interviewees from both coalitions stress. The 
learning process encompasses a policy-oriented shift of the argument, combined with a 
strategic motivation which resembles an operational learning process. 
The interviewees from both coalitions considered the policy learning of the CFC as 
particularly influential for the fact that the policy arena was broadened by a multitude of 
actors. Without the shift of the CFC to an economic debate of the BC forest sector, the 
policy network would not have come to a common line of argument, as several 
interviewees point out. The increasing professionalization of the CFC also strengthened the 
local institutional processes through their improved knowledge and support, most CFC 
interviewees note.  
In contrast, the CFC´s progress had no influence on the province´s turn towards individual 
negotiations with the communities (organization of authority) or the fact that the decision-
                                                 
11 see chapter 4.1.2. 
12 Stanbury 2000, 251 
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making framework was not reformed. Instead, some interviewees argue that possibly the 
CFC did not become professionalized enough to pressure for such profound changes 
during the 1990s, which would have weakened the SFC. The SFC´s strategic response to 
the CFC activities is analyzed below in chapter 4.2.2. 
 
Change of Secondary Beliefs I: From forest conservation to local forest benefit 
13 out of 16 interviewees identified a considerable shift with regard to the political 
motivation of the Community Forestry Coalition: away from individual and specific 
projects to a more comprehensive approach to the structural weaknesses of BC 
environmental policy. This shift is the result of a form of conceptual learning or problem 
learning, through which things started to become evaluated from a different viewpoint or in 
a ´new light´, as explained in chapter 2.2.3. The CFC increasingly linked their regional 
environmental concerns to a stronger criticism of the corporate structure of the forest 
industry, as well as the tenure system that had existed in BC since the colonial period.  
The initial wave of environmental conservation that had swept the province since the mid-
1980s—with the international protests against old-growth clearcuts in Clayoqyot Sound—
transformed into a new view that addressed forestry as an economic activity with 
considerable perspectives. In the past, the political conviction of the environmental 
initiatives had more been focused on a no-use conservation of pristine ecosystems. The CF 
actors increasingly acknowledged the strong relevance of local socio-economic benefit of 
the communities in order to create a motivation for them to protect the environment. The 
new adopted view addressed logging as a necessary element of environmental protection 
(13), community stability (13), and environmental justice (11). The following table 
presents the policy beliefs of the Community Forestry Coalition as collected from the 
empirical data.  
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Table: Change of Policy Beliefs of the CFC in Canada; changes are highlighted in 
bold  
 Community Forestry  
Coalition (CFC) 
stated by the majority of actors 
(i.e. at least two-third) 
n = 16 11 – 16 statements 
 
Policy Core Beliefs: 
1. Deep Core Beliefs  
ethic responsibility to spare and protect wilderness (14) 
humans are intruders if they exploit for economic profit (14) 
 
2. Policy Core Beliefs 
decentralized local authority to secure long-term interests in sustainability 
and local employment (13) 
 
 
Secondary Beliefs: 
 
 
3.1 forest decision-
making  
 
protection of old growth rainforest to preserve pristine wilderness (12) 
Change in Phase II: … and to preserve biodiversity (13) 
 
3.2 benefit distribution  
local benefit secondary to nature conservation 
Change in Phase II: local benefit of forest use for environmental 
protection as well as for economic stability of communities (13) 
 
3.3 organization of    
authority 
local authority more for nature conservation than for exploitation 
Change in Phase II: vitally important as an element of community 
development and environmental justice (11) 
 
3.4 hierarchical 
structures and 
formality 
local initiatives complements transparent administration 
Change in Phase II: democratic participation rights of the public  
require a pluralist participation through diversified policy 
communities and strong local representation and rights (11) 
 
3.5 network 
cooperation and 
information access 
cooperation across local initiatives  
Change in Phase II: strategic grassroot activism with more 
institutionalized action across the environmental groups (12) 
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The changes correspond to both learning processes described above, as they affect both 
issue-related as well as network-related policy beliefs. As most interviewees state, the 
changes were motivated by two different issues that the CFC increasingly adopted into 
their knowledge and views. Firstly, the global influence from the international shift 
towards new sustainability concepts since the 1980s. Secondly, the growing problems in 
BC rural employment and long-term logging perspectives during the 1990s had made it 
necessary to rethink about the economic options of BC. Under a perceived threat of the 
growing corporate takeovers of the forest industry which was facing increasing investment 
costs and thus up-scaled their operations, the local communities became increasingly 
dependent on employment in a sector whose decision-making was more and more out of 
their reach.  
As the table below shows, both the provincial and local actors agree that the structural 
dependency and economic perspectives were the main reasons for the CFC’s change of 
beliefs. The initial environmental concerns of the CFC about the threat of large-scale 
logging were not identified as a direct cause of the change in policy belief. Thus, a 
significant amount of policy-learning must have occurred that reviewed the facts (know-
what) from a new light and refined the CFC’s understanding of the problem (know-why) to 
shift the focus to the structural dependency in BC forestry. 
 
Table: Influential reasons for the change of policy belief of the CFC. Source: 
Interview data; see Annex 3 and 4 for an overview of the statements13 
 
 
provincial actors local actors 
corporatization and growing structural dependency in 
forest sector 
++ ++ 
rural loss of employment and long-term perspectives + ++ 
local empowerment and civil rights issues + + 
global shift towards sustainability as a new concept + 0 
++ = strong positive effect; + = positive effect; o=no direct effect detected;  - = adverse effect 
 
The analysis suggests that only one of the external events (i.e., the declining local benefit 
from the forest) directly motivated the change of policy belief among the CFC. Thus, the 
declining local forest benefit had a decisive role for the progress of the CFC, and therefore 
represented an important underlying causal driver of the policy process14. 
                                                 
13 The table reflects more specific aspects than those covered by the systematic indicators. It was added to the chapter 
because the regional and local level could be particularly well distinguished between the interviews and contribute to an 
understanding of the changes.  
14 as also deduced in chapter 4.1.2.1. 
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It is concluded that the CFC’s strong change of beliefs during the 1990s was motivated 
primarily through the declining local benefit from the forest15. At the same time, the 
change was made possible by a slow shift of perspective through the described policy 
learning process during the professionalization of the CFC. 
 
The Rise of the Aboriginal Movement since the late 1990s 
The majority of interviewees does not identify a substantial learning process among the 
state forestry coalition in this stage. Some interviewees see a gradual adaptation of the 
coalition to the deregulation process that the Liberals implemented to grant more planning 
security to the forest industry, and make the administrative decision-making more efficient 
and less costly for the government. Some interviewees also noted an increasing shift of the 
SFC towards more community consultation (8) in order to prevent local opposition, after 
the industry had experienced some cases of heavy resistance with a highly negative media 
coverage.  
Policy Learning II: Sophistication of Aboriginal Rights Groups since the late 1990s 
One aspect of the community forestry coalition, in contrast, was described as becoming 
increasingly sophisticated with regard to aboriginal rights (13). The interviewees identified 
this as a significant learning process in which they managed to shift the political interest 
slightly from environmental issues to more local and indigenous land rights. All interviews 
and literature indicate that BC's First Nations developed a more and more sophisticated 
profile regarding their political standing and representation of their own interests. This 
form of learning relates to Johnson and Lundvall´s (2001) ability to do something (know 
how), as well as the knowledge about facts and laws (know why).  
This suggests several learning parallels to the professionalization of the environmental 
actors in the earlier stage, as it also included operational learning as well as the adoption of 
new substantial facts. Their learning progress in the use of public support also shows 
parallels. Some groups in public supported the first nations lobby because of their ideals of 
local rights and control as they refer to basic civil right goals. This connection of different 
groups of interests relates to the knowledge about who knows what (know who).  
Besides, the aboriginal struggle for local land rights has widely become attached to 
environmental issues, which defined a clear political focus. Especially resource access was 
the political focus of the aboriginal groups, which is why they identify themselves as part 
of the CFC. Their policy learning improved considerably in network-related aspects around 
public campaigns and the political use of court cases (know-how and know-who learning). 
                                                 
15 Following this conclusion, the change was not primarily influenced by the global change in the policy discourse. In 
other words, there was no normative adaptation of the new human-environment concept from the global policy 
community, but it rather grew from within. At the same time, it has to be noted that such influences may have been 
present, but too subtle and gradual to be noticed by the actors themselves, although shaping their shift of beliefs 
indirectly. The BC environmental movement, on the contrary, has considerably contributed to the global policy 
discourse on environmental conservation, for Greenpeace and other internationally influential ENGOs have their 
historical roots in Vancouver and Victoria (see, for example, Weyler 2004). 
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For example, the International Forest Market Campaign—launched by the Interior 
Alliance, Union of BC Chiefs, Assembly of First Nations, and the American based 
National Congress of American Indians—have created a joint force for a public campaign 
to discredit commercial logging attempts with buyers and consumers. Their point of 
argument was accessible for the interested public, stating that that forest resources from 
land with aboriginal title are stolen goods16. 
Many aboriginal communities and their regional representation groups also gained a 
considerable level of environmental knowledge, including ecological impact studies, GIS 
and environmental management plans (know-what learning), and research on their own 
local traditional environmental knowledge to record it for future reference. Their growing 
environmental expertise was clearly acknowledged by the interviewees from both 
coalitions. Eco-based management approaches and local campaigns for holistic 
management were also shifted into the centre of attention in public for media campaigns.  
There has no change of policy beliefs been detected for the consolidation stage, which 
might be explained by the fact that the CFC had already undergone an immense 
transformation during the 1990s and scrutinized their policy beliefs to a considerable 
extent. According to the ACF, such a substantial review of the actors’ belief system 
(mostly relating to know why learning) is assumed to be very slow, resistant to change, and 
thus rare.  
 
Although generally associated as an integrate part of the environmental groups, the 
aboriginal groups were now specifically gaining public attention and political momentum 
on aboriginal issues. In fact, several actors indicated that the CFC was now more and more 
joining them in reverse. They state that the environmental movement now increasingly 
benefited from the aboriginal issues, as opposed to the 1990s when the aboriginal groups 
benefited from the environmental movement. While the latter levelled off since 2001, as 
most interviewees agree, the aboriginal groups experience an increasing political 
momentum through successful court cases on forest-related issues, which are outlined in 
chapter 4.3.2. below. 
For years, a wave of court cases has been growing. How to legally claim their land and 
resource rights was the most significant learning progress of the aboriginal groups, as all 
interviewees agree. Since the late 1990s, most First Nations have come to employ 
professionals on issues of legal representation, i.e. attorneys and legal consultants, and the 
personal knowledge of the aboriginal leaders made considerable progress as well. 
Especially the Haida show a strong example of the new sophistication, because they 
intended to get a legal recognition of their aboriginal governance so as to create a political 
counterweight to the government. They won their court appeal on an important court case 
                                                 
16 Chief Manuel, Chairman of Shuswap Nation Tribal Council and Chairman of Interior Alliance 
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on an industrial tenure transfer17 based on the argument that the industry did not 
acknowledge the required aboriginal consultation. The Haida struggle for legal recognition 
of their lands has become one of the most observed processes in the country, expected by 
many to cause a widespread effect on many others: 
A decisive court victory acknowledging the Haida's aboriginal title is the best hope to 
revigorating the moribound B.C. treaty process, which started in 1993 but has yet to 
produce a single final agreement (David R. Boyd, Comment in The Times Colonist on 
March 14, 2002).  
The local struggle and public campaign of the Haida represents one of the most important 
cases of aboriginal territorial struggles in BC that might develop into an exemplary case for 
many others in the coalition. This is explored in detail in section 4.3.2. below. 
As explored above and in chapter 4.1.2, the increasing legal recognition of aboriginal 
resource rights in court was perceived as a potential threat to the planning security of 
industrial forest tenure. Thus, it is concluded that the CFC´s learning process had a causal 
linkage to several effects as identified below. The shrinking CFC front, on the contrary, 
was strengthened by the new aboriginal movement, which is reflected below as well. 
Table: CFC's Policy Learning and Identified Effects in British Columbia during the 
Consolidation Stage since 2001 
 
                                                               Causes 
Effects 
CFC:  
Sophistication of aboriginal 
rights groups 
Forest-related Decision-making: 
community-based joint ventures promoted 
0 
Benefit Distribution:  
authority and accountability shift from government to 
industry 
++ 
Lo
ca
l E
ffe
ct
s 
Organization of Authority: 
community forestry program expanded but restricted 
+ 
Hierarchy Levels and Formality:  
Deregulation process 
++ 
Hierarchy Levels and Formality:  
Containment of CF in policy niche 
+ 
N
et
w
or
k 
Ef
fe
ct
s 
Accessibility of the Network:  
Shrinking CFC front 
- 
++ = strong positive effect; + = positive effect; o=no direct effect detected;  - = adverse effect 
                                                 
17 Tree Farm Licence (TFL 39) transfer; see chapter 3.1.2. in detail 
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In conclusion, the increasing sophistication of the aboriginal rights issues as part of the 
CFC became one of the major driving forces that encouraged the provincial government to 
shift their authorities to the industrial tenure holders, because this provided more security 
for the BC forest economy in the case of a future landslide of aboriginal land rights.  
In review of the two process stages, the following conclusions have been found for the 
development of the CFC.  
 
Summary: Priority Shift of the Community Forestry Coalition in British Columbia  
• CHANGE OF FOREST-RELATED BELIEFS: The CFC underwent a change of 
forest-related secondary beliefs in the implementation stage, as it shifted the focus 
from ecological protection to include the local forest benefit as a key goal.  
• FOREST-RELATED POLICY LEARNING: The CFC underwent a strong 
learning process which significantly improved the socio-economic and legal 
knowledge of BC forestry, and established a whole number of self-taught experts 
and new environmental professionals in the CFC. In fact, it can be concluded that 
the policy process was causally driven by policy learning, which provided the 
necessary momentum for change that was set off by an external event as a catalyst 
event18.  
• CHANGE OF NETWORK-RELATED BELIEFS: The CFC showed a clear 
reorientation of their network beliefs from the previous local initiatives to a 
coordinated network that would synergize the local grassroot forces.   
• NETWORK-RELATED POLICY LEARNING: The CFC shows a remarkable 
level of operational policy learning during the implementation stage, in order to 
establish the new internal structures of the coalition that had even been manifested 
in a change of the network beliefs. The learning process levelled off in the 
consolidation stage when the network structures had reached a defined state and the 
coalition withdrew slightly from the process. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
18 This still holds true that external events had an important role as the trigger of change, as analyzed in chapter 3.4.2.1. 
 144
4.1.3. Ecuador: Internal Struggles and Capacity Building Lessons  
The internal learning progress of the Community Forestry Coalition in Esmeraldas was 
heavily impeded or challenged by organizational problems. The interviewees identify 
several learning issues of the CFC since the 1990s, which can broadly be characterized in 
two processes.  
Firstly, several interviewees from both coalitions describe that the CFC had substantive 
lessons on the realistic merits and prospects of community forestry in the Esmeraldan 
context, which relate to the institutional organization of the pilot communities and the best 
balance of interests to stabilize the local forestry system. Within the categories of Johnson 
and Lundvall (2001) as elaborated in chapter 2.4, this knowledge encompasses the more 
object-oriented knowledge about principles and laws (know why) and the knowledge about 
facts (know what) which advance the CFC’s ability to understand specific policy aspects in 
the communities.  
 
Policy Learning I: Diffusion of knowledge and interaction patterns 
The entering CF actors boosted the learning and discourse of the regional policy network, 
especially among the emerging CFC that was building its cooperation structures. 17 out of 
22 interviewees identify a heterogeneous sharing of experiences within the coalition that 
spread knowledge from one level to another (i.e. national-regional-local), and between 
local staff and internationally trained staff. The initial learning phase was driven by a 
diffusion of knowledge and ideas (know-what aspects of learning) among the international 
and regional staff, as many interviewees describe. Environmental knowledge and technical 
know-how learning was introduced by the new international actors, while the regional staff 
contributed important knowledge on the personal networks (know-who learning) —and 
their relevance—to the initial learning phase. Most interviewees regard this process as 
highly related to the improved situation of the communities, especially their local control 
over the resources. This initial diffusion of knowledge also provided the basis for the 
lesson-drawing over the course of the project implementation, and helped to identify and 
interpret the local constraints. 
One of the key lessons that the interviewees described was the strong relevance of personal 
networks among the local communities for the commercialization of timber. For example, 
the establishment of UTAFC as a new intermediary system was designed to offer the 
communities a more formal commercialization system to sell timber from their local 
forests. This was intended to replace the existing informal system of independent 
intermediaries who transported the timber downstream directly from the communities to 
the next timber enterprise. The targeted problem was that the informal system was 
intransparent in terms of timber prices, quality and delivery of the timber, which made the 
forest communities vulnerable to an arbitrary pricing system without any alternatives.  
The new system was launched as a cooperative concept for several communities, and 
supported by several CF actors of the region. However, it soon became clear that the new 
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system had failed. The local community members preferred to keep up their good personal 
relationship with the informal intermediaries, and feared to jeopardize their personal 
network in case the new system would fail. The complex interwoven system of mutual 
favours, informal information channels, and personal trust had been considered too 
beneficial for the people to have it replaced by a formal and transparent system with an 
uncertain future. As several regional interviewees stated, these experiences had yet to be 
translated into a new organizational concept to accommodate the local customary 
structures. 
As the second aspect of the CFC’s learning during the implementation stage, most 
interviewees stated that the CFC drew more operational lessons on the most effective 
behaviour to pursue their intended policy goal. These lessons relate to the internal 
organization of the coalition, the central Coordination Unit (UC), the challenges of the 
high fluctuation of the staff, and learning to deal with the strategic cooperation of members 
of the SFC. These key lessons refer to the interaction in the policy network, and thus the 
operational ability to do something (know how) and the knowledge about who knows what 
(know who).  
Capacity building formed a central focus of the CFC's implementation strategy, as most 
interviewed CFC actors report. At the same time, they described learning as one of the 
major internal constraints within the new coalition, which suggests an internal process of 
capacity building within the CFC as well. 17 out of 22 interviewees stressed that the 
community forestry coalition underwent a considerable challenge to spread knowledge 
internally within the coalition, and also needed to establish common interaction patterns.  
Over time, most interviewees stated that a relatively high fluctuation of staff influenced the 
learning pattern among the actors considerably. It enhanced the diffusion of knowledge 
and ideas among the actors, and shaped the interaction patterns for learning. The diffusion 
of knowledge also reaches beyond the CFC, especially where an actor hires an individual 
from the opposite coalition, strategically acquiring not only the knowledge but also the 
desired networks19. Besides, individuals tend to take their personal policy beliefs with 
them, which has an impact on the role of changes in the policy beliefs, as elaborated 
below. 11 interviewees identified an improvement in the way that the high fluctuation of 
staff was utilized to spread knowledge and contacts among the network.  
However, the regional coordination proved to be one of the key challenges, and remained a 
central problem that most of the operational policy learning was concerned with.  
 
Lack of reliable information and cooperation caused an immense inefficiency constraint 
among the actors. The most important challenge was the coordination of international 
project goals and local goals, combined with the different attitudes of high-rank officials 
                                                 
19 As indicated in some interviews, this pattern might reinforce the relevance of personal networks within the policy 
network, and question the theoretical assumptions about the motivation of actor behaviour 
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and local employees who were now intended to form a joint coalition.  
The new CF actors mostly maintained a strong linkage to their national head offices, which 
most interviewees regarded as a valuable and quick access to the policy discourse beyond 
the regional policy system. At the same time, most regional actors criticized the top-down 
orientation because it weakened the validity of the regional learning process. However, 7 
interviewees stated that the close cooperation between different levels of actors has 
brought a better mutual understanding of the policy priorities, especially between 
environmental protection and the socio-economic benefit of the communities. This gap or 
compromise was also particularly identified for the Mexican case in section 4.1.4. 
Furthermore, intransparency and inefficiency were a major issue during the boom period. 
Apart from the small-scale regional organizations, the major NGOs working in the region 
defined non-overlapping activity areas and objectives, for which no overarching strategy 
was developed, as all respective respondents recall. The new NGO front created a 
relatively dense and potential but uncoordinated and intransparent project environment in 
Esmeraldas, as 78% of the respondents claim20. The provincial forest director or other 
provincial authorities, on the other hand, were not involved in the formulation of action 
strategies, neither in terms of activity, monitoring, or mere information on activities 
between communities and timber enterprises21.  
 
Decentralization Struggle in Esmeraldas 
Overall, the internal structures of the regional government had gone through a rather limited 
change compared to the immense transformation of the policy network. Despite the 1994-96 
national rupture, the Esmeraldan scene had experienced relatively little immediate change and 
preserved their own subsystem, including its grown political structures in informal support and 
information channels. Even the newly created provincial Ministry of Environment imposed little 
network impact from within the governmental institutions. This was because the governmental 
staff, although newly appointed in their official position and title, still remained within the same 
circle of people involved, roughly untouched for their distinct expertise—and contacts—in the 
distinct Esmeraldan context.  
In the national decentralization process, the provincial government had legally been handed over a 
whole list of resource management responsibilities. In fact though, the national Ministry of 
Environment and the national Ministry of Agriculture have been reported to defend their former 
responsibilities, contacts, and actual authority quite successfully22. Institutions and representatives 
                                                 
20 Where projects had been nationally approved or supported, as in the case of the GTZ, the national actors expected 
institutional support from the international projects in Esmeraldas in a function of an organizational compensation (see, 
for example, Wentzel 1998 for the case of the GTZ), if not an extended implementation arm with direct links to the 
national level, since the governmental administration had become more and more understaffed with regard to its wide 
area of responsibilities (Wentzel 1998). This positioning of international projects created a constellation in the provincial 
network that was in some cases perceived as disempowering and threatening by the provincial government, since they 
had little influence or control over the nationally approved NGO activities.  
21 84% of respondents; see also Morales et al. 1998 
22 The provincial and local government authorities demand that the actual administration competence of natural 
resources be finally transferred as stated by the national policy of decentralization, but the national level argues that they 
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were claiming and defending their stakes.  
The fear to lose bribery income is thought to be a considerable factor for the decentralization 
struggle, focusing on the individual who has to defend his job functions and personal benefit, as 
most informants point out. Besides, most actors state that the province neither has the capacities 
nor actual willingness to conduct an actual enforcement of rules. The regional council and the 
municipal units (juntas parroquiales) are characterized as reactive and punctuate in their action, 
rather based on the benefits of the respective community of the individual leader. Interestingly, the 
commercial actors recognize the latter considerably and stress their institutional functions 
(normative and desired functions) in the forest management of the region. Among the actors of the 
Community Forestry Coalition, this was considered a revealing evidence for the silent approval of 
the resource management practice in Esmeraldas. 
 
Also, 13 interviewees stated that the local community members and regional CF actors 
showed a strategic behaviour in how to cash in on the project, and that this often provided 
a higher motivation than the actual progress. The CFC, as they report, tried to outrun this 
behaviour by offering more indirect and object-based funding instead. 
Another key lesson on the interaction within the policy network was the conflict over the 
regional Coordination Unit (UC). It represents another similar issue that limited the 
learning process of the coalition to operational aspects (know-how and know-who). The UC 
was founded as an institutional platform for both coalitions to facilitate new community 
forestry projects in Esmeraldas, along with the ambition to re-shape the network 
strategically23. For the CFC, the new platform also offered a strategic merit in that it served 
to guarantee the regional CF activities politically24, especially for the GTZ25. Eventually, 
the UC struggled with this assigned two-purpose function: While expected to provide very 
partial lobbyism support for E activities, it was officially designed to serve as an impartial 
hub for information and coordination among all regional actors. Because of this, its 
activities were heavily criticized for being partial. Most SFC members withdrew in the 
early 2000s. The following box outlines the conflict of interest that caused the drawback. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
have not reached the technical and administrative capacities to deal with any more than punctuate issues yet (Ministry of 
Agriculture 2002, Morales et al. 1998). National administrators call it a "vision" instead of a "mission" (Ministry of 
Agriculture 2002).  
23 founded through an agreement between the government of Esmeraldas, the Ministry of Environment and MFC-E. The 
UC members included actors from all coalitions, the Ministry of Environment, the GTZ-Project, Fundación Natura, 
SUBIR and USAID. Additional observants are primarily the commercial actors including ENDESA, BOTROSA, 
SETRAFOR, Fundación Forestal, and further NGOs such as CARE and the community of Capulí.  
24 Heindrichs 2000, 10 
25 The German Ministry of Cooperation put the project at the test, stressing that the project start would depend on the 
local structures of the counterpart institution – for which they would regard the UC as the indicator for the political 
interest of Ecuador in the Esmeraldas project; see Heindrichs 2000, 15. 
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Conflict of Interest in the Regional Coordination Unit UC 
The individuals of the UC had been selected based on their extensive personal contacts among the 
CFC actors, in order to link the local to the national level in order to facilitate the local political 
voice and strengthen their power in the actor constellation.  
The role of the UC as detected in the interviews shows the immense importance of informal 
networks around this central network hub.  
The UC's personal contacts could trigger an empowerment of the communities by providing direct 
one-entry access to the regional network26. For a practical facilitation of the communities, the UC 
also provided a platform for information access and internal coordination among the actors. 
Besides, several lobby activities were supposed to facilitate and promote the new CF network 
politically.  
However, especially after the failure of the commercialization unit UTAFC, the actors wanted the 
UC to shift more to the operational facilitation and compensate the new empty space, rather than 
representing the CF interests politically. At the same time, the UC staff had naturally shifted further 
towards the political end of their service, since that was their strength and origin as politicians in 
the network. 
The regional policy network struggled with these cooperation conflicts. Especially the SFC actors 
withdrew from the platform. As a result, several actors –both from the SFC and from the CFC—
shifted more to one-one-one interaction with the fellow actors instead of relying on the network 
platform. The individual CF actors instead focus on network contacts through the national 
environmental organizations. 
 
 
As discussed above, the CFC learning shows a combination from different input sources: 
substantive knowledge from the external input of the project boom (know-what aspects), 
and operational aspects (know-how and know-who) from internal lesson-drawing among 
the individuals during the start-up years of the CFC.  
Both sources are clearly identified and stressed by the interviewees. They also stress, 
however, that the policy learning of the CFC was limited to these operational aspects, and 
needed to use considerable resources to overcome the internal problems. This made their 
capacities for proactive policy learning towards the definition of policy goals rather 
limited. For the same reason, no change of the policy beliefs was identified as of the early 
stage of the process. 
Most interviewees identify a strong causal linkage of the CFC learning process to the 
improved local control of the forest communities as explained above. Secondly, they 
identify a strong influence of the CFC’s learning experiences with the changed ways of 
interaction among the policy actors, which resulted in a more heterogeneous system of 
formal interaction side by side with a more informal cooperation. The international project 
                                                 
26 Heindrichs 2000, 10 
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boom induced the diffusion of knowledge through the fluctuating staff, while the internal 
network practice of the local staff induced the network shift towards more informal 
agreements, away from the paradigm of formalism that the international projects started up 
with. This development was is also explained in chapter 3.4.2. and 4.2.2. The actual 
diversification of the CF-related actors in the policy network was, in contrast, a result of 
the international project boom (external event) itself, and unrelated to the improvement of 
the quality of the discourse. 
In a short conclusion, the following can be summarized about the development of the CFC. 
 
Summary: Priority Shift of the Community Forestry Coalition in Esmeraldas  
• CHANGE OF FOREST-RELATED BELIEFS: The CFC underwent a change of 
forest-related secondary beliefs in the implementation stage, as it shifted the focus 
from ecological protection to include the local forest benefit as a key goal. 
• FOREST-RELATED POLICY LEARNING: The CFC benefited from a 
diffusion of forest-related knowledge (know-what and know-how) among the local 
and international staff. However, the substantive learning was heavily impeded as 
the CFC mostly needed to focus their resources on operational challenges within 
the network.  
• CHANGE OF NETWORK-RELATED BELIEFS: No change has been 
detected.   
• NETWORK-RELATED POLICY LEARNING: The CFC shows a remarkable 
level of operational policy learning during the implementation stage, in order to 
establish the new internal structures as thoroughly as possible. It struggled 
considerably to overcome inefficiencies within the policy network, and thus 
concentrated its efforts strongly on the internal capacity building among the actors. 
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4.1.4. Mexico: Local Forest Benefit Over Time 
Policy Learning I: Shift of focus from environmental conservation to local forest benefit 
The learning process of the PPF and the emerging forest societies was very dynamic 
throughout the launching phase of the community-based forest management in the forest 
ejidos right after the end of the concession, with regard to both forest-related (know-what) 
and network-related (mostly know-how) aspects as explained below. All 22 interviewees 
identified a strong progress in the institutional development of the forest societies, which is 
described in detail in section 4.3.4. As another strategic issue, 16 out of 22 interviewees 
stated that during the early implementation stage in the 1980s, the growing CFC shifted 
towards a stronger focus on the local forest benefit, as opposed to environmental goals for 
the forest communities.  
Environmental goals provided the project background to the Plan Piloto Forestal and added 
political support to the regional activities of the PPF27. Internally however, the local forest 
benefit was prioritized over environmental goals during the implementation stage, as 
nearly all interviewees stress28. While environmental goals were part of the overall 
expectation of the PPF, it soon became clear that the political opportunities and resources 
were limited and required a strong focus. The local forest benefit was regarded as the key 
criteria that the PPF's success would be measured by, and the key requirement to 
community-based forest income to achieve acceptance of the local population. 
Most interviewees agree on the challenges in the communities that called for the shift of 
focus. The forest ejidos faced an immense challenge to take over the logging activities 
directly from the state-based MIQROO, for which the most imminent learning focused on 
the practical challenges to launch the community forestry as quickly as possible. The 
learning of the CFC thus focused on the organizational setup of the new forest societies, as 
well as the range and accountability of their forest services to the ejidos (see section 
4.3.4.). Several interviewees discussed at length the necessity or the flaws of the initial 
trade-off between the long-term ecological goals of forest management and its short-term 
economic success. 
The PPF’s strategic adjustment between local forest benefit and ecological sustainability 
was described as a major characteristic of the policy-related learning of the PPF and fellow 
supporters. The forest management goals were iteratively readjusted to accommodate both, 
depending on the institutional and political feasibility at the time. Thus, the shift resembles 
a forest-related learning process (know-what) as well as a network-related learning process 
(know-how) of the feasible management options. 
                                                 
27 The PPF's environmental merits were strategically marketed to secure the stability of the project from environmental 
supporters, as several interviewees recall. The regional CFC managed to turn this national interest into a support for its 
regional focus on the forest benefit of the local communities, as a means of natural resource protection in the long run. 
28 as for example Bray (2000) points out clearly: The PPF’s initial approach was not to manage ecosystems, but to 
manage mahogany, and Spanish cedar and the LSKs. They saw their task as assuring the establishment of production 
forests, essentially adopting the MIQROO management plan of 75 year polycyclical system for managing mahogany, 
but also introducing some important and participatory forest management institutions and policies.  
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Change of Policy Beliefs I: Local forest benefit is essential 
Nearly all interviewees (20 out of 22) identified the prioritization as a result of the CFC's 
secondary policy beliefs during the early implementation stage29. The interview statements 
differ, however, about the extent of the change, and on whether the shift was the result of a 
learning process that merely affected the short-term implementation strategy, whether it 
was due to a substantive change of the policy-related goals.  
Most interviewees actors did not identify an environmental motivation in the PPF activities 
during the implementation phase and identify a strong socio-economic priority. For the 
first few years, the logging practice was tolerated as possibly unsustainable in order to 
launch community forestry at all. Especially the PPF's start-up organization Sociedad Sur 
was criticized by the interviewees for its strong focus on mahogany for its commercial 
returns, while disregarding other timber species which would have needed more time and 
input to contribute to the communal income. This reflects the secondary policy belief of 
the CFC with regard to forest management goals, in combination with the strong people-
based perspective of the policy core beliefs, as outlined in the following table.  
 
                                                 
29 The strong priorities on the local forest benefit are explained further below for the consolidation stage in a discussion 
of the underlying policy beliefs of the CFC across the policy process.  
 152
Table: Policy Beliefs of the CFC in Quintana Roo; changes are highlighted in bold. 
Source: Summary of interview statements30 
 Community Forestry Coalition 
(CFC) 
 
n = 22
stated by the majority of actors 
(i.e. at least two-third) 
 15-22 statements 
Policy Core Beliefs: 
1. Deep Core Beliefs  humans are part of nature; forests have a rich value for ecological balance 
and for the livelihood of humans (15) 
2. Policy Core Beliefs 
people-based: the local people are the day-to-day decision-makers and need 
to be directed by a higher level of authority (16) 
 
 
Secondary Beliefs: 
Secondary Beliefs related to the local institutional organization of community forestry: 
 
3.1 forest decision-
making  
 
forests require expert protection and management (16) 
Change of policy beliefs in Stage II: local forest benefit is essential (20) 
Change of policy beliefs in Stage III: but requires long-term 
sustainability of the forest resources (17) 
3.2 benefit 
distribution  
local people should receive benefit because the resource is part of their ejido 
(19) 
local people should receive benefit because local forest benefit is essential to 
motivate long-term forest protection (12) 
3.3 organization of    
authority 
indigenous groups have resource rights as ejido members; ejidos make them 
local decision-makers and thus key (18) 
 
Secondary Beliefs related to the structure of the policy network:: 
3.4 hierarchical 
structures and 
formality 
people-based forest use with strong institutional support to ensure sound 
decision-making (16) 
3.5 network 
cooperation and 
information access 
small efficient circle of experts; ejidos need good exchange of information 
with top levels to make both sides work (17) 
 
                                                 
30 Please refer to Annex 4 for a more detailed list of the policy beliefs, and to chapter 2.4. for the methodological 
approach of the data collection. 
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Policy Learning II: Shift from local benefit to sustainable development 
For the consolidation stage of the 1990s, 17 out of 22 interviewees identified an adjustment 
process of the CFC from the local forest benefit to a stronger focus on sustainable forest 
management, and thus incorporating environmental goals after the implementation stage 
(i.e., know-what and know-why related learning). The majority of interviewees particularly 
stress that environmental awareness and ecological education received increasing attention 
in the training programs of the forest societies for the ejidos especially since the late 1990s.  
Forest conservation had increasingly entered the Mexican policy discourse after alarming 
new studies31. From the late 1980s on, forest inventories were introduced as a regular 
procedure in the communal forest management, and started to show new results on the 
sustainable rate of logging of the individual species. They were used to provide a better 
monitoring of the state of the forest, but also aimed to encourage participation of the local 
community members, and to educate them for a better understanding of the forest 
ecosystem32.  
The most urgent issue was whether the forest management systems reached a state of 
ecological sustainability. This was relatively difficult to determine in the 1980s for the best 
logging volumes and the composition of timber species. Reliable data were yet to be 
collected over several years and required a close monitoring and better understanding over 
time. As described in section 4.3.4 with regard to the regional policy learning, the logging 
volumes were corrected several times after measurement problems of the actual sustainable 
rate. An alarming report in the early 1990s had led to a reduction of the timber harvests by 
35% in the south of Quintana Roo, and even by 45% in the Zona Maya33. Until the mid-
2000s, both local communities took up measures to be certified, but not yet finished the 
formal approval process of the FSC.  
 
Change of Policy Beliefs II: Environmental goals and local forest benefit combined  
In agreement with the above described learning, 17 out of 22 interviewees identified a 
change of the CFC's secondary policy beliefs in the 1990s through which they increasingly 
adopted long-term ecological sustainability as an essential element that is as important as 
the local forest benefit. In comparison, all interviewees stated that, during the 1980s, the 
local forest benefit was the strongly dominant goal. Please refer to the table presented 
above for an overview of the CFC's policy beliefs. 
The majority of interviewees state that the shift towards environmental goals was 
motivated by lessons in the forest communities. However, the interviews showed 
controversial positions on the question whether environmental goals had been an 
underlying long-term goal since the beginning of the PPF. 
                                                 
31 see, for example, Haenn 1997 
32 Especially Ejido 20 de Noviembre became a central stage for numerous environmental projects in Calakmul, and is 
involved with a number of the ENGOs that are active in the region on agroforestry and reforestation projects. 
33 Bray 2000 
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Several interviewees argue that environmental goals had already been intended34 in the 
overall strategy of the PPF35 since the 1980s. Especially PPF-related interviewees state that 
the initial focus on the local forest benefit was a temporary strategy which seeked to 
address environmental goals as soon as the socio-economic basis of community forestry 
was established. They argue that the local forest benefit as an important short-term goal to 
gain more support for the PPF implementation among the ejidos. While environmental 
protection is a long-term goal that requires a long period of time to confirm its success, the 
local forest benefit was a more visible and convincing argument to the communities in the 
short term. The local forest benefit was essential to gain further political support to launch 
the community forestry system successfully, and needed to be given priority over 
environmental long-term goals. Thus, most PPF actors clearly identify a pragmatic trade-
off between the two, and stress that quick economic results were essential for its successful 
implementation.  
Seeking to synthesize both perspectives and explain the controversy, it is concluded that 
the policy beliefs included environmental long-term goals from the beginning to a certain 
degree. Nearly all interviewees suggest that the core beliefs remained unchanged. The PPF 
and the forest societies' main policy beliefs suggest a view in which both goals are 
intrinsically connected, and the one requires the other in the long run. Notwithstanding, the 
secondary policy goals were pragmatically adjusted over time with regard to the 
operational policy beliefs (i.e. shifting priorities between environmental and social goals; 
see table below). This is supported by the fact that the network-related beliefs of the CFC 
remained unchanged. It shows that the overall approach and strategic implementation, in 
comparison, remained consistent over time. Thus, the interpretation is offered that the 
policy-related beliefs were over-layered by the strong secondary network-related belief 
which states that a short-term success is needed to establish community forestry at all. 
Local benefit and political windows of opportunity were, consequently, key determinants 
for action during the first phase.  
Learning had an important role to support the environmental shift of the CFC, as several 
interviewees stress. Above described studies and lessons in the forest ejidos encouraged a 
double-loop learning process on the long-term perspectives of forestry. This, again, 
corresponds to a pragmatic approach of the CFC. In particular, two central PPF team 
members pointed out that they anticipated these environmental goals to be adopted—in 
other words, learnt—automatically by the ejidos themselves once the time was ready to 
look beyond the local benefit.  The local experiences of the ejido development are 
                                                 
34 Some also pointed out that the environmental goals had always been claimed, but often a strategic aspect on the 
official agenda to secure funds and political backing. 
35 This assumption is underlined by the structure of the PPF as a small and centrally driven team which allowed for a 
consistent strategy over long periods of time, as opposed to a larger CFC with a pluralist discourse and shift of goals. 
Most interviewees describe the PPF as a process that was strongly stimulated by very few actor, and dispersed through 
directed action rather than an open discourse. The PPF as the main driving initiator of the progress has been described as 
pragmatically goal-oriented. The goals of the project were defined by a rather small group of experts. Thus, most of the 
policy learning of this stage has been reported to occur rather from one source (PPF) which provided the initial starting 
point of the emerging Community Forestry Coalition. For a discussion of the tight internal structures of the PPF and its 
strategic planning approach, please refer to chapter 4.2.4. 
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discussed below in chapter 4.3.4. The development of the CFC suggests the following 
conclusions. 
 
Summary: Priority Shift of the Community Forestry Coalition in Quintana Roo  
• CHANGE OF FOREST-RELATED BELIEFS: The CFC underwent a change of 
forest-related secondary beliefs in the implementation stage, which shifted their 
focus from ecological protection to include the local forest benefit as a key goal.36 
• FOREST-RELATED POLICY LEARNING: The CFC underwent a 
considerable learning process to adjust their sustainable management practice. It 
has been argued that this shift was a combination of new ecological knowledge 
(know-what) and practical feasibility (know-how) without jeopardizing the PPF’s 
stability. This process continued through the implementation and consolidation 
stage. 
• CHANGE OF NETWORK-RELATED BELIEFS: No change has been 
detected.   
• NETWORK-RELATED POLICY LEARNING: The CFC shows a remarkable 
level of operational policy learning during the implementation stage, in order to 
establish the new internal structures as thoroughly as possible. The learning process 
levelled off in the consolidation stage when the network structures had reached a 
defined state.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
36 As opposed to the other two CFCs, this change is less visible and relevant in Quintana Roo because the CFC is driven 
by fewer actors and based on top-down strategic planning. 
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4.1.5. Comparison and Discussion 
The section explored the development of each CFC and analyzed the policy learning and 
changes of beliefs that defined their policy goals. Several findings could be synthesized 
across the case studies. 
CHANGE OF FOREST-RELATED BELIEFS: It could be shown that all three CFCs 
underwent a change of forest-related secondary beliefs in the implementation stage, which 
shifted their focus from ecological protection to include the local forest benefit as a key 
goal. This shift is understandable as it reflects the initial reorientation of the environmental 
actors towards community forestry, thus establishing a focused Community Forestry 
Coalition.  
FOREST-RELATED POLICY LEARNING: The substantive learning progress of the 
CFC shows considerable differences between the case studies. Part of it results from the 
differing levels that the CFCs initially started with: While the BC grassroot actors 
underwent a strong learning process of self-taught experts, the Mexican and Ecuadorian 
projects were driven by professionally trained staff with international experience. 
Notwithstanding, it was also shown that especially the Ecuadorian CFC was heavily 
impeded by inefficiencies of the network and thus needed to focus their resources on these 
operational efforts to a larger extent.  
CHANGE OF NETWORK-RELATED BELIEFS: Only the Canadian CFC showed a 
clear reorientation of their network beliefs. This can also be explained by the immense 
progress of the self-taught experts in the grassroot movement, as opposed to a stronger pre-
designed approach of the two Latin American case studies.   
NETWORK-RELATED POLICY LEARNING: All three CFCs show a remarkable 
level of operational policy learning during the implementation stage, in order to establish 
the new internal structures as thoroughly as possible. The learning process levelled off in 
the consolidation stage when the network structures had reached a defined state. This 
reflects the finding that the changes and activities of the CFC were much stronger during 
the implementation than in the consolidation stage of the process, which results from the 
higher momentum of change that characterizes the implementation stage. 
Notwithstanding the similarities, the focus of the operational learning process varied 
among the coalitions: The Canadian CFC achieved a pro-active level of political action as 
it started to delegitimize the forest sector and forced the SFC into a defensive position. The 
Mexican CFC’s learning was practically focused on the institutional setup of the network 
and de facto arrangements, which created a convincing de facto success that helped 
strengthen the CFC. The Ecuadorian CFC, in comparison, slipped into a reactive position 
as it struggled with considerable internal organizational constraints. 
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Table: Levels of Policy-learning and Changes of Beliefs among the Community 
Forestry Coalitions37; compiled from chapter 
 
 
 
Community Forestry Coalition 
BRITISH COLUMBIA 
Community Forestry Coalition 
QUINTANA ROO 
Community Forestry Coalition 
ESMERALDAS 
 Implementation 
Stage (II) 
Consolidation 
Stage (III) 
Implementation 
Stage (II) 
Consolidation 
Stage (III) 
Implementation 
Stage (II) 
Consolidation 
Stage (III) 
 
core aspects 
 
- no change-  - no change-  - no change-  - no change-  - no change-  
- not yet 
reached-  
 
forest-related 
policy beliefs  
 
STRONG 
shift to local 
forest benefit 
goals through 
the CFC’s 
growing 
professionalizati
on 
NONE MODERATE 
strategic shift of 
focus towards 
local forest 
benefit 
MODERATE 
shift to 
embrace 
environmental 
goals as part 
of local forest 
benefit 
LOW 
shift to embrace 
local forest 
benefit as 
instrument for 
forest protection 
not applicable 
(n.a.) 
forest-related 
policy 
learning 
(know-how and 
know-who) 
STRONG 
structural 
economic 
knowledge on 
forest sector; 
shift of argument 
 
LOW 
improved 
community 
plans for 
CFPP and 
court cases 
MODERATE 
strategic 
adjustment of 
feasible 
management 
options between 
social and 
environmental 
MODERATE 
determination 
and 
adjustment of 
sustainable 
logging rates 
LOW 
diffusion of 
environmental 
knowledge 
between 
international and 
local staff 
n.a. 
 
network-
related policy 
beliefs  
 
STRONG 
coordinated 
network for 
grassroot action 
NONE NONE NONE 
 
NONE 
n.a. 
network-
related policy 
learning 
(know-why and 
know-what) 
STRONG  
delegitimation of 
the SFC’s public 
argument of 
justification 
MODERATE 
public 
campaigns 
and court 
cases against 
government 
and industry 
STRONG 
institutional 
establishment of 
forest societies, 
network, CFC 
and local 
management 
structures 
MODERATE 
adjustment of 
forest services 
after external 
perturbations 
(deregulation, 
privatization 
trend) 
STRONG 
significant 
organizational 
effort to 
overcome 
internal 
challenges 
n.a. 
 
                                                 
37 The categories strong, moderate, low and none characterize the progress of the CFC in the particular field. It refers to 
the level of progress and activity, and is used to provide an overview for comparison between the case studies. 
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4.2. Learning of the Competing Advocacy Coalitions: Strategic Approaches and 
Responses 
4.2.1. Introduction: Theoretical Perspective 
This section analyzes the learning that was induced in the three case studies when the 
dominant coalition was challenged by a new opposition entering the policy network38. The 
ACF states that non-cognitive, i.e. external, events are necessary for a major policy change, 
because they are the ones that can shift the advocacy coalitions' power constellation. A 
new Community Forestry Coalition in the network represents such an external event to the 
policy subsystem39, and has been identified as a strong influence on the process in all three 
cases. The policy core beliefs of the SFC usually remain unchanged according to the ACF 
when challenged by a new coalition. Their beliefs are strongly defended because actors 
tend to reject any cognitive information that would delegitimize or question their core 
beliefs, especially when confirming their interpretative views among the coalition 
members40.  
In all three case studies, the interviewees identified a strategic response of the dominant 
coalition which seeked to shield their position against the new actors and issues41. 
Especially for this section, it is central to note the filtered and goal-driven character of 
policy learning. Sabatier's definition42 recaptures that the focus of policy learning is on its 
instrumental use according to the actor's own interest, and usually aims to incorporate new 
strategic information against their opposition: 
Policy learning refers to relatively enduring alterations of thought or behavioural 
intentions . . . in order to further their policy objectives. They will . . . use policy analyses 
primarily to buttress and elaborate those beliefs (or attack their opponents' view). 
The following three sections explore the strategic interplay of the State Forestry Coalition 
with the Community Forestry Coalition, and review the filtered use of new information 
with a brief view on the outcome of their strategies. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
38 The terms strategic behaviour and strategic response are used to describe the coalitions’ planned activities to succeed 
over the competing coalition. They are determined by cognitive processes as they are based on the identification of the 
problem (perception of the political threat), assessment of their opportunities, and interpretation of the best strategy to 
succeed over the opposing coalition. As a result, the strategic behaviour of a coalition is strongly driven by its operational 
aspects of policy learning (on know-how and know-who aspects) in the policy process, and also by issue-oriented aspects 
of policy learning (know-what and know-why aspects) in order to formulate new arguments in the policy network.  
39 even more so in cases where their activities are concerted from international spheres 
40 see chapter 3.2.2. for the strong cognitive resistance of actors against new influences on their core beliefs 
41 see Annex 3 and 4 for the interview statements 
42 Sabatier 1993, 19; see also chapter 3.3 
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4.2.2. Canada: The Case of Buttressing Learning  
As the CFC was expanding and refining their policy positions43, the industrial forest sector 
became pressured to react to the increased pressure and strategically tried to accommodate 
the environmental concerns (12 out of 16) to secure their acceptance in the general public 
(8). The SFC chose to defend their position as long as possible through an elaborate 
reactive strategy.  
Compared to the CFC, the learning process of the SFC was less directed at a substantial 
refinement of knowledge (know-what aspects of learning), but rather oriented towards the 
political skills of a strategic response to the economic perturbations that came along with 
the evolving environmental pressure (know-how and know-who). This encompasses a form 
of buttressing learning44 which seeks to restrengthen the arguments that the public 
legitimation of the forest sector was based on. After the new NDP government had started 
to impose much stricter regulation upon the logging operations right after they moved into 
office in 1991, the forest industry had withdrawn into a rather defensive position, as they 
already were during the environmental protests of the late 1980s. Their political agenda 
was, thus, defined by immediate counter-strategies against the new environmental 
regulations, rather than re-designing their own agenda entirely. 
Since the times of colonization, the frontier lands had been explored and exploited from a 
perception of superabundant forest resources. The forest industry established itself 
politically on the argument of creating economic growth: Old-growth 'overmature' 
rainforest was planned to be replaced by secondary forest in order to increase the growth 
rate and thus productivity of the logging industry, in short referred to as the conversion-
liquidation project.  
Facing the first attacks of public criticism on the environmental damage of industrial 
logging, the industrial actors now got into the position where they had to respond to the 
accusations, while maintaining their economic argument to justify their immense role in 
BC. The industry's strategy remained at a resistance mode that aimed to defend and 
elaborate the belief structure that legitimized the industry's position, for example by 
multimillion dollar campaigns to influence the public. The late 1980s were pointedly called 
the "dialogue of the deaf" era where resources appeared to be key in convincing the public 
of either of the two belief systems45.  
When the Community Forestry Coalition had managed to delegitimize the economic 
benefit of the large-scale industry for BC by the early 1990s, "(t)he State Forestry 
Coalition, which at first had answered with denials and counterchallenges, began to mix 
concessions and mea culpas into its response."46 With the increasing attention of the 
general public during the public protests, however, the environmental protests grew to a 
                                                 
43 see chapter 4.1.1  
44 understood as a form of instrumental learning that seeks to bolster one’s existing policy beliefs while they are being 
challenged; see Lertzman et al. 1996 
45 Lertzman et al. 1996, 123 
46 Lertzman et al. 1996, 121 
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level where the forest industry had to respond where they were facing significant economic 
loss through the international campaigns against the BC forest industry.  
By adopting new environmental standards, the SFC soon stressed the new environmental 
success in order to neutralize the pressure tactics of the other AC. This strategy aimed to 
buttress the forest sector and its links to the government: 
The general tactic of these highly professional and well-funded groups was to use a carrot 
rather than a stick in seeking their objectives. These groups often praised the BC 
government in the international sphere (one group presented the Premier with an 
international conservation award). This approach further endeared these groups to a 
government that was being criticized internationally by the Western Canada Wilderness 
Committee, Greenpeace, the Valhalla Wilderness Society and the Natural Resources 
Defense Council (Cashore 1998). 
It is important to note that both the interviews and literature show two different perceptions 
of the motivation of the industry: The Community Forestry actors describe the industry's 
behaviour as a tactical move to reduce the political force of the CFC by calming down the 
explosive momentum that the environmental campaign had developed in public. The 
voices from the SFC, on the contrary, stress that the change had been triggered from the 
economic necessity to pull out of the frontlines of public criticism, as a deliberate change 
of corporate strategy to mitigate the impacts on exports and marketing. These polarized 
positions in the interviews and literature also show differing views on the public dynamics 
that the campaigns had generated - from a wave of environmentalism to calls for more civil 
rights and environmental justice on the local level on one hand to a strategic 
instrumentalization of the general public for rallying purposes. 
The SFC strategically adopted 'voluntary' responses that go beyond the demanded changes; 
either to 'spike the guns' of the other AC or as a change of corporate strategy against other 
competitors that would then become the target of criticism instead47. 
Home Depot singled out B.C. cedar in its international list of endangered wood. Within 
two months, B.C. forest companies, fearing a loss of the lucrative cedar market, were 
scrambling to join the leading certification agency, Forest Stewardship Council. Even the 
arch-foe of local greens—the Forest Alliance of B.C.—abandoned its pro-clearcutting 
stand and applied for FSC membership (Vancouver Sun, May 5 2000, p. A14).  
Another important reason for the defensive mode of the SFC was that the competition grew 
fierce among them. None of them could afford to be stigmatized by further boycotts. 
Facing the economic pressures that had developed during the environmental protests, 
MacMillan Bloedel for example was among the first to back away from clearcutting and 
old-growth forest on public land. This caused a serious rupture in the industrial lobby and 
eroded the protective forest coalition.48  
(The timber companies') experience in the 1990s (…) illustrates the way companies 
respond to groups under network in which they must share influence in the policy making 
                                                 
47 discussed for BC by Stanbury 2000, 253 
48 Its new strategy was driven by shareholder pressures to have the share price value go up and save the company's 
survival; for a discussion of the role of the environmental protests behind MacMillan Bloedel's change in strategy see 
Cashore 1998. 
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process with environmental groups and other social actors. This is because many of BC's 
clientele-pluralist forest policy networks crumbled post 1991, as pressure-pluralist, 
concertation, and state-directed networks emerged amidst an increasingly complex 
regulatory style (Cashore and Vertinsky 1998, 22-23).  
Furthermore, MacMillan Bloedel pressed for an open log market and a reform of the 
stumpage-based revenue system. This implied a slippery slope towards an end of tenured 
harvest licenses in BC, which the industry seeked to protect but the provincial government 
(NDP) had long been waiting to put an end to.49 Among the forest industry coalition, this 
was a clear threat. MB chief executive officer Tom Stephens had internally become a  
lone wolf whose actions could harm the industry as a whole, (…) deserting collective 
strategy in order to push the interests of his own company50.  
In 1998, MacMillan Bloedel withdrew officially from the Forest Alliance of BC. The 
forest actors experienced a network rupture along with this. MacMillan Bloedel had 
contributed an annual Can $ 1000,000 to the Forest Alliance's budget of Can $ 2.5 million. 
More importantly, the new strategy of MacMillan Bloedel triggered unrest and controversy 
among the forest actors because the security within the previous coalition had eroded 
considerably. In fact, it led to a  
sweeping reappraisal of roles (where) COFI knows its role is going to change. But to 
what nobody yet knows (…) Its traditional job is to act for the industry in government 
relations. But if collective strategy breaks down, what can the relationship with the 
government be?51 
Several commercial interviewees reported that the internal coherence of the coalition had 
weakened, although cooperation might be even more important under pressure. The 
accelerating speed of takeovers, paired with their economic dimensions, caused widespread 
public concern, and weaker coherence among the coalition: 
If a U.S. firm can buy a B.C. institution like M-B without even the slightest controversy, 
as Weyerhaeuser52 did in 1999, then a Toronto outfit repatriating the same properties 
could expect equally clear sailing. Except now, (…) the coastal forest industry is right in 
the middle of the big shake-down that everyone has been predicting for years. (Les Leyne 
in "New Corporate Bears in Our Woods", The Times Colonist, June 1, 2005) 
In conclusion, the SFC’s strategic accommodation of the environmental criticism—from 
buttressing learning over—has effectively contributed to a number of the effects as most 
interviewees identified. Higher voluntary environmental standards and the pragmatic 
acknowledgement of community consultation had a positive influence on the local 
situation regarding the communities’ broader range of possible arrangements with the 
forest sector and the BC Ministry of Forests. The SFC’s gradual response to new 
environmental standards, and the gradual development of their public delegitimation, both 
encouraged an increasing policy arena with more actors across the coalitions because it 
                                                 
49 Clarke 1998 
50 Clarke 1998 
51 Clarke 1998 
52 Weyerhaeuser Canada holds renewable, long-term licenses on 13.2 million ha of forestlands in five provinces and 
owns 269,000 ha. In February 2005, Weyerhaeuser itself was taken over by the Toronto investment player Brascan.  
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intensified the policy discourse of the 1990s. 
 
Table: SFC's Policy Learning and Identified Effects in British Columbia during the 
Implementation Stage since 2001 
 
                                                                              Causes 
Effects 
SFC: 
Strategic Accommodation of 
environmental criticism 
Forest-related Decision-making: 
community initiatives for CF planning and ecosystem-
based alternatives 
0 
Benefit Distribution:  
protected areas and funds assigned to communities to 
mitigate logging effects 
+ 
L
oc
al
 E
ff
ec
ts
 
Organization of Authority: 
individual negotiation options of communities with 
government 
+ 
Accessibility of the Network: 
policy arena opens to a multitude of new actors 
+ 
N
et
w
or
k 
E
ff
ec
ts
 
Hierarchy levels and Formality:  
Formal framework of decision-making not reshaped 
 
0 
++ = strong positive effect; + = positive effect; o=no direct effect detected;  - = adverse effect 
 
 
Change of Policy Belief: From Government-oriented Planning to Community Consultation  
The consolidation stage brought several changes. The majority of interviewees note that 
the state forestry coalition underwent a change of a secondary policy belief since the 
1990s, although still less comprehensive or policy-oriented than the CFC. 15 out of the 16 
interviewees stated that the industrial actors of the State Forestry Coalition increasingly 
adopted local participation into their position. As opposed to the previously preferred 
closed efficient network, the state forestry actors now started to acknowledge local 
interests. As the interviewees sum up, this change is not the result of a content-driven 
policy learning process comparable to the one of the CFC, but rather evolved as a strategic 
lesson-drawing to remain efficient in their logging operations in the field. Both changes of 
policy beliefs are discussed in detail below. 
Several interviewees identified a slight shift in the forest sector strategies of the 1990s: The 
SFC moved from a government-oriented planning attitude to an approach that tried to 
acknowledge more community participation. This change does not, most interviewees 
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stress, imply a change of belief in the hierarchical structures of decision-making in the 
forest sector53. Instead, the change addresses the more pragmatic and operational fields of 
forest management and network cooperation. Some interviewees argue that this developed 
only after the years of buttressing learning that had the forest industry realize that it is more 
efficient to involve the communities more, instead of fighting and losing logging 
operations that were planned without a minimum of local consultation. 
After the 1990s, the SFC again shifted their attitude slightly further towards the public, 
local forest communities, and aboriginal consultation rights in land use planning. This 
suggests a gradual continuation of the changes that took place in the previous stage. 11 out 
of 16 interviewees noted a continued change of belief after 2001 among the state forestry 
coalition. It is described as a slight shift from the previous government-oriented planning 
to a new approach that would involve community consultation.  
As nearly all interviewees point out, the shift was heavily pressured by the increasing 
jurisdiction on communal consultation and aboriginal resource rights. Several high-profile 
court cases had occurred in which the community fought against the forest industry, and 
which laid new precedents for the legal responsibilities of the private concession holders in 
the planning process54. This suggests a slow adoption of the lessons that the timber 
companies had drawn over the past decade with regard to community consultation. The 
SFC actors now increasingly supported the point that communities need to be consulted. 
This is described as a logical response to the increasing recognition of communal rights by 
several court cases and local protests. It was a gradual adjustment alongside the 
deregulation process and caused considerable conflict among the actors, as explored in 
chapter 4.1. Thus, the changed secondary belief reflects the SFC's adjustment to secure 
local support for the companies' projects, as the local protests and resistance could 
otherwise lead to heavy public disapproval, compensation payments, or lengthy court 
cases.  
Similarly, aboriginal land claims and aboriginal land use rights are now considered part of 
the planning costs as they are gaining more rights (legal costs of compensation) and more 
public interest. Generally, the increased public interest in environmental protection and 
local empowerment was now identified as important in the planning process as well. If a 
timber company had to operate against the local community and would jeopardize their 
image and political support for logging in the region, this could turn individual cases into a 
high additional cost and delay for the timber companies. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
53 which would have suggested an unlikely devolution trend even in the industry 
54 see chapter 4.1.2. 
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Table: Changes of Policy Beliefs of the State Forestry Coalition in British Columbia; 
changes are highlighted in bold  
 State Forestry  
Coalition (CFC) 
stated by the majority of actors 
(i.e. at least two-third) 
n = 16 11 – 16 statements 
 
Policy Core Beliefs: 
1. Deep Core Beliefs  
 
natural resources for economic use and entrepreneurial benefit (12) 
abundance of natural resources through territorial expansion (11) 
2. Policy Core Beliefs 
 
centralized governmental authority to coordinate exploration and resource 
use and to provide planning security for businesses (15) 
 
Secondary Beliefs: 
 
- forest-related:  
3.1 forest decision-
making  
Conversion-Liquidation of old growth rainforest to more productive 
second growth forest to protect economy (14) 
3.2 benefit distribution 
  
BC forests are 95% on Crown Lands, so there is no communal rights in 
focus (12) 
3.3 organization of    
authority 
most forests are legally on Crown Lands, for which no communal rights 
exist; many indigenous groups have no legal basis so far (11) 
- network-related:  
3.4 hierarchical 
structures and 
formality 
the provincial government is the legitimate authority (15) 
regional sub-administration provides faster approval of logging plans (14) 
3.5 network 
cooperation and 
information access 
closed efficient network between the only legally authorized decision-
makers: provincial government and industry (13) 
participation of communities facilitates planning process and avoids 
resistance and delay of planning; public information reduces 
environmental concern and resistance (15) 
Change in Stage III: aboriginal rights need to be addressed and 
require community consultation to avoid costs and delay of operations 
(11) 
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Protective Liberals and the CFPP Containment Strategy  
As the majority of CF interviewees sum up the recent implementation of the CFPP, the 
recent policy development corresponds to the SFC’s strategic buttressing and their 
voluntary opening towards more community consultation. The initial tenure reform debate 
was translated into the CFPP so as to accommodate the previous debate. As most CF 
interviewees identify, however, the hierarchical decision-making structures remained 
unchanged (as explained in detail in chapter 4.1.2.) and community forestry was instead 
arranged as a small niche of carefully restricted tenures, without tackling a structural 
reform of the overall tenure system. This move of the Liberals served two purposes: for 
one, a give-in to appease the Community Forestry Coalition and the forest communities 
which called to maintain the commenced path of change. At the same time, the Liberals' 
new policy helped to contain the structural criticism on forestry policy to local 
communities and accommodate it without threatening the old system in place.  
The increased economic pressure and competition of the logging industry has been 
described above in chapter 3.4.2. Another major economic threat for the forest sector was 
the vanishing investment security for the forestry sector when the first nations' land claims 
became legally acknowledged55. At once, aboriginal land claims turned into an 
increasingly pressing issue all over Canada, and especially in BC more than a hundred of 
such aboriginal titles have yet to be resolved.  
As explored in chapter 3.4.3.1, the growing legal recognition of First Nation land rights 
urged the government to take action. The SFC saw their stakes jeopardized. While the 
treaty negotiations would cause public costs out of the negotiation process and follow-up 
payments, the unsettled land claims were increasingly perceived as a threat to investment 
security for large-scale projects on the very territories that were fought over. 
For example, the TFL 39 case on Haida Gwaii highlights the legal implications and the 
perceived risks for the BC government. It challenged the rights of industrial tenure holders 
on a lack of aboriginal consultation during a tree farm license transfer (TFL) and became 
one of the most significant recent cases in BC. 
 
 
 
                                                 
55 The British Colonial government of BC declared all as Crown lands and abandoned any treaty negotiations with the 
native people in the mid-19th century. They neglected any first nation ownership of the newly sovereignity territory ever 
since. Only after the recent Delgamuukw decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in 1997, indigenous land ownership 
was legally recognized again within the federal sovereignity of the Canadian state territory. In this decision, an 
aboriginal title was for the first time ever proven successfully in a Canadian court. Before this exemplary case, 
aboriginal communities only had the option of treaty negotiation with the government, without being able to question the 
government's decisions and defend their rights in court. The 1997 Delgamuukw decision thus set a starting signal to a 
new wave of aboriginal land title. The second exemplary case, the Nisga'a agreement in BC, was the result of separate 
negotiations with the government, dating back to 1973.   
Specifically, it was not the aboriginal rights movement per se that caused concerns among the SFC actors, but more the 
legal implications and the negative public image its opponents. 
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The TFL 39 Court Case: Haida Gwaii against the Ministry of Forests and Weyerhaeuser 
While the Islanders intended to re-structure the forest management away from the large-scale 
licensees as soon as possible, the large TFL 3956 was to continue with industrial logging for 
decades as granted by the Ministry of Forests. TFL 39 was just in the process of a transfer from 
MacMillan Bloedel to Weyerhaeuser after a corporate takeover57. If replaced, it would confirm 
cutting rights until 2020 and make a local re-structuring process for this large share of the Island's 
productive forest impossible. However if the area were to be available, ICSI's community forest 
feasibility study had expressed interest in parts of MacMillan Bloedel TFL 39 as candidate areas 
for community forestry.  
During the planning process for the community forestry pilot proposal, a procedural weakness 
occurred in the TFL transfer which, to the Haida, looked like an opportunity to expel Weyerhaeuser 
from the Island, to win valuable forest areas back, and practically reclaim Crown lands into local 
tenure. The argument was based on a lack of public participation to assess the community impact 
from the tenure transfer, and they were concerned about the implications of this long-term 
giveaway upon their land claim process. The Haida went to court and won58 against B.C. and 
Weyerhaeuser: the Crown and Weyerhaeuser are under a legally enforceable duty to consult with 
the Haida and to accommodate Haida interests in their traditional territory. The transfer and 
replacement of Weyerhaeuser’s TFL 39, was judged to be illegal59. 
Since TFL 39 was only one of eighteen licenses in the process of being renewed, the BC 
government might have feared—as several CF actors assume—that the Haida Gwaii case could 
turn into a slippery slope towards an overdue tenure reform in the whole province. During the court 
case of the Haida, the Ministry of Forests had gradually changed much of its regulations related to 
the governmental responsibilities in industrial forest licenses. Some interviewees identify a causal 
connection between the two events. As a result of the provincial deregulation process around 
industrial logging (see chapter 4.2.2), the TFL were further withdrawn now from local influence. 
Interestingly, the tenure of MacMillan Bloedel was soon passed on from Weyerhaeuser to the next 
corporate takeover to Brascan. Instead of invalidating the illegal transfer of the TFL 39 from 
MacMillan Bloedel to Weyerhaeuser, now the further transfer to Brascan was approved because it 
did comply with the most recent regulations. The government argued that it had no particular 
responsibilities or requirements to the licensee according to the new regulations.  
Local resistance to the governmental move was strong. A month after the $1.2 billion Brascan deal 
                                                 
56 The Tenure Forest License No. 39 includes land on northern Vancouver Island and the mainland coast; the Haida 
Gwaii portion of the TFL alone, known as Block 6, involves an AAC of over 1.25 million cubic metres. The tenure, all 
on Crown lands, was granted to MacMillan Bloedel by the Ministry of Forests and therefore out of reach for a local re-
structuring of the forest management.  
57 The Seattle-based Weyerhaeuser Co. had started the takeover of the British Columbian timber giant MacMillan 
Bloedel in 1999. In February 2005, Weyerhaeuser then was taken over by the Toronto investment player Brascan. "If a 
U.S. firm can buy a B.C. institution like M-B without even the slightest controversy, as Weyerhaeuser did in 1999, then 
a Toronto outfit repatriating the same properties could expect equally clear sailing." (Les Leyne on "New Corporate 
Bears in Our Woods" in The Times Colonist, June 1, 2005). 
58 The Haida won the appeal court decision in February 2002. The province appealed the decision, and in November 
2004 the Supreme Court of Canada ruled in favour of the Haida again. 
59 According to the recent Supreme Court of Canada ruling, the province has an obligation to consult and accommodate 
Haida interests in exactly this kind of forest license transfer. However, the province maintains it has no authority over 
the transfer.  In actuality the province conveniently legislated itself out of the obligation while the case was being heard.  
The Supreme Court in its ruling stated that the province can’t hide behind its own legislation. For a detailed discussion 
see, e.g., Dogwood Initiative 2005.  
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was announced in February 2005, the Haida started logging blockades on the Island, which have 
led to a temporary agreement with the BC government over Can $5 million60.  
 
Facing such pressures only from specific high-profile cases, the government assumed a 
possible slippery slope when giving in too far. It was unclear how any legal exemptions61 
could fit into the existing forest policy and the equal treatment of all communities. Some 
outstanding exemplary cases might redefine the legal status of land title on granted TFLs 
(e.g., Haida Gwaii62) or aboriginal consultation for TFL transfer (also on Haida Gwaii). 
Another central and unsolved question in the process of land tenure reform and indigenous 
territories was the compensation for resource extraction, existing licences, and damages 
since the colonial past, in other words who compensates whom63.  
It can thus be suggested that the increasing political force of aboriginal groups from their 
successful title cases pushed the government into a defensive position that did not open up 
for devolution in general, but maintained its leverage to give in to the punctuate areas of 
concern where it was legally necessary after the court decisions. This was used instrument 
to protect the overall stability of the BC forest economy, as the socio-economic 
implications of the alternative are yet unknown. 
 
In conclusion, the following learning processes and changes of beliefs have been found for 
the Canadian SFC.  
Summary: Strategic Response of the State Forestry Coalition in British Columbia  
• CHANGE OF FOREST-RELATED BELIEFS: The Canadian SFC tried to 
buttress its key beliefs of the forest economy in the region while it was gradually 
delegitimized by the CFC in the 1990s by the use of its own arguments. No forest-
related change of beliefs has been detected. 
• FOREST-RELATED POLICY LEARNING: The buttressing strategy included 
both forest-related (know-what) as well as network-related (know-how) aspects of 
                                                 
60 The agreement was reached right before the provincial election in May 2005. The Ministry of Forests offered 40,000 
ha of protection for Haida lands and $5 million in return for all parties to stand still on the status quo, i.e. no further 
impediment of commercial forestry activities on the Island. 
61 Both the National Aboriginal Forestry Association and the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples recommended a 
new legal category of forest tenure for aboriginal communities, calling for a more holistic approach to eco-system-based 
management without volume-based or time-limited production requirements (Burda et al. 1997, xi).  
62 As opposed to the other five communities of the research, the Haida Gwaii case shows more stimulus from the local to 
the regional level than the other way around. In fact, the Haida Gwaii court case on the aboriginal land title might turn 
into an exemplary case for other First Nations on how to accommodate territorial rights and community-based 
governance in BC. Several actors anticipate that the Haida case might even turn into a slippery slope for the government 
to give in more to the First Nations' recent demands. The Haida case, thus, reflects several issues in the larger 
environmental and indigenous movement in BC that the regional actors watch closely to track policy change. 
63 While the BC government regards their Crown lands as legal ownership of the general public, and timber companies' 
licences thus as legally binding, First Nations argue that such tenure changes would represent a mere "quid pro quo for 
removing historic social contract obligations"63, for which no compensation would be payable to timber companies nor 
the public (BC Coalition for Sustainable Forest Solutions, in their draft citizens' legislation declared before the 
provincial election in May 2005) 
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learning, but increasingly failed against the proactive strategy of the CFC and also 
did not result in a change of belief. 
• CHANGE OF NETWORK-RELATED BELIEFS: The SFC extended their 
position of public involvement and incorporated more aboriginal and community 
rights. This was clearly motivated by the external perturbation of the aboriginal 
rights movement and their legal recognition, as found above and in chapter 3.4.2.1. 
• NETWORK-RELATED POLICY LEARNING: As stated above, the SFC 
underwent a considerable buttressing learning during the implementation stage, 
which included know-how and know-who aspects regarding public relations and 
network interaction. In the consolidation stage, the SFC went through another 
operational learning process to accommodate the new legal and public requirements 
for community consultation (know-how and know-who aspects).   
 
The section helped understand the strategic struggle between the advocacy coalitions, 
especially during the eventful implementation years of the 1990s. The two coalitions 
developed clearly distinct strategies to deal with each other’s political moves. The SFC 
was soon pushed into a defensive position, while the CFC grew considerably into a 
stronger pro-active position.  
The analysis showed that the progress of the implementation phase was strongly influenced 
by policy learning. The political position of the SFC was significantly challenged by the 
CFC’s immense progress in both expertise and political skills. In short, the CFC’s strategy 
could be paraphrased as knowledge-driven because this was the major asset that equipped 
the CFC with the necessary power to challenge the SFC.  
 
The section discussed why the strategic behaviour of the SFC did not succeed in the long 
run. The SFC’s strategic responses –and in fact their capability to resist the pressure—offer 
us valuable insights on the overall success of the CFC’s strategic approach. Over the 
course of the implementation phase, the following strategic responses have been found for 
the SFC:  
Table: Strategic responses of the SFC to the CFC pressures over time in British 
Columbia. Source: compiled from chapter. 
 (1) short-term strategic response 
SFC not affected; 
ignores CFC for some time 
(2) medium-term strategic response 
SFC challenged;  
buttressing learning 
(3) long-term strategic response 
SFC partly weakened, 
public/economic pressure to change 
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4.2.3. Ecuador: The Case of Strategic Cooperation 
18 interviewees identified a counteraction of the state forestry coalition in which they 
moved from neglect to a strategic cooperation with the community forestry actors. This 
served to contain and limit the recent CF activities, while securing access to the coalition's 
considerable funds. Both processes are described in the following section. The interview 
responses are presented in more detail in Annex 4. 
Facing the new actors and funds that entered the region, the SFC adapted strategically to 
mitigate adverse effects in the region to sustain their logging activities and their dominant 
position in Esmeraldas. As most interviewees report, the SFC went through a policy 
learning process that gradually incorporated the changed conditions into their new 
assessment of cost and benefit in their network behaviour. Most significantly, several CFC 
and local interviewees described a two-tier approach of the SFC: The commercial actors 
maintained the exploitative logging practice, while adding a new tier of joint projects with 
E groups as a new but separate area of activity. While the first served to protect the 
economic benefits and stability of the SFC actors, the second aimed to access the immense 
source of resources and political approval that the emerging CFC introduced to the region.  
The SFC increasingly utilized the new CFC resources for their planning activities, e.g. 
environmental assessment, ecological zoning of forest areas, engineering know-how for 
logging equipment and access roads, technical forest services in the communities, and side 
projects with agroforestry. This gradually improved their knowledge on forest management 
matters such as low-impact logging techniques, but the learning is mostly centered on the 
strategic adjustment to a new cooperation in the network. They slowly developed a new 
strategic focus to include CFC-related projects in their work, in order to be informed about 
the policy network's activities, and contain changes as much as possible. In order to access 
new sources of funding and information, the SFC actors were offered a strong incentive to 
cooperate with the CFC. However, the interviewees' descriptions of several contracts64 
show that the cooperation was often grounded on personal agreements or otherwise non-
enforceable contracts. This indicates the SFC's strategic learning to accommodate the E 
projects as a controlled side aspect of their dominant logging strategy, strictly avoiding 
legal enforceability in the cooperative projects where possible. 
Another element was that the SFC developed a new strategy of community contracts. The 
policy change of 1994 had marked a significant change because it conferred formal tenure 
rights to indigenous territories. While the territories had previously been harvested without 
formal accreditation, the timber companies were now pressured to formalize their 
activities. With the companies' need to expand their logging areas continuously, and new 
eligible forests in the region becoming rare, the formal adjudication of indigenous lands 
brought another limitation to the intended expansion of the logging companies. Thus, they 
entered contracts with individual communities to secure their territorial expansion, partly 
                                                 
64 i.e., Public Private Partnership as a triangle contract between the community (Capulí), E actor (GTZ/MFC-E), and 
timber enterprise (Endesa Botrosa) , infrastructural planning and road construction, or joint Forest Certification projects 
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in competition against other logging companies. 
The SFC actors thus increasingly followed the strategy to expand through contracts on 
indigenous land claims, rather than buying their own lands. They realized that the long-
term planning security of their logging operations would be protected more efficiently if 
they adjusted to the legal tenure changes accordingly, otherwise their logging areas might 
be legally invalid later on. Besides, the booming CFC-related projects offered a 
considerable new source of resources that helped to adjust to the recent legal changes. 
 
 
Strategic adjustment of the forest companies to the 1994 legal tenure reform:         
The Example of Endesa-Botrosa and Capulí 
Among the investigated communities on the Río Onzole, Capulí entered a concession contract with 
Endesa Botrosa comparably early in 1994, when the latter offered to support the community legally 
during the adjudication process. The contract was initiated by Endesa Botrosa and not by the 
community, motivated by the enterprise's interest to secure the future territorial expansion of their 
logging activities.  
The SFC knew they had a good bargaining position towards the communities because the latter 
were struggling with the adjudication process of their territory and did not have access to 
information on the legal requirements, as all respondents report to have been the major barrier to 
filing their land claim. The adjudication process had become a lengthy and costly barrier for the 
communities because they could file for a formal recognition of their claim, but usually did not 
have the sufficient resources nor knowledge to do so.  
Numerous cases have been reported where Endesa Botrosa's lawyers took the initiative towards 
forest communities. Arenales, along with several other communities, rejected a similar offer 
because they feared to lose their say in the socio-economic future of the community. 
 
For the implementation phase since the 1990s, one issue has been identified (by 20 out of 
22 statements) that represents a change of a secondary policy belief in the state forestry 
coalition. There is no indication of a change of policy beliefs among the CF coalition. The 
interviews indicate that the SFC opened up towards the new CF actors in order to get 
access to the funding and resource support that new CF projects offered to bring. The 
strategic character of the change of belief is outlined below65.  
 
Change of Policy Beliefs: From closed operations to incorporating CFC resources 
The interviews with SFC members indicated a new policy belief which acknowledged the 
new role of the CFC in the region. As several commercial actors identified, the commercial 
actors increasingly opened up to the CF-related policy network actors. This indicates a 
                                                 
65 Please refer to Annex 4 for the interview statements of the coalitions' policy beliefs, and to chapter 2.4 for a description 
of the data collection process. The definition and scope of the analyzed policy beliefs is outlined in chapter 2.4.2, and the 
theoretical concept of policy beliefs within the Adovcacy Coalition Framework is found in chapter 2.2.2.  
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shift of the secondary policy beliefs and includes several following aspects, identified by 
several interviewees: 
The SFC decided to open up to the CFC in order to be informed about their latest activities 
that might interfere with their own operational plans and thus reduce their costs of 
transaction within the network. The SFC also utilizes the CFC for marketing purposes in 
order to improve their public image, to obtain forest certifications, and to access new 
communities. This reduces marketing and transaction costs. They open up to joint training 
and planning in order to utilize the CFC's additional expertise for new infrastructural 
planning and conservation buffer zones, and in general open up in order to access these 
new resources in funds and know-how. 
 
Table: Change of Policy Beliefs of the SFC in Ecuador; changes are highlighted in bold  
 State Forestry  
Coalition (CFC) 
stated by the majority of actors (i.e. at least two-third) 
n = 16 11 – 16 statements 
 
Policy Core Beliefs: 
1. Deep Core Beliefs  
 
human dominion over nature; forest represents natural resource for 
economic use and entrepreneurial benefit (18) 
2. Policy Core Beliefs state-based: the government is the legitimate authority (16) 
 
Secondary Beliefs: 
 
- forest-related:  
3.1 forest decision-
making  
 
 
large-scale logging in valuable old-growth areas is most cost-efficient; 
high price competition requires strategic relocation and expansion (20) 
3.2 benefit distribution 
  
private enterprise-driven forest use and benefit; monetary income (16) 
3.3 organization of    
authority 
the state is the legitimate owner of all lands unless private property is 
granted within legal recognition (16) 
- network-related:  
3.4 hierarchical 
structures and 
formality 
centralist top-down structures (20)  
where state fails to enforce rules, there is no collective self-regulation but 
entrepreneurial exploitation of the business options (17) 
3.5 network 
cooperation and 
information access 
maintain closed network for majority of operations, but open to CFC for 
information exchange and joint activities where cost-reduction or 
marketing value are increased (20) 
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The interview statements also show that their increased willingness to cooperate is 
economically driven and does not reflect a change of environmental goals per se or even 
altruistic behaviour. The SFC actors rather incorporated the CFC actors into their current 
assessment of the cost and benefit of cooperation. Thus, their cooperation willingness does 
not extend beyond the immediate benefit, and the interview statements indicate that they 
continue to support closed (protected and efficient) networks.  
As the more detailed interview statements in Annex 4 indicate, the SFC maintains the 
position that lack of education and resources make information access difficult across the 
network, and nearly rules out public involvement (14). They maintain that network needs 
to be efficient and thus focuses on those who are capable and knowledgeable (13). As 
another interesting aspect, 8 out of 22 interviewees suggested that the SF actors prefer 
intransparent one-on-one interaction among the policy actors, as it makes make logging 
operations less vulnerable to legal and marketing constraints.  
The SFC's change of policy belief shows a strong resemblance to the policy learning 
process that was described above. According to the far majority of interviewees, it was 
primarily a strategic adjustment to the changing conditions since the CFC moved in. This 
represents a change of the lower policy beliefs that have a merely operational character. 
Thus, the changed aspects of the policy beliefs are very peripheral and do not indicate a 
significant change of the SFC's position.  
The following table underlines the operational and strategic character of the SFC's shift. As 
the recent relationship of the industrial actors with the CF actors was widely discussed, 
most interviewees took a clear position on why Endesa Botrosa and their fellow coalition 
members had decided to cooperate with the new CF actors. The graph shows that all actors 
regard the resources of the CF projects as the by far most relevant, if not the only relevant, 
motivation for the commercial actors to cooperate66. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
66 based on the prevalent statement of all interviews in the particular actor group (number of interview statements in 
combination with their considered relevance of the reason) 
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Table: Influential reasons for the change of policy belief of the State Forestry 
Coalition 
 
Why did the SFC change their policy position 
towards the CFC? 
 
SFC actors 
provincial  
actors 
(outside SFC) 
local actors 
(outside SFC) 
CFC moves in with considerable resources to 
offer 
++ ++ ++ 
Planning insecurity due to land rights reform 
and adjudication of ancestral lands 
++ + 0 
Devolution process causes institutional 
insecurity for which the CFC has to be kept as 
a friend for the future 
++ + 0 
Political incentive from national level to 
cooperate 
0 + 0 
++ = strong positive effect; + = positive effect; o=no direct effect detected;  - = adverse effect 
 
As the statements of the provincial and local actors outside the SFC show, the primary 
incentive to change apparently came from the considerable inflow of resource from the 
CFC. The issues of planning insecurity that were identified by the SFC actors confirm a 
comprehensive re-assessment of the benefits for the SFC in their action, now that the 
institutional framework was changing.  
As discussed above in section 4.1.2, the Community Forestry Coalition struggled internally 
to create accepted standards of formal agreements and codified knowledge. The state 
forestry coalition, as outlined in section 4.2.2, adjusted strategically to the activities of the 
CF without changing their position on the substantial policy debate. The SFC changed their 
operational policy beliefs over time and considered the CF actors as a new element of 
consideration in their economic strategies, but again without any substantial changes of 
policy beliefs that would indicate an issue-oriented shift of positions.  
It is concluded that the slight change of beliefs emerged alongside the policy learning 
process, but was basically driven by an external event (boom of international E activities), 
while one other external factor (institutional re-structuring of the government) only added 
some pressure to induce the change. As the issues of the change in beliefs are closely 
related to the lessons adopted in the policy learning process, they are likely to enhance the 
same effects in the policy process as the learning. 
 
The second interesting effect is the network impact of the SFC learning response. In the 
initial phase of the international project boom, the SFC at first seemed to block the 
intruding actors from the policy discourse. After the considerable forest policy reforms on 
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the national level, transfer of forest authority to the Ministry of Environment, and 
strengthening of CF actors on the national stage, the SFC responded by strategically 
accommodating some of the E activities into a selective cooperation, as most interviewees 
describe. This was considered beneficial for the SFC because of the information access to 
current activities in the region, legal advocacy for indigenous communities, land conflict 
resolution, and considerable funding available for joint projects, such as the Public Private 
Partnership (PPP) between Endesa Botrosa, the Capulí, and the GTZ. Since the SFC did 
want to cooperate but avoid legally binding consequences, they entered agreements on a 
personal instead of formal base. 
A regional coordination platform (UC) was established to facilitate the network of the 
entire policy community. However, the coordination unit was rejected by the SFC after 
some incidences where the personal networks of the employed staff had led to pro-CF 
activities, instead of representing the entire actor community67. Due to the heavy impact of 
personal networks among the individuals, the actor behaviour of the SFC shifted to 
selective personal agreements instead of joining the network centrally. The relevance of 
personal trust relationships and informal information access was strongly emphasized 
among interviews from both coalitions. This became even more relevant in a rather small 
community of involved individuals over time, where past experiences continue to shape 
the future willingness of actors to cooperate.  
The policy learning and strategic re-orientation of the SFC had a direct impact on the local 
level. The companies entered new and formal paths of planning, logging and timber trade 
to secure planning security and incentive benefits offered in the new system, while 
maintaining the regular mode of operations. As all local interviewees reported, the 
dominant logging companies shifted their focus on official contracts with indigenous 
communities that had recently received land title during the mid-1990s adjudication 
process. Realizing the growing uncertainty of illegal logging operations on invaded 
territory, the companies now contacted the community leaders to get exclusive logging 
rights to their lands. Although the local interviewees regard the contract offer as no real 
choice—given the alternative that the company would illegally invade the same area for 
logging anyway—the formal contract has added to the formal recognition of local control 
over the resources, as the provincial actors mostly agreed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
67 see chapter 4.1.3. 
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Table: Policy Learning of the State Forestry Coalition and its Effects in Esmeraldas 
during the Implementation Stage 
   
Policy Learning  
 
Causes
Effects 
SFC: 
Strategic containment 
and utilization of E 
activities 
Forest-related Decision-Making: 
growing formalization and control of logging and timber 
trade 
+ 
L
oc
al
 E
ff
ec
ts
 
Organization of Authority:  
communities gain local control over their resources  + 
Hierarchy Levels and Formality: 
network cooperation varies increasingly between 
formalized and personal agreements 
++ 
N
et
w
or
k 
E
ff
ec
ts
 
Accessibility of the Network: 
policy arena diversified with CF actors and local 
initiatives  
+ 
++ = strong positive effect; + = positive effect; o=no direct effect detected;  - = adverse effect 
 
In a short conclusion, it is argued that the SFC’s strategic containment and utilization of 
the CFC’s resources had—despite its delaying and obstructing effect on the CFC’s policy 
goals—a positive effect on the local situation where they gave in to more formalized 
agreements and acknowledged existing indigenous tenure. At the same time, it is vitally 
important to note that the SFC managed to affect the network cooperation considerably as 
they strategically undermined, or avoided, a reliable standard of formalized agreements or 
informal cooperation. The following learning processes can be synthesized for the SFC 
over the policy process: 
Summary: Strategic Response of the State Forestry Coalition in Esmeraldas  
• CHANGE OF FOREST-RELATED BELIEFS: No change has been detected. 
• FOREST-RELATED POLICY LEARNING: The SFC benefited slightly from 
the diffusion of knowledge among the CFC experts, but did not undergo a separate 
forest-related learning process within the coalition. 
• CHANGE OF NETWORK-RELATED BELIEFS: The SFC opened their 
network-related position and opened up towards the CFC for a selective 
cooperation. It was shown to embrace the entering CFC strategically in order to 
access their funds and resources, which would make them more prepared for a 
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heavier competition in the long run. This has been identified as a strategic response 
to the changed conditions of the cost and benefit.  
• NETWORK-RELATED POLICY LEARNING: The SFC underwent an 
operational learning process and improved their knowledge on the cost and 
potentials of cooperating with the CFC, including the know-who and know-how 
learning of how to do so selectively. 
 
The lasting success of the SFC’s resistance to policy change suggests that the CFC’s 
strategic approach was not effective for some reason. It was found that strategic behaviour 
formed an important barrier between the two coalitions that prevented true cooperation.  
It could also be shown that policy learning generally represents a less important force in 
the process, if not a constraint to policy change. The process was clearly driven by external 
events, which involved considerable resources to affect policy change. In short, the 
Esmeraldan process could thus be paraphrased as resource-driven. 
The section outlined the strategic responses of the SFC and explained their motivation to 
cooperate strategically with the CFC. From a more conceptual perspective, the SFC’s 
behaviour could be summarized over the process as follows: 
 
Table: Strategic responses of the SFC to the CFC pressures over time in Esmeraldas. 
Source: compiled from chapter. 
 (1) short-term strategic response 
SFC not affected; 
may ignore CF for some time, but resources are interesting 
for SFC  
(2) medium-term strategic response 
SFC interested;  
strategic cooperation to access funds 
(3) long-term strategic response 
SFC barely weakened;  
change takes very long and depends on economic cost and 
benefit of change;  would require an economic incentive 
(e.g. forest certification for better timber prices) 
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4.2.4. Mexico: The Case of Institutional Replacement 
This section explores the strategic competition of the Advocacy Coalitions from the 
opposite perspective. It chose this change of perspective for several reasons68, most 
importantly because the PPF showed a particularly interesting strategic and pro-active 
approach to undermine the SFC’s dominance in Quintana Roo’s forest policy.  
When the CFC69 entered the regional policy network, the established state-based forest 
administration showed considerable resistance against the initiated restructuring of the 
PPF. Their authority was jeopardized or lost to the new forest societies and the ejidos. 
Especially the first forest society after the launch of the PPF70 was facing immense 
resistance from the established network. It replaced the state-based service administration 
body Union with regard to forest management, commercialization, technical expertise and 
advisory functions for the ejidos. These were important fields of influence on the local 
level. The Uniones realized that their power and access to the local base were increasingly 
undermined by the new forest society, and fell into heavy resistance to protect their claims.  
However, their defensive response was rather based on personal resistance than a strategic 
initiative that targeted the public or the policy discourse. As some interviewees report, they 
particularly used their close personal contacts to the corporate structures of campesino 
associations and administration levels of the governing party in order to stop and revert the 
process. Several interviewees state that it was for the personal trust relationship between 
the governor and the PPF team that the sociedad was politically protected against the 
corporate political pressure that the Uniones and regional institutions generated against the 
newcomer71.  
 
Hierarchical Levels and Formality: Shortcut of institutional hierarchies  
The distinct design of the PPF with its political backing from the highest ranks of the state 
government allowed for a direct top-down approval which made it independent from 
considerable body of the regional forest administration. The most described effect that the 
new PPF had on the regional network was that they managed to evade, or shortcut, the 
existing decision-making hierarchies of the institutional authorities. Most interviewees 
noted that the PPF circumvented a considerable amount of conventional procedures that 
the forest sector and the ejido rights would have otherwise had to comply with.  
This hierarchical shortcut resolved the conflict of interest that existed with the government 
                                                 
68 The PPF’s strategic approach formed an outstanding and characteristic element of the case study that could not be 
ignored. Second, the interviewees identified much more strategic activity of the CFC than concerted strategic responses 
of the SFC, which thus suggested a change of perspective for the analysis. Third, the chosen strategy of the PPF did not 
leave much room for the SFC to intercept, because the PPF undermined their institutional backing effectively as shown. 
Fourth, the SFC experienced a serious rupture between the 1983 end of the MIQROO concession and the new timber 
commercialization structures under the PPF, for which there is an interrupted line of actors in the coalition that make it 
difficult to determine consistent changes of beliefs. See Annex 2. 
69 i.e. PPF in the early stage of the process 
70 see chapter 3.3.2.1 
71 see Förster et al. 1993, 136 
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as a stakeholder over the land. The Agrarian Reform Ministry held the legal authority to 
the financial surveillance of the ejidos. The forest administration was in the hand of the 
Uniones who managed the forest royalties. As most interviewees report, the financial 
benefits of the forest were unproportionately held back by the authorities and not passed 
down to the ejidos, for different reasons. The PPF addressed the conflict of interest 
between the state agencies and the ejidos, which was perceived as a source of immense 
political tension and institutional struggle in the region. For this reason, the PPF aimed to 
cut off the high financial authority of the regional administration, as some CFC 
interviewees point out. 
The forest societies were intentionally founded as completely new institutional entities 
with no track record. This established a new impartial intermediary level in the conflict of 
interest between the ejidos and the state. In a comparison of the two, several interviewees 
state that the Sociedad was more transparent and accessible for the public in its meetings, 
more democratic in the decision-making process, and is described as less corrupt than the 
Union. This is attributed to the fact that, under the new forest society, the administration of 
forest-related funds was handled by the ejidos themselves, which made the forest society 
less exposed to bribery than the Union might have been. The PPF established a new 
structure instead which created new levels of authority and passed down some of these 
decision-making powers to the ejidos.72  
As several interviewees sum up, the PPF thus managed to shortcut the existing 
administrative hierarchies to circumvent the state agencies' own interests in maintaining 
the state-based system. This shows a strong internal strategic approach of the PPF and its 
supporting actors against the opposite coalition.  
The approach of the PPF was rather directed by very few actors with a set strategy, as most 
interviewees agree73. Thus, the internal learning processes were usually not the result of a 
pluralist discourse among a whole number of actors. The planning process of the PPF's 
restructuring activities had no participative design, neither in its initial planning phase74 
nor in its strategic implementation. The PPF activities were grounded upon very flexible 
planning decisions of very few team members. The planning process did not follow a 
predetermined plan, but developed iteratively—within a certain frame of reference—to 
respond to the options that were politically feasible.  
The internal structure of the PPF shows some remarkable characteristics. It was designed 
as a very small and efficient team that maintained a non-bureaucratized structure in which 
                                                 
72 The local effects of the forest societies' institutional arrangements are discussed in chapter 3.3.2.2 and 4.1.4. 
73 This reflects the non-participatory approach that was discussed for the Plan Piloto Forestal above in chapter 4.1.4. 
regarding the pragmatic short-term definition of policy goals. 
74 As an early example: One central obstacle to the bilateral agreement between the GTZ and the Mexican counterpart 
had been the elections in 1976, because they caused considerable cuts and changes in the reach of supportive political 
contacts that had been established at this early stage. Similarly, in the following confirmation phase of the new project, 
the substantial decision-making took a "less elegant" path that excluded the German BMZ and other key actors and 
designed the endeavour rather as a "scientific playground" (Förster et al. 1993, 36) to respond to the Mexican priorities in 
the regional forest project activity.  
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everyone was involved in most issues. The team was officially affiliated to different 
counterpart organizations over the years, but maintained a distinct independence without 
formal control from outside authorities. Instead, it was strongly backed by the personal 
support of highly ranked politicians, and recognized as such by fellow actors. This made 
the PPF particularly flexible, which allowed for quick strategic moves where political 
opportunities arose. It also equipped the PPF with sufficient leverage to circumvent, or 
shortcut, the existing institutional hierarchies. 
The PPF team systematically maintained informal contacts to the political as well as to the 
local level as their key channels of activity and planning. Most interviewees stress the 
importance of these contacts as their power base. The PPF members themselves were also 
highly recognized individuals who based their political leverage on their own personal 
networks among the actors. Most actors stated that the excellent personal contacts of the 
PPF members contributed significantly to the quick launch of the new forest management 
structures. The personal contacts among key individuals were able to support a reliable 
cooperation among the actors where the recent arrangements were not otherwise officially 
enforced yet.  
 
In summary, the section showed how the internal structures of the PPF—as the key CFC 
actor during the early implementation phase—allowed for a distinct strategic approach that 
targeted an institutional restructuring of the regional policy network.  
It has been shown that the coalition’s strategic behaviour was highly important as a driver 
of change. Policy learning, in comparison, had a rather moderate role. The overall cause of 
change was an external event, as it provided an important perturbation that formed an 
opportunity to change. As it has been analyzed above and in chapter 3.3.2.1, the external 
event required the CFC’s strategic behaviour to skilfully exploit the opportunity and induce 
change. 
The CFC’s strategic approach could thus be paraphrased as politics-driven. It shows a 
strong focus on their political assets to promote their policy goals. Based on political 
approval from highest ranks and close personal linkages throughout the network, the CFC 
managed to shortcut the institutional hierarchies and establish new authorities that 
undermine, and replace, the existing ones.  
The CFC’s approach proved to be convincing. As the SFC was increasingly weakened, it 
was forced to give in to change because their political power had increasingly eroded and 
thus—as opposed to the Esmeraldan case—did not offer alternatives. The course of the 
SFC’s strategic response over time can be briefly summarized as follows: 
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Table: Strategic responses of the SFC to the CFC pressures over time in Quintana 
Roo. Source: compiled from chapter. 
 (1) short-term strategic response SFC may ignore CFC for a short time, but political power becomes vulnerable  
(2) medium-term strategic response 
SFC weakened;  
defense of political connections  
(3) long-term strategic response 
SFC very weakened,  
political pressure to change 
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4.2.5. Comparison and Discussion 
The section explored the strategic learning responses of the coalitions. The SFC strategies 
varied, and the choice of their strategies was driven by different factors. Especially the 
roles of policy learning and strategic behaviour could be clarified to explain the policy 
process. The following table outlines the findings across the case studies. 
 
Table: Types of CFC Strategies and their Influence on Change during the 
Implementation Stage 
          
 
 
BRITISH COLUMBIA 
 
Knowledge-driven CFC 
Strategy 
 
ESMERALDAS 
 
Resource-driven  
CFC Strategy 
 
QUINTANA ROO 
 
Politics-driven    
CFC Strategy 
major cause  of 
change 
policy learning;  
required an external 
event to be triggered  
external event;  
required resources to 
affect change 
external event;  
required strategic 
behaviour to affect 
change 
influence of external 
events 
high;  
important trigger of 
change 
high;  
most important driver and 
trigger of change 
high; 
important trigger of 
change 
influence of policy-
related learning  
very high;  
most important cause 
and driver of change 
low; 
less important, if not 
constraint 
moderate; 
less important than 
strategic behaviour 
influence of strategic 
behaviour 
moderate;  
less important than 
policy-related learning 
moderate; 
important barrier between 
both coalitions 
very high; 
most important driver of 
change 
 
The three SFCs showed changing strategic responses over the process, which were 
determined by the relative threat that the CFC represented at the time. Each case section 
offered a simplified explanation on the strategic interplay between the coalitions in three 
basic steps. This suggests an insight on the general merits of each CFC strategy as they 
entered the policy subsystem. An overview is presented below.  
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Table: Strategic Responses of the State Forestry Coalitions (SFC) to the new 
Community Forestry Coalitions over time. Source: compiled from chapter 
          
 
 
 
SFC strategy 
 
BRITISH COLUMBIA 
 
Knowledge-driven CFC 
Strategy 
 
ESMERALDAS 
 
Resource-driven  
CFC Strategy 
 
MEXICO 
 
Politics-driven    
CFC Strategy 
 (1) short-term 
strategic response 
SFC may ignore CFC for 
some time 
SFC may ignore CF for 
some time,  
but resources are 
interesting for SFC  
SFC may ignore CFC for 
a short time,  
but political power 
becomes vulnerable  
(2) medium-term 
strategic response 
SFC challenged;  
buttressing learning 
SFC interested;  
strategic cooperation to 
access funds 
SFC weakened;  
defense of political 
connections  
(3) long-term strategic 
response 
SFC partly weakened, 
public/economic pressure 
to change 
SFC barely weakened;  
change takes very long 
and depends on 
economic cost and 
benefit of change;  would 
require an economic 
incentive75  
SFC very weakened,  
political pressure to 
change 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
75 e.g. forest certification for better timber prices 
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4.3. Lesson-Drawing and Adaptation Processes in the Communities  
4.3.1. Introduction: Lesson-Drawing from Community Experiences 
The local experiences of the forest communities provide key information on the policy 
outcome and impact of the changes in forest-related policy. The ACF perspective assumes 
that the policy outcome is observed, interpreted, and reflected upon by the advocacy 
coalitions in a cognitive process to review the policy-making76. Thus, the local experiences 
represent one of the key sources of policy-related learning for the advocacy coalitions, 
because they show the actual outcome of intended changes in the policy field.  
Local community experiences are complex. They need to be detected and interpreted into 
lessons. The detection and interpretation is affected by several constraints that Sabatier and 
Jenkins-Smith (1996) address as bounded rationality77. The following section discusses the 
local institutional changes that were identified by both coalitions, and follows their 
interpretation of the trends in the communities over time.  
Where the interviews indicated a direct lesson-drawing from the local experiences into the 
coalitions and the policy network, it is discussed in detail. More generally, the section 
analyzes the lessons that the communities drew for themselves and how they addressed 
institutional problems internally78, which reflects on the implementation of the policy 
changes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
76 please refer to chapter 2.2 for the theoretical assumptions of the ACF in an overview graph 
77 see chapter 2.2.1. A thorough lesson-drawing of the actors from local experiences depends, among others, on factors 
such as: resources of the coalitions to monitor changes, personal access to the communities, ecological knowledge to 
detect changes, economic understanding to understand trends, social and legal experts to interpret changes, etc.  
The research incorporated the restricted resources and cognitive filters of the actors by using actor-based (subjective) 
empirical data from both coalitions. For the perception of the local lessons, the interviews asked both coalitions to 
identify the changes and effects as they are aware of. The interview data is complemented by several studies that analyze 
significant changes around the institutional organization of community-based forestry from different actor perspectives. 
78 These issues contribute to the issues raised on Ostrom's (1997; 2002b) institutional design principles in communities, 
and the likelihood of collective action, as explored in chapter 1.2. 
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4.3.2. Canada: With or Without the Government - Operating Joint Venture 
within the CFPP and Aboriginal Governance through Land Claims 
The section explores two very different local experiences of the BC policy process. 
Esketemc established a working community forestry system under the 1997 Community 
Forestry Pilot Program CFPP and became one of the largest—and fastest—community 
projects under the new tenure program. Haida Gwaii, on the other hand, has become a 
prominent example of a grassroot struggle for aboriginal land title and local governance, 
through which it seeks to establish a self-governed form of community forestry. 
These contrasting ends of the spectrum show that community forestry is yet to be settled in 
BC, after the implementation phase of the structural tenure debate in the 1990s and 
continuing aboriginal land claims. The section discusses the lessons that can be drawn 
from the two contrasting community experiences with and without the government. 
 
Esketemc: Joint Venture with a Local Timber Enterprise 
At 25,000 ha, Esketemc is the largest area approved for community forestry within the 
CFPP. The CFPA holder is the Esketemc First Nation, i.e. it is explicitly based on the 
structures of an indigenous community. The community forest is managed under the new 
firm Esketemc First Nation Forest Products Ltd., which is directed by the Chief, Council 
and Band Administrator.  
Since 1991, Esketemc First Nation held a close partnership with Lignum Limited, which 
merged in a local joint venture company called Eco-Link79. In June 1999, the existing 
partnership was taken as the basis for a proposal to the BC government's new Community 
Forest Pilot Plan (CFPP). Esketemc First Nation was among the first communities who 
were offered agreements after their proposals, and became one of the first four pilot 
communities announced by the Ministry of Forests. The existing joint venture was a major 
argument for the feasibility of the CFPP proposal.  
 
The Community Forestry Pilot Agreement (CFPA) and Joint Venture in Esketemc 
Esketemc’ CFPA was signed in Feb 2001 by the band and the Ministry of Forests in February 
2001, after 18 months of negotiations. The approved harvest rate per year during the pilot phase is 
17,000 cubic metres, with the first management plan approved in August 2001. If the pilot licence 
is successfully completed, a long-term community forestry agreement could be offered by the 
Ministry of Forests for 25 to 99 years.  
Esketemc First Nation Forest Products Ltd. was registered as the new local manufacturing firm in 
October 2001 and the community forest started cash flow in November 2001. From November 
2001 to January 2002 alone, Ecolink logged 15,000 cubic metres of timber. Local employment was 
                                                 
79 Each partner in Eco-Link owns an equal half of the company, although the Esketemc First Nation has the option of 
buying out Lignum's share at some future time. Initially established to provide silviculture services, the company 
expanded into logging in 1994 and obtained a 55,000 cubic metre per year timber supply licence. Lignum provides the 
technical support and organizes the harvest operations for Eco-Link. 
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generated for twenty-five person months of logging, transportation and silvicultural work, of which 
80% were indigenous members of the Esketemc community80. With increased access to revenues, 
the band is considering log home construction and other value-added products, and the pilot 
agreement will be key to securing financial support for investment in value-added manufacturing81. 
Further economic development funds were granted in 200382 to foster the development of private-
sector partnerships, management advice for forest management plans, and training for local forest 
employees in Esketemc. More recently, Esketemc entered a comprehensive Forest and Range 
Agreement with the BC government in April 2004, which included a total timber volume of 
191,000 cubic metres as an additional boost to the community benefit. The agreement also included 
an additional revenue sharing of 1.77 million Can$ over a five year period to flow back into the 
community.  
 
Notwithstanding the quick launch of Esketemc’s community forest tenure, the case has 
been discussed critically by several CFC actors. This is due to two aspects. First, Esketemc 
had already been part of a joint venture constellation for years. Thus, most NGO 
interviewees argue that the Esketemc community forest established merely a new legal 
format (or label) for existing local logging activities, instead of creating a new form of 
local governance. Second, the community has an unsettled land claim with the Crown and 
might thus compromise, or delay, their land rights for an agreement that is continuously 
subject to approval by the government83. Interestingly, Esketemc's Forest and Range 
Agreement with the BC government constitutes that the unsettled land claim shall remain 
untouched as long as the agreement continues.   
 
Haida Gwaii: Grassroot Conflict over Traditional Authority and Local Governance  
The Haida have become one of the most prominent examples for their grassroot struggle to 
gain control over their forests. They launched high-profile logging protests against the 
large-scale logging operations that the Ministry of Forests granted on the Island's Crown 
lands, and they continue to fight in court for years to gain legal recognition of their claimed 
aboriginal territory.  
The grassroot struggle on Haida Gwaii went through different stages over the past two 
decades, which roughly correspond to the stages of the BC policy process. Until the late 
1980s, the Haida initiated local protests against industrial forest exploitation on the Island, 
which was motivated by environmental conservation concerns. This led to a negotiated 
settlement with the government that transferred vast forest areas into a National Park and 
protected areas. During the implementation phase of the BC policy process in the 1990s, 
                                                 
80 MoF 2002: Community Forest Agreement Program, Annual Report 2001-2002 
81 Source: Website of the National Aboriginal Forestry Association NAFA, 
http://www.nafaforestry.org/nafaiog/nafaiog3.php accessed on June 10, 2005 
82 Can $ 340,000 granted from the BC Economic Measure Fund 
83 The area is comprised of Crown lands, 2,500 hectares of Indian Reserve Land, and 2,000 hectares of Crown lands 
which are identified as Specific Land Claim area (i.e. unresolved land dispute between the First Nation and the 
government) within the Esketemc Traditional Territory. 
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the Haida launched a major initiative to gain local governance rights on the Island. The 
initiative struggled with internal conflict over communal participation and traditional 
authority, and did not succeed in negotiations with the BC government. Since the 
consolidation phase of the 2000s, the Haida have shifted their grassroot struggle into court 
and launched two major court cases on community consultation rights as well as a 
comprehensive aboriginal land title. 
During all three stages, the Haida received relatively high media profile among the BC 
public, which makes them a strong example of a local grassroot initiative that is backed by 
political interests.  
 
I. Environmental Concerns of the 1980s: Logging Protests 
Forest use was a central part of the Haida culture for thousands of years. The Haida traditional 
forest use encompassed especially construction material and non-timber goods for their houses and 
daily lives. These include cedar trees for canoes and totem poles, spruce roots for weaving hats and 
baskets, moss for insulation and padding, and cedar bark for roofing and weaving mats. Especially 
cedars represented a high spiritual and ceremonial value for community life. Logging became a 
central element of the Island’s economy in the 20th century. 
During the 1970s, a clear shift occurred in the Island's public opinion on the forest management. 
After long times of unawareness and silence, a philosophical debate kicked in and led to open 
criticism against the forestry policy. The Haida saw that action had become necessary especially 
after a BC Forest Service report84 officially admitted unsustainable logging at 2.5 times the 
sustainable yield. Heavy protests and logging blockades on Haida Gwaii's southern Lyell Island in 
1987 lead to a remarkable local accomplishment.  
The 1987 Lyell Island protests received international attention and developed considerable 
momentum and pressure on the provincial government. They established the Gwaii Haanas 
National Park85 and a Haida Heritage Site on the southern island, which put most of the southern 
island under ecological protection86. Despite the extensive changes, it is important to note that the 
negotiations with the government did not initiate any structural reforms for forest use on the island. 
II. Local Governance Debate of the 1990s: Island Community Stability Initiative (ICSI)  
The provincial government had proved rather hesitant and protective of the status quo in industrial 
logging and offered more areas of protection to calm down the protests, instead of responding to 
the source of public unrest in industrial clearcut logging. Until the mid-1990s, an estimated 100 
                                                 
84 Queen Charlotte Timber Supply Area Analysis, March 1982 
85 non-aboriginal name: South Moresby National Park 
86   Another bargaining aspect was funding. Since the newly established areas of protection implied a loss of resource 
base for the previous forest users on the southern island, the Southern Moresby Island Replacement Fund was created 
to compensate future losses and facilitate the economic transition of the neighbouring communities. The two parties of 
forest users that were addressed with the funds were the forest sector for direct loss in timber revenues, and the 
communities based on their territorial loss of resource base within the unresolved aboriginal land claim of the Haida. 
Additionally, a general fund was established to foster economic development, the $65 million Gwaii Trust.     
The government had several benefits from this arrangement. It could follow the general environmental policy to increase 
the protected areas of the Crown, appease the Haida for some time86, and contain the territorial extent of the Haida 
protests for the future.  
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million cubic metres of wood were extracted from the Island, with little economic benefit left 
behind for the local communities that still lack basic infrastructure. Unemployment rates were as 
high as 70% in some communities87, and the dissatisfaction grew about the low socio-economic 
benefit that the Island communities received from the large-scale logging on the Island: Only 14% 
of jobs derived from the TSA harvest were held by people who live on the Islands; the timber 
available to local small business interests was about 9% of the total annual cut; and out of the 
annual harvest of about 2 million cubic metres, less than 4% was processed in local mills88. 
This led to a shift of focus on the Island, and the population realized they would have to act for 
themselves to protect their forest resources89. They launched a local initiative (ICSI) which seeked 
to gain local rights to forest decision-making. ICSI was officially accepted as the official 
representation body for all six Haida communities as well as most non-aboriginal communities on 
the islands90. The ICSI initiative developed strategies to reform forest tenure, harvesting and a more 
community-based economy91.  
From the mid-1990s—before the CFPP provided a new option for community tenure—ICSI 
negotiated with the Ministry of Forests over a community-held forest tenure, yet still within the 
traditional forest license system92. Although a volume-based tenure was intended by the 
government, ICSI planned to manage the logging volumes as if in an area-based system, and 
discussed an ecosystem-based management approach with considerable dispute among the people 
on the island93.  
While the process triggered a lot of discussion and encouraged the local communities to stand up 
for their own land rights and forest management vision, the intended Haida Gwaii area-based 
tenure was never honoured. Instead, the government offered a much more restricted volume-based 
forest license, which triggered heavy controversy among the population94. In 2005, the process was 
                                                 
87 ICSI 1996 
88 ICSI 1996 
89 When the Forest Service District Manager continued to increase the logging rate despite the public protests that had 
gained momentum in the early 1990s, the Island communities—now much more aware of the environmental threat and 
more organized for collective action— established the Island Community Stability Initiative (ICSI) to form one united 
political backbone for both Haida and non-aboriginal Islanders to gain environmental control over the Island's land base. 
90 Additionally, the Haida established the Forest Watch program in 1994 to achieve more field control and prove actual 
forest stewardship. The Islanders' identity and pride in the Haida culture thrived during these years, as all interviewees 
describe. 
91 Burda 1999, 75 
92 The only open question was if it would be rather an area- (TFL) or volume-based (FL) license. The official 
negotiations between ICSI and the provincial government centered around a volume-based, 10-15 year non-renewable 
forest license. ICSI actually intended to manage it like an area-based license, with chart areas large enough for larger 
rotation cycles of 125 years instead of 8092. Once the traditional forest license would have been granted and the Ministry 
of Forests had given in on a certain area of communal management, ICSI planned to transfer the license into a 
Community Forest License according to the new CFPP, and strongly favoured an area-based approach.  
The negotiations between ICSI and the BC government led to a memorandum of understanding in 1996 that outlined a 
large area-based tenure, based on ecosystem-based principles, and included the reapportioning of tenure from the TSA, 
the SBFEP and MacMillan Bloedel to a community forest. 
93 The question for ICSI was: How do we get from here to there? Beyond the practical challenges of benefit distribution, 
corporate liability, local mill management and value-added businesses, the Haida communities also widely discussed 
more structural issues such as: Do we want a more corporate entity, co-operative model, or how much direct 
participation can we actually manage? Can we establish island-wide ecosystem management as a joint responsibility of 
all island communities? Behind all, how do we define "community" and "forestry"? as Johnson 1997 phrased it. 
94 Ironically, this reduced offer managed to weaken the Island communities. It divided the initiative into two parties: The 
more economically oriented opted to accept whatever was offered anyway, the more environmentally oriented did not 
want to give in to the compromise. The pragmatism of those who were concerned about the immediate community 
employment was standing in direct opposition to the emerging idealism towards environmental protection on the island 
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rescinded due to internal conflicts on the Island95. 
III. Aboriginal Court Cases of the 2000s: Grassroot Success through Jurisdiction 
Over the years of their struggle, the Haida developed a more general concept of their land use 
rights. As a result, this process encouraged them to fight for their own concept of local governance 
to re-organize their natural resource management as a whole96. Parallel to the stalled negotiations, 
the Haida have been leading a court case over their aboriginal land title that is expected to bring a 
clear decision over the entire Island's territorial rights and local governance97.  
In order to settle the conflicts for the moment, a new debate started on the Island about co-
management. With the title case yet to be decided somehow, BC and the Haida have agreed to co-
manage the land use planning on the Islands in 200398. It has been introduced recently since the 
early 2000s as an interim governance tool between the Haida and the government.  
 
Leadership Conflict: Traditional Authority and Aboriginal Elites 
Two issues suggest important lessons from the conflictive experience of the Haida. One 
central challenge is the conflict of interest between the Islands' communities in the process 
of defining local governance structures. The Island is not only home to Haida 
communities, but also to non-aboriginal communities. In fact, the non-aboriginal Islanders 
outnumber the Haida population considerably, although many support the aboriginal 
ancestry of the Island. In light of the pending title case that is about to determine the 
Islands' future, the Island communities are increasingly aware of their need to prepare. 
                                                                                                                                                    
(Burda 1999, 61; ICSI Community Forestry Symposium on Haida Gwaii, September 1997). The internal conflict of the 
Islanders reached a considerable momentum, for which the government withdrew from the negotiations with Haida 
Gwaii as a whole. 
95 Several issues required clarification and agreement among the involved actors. ICSI was weakened internally because 
it was bound to the success of an island-wide agreement (Community Protocol Agreement) over local government 
structures that was being argued over at the same time. The community forestry pilot term of five years was supposed to 
be honoured in July 1999 and ending in July 2004, but the offer was rescinded due to conflicts over the management 
implications with the Ministry of Forests and internal conflict over ICSI. As several interviewees sum up, the process 
stalled because the local cooperation and willingness had been worn out during the lengthy process with the provincial 
government.  
96 see Pinkerton 1983. Located on a remote island with well defined boundaries and a revivened aboriginal culture, the 
Haida developed a particularly strong sense of local identity that has fed into a considerable local resistance against 
industrial forestry and a political initiative towards community forestry.  
97 Alternatively, they could have opted for the treaty negotiation process with the BC government, for which they would 
have had to surrender their aboriginal title to qualify. Instead, they chose to fight for a land title by court decision, for 
which they would have to argue. The title case has been ongoing for years, which was an additional challenge during the 
CFPP negotiations out what legal status land property rights and agreements with the BC government would then have.  
After two years of discussions, the parties found that the treaty process could not bridge differences between the parties' 
respective visions and negotiations were halted in 1995.  In March 2002, the Haida launched a rights and title lawsuit in 
the Supreme Court of BC over their complete land claim to the Queen Charlotte Islands. In November 2002, they added 
further practical demands related to the land claim, such as compensation for resource loss, quashing of tenures and 
licences, and recovery of land. In September 2003, B.C. made an offer of temporary land protection to encourage the 
Haida to re-enter discussions rather than have the courts decide. Again, the government tries to maintain control and 
influence on the process and keep it at their own pace, rather than having to face sudden decisions superimposed by 
jurisdiction. 
98 In 2001, co-management had became one of the main three areas of concern in the Coast Sustainability Protocol 
Agreement signed by government, forest industry, ENGOs, communities and First Nations. Economic development 
within the ecological restrictions, both in forestry and tourism, was the central challenge as all actors agreed. Based on a 
defined Haida Land Use Vision in written form, a community planning forum was established to develop the plans in an 
ongoing process.  
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They are divided into different parties. For those who disapprove of the industrial 
exploitation on the Island, the Haida land title offers a promising way out. They support a 
system of local governance system that takes ecological protection and community well-
being stronger into account99. Others, however, doubt that the community development 
would prosper under a Haida-based governance, which could be driven by the private 
interests of a small aboriginal elite.  
The concerns about an aboriginal elite dominating the Island are shared by both aboriginal 
and non-aboriginal Islanders, as several interviewees pointed out. Even those who are in 
favour of aboriginal governance on the Island do not all agree with the as the Haida’s 
representative body100, as the following example illustrates.  
 
Aboriginal Representation Conflict: The Haida Protocol Agreement 
The Council of the Haida, trying to gather as much momentum as possible to prove the aboriginal 
title to the Supreme Court of Canada, initiated an Island-internal agreement to allow for both Haida 
and non-Haida communities to come together for a joint agreement and vision101. The Haida 
Protocol Agreement was a tool to manifest the basis of mutual rights and responsibilities of the 
Island communities. However, several issues were struggled over considerably102 and revealed 
many layers of concern and conflict among the communities, if not distrust—because many non-
aboriginal people are not convinced that anything, not even the Haida Protocol Agreement, would 
remain legally binding after settling the land claim. Many felt betrayed by the CHN demand that 
they must recognize the aboriginal title before these discussions can even begin103, giving away a 
major point of negotiation before even starting. Most non-Haida communities were concerned that, 
as the Haida gain more control, they would begin excluding the non-aboriginals and thus provide 
no change to what the province does:  
“Guujaw came out of his house and said 'hey guys this is how things will be run in the   
future.' Guujaw should remember what it was like not to have a voice in these affairs”  
(statement of Massett's Nick Grosse in 2002 about the land planning process)104. 
Since the Haida have made it clear that they will not negotiate any form of all-Island governance 
without Haida land title, the non-aboriginal communities face a straight forward decision. They 
increasingly sided with the Haida recently, suggesting the view that they would take on the Island's 
                                                 
 
100 The CHN was created in the early 1980s to represent the local Haida Nation government as a legally recognized body 
during the first period of growing political unrest and negotiations with the government. It has around 3,500 members 
and was founded on the mandate to strive for full independence and sovereignty of the Haida Nation. Several Haida 
voices argue that it is a mere political entity to represent the Haida interests to the outside, formally established according 
to the government's legal requirements. Its official task is to formally pursue the title case in the outside world, rather 
than to represent an internal government. 
101 To argue their aboriginal title as strong as possible, they needed all neighbouring non-Haida communities to support 
their claim to the Islands' land and water. This motivated the Haida Agreement Protocol which seeked to unite the 
political voice of all Islanders towards the court case. However, the actual legal impact of the non-Haida communities on 
the court's decision remained unclear; see Lordon 2002 
102 e.g., What legal status do private land property and tenure rights have once the land claim has been established? How 
will governmental payments be distributed among the Haida and non-Haida communities? 
103 see Lordon 2002: Especially for industrial holdings of private land tenure (i.e. forest tenure with Weyerhaeuser etc), 
CHN representatives stated that "We're not going to give any blanket guarantees". 
104 cited by Lordon 2002 
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challenges of local politics rather than go on with the top-down exploitation of the province. 
However, the cooperation among the communities is limited due to previous conflict and 
resentments105.  
 
Despite the internal controversy, the CHN has increasingly gained internal political power 
on the Island because of its legal recognition from the outside. The formalized 
representation of the Haida towards their land title through the CHN suggests the 
possibility of a slow impact on the social organization of the Haida: Political recognition 
from the outside, and media skills, become important criteria for choosing the internal 
leaders106. 
The question remains how traditional authority should be reflected in the local governance 
system in the long run. The problem is that Haida Gwaii needs a strong united 
governmental body to represent the Island towards the provincial government and in court. 
For both, the representation body needs to be grounded upon the traditional system of the 
Haida to support their claim of a strong aboriginal land title.  
The traditional system is, however, based on a two-class system with elite family clans, 
rather than democratic pluralism. Leadership rights are passed down through hereditary 
chiefs, and decision-making rights are limited to the privileged few. This structure is kept 
up for its cultural traditions, while the Council of the Haida Nation (CHN) also established 
a broader management body comprised of professional staff for land use planning and 
legal administration. As shown above, the structure continues to cause internal discussion 
and conflict. 
 
Community Leverage: Grassroot Community vs Government 
The increasing recognition of aboriginal rights had palpable effects for BC forest 
communities in their political leverage. Right after the new NDP government was elected 
in 1991, the province had committed to negotiating aboriginal land claims. This had an 
immense impact on the First Nations' leverage of negotiating local governance, because 
they could now develop a comprehensive land use plan for their claimed territory. It 
caused a boom of local initiatives and new land use plans which increasingly addressed 
more comprehensive ecosystem-based management options, and aimed to review the local 
                                                 
105 Port Clements was the only non-Haida community that demonstrated willingness to step into the Island-internal 
discussion with the CHN. This would probably "raise eyebrows in Victoria" and suggests a paradox: To what extent can 
municipalities recognize aboriginal land title where the province does not? as Lordon 2002 suggests. Traditionally, the 
non-aboriginal communities of Sandspit and Queen Charlotte City do not side with the Haida, whereas the Village of 
Masset and Port Clements do.  
106 A few of informants criticize that in fact it does not reflect the internal social organization of the Haida, nor respect 
their traditional governance structures. Among the critics, a hereditary chief member states that the CHN does not 
acknowledge the elders' traditional advisory role and status for hereditary chief rights. The elders are neither referred to in 
the written procedural framework of the Council, nor are invited to hearings informally as the tradition calls for. The 
CHN focuses on strategic coalitions with politically beneficial actors. It does not even keep up the code of traditions in 
place today, let alone lead the Haida back to a more culturally based governance system as it claimed to the outside 
world. personal communication on June 18, 2005 
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forest use as a whole107.  
As has been shown in section 4.2.2, the government and SFC used a containment strategy 
to channel the emerging community forestry process into a more controllable policy niche. 
It resisted several slippery slopes (see court cases on aboriginal land rights in chapter 4.3.4) 
that could have triggered a broader policy change. This was in fact a major incentive for 
the government to negotiate directly with protesting grassroot communities. Thus, the 
Haida were part of an important grassroot movement that forced the government to open 
up.  
At the same time, the grassroot initiatives also forced the government into a defensive 
position though, which implies an adverse effect on the process. It directed the growing 
call for community forestry into a program that is based on individual arrangements with 
the government, and subject to critical approval by the Ministry of Forests. Similarly, the 
new treaty talk initiatives—which were subject to a whole set of conditions—, made local 
arrangement options much more flexible, but also heterogeneized the community forestry 
structures, as opposed to introducing an overall structural tenure reform108.  
The recent development of the CFPP negotiations on Haida Gwaii shows a similar 
approach in a different context. In response to the rescinded CFPP negotiations, the 
Ministry of Forests put forward an offer in 2005 for a separate community tenure in 
Masset, a non-aboriginal community on the northern shore of the Island. This offer was 
controversial as an attempt to "divide and conquer" by several NGO interviewees, while 
several local actors welcomed it as a (more feasible small-scale) perspective for the future. 
Although no direct linkage can be assumed, it is suggested that the partitioning of such 
grassroot initiative has a favourable effect to reduce the momentum of change.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
107 The government established the First Nations Forestry Council (FNFC) by 1992 which responded to the central 
importance of forestry issues for the aboriginal communities. The BC Treaty Commission was established in 1993 for 
the first interim agreements, and started treaty talks after 1995. Especially in the Clayoquot Sound where the conflict had 
reached international attention, an Interim Measures Agreement was reached in 1994 between the BC government and 
the Nuu-Chah-Nulth Tribal Council in Clayoquot Sound, which agreed on a form of joint land management in the 
conflict area of the logging blockades.   
108 see chapter 3.4.2 
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Conclusion: Local Key Lessons from British Columbia 
In brief, several major points can be concluded from the section.  
• LEADERSHIP CONFLICT: The ambitious grassroot struggle of the Haida 
underwent significant internal political conflict, mostly over aboriginal leadership 
and their expansive powers. The analysis revealed an intrinsic problem in this 
conflict because traditional leadership was necessary to create a strong legal and 
political representation of Haida Gwaii to the outside world, while this position 
tempted to misuse the given power and reinforced non-democratic structures 
internally. 
• COMMUNITY LEVERAGE I: The grassroot struggle of Haida Gwaii created 
considerable political leverage of the community for direct negotiations with the 
provincial government. Their leverage as a community was particularly strong in 
BC because the grassroot initiatives had the political backing of a public movement 
(environmental movement). Later, it had a strong legal backing by court 
decision109.  
• COMMUNITY LEVERAGE II: The immense grassroot momentum of the Haida 
was met with an intricate strategy of the government and SFC, who seeked to 
protect their stakes as landowner and tenure holders110. The analysis shows that the 
high grassroot leverage of Haida Gwaii contributed to the government’s motivation 
towards a heterogeneization and parcellation (“divide and conquer”) strategy to 
disperse the momentum of the grassroot movement. 
• COMMON-POOL VS PRIVATIZED USE: Cooperation among the Islanders 
was strictly ruled out where private property rights would be affected111. The 
community forestry concept was designed to provide additional rights to the 
community from public lands, not to affect existing private property rights of the 
community members.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
109 in a legal system where jurisdiction is enforced 
110 The previous chapter already identified the containment strategy of the SFC through which it seeked to channel and 
control the community initiatives. 
111 e.g., conflict over the Haida Protocol Agreement 
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4.3.3. Ecuador: Organizational Lessons - Traditional Authority and 
Common-Pool Forest Use 
As shown earlier112, the Esmeraldan implementation process of community forestry 
struggled considerably over a number of organizational constraints and lacking 
coordination of collective action, as well within the CFC as also with community-based 
timber commercialization systems, lacking reliability of formal agreements with the forest 
sector, and a lack of internal organization in both communities. The lessons of the 
communities thus focused mainly on two specific fields: the internal conflict arising from 
leadership structures, as well as the lack of collective action. The aspects are explored in 
both communities below. 
Capulí – Concession-based timber commercialization and its conflicts 
Capulí, located about 7-12 hours by canoe upstream from Borbón in northwestern 
Esmeraldas, has about 13,000 hectares of indigenous land title with about 90% remaining 
primary rainforest. The community land title was granted by INDA in 1997113. The Chachi 
were among the indigenous people who had received land rights from the Ecuadorian 
government before 1992, with some 10 communities receiving legal land title for 
approximately 89,500 hectares114. The land tenure was distributed in proportion with the 
number of families and the size of the area of the respective community. However, the 
Comunas Law had considerably hampered community-level governance and resource 
management within, and the juridical adjudication of the communal territories turned into a 
lengthy process that the communities are still struggling with. Besides, forest-related 
investments continued to be hindered by insecure property rights, due to adjudication 
delays115 as well as to lacking enforcement of the granted land titles.  
Forest management with regard to timber has not been part of the traditional Chachi 
culture, since timber had no direct income quality within their subsistence system except 
for the sporadic construction of their patios and canoes that needed replacement. 
Accordingly, the communal organization for collective action was limited to sporadic 
events rather than routinely coordinating the socio-economic activities. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
112 see chapters 4.1.3 and 4.2.3 
113 September 1997, recognized as ancestral lands in accordance with Article 38 of the Agrarian Development Law 
114 Gamboa 1999 
115 see, for example, Southgate 2000 
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Traditional Organization of the Chachi 
The Chachi culture developed from a family-based social organization whose traditional conflict 
solution was based on clan support for internal conflict, and on avoiding confrontation with the 
outside world116. The survival strategy of the Chachi was embedded in various levels of socio-
cultural isolation117, based on collecting and hunting subsistence and spread across the forests for 
better livelihood territories.  
Thus, little collective organization was required for their daily livelihood activities. The community 
life and collective responsibilities were traditionally kept at a minimum level that was maintained 
by small mutual favours, directly organized between neighbouring families that lived all on their 
own little territory a few hundred meters away from each other in the thick rainforest118. 
At the same time, clans and families were very important as a traditional safety net for the 
individual when internal conflict arose among the dispersed population, or hunger and attacks 
threatened survival. Especially the local and regional interviewees stressed that internal clan 
conflicts have significant impact on the social organization of the community until today, and 
regional power struggles persist among the large clans.  
 
The communal forest did not receive much attention compared to the fincas119. It was 
rather seen as a territorial reserve for population growth in the community, in order to 
provide new families with their own fincas. Control was virtually non-existent in the 
communal forest, and was difficult in the vast unmanaged area of thick forest with little 
accessibility. Most families were quite satisfied with the fincas they already had, and did 
not regard the communal forest as a serious source of income. 
Timber sales became important as a source of monetary income when more goods from 
Borbón reached the community and triggered the need for money to purchase goods. The 
first opportunities to sell timber for money came relatively recent within the past ten years, 
mostly through new roads and timber enterprises in the region, including informal 
intermediaries who traveled on the river by canoe. But even then, the communal forest 
was—due to its size and the dense primary forest vegetation—only occasionally used for 
timber harvesting, sometimes by communal initiatives or individuals without much 
                                                 
116 When the Chachi were threatened by invasion, the groups traditionally chose to withdraw defensively to more remote 
places upstream. They are thought to have originated from the sierra, from where they then migrated to the coast during 
the conquista as a defensive response to early colonization and increasing settlement pressure. Similarly, until 1998 there 
had not been any cooperation or integration with the closely neighbouring Afro-Ecuadorians, because there was a 
traditional distrust towards the "Negros", and the Chachi thought that the new development strategy would obliged them 
to mingle with their black neighbours (Acopa 1998, 2).  
117 i.e. primarily with the family, then with the clan (across communities as well), then with the same ethnic group, but 
only where it would be of strategic importance to solve existing conflict. Until today, the daily life is based on the nuclear 
family, where marriage represents the spiritual center and equilibrium within their cosmovision. 
118 Only 15 years ago, the families were encouraged to move together into one joint community settlement. As a 
response, they added walls to their previously open patios, in order to maintain their family privacy as they had before.  
119 The fincas are small land parcels that are assigned directly to families within the community for a form of private land 
use. They are usually better accessible than the community forest because they are located along the riverbanks, and 
visited much more frequently and for longer periods of time. The basic livelihood mostly depends on the fincas, while the 
communal forest may add monetary income on a less frequent basis. This reflects a high value of the privately controlled 
income for the families, as the income source needs to be reliable and well maintained.  
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community control.  
In the first years of this transition, the people of Capulí mostly relied on their subsistence-
based economy from the fincas, which proved as a more reliable source of income. Until 
then, neither the forest quality nor the territory seemed threatened nor scarce to the 
community members and was thus by several local interviewees regarded as a reserve for 
future private land parcels, rather than a constant source of collective forest income. 
The role of the communal forest changed when the powerful timber enterprise Endesa 
Botrosa approached the community to enter an exclusive concession contract for logging 
on their newly recognized indigenous land title by INDA120. Capulí contracted its 
indigenous territory into exclusive logging rights to the national timber enterprise Endesa 
Botrosa in 1994121. However, the contract with Endesa Botrosa turned out to be a heavy 
drawback for Capulí as it was repeatedly modified and still pending for implementation 
until the mid-2000s. The community became increasingly backed by the GTZ to turn the 
contract into a working community forestry system. However, the concession contract was 
indefinitely stalled122 and heavily dampened the community’s willingness for further 
transformative changes. 
At the time of the interviews, Capulí's community members described themselves as 
powerless and marginalized through the concession contract because Endesa Botrosa had 
not launched the contracted logging activities for years, thus leaving Capulí to a minimal 
forest income because they were legally obliged to sell their forest resources exclusively to 
the timber company. On the non-contracted lands and fincas, the forest management was 
advanced further in training, agroforestry and internal organization skills through the help 
of the regional CFC actors, mostly MFC-E and FEPP123. 
 
Arenales – Community-based and  independent timber commercialization  
Arenales has far less land title than Capulí, comprised of about 2,300 hectares which has 
been granted by INDA in 1996. Of the communal land title, only 400 hectares are 
remaining primary rainforest (compared to 90% valuable primary rainforest in Capulí). As 
Arenales is located further downstream than Capulí and closer to the main centre Borbón, 
the community is slightly more exposed to migrating colonos, invading harvesters and 
neighbouring communities higher. The smaller size of the territory made boundary 
conflicts and illegal invasive logging much more urgent to resolve, as it affected the 
already limited resources of the community.  
                                                 
120 see chapter 3.2.2.1 for the INDA land adjudication process over the 1990s 
121 see also chapter 4.2.3. Despite the controversy over the outcome of the contract, all local informants, and many 
regional actors, pointed out that the communities regarded such contracts as the better option. They argued that their 
actual alternative would be non-contracted illegal logging of the same company on the same communal lands. The local 
control of the communities against invasive logging were fairly limited.  
122 after several phases of being refined; as shown in chapter 4.2.3 
123 see Annex 2 
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Traditional Organization of the Afro-Ecuadorians 
The Afro-Ecuadorian population in northern Esmeraldas is organized into 54 communities with 
approximately 40,000 people. Their land tenure is community-based and encompasses 
approximately 150-200,000 hectares124. About 300-400 families are dependent on the production 
of timber, including logging and the commercialization of timber to the industrial companies.  
The social organization of Arenales was traditionally centered on a well defined community of 
individual families, in which cross-parenting and re-marriage were also common. There is no 
strong elitist or clan structure as among the Chachi. Both men and women can hold communal land 
tenure rights, manage their individual land parcels where families are separated, participate in the 
community decisions and be leaders125. 
Afro-Ecuadorians usually live further downstream than the Chachi, which makes their communities 
more accessible for timber trade and more exposed to socio-cultural influences from the city126. 
Most timber intermediaries on the Río Onzole are of Afro-Ecuadorian descent for this reason. 
Similarly, until today, single black families or individuals (colonos) migrate to where the forest 
resources and income opportunities are better. Generally, however, the Afro-Ecuadorian 
communities are also traditionally based on one territory that is recognized as indigenous territory 
under the recent adjudication process outlined in chapter 3.2.2.1. 
 
As in Capulí, the territory was divided between individual land parcels and the communal 
forest. Due to the smaller size of the overall territory, the majority of the territory is 
consumed by the fincas. These are used for the daily family supplies and also timber 
income. Monetary trade evolved earlier than in Capulí because the community is located 
further downstream on the Río Onzole, and thus closer to the timber trade hub Borbón. 
Timber harvesting represents the most important supplement of monetary income, and is 
traded through intermediaries who buy and transport the goods by canoe. The timber 
harvesting on the fincas was decided, harvested and sold individually without community 
involvement or control.  
The communal forest, similar to Capulí, was rather seen as a collective income reserve for 
sporadic community needs, such as building repairs and fiestas, and future land reserves. 
There was no effective maintenance or management on the communal lands. The control 
efficiency in this area was very low127. However, a major difference to Capulí is that the 
                                                 
124 Encalada et al. 1999, 18 
125 The previous community president at the time before the GTZ project was a woman who had chaired the community 
for several years and had re-structured the communal decision-making into a more centrally governed system than before, 
removing control instances to improve her own feasible range in decision-making. The preconditions for the new 
community forestry design had, thus, recently been rather centralist in decision-making, however little enforced in 
management practice. 
126 In the case of the two communities, Capulí is quite remote at 7-12 hours of traveling by canoe from the regional 
center of Borbón, while Arenales is only 2-4 hours by canoe and sees a lot more traffic coming by on the river. The 
Afro-Ecuadorians are thought to have landed from shipwrecked slave transports about 400 years ago, and survived in the 
dense forests of Esmeraldas in small communities that adapted quickly to the new environment. Based on their different 
history, a territorial or social withdrawal has not become a key feature in their cultural traditions as among the Chachi. 
127 There was only one person (cabildo) in charge of looking after the large area of thick forest, who did not receive any 
payments for his service. The fellow community members had no interest in supporting his control function, and instead 
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smaller community territory holds less resource reserves for population growth. The local 
people slowly identified the resource scarcity as a wavering problem for the near future, 
but this did not lead to an increased initiative towards collective action128.  
As Arenales could not afford to jeopardize their limited forest resources by a binding 
contract, they decided not to enter an exclusive concession contract like Capulí. It decided 
to commercialize their timber independently on a rather small scale, and rejected a 
concession offer with a broad majority vote of the community. Instead, the community 
started to implement a small-scale system of community-based forest management. It 
became increasingly recognized by the locals as an important component of the community 
income, as 8 out of 22 interviewees identify.  
 
Leadership Conflict: Local Organization Challenges and Elite Leadership  
Notwithstanding the different commercialization arrangements in the communities, the 
implementation continues to be hampered by internal organization constraints in both. The 
local benefit distribution has not yet seen a transformative change. The communal forest 
income continues to be of secondary relevance for the people and lacks their support. The 
benefit distribution remains intransparent, has not been settled among the community 
members, the communal income varies substantially, and the administration of funds 
remains in the start-up phase129.  
The internal organizational challenges are multifold, as addressed earlier in a different 
context130. They encompass a rather typical array of factors that were identified from the 
theoretical perspective in chapter 1.2.  
• A lack of education (i.e. read and write) makes the legal procedures around logging 
activities difficult, as 14 out of 22 interviewees identify among the key constraints. It also 
causes high transaction costs and delays cooperation within the community. 
• Lack of control and enforcement (free rider effect; benefit from defection) and a lack of 
income security from communal forest activities (lack of benefit from cooperation) 
provided insufficient incentives for collective action. 
• Conflicting goals between the older generation (long-term income stability; resource 
protection) and the young local leaders (short-term income growth; economic 
development) corrupted the shared benefit and willingness of the local population to 
cooperate. This is embedded in a leadership conflict between traditional authority rights 
                                                                                                                                                    
harvested the area where it neighboured their private fincas, justifying the action by unclear boundaries when caught.  
128 Several local interviewees report that the diminishing communal reserve has instead motivated some families to secure 
their heritable rights to communal land title to get new fincas in the future (e.g., when children left the community for 
several school years and would have lost their communal member rights for lack of local presence). 
129 Both communities entered training programs offered by the MFC-E on the management of communal funds, including 
the establishment of a communal bank for small-scale investment. The communal administration is being supervised by 
the project team and has not been fully established in the community. The communal capital was yet to be built, in order 
to offer community-based loans for forest-related investment and others. The benefit from community-based logging and 
other forest use has not yet changed much, as most local interviewees report. 
130 see chapter 4.1.3 and 4.2.3 
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(old generation) vs. capable forest management (young generation with higher education). 
• Abuse of leadership power for personal benefit (private logging activities, bribery) eroded 
the willingness of the local people to collective action. 
In both communities, the majority of interviewees identified an awareness among the 
community members to support collective action in theory. For example, 8 interviewees 
state that more people go to the community meetings than before the launch of the land 
title and the project activities. However, the internal challenges proved high enough not to 
encourage collective action for the actual forest-related activities. As a result, it was found 
that the private land parcels of the families (fincas) continued to be managed much more 
intensively than the community forest, while the capacity building efforts of the CFC 
continue to build on a gradual progress131.  
 
                                                 
131 For example, an important improvement was achieved for the resolution of land use conflicts to secure the community 
boundaries, as 12 of the 22 interviewees identify a clear important improvement of the land use conflicts since the 
support of the MFC-E. 
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Conclusion: Local Key Lessons from Esmeraldas 
The following can be concluded in brief from the local experiences. 
• INTERNAL ORGANIZATIONAL CONFLICT: The implementation of 
community forestry is seriously hampered by a lack of education, transparency, 
control and enforcement of rules. This demotivates collective action substantially. 
• LEADERSHIP CONFLICT: A well educated leader was necessary to represent 
the community for legal procedures (land title, forest management plans, regional 
cooperation) to the outside world, while the position—given the strong educational 
disparities in the community—was tempting to misuse the power. 
• COMMUNITY LEVERAGE: Generally, the communities have no political 
leverage to negotiate their situation with the government or industry. However, a 
direct effect of an external perturbation has to be noted here. The land adjudication 
process of the 1990s has motivated the forest industry to formalize concession 
contracts with the communities, which empowered the local people because it 
improved their situation from previous illegal, uncontrolled and invasive logging 
by the same actors. 
• COMMON-POOL VS PRIVATIZED USE: The social traditions are more based 
on privatized forms of land use and change slowly. Collective action remains 
limited because the internal organizational capacities discourage cooperation. The 
people maintain a strong focus on their fincas as a more reliable source of income, 
which reinforces a low interest in collective action.  
 
In summary, the Ecuadorian local experiences reflect some of the key constraints around 
the Tragedy of the Commons132, which re-emphasize the overwhelming role of the 
communities’ institutional capacity to govern themselves and enforce rules. As of the mid-
2000s, no forest-related communal income has come to establish the role of the collective 
forest activities as an important contributor to the community.  
It is suggested that, due to the lack of a frequent and established benefit from the 
communal forest, the communities’ motivation to self-organization was limited. The 
environmental goals of the CFC actors did arguably not generate a sufficient motivation 
among the local population. The role of local forest benefit was not understood as a 
powerful priority during the launch phase133. 
 
 
 
                                                 
132 see chapter 1.1 
133 see chapter 4.1.3 for the CFC’s priorities between social and environmental goals 
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4.3.4. Mexico: Common-Pool and Privatized Forms of Forest Use  
The consolidation stage after the end of the Plan Piloto Forestal raised a new array of 
challenges for the ejidos over the 1990s134. As the PPF withdrew from the region and the 
1992 Agrarian Reform liberalized the ejidos’ relationship with the forest societies as their 
service providers, the ejidos were facing several internal problems that they had to address 
by themselves. The local benefit distribution was reassessed and shifted towards more 
privatized forms of forestry. Secondly, internal conflict emerged over the roles of 
traditional ejido leadership as opposed to the management requirements of modern forest 
businesses. Both are discussed here. 
 
Common-pool vs Privatized Use: Work groups (grupos de trabajo) within the ejido 
Management inefficiency was an increasingly prominent source of conflict among the 
rivalling subgroups in forestry. Communal subdivisions had already been introduced 
before within the ejidos by different chicle cooperatives since Cárdenas 1934-40 due to 
economic conflict. The traditional clan structure of the Maya settlements had also 
enhanced the emergence of different management ‘schools’ around several elite families of 
the area which competed over decision-making and forest benefits. Thus, when the 
neoliberal reforms of the state in the early 1990s allowed to transfer the community 
forestry decision-making from the state to decentralized subgroups, this formed an external 
perturbation to the community system that suddenly gave way a more independent 
organization of the forest management, giving way to the privilege structures and internal 
rifts that had been swaying for decades.  
This explains why the 1992 Agrarian Reform and privatization of forest services had such 
a profound impact on the local forest activities and the distribution of the forest benefit. 
Work groups were formed to organize the local logging activities in smaller units that 
could be controlled, and accounted for, in privately managed units. In Petcacab, 
approximately 10 work groups (grupos de trabajo) or subcommunal enterprises were 
formed. The forest remained a communal property, but the previously existing community 
forest enterprise was dissolved into smaller units. Instead, work group enterprises divided 
up the annual authorized logging volume on a proportional basis. Thus, the stock remained 
common, but the flow was divided up into a number of separate enterprises each composed 
of community members, under a common management plan, but no single enterprise can 
be regarded as communal. 
The forest subgroups (grupos de trabajo) within the ejido represent a form of internal 
privatization135 that follow de facto private benefit goals, but based on officially collective 
                                                 
134 see chapter 4.1.4. The role of the sociedades and their relationship to the ejidos was heavily affected by the 1992 
Agrarian Reform which introduced less control and involvement of the general ejido leaders in the communal forest 
management. Thus, the internal structures of the ejidos were heavily challenged and required an adjustment of the forest 
management to the new organizational setup, and jointly with the forest societies.  
135 see, for example, Armijo 1994 
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tenure rights. As Armijo (1994) points out, the work groups are a kind of privatization 
within the ejido. They constitute a dissolution of the community enterprise, and the 
division of its annually calculated flow of resources among a large number of small kin-
based groups.  
The new work group arrangements developed immense dynamics since the early 1990s, as 
nearly all interviewees stress. The trend was observed with caution by several actors, 
because it could challenge the validity of the common-pool base of the ejido in the long 
run. This caused further legal adjustments during the 1990s which seeked to mitigate the 
trend136.  
Considering the immense development since the first work groups, they mark a major shift 
in the organization of collective action in the ejidos. Bray (2000) goes further to argue that 
this is the first genuinely self-organized aspect of community commercial forest 
management in Quintana Roo137. The interviews also indicated a strong support for the 
recent work group arrangements, which was boosted by the fact that—for the case of 
Petcacab—the work groups were able to quadruple their income138.  
Armijo (ibid) also suggests that forest work groups resemble a delayed response to the 
1992 Constitutional Reform (Article 27) which legalized the parcellation of ejido lands 
into private tenure139. Collective forest lands, however, remained inalienable. The work 
groups offered a privatized form of forest use within the ejido structures that offers 
economic advantages, while maintaining the strong common-pool basis of the ejido. This 
combination of privatized forest use within the common-pool basis allowed to remain 
closer to the existing informal organization within the ejido, which provided a strong 
framework. 
 
1992 Constitutional Reform: Reasons for the Limited Ejido Response 
Until 2003, no ejido in Quintana Roo had opted for a privatization of the individual land holdings. 
The 2000 program PROCEDE was introduced to offer a land clarification process for a legal 
adjudication and formal demarcation of unclear borders. However, 34 out of the 278 regional ejidos 
preferred to maintain their ambiguous land title situation and did not participate in the program. 
Their concern was that the participation in the PROCEDE would lead to new property taxes now to 
                                                 
136 For example, the 1992 Agrarian Reform Law abolished the official documentation of timber transports for the 
community which previously gave the ejido leader sufficient information on the forest activities in the community. It had 
now become obsolete to ask or even inform him, which decentralized the administration processes within the ejidos and 
encouraged a further splitting into subgroups, away from common-pool use. In order to mitigate the trend, the Secretary 
of Environment (SEMARNAT) of Quintana Roo re-introduced the requirement to pull the ejido leader back into a central 
position (see Arguëlles et al. 1994, 50). 
137 see also Taylor and Zabin 2000 
138 Bray 2000 
139 The 1992 Agrarian Land Reform introduced that individual landholdings could be privatized. However, the 
privatization is bound to the condition that the whole ejido opts to dissolve, for which the response of the ejidos to this 
immense step was reluctant. Common property itself still could not be transferred into private property, it would instead 
revert to public ownership of the federal government. Forests and grazing lands, at the same time, remained non-
transferable. They could neither be parcelled nor privatized.  
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be settled on the previously unproven lands.  
Another concern added to their hesitant position. Over time, a tacit layer of informal authority had 
developed that circumvented certain agrarian regulations on the local forest management. The 
system worked as long as all stakeholders cooperated in silent approval. The internally common 
subdivision of lands to individual families or ejidatarios has no legal standing and thus required a 
flexible handling among the community members that relies on informal trust relationships and 
tradition. Ejido leaders do not receive financial payment for their time and effort invested, but see it 
tacitly legitimate to make use of their power links to concessionaries and the agrarian reform 
ministry in order to achieve some kind of "compensation" as long as this did not end in abuse of 
authority.  
Although this community practice successfully managed to "modify" some official restrictions 
internally, the legal authorities were still used as an external power instrument of retaliation where 
the rivalling family struggles occasionally erupted in open disagreements140. External audits were 
even repeatedly used between families to achieve an impeachment of rivals, revealing the long-
term power strategies of the traditional local elites. Networks were also key in the local families' 
tactics where personal relationships with agrarian reform officials helped obtain support and 
guidance through the process of legal arguments in statutory law141.  
 
The considerable amount of informal arrangements within the ejido imposed considerable 
challenges on forest decision-making, which the forest work groups could approach from a 
different angle. Bray (2000) points out that the work groups could—and were indeed 
intended to—provide a new "means of dealing with corruption within the community 
enterprise, an issue the PPF never addressed". However, the constraints of informal rules 
and flux continued into the work groups, as several interviewees report. This was also 
criticized by Armijo (2002), Richards (1999), and in detail by Bray (2000):  
(R)esorting to this more informal method of work organization has resulted in great 
inefficiencies and confusion in marketing and has dealt a blow to the traditional authority 
of the Comisariado, who is now just a member of one of the work groups. The work 
group modality appears to be in a state of great flux, with frequent changes in the number 
of groups, their composition, and frequent struggles over how to use or dispose of 
equipment that belonged to the community enterprise, but now must be shared among 
quarrelling work groups.  
 
In summary, the smaller work groups offer an internal arrangement that helps to unwind 
some of the internal conflict over forest decision-making and benefit distribution on the 
ejido level. It remains to be seen in the future whether they continue as privatized forms of 
forest use within the ejido, or evolve further to dissolve the common-pool basis that the 
ejido was historically based on. 
 
 
                                                 
140 Wilshusen 2003, 279 
141 ibid 
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Leadership Conflict: Traditional ejido governance vs. forest enterprises 
The forest management is woven in a complex system of informality, including mutual 
favours, personal trust relationships, future reciprocity, and overall a high consideration of 
social benefits compared to monetary costs and benefits. These traditional ties span an 
additional layer of social rules and power hierarchies over the state-imposed ejidal system 
and both strengthened and weakened the ejido's communal decision-making over time.  
Petty corruption and unilateral decisions for the personal benefit of the leaders were 
common, especially where communal and personal interests could be promoted at the same 
time. In many cases, it was simply the lack of cross-power control, information and 
documentation that allowed for a one-man decision-making and put the forest-related ejido 
situation at stake. Even follow-up investigations and sometimes removal of ejido leaders 
were not successfully impartial, but were mostly based on strategic retaliations between 
rivalling family groups that were struggling over dominating community power142.  
The ideas and goals of traditional authority leaders and the forest harvesters drifted apart. 
A central point was whether communal forestry should be based on traditional leadership 
within the general community, or whether an enterprise or economic subdivision should be 
created for a more efficient management of the forest harvesting. The communal 
organization is surrounded by numerous conflicts of authority and interests identified by 
regional and local interviewees: 
 
Table: Areas of conflict within the forest ejidos. Source: interview data  
• political abilities of a communal leader vs required business abilities of a forest manager 
• uniform salaries according to traditional conventions 
• rotation cycles of a democratic leader vs expert networks and accumulation of knowledge 
for a forest manager 
• authority hierarchy of the communal leader with his political standing on one hand, and the 
forest manager in charge on the other hand who brings most of the community income 
• egalitarian ejido structure and collective shareholder rights vs hierarchical command-and-
control structures with managers and subordinate employees in a forest business 
• community economy as a collective livelihood base with social goals vs financial business 
management with cost efficiency as a means of survival 
• traditional authority structures with respected elders as community leaders vs competitive 
structures with young and dynamic experts as business managers 
The most significant triggers of open conflict were the use of communal funds for social or 
individual purposes instead of a forest-related re-investment, as well as a shift of authority 
for the annual negotiation over the timber price, which was now to be handled by forest 
                                                 
142 for disputes in detail see Wilshusen 2003, pp.270 
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harvesters who are better acquainted with the system.143 With a frequent turnover of 
leadership, there was no accumulation of knowledge nor of personal network contacts over 
time, which seriously impeded the commercialization potential of the ejidos that could not 
advance their management skills144.  
 
Santa María de Poniente: Ejido Split and Restructuring after Internal Conflict 
Especially in Santa María de Poniente and Petcacab, the forest use was organized around 
different elite family clans that formed rivalling coalitions in terms of internal political 
power, commercialization of timber and the administration of harvesting equipment. Long-
standing internal rifts and subgroups even led to the erosion of the social organization of 
the ejido as a whole, which was eventually resolved by splitting the ejido in the late 1990s.  
The ejido Petcacab originally combined three settlements: Petcacab, Polinkín, and Santa 
María de Poniente. An underlying cause of the rift was thus the spatial distance of the 
settlements which had a deteriorating effect145, keeping in mind that personal networks and 
the family-based power struggle of the Mayan communities had such a central role to 
maintain a powerful position in the ejido.  
The main conflict between the rivalling family groups evolved around the protection of 
territorial claims (fincas) as well as resource benefits. Anecdotes on personal distrust and 
misuse of authority over the years added to the organizational distance between Petcacab 
and Santa María Poniente146. The latter thus started to seek formal separation from 
Petcacab since the late 1970s to establish an independent land grant of the agrarian reform 
ministry on their parts of the ejido territory147. While doing so, the formal process was 
postponed, rescinded, and reactivated in the late 1990s again, when Santa María received 
independent ejido status in 1998. 124 ejidatarios formed the new ejido of Santa María 
                                                 
143 The timber price had originally been fixed annually with the general leader of the ejido. For a further discussion of 
the ejido organization see Arguëlles et al. 1994, 49  
144 Zabin and Taylor 1997, Armijo 1999, Bray 2004 
145 Petcacab was the larger ejido center, whereas Santa María and another village were remote and hard to reach. At 
roughly 20km distance to Petcacab and seasonally hard to reach through forested and flooded areas on a road in poor 
conditions, the settlement suffered from severe limitations in communication and control access to what was going on in 
Petcacab. Traditionally, the president of the ejido was elected from the main communal arena at Petcacab, and his 
networks of support and information followed similar patterns. Over the years, the internal communication networks and 
informal power coalitions had marginalized the interest groups of the two smaller settlements within the ejido boundaries; 
throughout the entire ejido history, the leadership power remained well protected in Petcacab. 
146 See Wilshusen 2003, 272. For example, Polinkín community members set fire to open new agricultural fields and 
transfer collective lands into individual land parcels, which compromised the interests of the ejidatarios from Santa 
María. Similarly, while the new land grant application of Santa María Poniente was being processed for years, Petcacab 
was accused of strategically harvesting the timber of the Santa Marian forest in order to save their own forest resources 
for the future after the separation and improve their situation in the resource inventory for the split-up negotiation 
(interview with forest representatives at UNORCA, May 2004). Where community presidents misused timber sale 
payments for their own wallets, and official communiqués did not reach the remote settlement for some reason, the 
blame increased the traditional rift and rivalry between both communities and strengthened their independent communal 
identities. 
147 Santa María Poniente filed its first petition in 1975 for the agrarian reform ministry to separate from the main ejido. 
The agrarian reform ministry realized the problem and responsed by working directly with the ejidatarios in the so-
called "annex" that was operatively regarded as independent of Petcacab and Polinkín (Wilshusen 2003, 269). The final 
split-up between the two communities required only a single majority in favour, but received 100% of all voters present.  
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Poniente, while 206 stayed with Petcacab.  
While Petcacab had undergone the strong privatization trend of smaller working groups, 
Santa María intended to return to a stronger communal structure in the forest decision-
making. The ejido deliberately launched a different concept of internal organization to 
avoid the very issues they wanted to get away from, while maintaining the forest 
management goals in general. In order to separate the forest management institutionally 
from Petcacab, Santa María also joined a different forest society (OEPFZM instead of 
Sociedad Sur) which is based much closer in Felipe Carillo Puerto, and to which personal 
connections already existed. 
After the experience with the dissolving authority structures under Petcacab before, the 
new ejido now tried to keep the decision-making together in a rather centralized 
structure148. No formal committees had yet formed in Santa María. Their community 
cooperation is now supported by a stronger communal identity, as mostly the local 
interviewees describe149. Regarding the setup of collective action in the forest activities, 
the separation represented an interesting rupture and opportunity to re-organization that 
shows lessons learnt in the management organization. The changes are listed below. 
 
Table: Forest and community rules in Santa María de Poniente, before and after the 
ejido split-up with Petcacab in 1998150 
 
Community forestry 
aspect 
Until 1998 (with Petcacab) Since 1999 (independent) 
Harvesting labour Collective and mandatory Individual and voluntary 
Participation in the 
community 
assembly 
Mandatory (if the ejidatarios do not 
participate, the assembly can 
withdraw their ejidal rights) 
Voluntary (the ejidatarios would not 
lose their ejidal rights; however, the 
majority does participate) 
Seed production and 
care 
collectively in the vivero 
(management decision as well as 
actual care labour) 
Decision-making collectively, 
actual care labour completed 
individually in the family parcels 
                                                 
148 In the interim time of 1998-2001 the ejido separation had already been approved but the forest harvesting permit had 
not, so instead of formal timber harvesting the ejido focused on agricultural activities in those years. At the time of the 
interviews, the first attempt of a local forest subdivision was on the table. Although established informally since 2003, 
the subdivision had not been approved yet by the community assembly. The problem is that the newly recognized ejido 
had received one single ejidal permit under which a subdivision could not operate nor split away without official 
approval. In the case of such subdivisions, the community assembly had warned the directiva it would quit cooperative 
support if the latter signed the approval. The source of this conflict is among the informants seen between new 
centralized power opportunities of the community leaders, the fear of losing grounds and control within the already 
weak ejido authority, and the fear to continue in a tradition of not community- but elitist family-based power structures 
as established with Petcacab earlier. 
149 For example, they report that community fire brigades had introduced more responsibility and awareness among the 
community members in terms of forest protection, and that this had actively strengthened social control mechanisms 
among the community members, reducing the occurrence of uncontrolled fire.  
150 sources: data collected from interviews with forest society and ejido members; and Wilshusen 2003 
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Link to Forest 
Society 
Positive: close contacts (which 
remain today) 
Negative: Sociedad Sur only visited 
occasionally from Chetumal 
 
Positive: UNORCA is much closer 
with offices in Carrillo Puerto; 
contacts existed already with the 
key persons at Carrillo  
Negative: contacts and institutional 
structure had to be established 
Timber calculation 
unit 
Square meter  Mata de zalam 
Forestry decision-
making 
Forestry-related community 
committees 
No committees, but central 
decision-making of the community 
assembly and the comissariat.  
Conclusion: 
Communal 
governance concept 
Forest decision-making and benefit 
distribution split into privileged 
subgroups 
Low authority structures and 
voluntary communal democracy 
with liberalized collective action 
rules of the community as a whole; 
needs to be consolidated over time 
now 
 
The changes show a clear shift towards individual and voluntary responsibilities compared 
to the collective and mandatory system of Petcacab. While this can be attributed to the fact 
that the ejido clearly intended a fresh start, it also suggests interesting lessons from their 
local experiences. Most importantly, the changes introduce lower hierarchical subdivisions 
within the ejido, with more local participation driven by the ejidatarios’ own socio-
economic interest instead of mandates.  
This shows a higher reliance on self-organization than the previous model. The smaller 
ejido size (124 ejidatarios compared to 330 before) allowed for a closer democratic 
participation and collective action151, which was strongly hampered before, and had in fact 
induced the ejido split.  
As of the mid-2000s, Santa María Poniente was still in the process of consolidating its own 
formal forest management, as the institutional structures (forest management plans, forest 
services, administrative approval) had to be established. Nearly all interviewees involved 
in the Zona Maya review the split-up as the better option and regard the changes as an 
improvement. Several interviewees stressed that the new concept has promising potential, 
but now depends on the social control dynamics of the small ejido in the long run. 
 
Ejido 20 de Noviembre: External Constraints and Pending Commercialization 
Ejido 20 de Noviembre in Calakmul continues to struggle to achieve the level of forest-
related organization that the Zona Maya accomplished. The timber commercialization 
                                                 
151 see chapter 1.2.3 
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remains on a much smaller institutional level. The Calakmul area was heavily exploited in 
the past decades, and the ejidos found themselves marginalized with less forest resources 
and transport than in the Zona Maya. Forest management, accordingly, had a less pivotal 
but more peripheral role for the livelihoods of the ejidos in Calakmul. The ejido 
experienced a rise of eco-tourism development plans to its hidden Mayan ruins on the ejido 
grounds, but on a much smaller economic scale.  
The ejido became a major targeted community during the heavy 1990s boom of 
environmental projects in Calakmul which helped to respond to the land use problems with 
the boundaries of the neighboring Biosphere Reserve. In 1989, Calakmul has been put 
under protection as the Calakmul Biosphere Reserve with an area of more than 720,000 ha 
which were planned to become part of a bigger biocorridor from the Mexican Caribbean 
(Sian Ka'an) across northern Guatemala (Petén) to Chiapas in the southwest. It was 
designed as an internationally prestigious conservation area152 with a clear shift towards 
environmental protection goals, and kicked off an immense boom of environmental 
activities153. The establishment of the Reserve was regarded as an emergency brake to the 
immense timber extraction and migration pressure that the area was struggling with.  
Forests are the main asset of the Reserve. The forests in the ejidos around it are aimed to 
function as a managed buffer zone for the reserve, to maintain the natural integrity of the 
region, and to offer a source of income in a region with too little water for intensive 
agriculture. However, there an immense land use conflict exists along the boundaries 
because its official delineation does not correspond to the ejido territories granted decades 
earlier to the local population154.  
Nearly all interviewees expressed their concerns about the limited progress of community 
forestry in Calakmul. The link to Quintana Roo with its networks and expertise has since 
                                                 
152 Calakmul has often been cited as the second most important biodiverse and unique reserve, only surpassed by the 
Amazonian. It is important to note, however, that the area is neither distinct to others in terms of endemic biodiversity, 
threatened species, nor pristine tropical rainforest152. The area has witnessed severe forest degradation in the past 
decades, and, on a bigger time scale, the downfall of the Mayan civilization (around 900 A.D.) which we are reminded of 
by over a hundred Maya ruins in the area today. Thus, what really makes it unique is the challenge that its historically 
grown human-environment system imposes on the forth-existence of an extremely vulnerable region. Both sides, human 
as well as environment, have been pushed to the edge of marginalization. As such, Calakmul represents a complex 
challenge for sustainable land use and a strategic policy change today.  
153 see chapter 3.3.3 
154 The delineation of the Reserve caused immense land use conflicts in the area, because it was announced after a 
pressured and quick decision for merely political reasons. As some actors remember the process, only aerial photography 
data was used to define the protected area—without considering the actual ejido boundaries on the ground that had 
existed for decades. The strong criticism prevails until today and spread internationally: "Some conservationists privately 
believe Calakmul was established only because Carlos Salinas de Gortari had a strong interest in consolidating his 
authority in international circles after widespread evidence suggested he won the presidency in a rigged election" (The 
Economist 1997; cited by Haenn 1997, 118). Beyond the almost 230,000 ha of the core areas of the Reserve, the 
peripheral zone of protection was partly arbitrarily drawn around it with almost no buffer zone at all on the east side of 
the Reserve. Thus, the conservation zone overlaps with numerous ejidos, exposing it to resource extraction from the 
dense settlements nearby, and challenging the livelihood options of the population. This resulted in a lot of work to 
harmonize the environmental protection goals with the ejidos, and to create functioning buffer zones with appropriate 
land use. More than 15,000 people live in the 72 ejidos around the Calakmul Reserve. Their land use strategies have been 
subject to numerous environmental projects that try to avoid, or mitigate, adverse effects of the ejidos' livelihood 
activities on the Reserve.  
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the implementation phase of the PPF been very strong, and a transfer of the PPF success 
was attempted several times but failed. The reasons are hard to tackle in the short run. 
Instead, the projects in Calakmul increasingly shifted to agroforestry, apiculture and 
agriculture in the 1990s to secure the livelihoods of the ejidos in the medium term, while 
protecting the forest cover to give it time to regenerate. 
While internal organizational conflict exists in 20 de Noviembre as well, it is much less 
identified as the core problem than in the Zona Maya. The main reasons are multifold and 
unclear, as most interviewees agree. Central issues among them are infrastructural 
constraints and the lower quantity and quality of the forest, since only four ejidos have 
sufficient forest resources for commercialization. Thus, the ejido was more dependent on 
external factors and experienced much less improvement from local lesson-drawing. 
 
Conclusion: Local Key Lessons from Quintana Roo 
The following can be concluded in brief from the local experiences. 
• INTERNAL ORGANIZATION CHALLENGES: Informal arrangements span a 
dominating layer of rules that are based on personal relationships and Mayan clan 
privileges, which bend the ejido regulations and benefit distribution. Lack of 
efficiency and accountability hamper the ejidos’ forest business management. 
• LEADERSHIP CONFLICT: Conflict persists between the traditional ejido 
leaders and the requirements of modern forest business management. The latter 
increasingly replace most forest-related functions. As a response to the 
privatization trend, however, laws have re-introduced some leadership rights to 
prevent erosion of the common ejido base.  
• COMMON-POOL VS. PRIVATIZED USE I:. Work groups have been 
introduced as an effective instrument to motivate efficient forest use based on 
individual benefit and accountability, while offering to circumvent some 
institutional and leadership constraints listed above. However, Petcacab showed 
that work groups may carry these conflicts along with them. 
• COMMON-POOL VS. PRIVATIZED USE II: Santa María de Poniente 
withdrew from work group arrangements because of negative lessons on internal 
hierarchical subdivisions. Instead, the ejido introduced strong individual 
responsibilities that are based on the socio-economic interests of the community 
members, and forest labour is conducted non-collectively. Thus, the key shift of the 
ejido was not from privatized to common-pool resource, but a reduction of the 
internal subdivisions of decision-making.  
• COMMUNITY LEVERAGE: No direct political leverage of the communities 
with the government or industry could be detected.   
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4.3.5. Comparison and Discussion 
As stated in chapter 4.3.1, the local experiences represent one of the key sources of policy-
related learning for the advocacy coalitions, because they show the actual outcome of 
intended changes in the policy field. The section explored selected key aspects of the forest 
communities’ institutional development to understand the implementation problems the 
local arrangements face, their local lessons and responses.  
 
Table: Key Local Lessons and Institutional Challenges 
          
 
 
BRITISH COLUMBIA 
 
 
ESMERALDAS 
 
 
QUINTANA ROO 
 
Internal Organization 
Challenges 
not identified STRONG CONFLICT 
lack of: education, 
transparency, control and 
reliability of agreements 
MODERATE 
social privileges and 
informal rules affect 
benefit distribution;  
lack of efficiency and 
accountability 
Leadership Conflict 
STRONG CONFLICT 
traditional hereditary 
chief leadership partly 
maintained for cultural 
roots 
traditional leaders  are 
important for external 
representation, but create 
imbalance of power 
within 
MODERATE 
leaders very powerful re. 
information access due to 
education disparities 
educated leaders 
necessary for external 
representation, but apt to 
misuse of power within 
MODERATE 
qualifications and 
functions of ejido 
leadership do not reflect 
requirements of modern 
forest business 
management 
ejido leader are 
necessary because 
reducing ejido leadership 
authority may erode 
common ejido basis 
Common-pool vs. 
Privatized Use 
not applicable 
strict common-pool 
arrangements on public 
lands that do not affect 
private property rights 
 
MODERATE  
limited willingness to 
collective action due to 
social traditions and lack 
of trust in new system 
(reasons s.a.) 
STRONG PRIVATE 
TREND 
work groups create 
subdivisions for efficient 
forest use that could 
circumvent institutional 
problems (s.a.) 
Political Leverage 
STRONG LEVERAGE 
public movement and 
legal court decision 
backed community for 
strong political leverage 
(strong leverage of few 
individual communities 
motivated partitioning 
strategy of government!) 
LOW LEVERAGE 
legal recognition of land 
title motivated formalized 
concession with industry 
 
not identified 
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INTERNAL ORGANIZATIONAL STRUGGLE: The local experiences show stronger 
similarities among the two Latin American cases than with the North American case, 
which did not face a strong internal organizational struggle. The internal organizational 
problems proved to be the strongest constraint in the daily implementation of community 
forestry in both Ecuador and Mexico, and are very resistant to change. The Mexican 
experience of Santa María de Poniente, however, showed an interesting approach to 
resolve its long-standing internal rifts when it chose to split into a smaller community size 
with a higher participation and more direct decision-making. 
TRADITIONAL LEADERSHIP CONFLICT: The traditional leadership conflicts 
showed remarkable parallels in the feared abuse of power that elite leaders may be allured 
by, especially if their position is very strong. This is the case in all three case studies, based 
on hereditary leadership rights, social clan support, and educational disparities. All three 
also showed a strong necessity to support their leaders for external representation, which 
reinforced their high position internally. 
COMMON-POOL VS PRIVATIZED USE: All three naturally show a strong tendency 
to protect their own socio-economic benefit, each within its own arrangement. The 
Canadian process on Haida Gwaii experienced heavy resistance when private property 
rights were threatened to be jeopardized. The Ecuadorian case shows a strong protection of 
private finca areas, while the community forest seemed to never reach a similar relevance 
for the people. The Mexican case shows a tremendous trend towards working subdivisions 
that establish more privatized activities with more individual influence on the forest 
benefit.  
COMMUNITY LEVERAGE: The political leverage proved to be an interesting point 
that connected the community experiences with the larger picture of the policy process 
from chapters 4.1 and 4.2. Large differences were identified between the Latin American 
cases and Canada. However, the Canadian local experience was arguably unique because it 
was particularly embedded in the public environmental movement and an unresolved legal 
situation, which would not be the case in many others in industrialized countries. While the 
Canadian leverage was made possible by the heavy interest of the government to avoid 
disapproval (loss of votes) from the public, the Ecuadorian leverage was based on the 
forest industry’s interest to avoid loss (national political standing, legal sanctions, NGO 
withdrawal) in economic terms. 
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5. CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS  
5.1. Policy Learning as a Cause of Policy Change  
5.1.1. Influence of Policy Learning and External Events  
The research explored three different case studies with distinct policy processes with an 
international development project, a grassroot environmental movement, and an 
institutional restructuring process. The methodological approach employed central 
elements of the ACF, and developed a scheme for a comparison of the policy processes 
with regard to the relative roles of policy learning as a cause of policy change.  
The thesis analyzed each policy process over more than a decade. It identified the major 
actors and coalitions as they shaped the policy process, and identified the policy beliefs of 
the coalitions and their changes over time. The work analyzed the major causes and effects 
of each case study, and compared the roles of external events and policy learning within 
each case study to explain the role of policy learning.  
a. Within the three case studies, it has been shown that policy learning alone could not 
induce major policy changes. Such changes required an external perturbation on the 
policy system.   
b. Although not as a singular force, policy learning has been shown to have a very 
potent role in enhancing, or sustaining, policy changes. Policy learning can have a 
stabilizing effect against adverse events, once the implementation process has 
started (Quintana Roo).  
c. Policy learning can even generate the major momentum of change that unfolds 
when released by an external catalyst event (British Columbia). It can also, 
however, have a very limited influence, if not form an internal challenge to the 
implementation (Esmeraldas).  
d. Policy learning has been shown to influence network effects more often than it 
would influence local institutional effects. This reflects the indirect and lengthy 
progress in which policy learning occurs, as opposed to external perturbations 
which can occur as a very sudden rupture. 
The case studies show different levels in the susceptibility of the coalitions to policy 
learning, but several parallels in the subject and focus of learning. One very significant 
pattern is the strategic learning of the State Forestry Coalitions (SFCs) to the entering 
Community Forestry Coalitions (CFCs) by which they prepare themselves for the more 
competitive situation. All three SFCs show a learning process in which they accommodate 
and placate the emerging criticism, mostly to secure further public acceptance of their 
activities. In the case of Canada, the SFC also followed a containment strategy to limit the 
newly emerging community forestry concept to very specific cases and policy programs in 
order to defend their stakes. 
 212
Another characteristic pattern is the increasing professionalization and sophistication of the 
CFCs, which had a significant external impact on the policy network and caused a 
threatening competition for the dominant SFCs. The CFCs went through a broad learning 
process from substantive forest-related issues to political know-how: a growing range of 
expertise from ecological knowledge, political governance and indigenous rights, socio-
economic insights of the forest sector, technical know-how in forestry and monitoring, 
institutional organization skills and public campaigns.  
These two processes suggest a direct learning response from one coalition to another. 
However, the majority of interviewees of the three case studies state that the coalitions' 
policy learning rather occurred within rather than across them. This reflects the central role 
that external events had for each policy process. Without them, the actors were unwilling 
to adopt new information, and rejected the possible truth behind it. This corresponds to the 
assumptions of the ACF related to bounded rationality. External event were necessary to 
create the pressure and motivation for the actors to open for change. The following 
sections discuss the roles of policy learning in the individual case studies, as compared to 
external events.  
 
Ecuador: Policy Learning as a Challenge and Constraint 
In Ecuador, the policy learning among the newly emerging CFC was characterized by a 
top-down diffusion of knowledge from the entering international actors, which spread to 
the regional and local actors.  
The process showed a strong network effect in the way that the cooperation patterns 
broadened to a wider range including strictly formalized agreements as well as very 
personal agreements. The effect was closely influenced by the boom of international 
environmental activities and thus could not have occurred without the external event.  
The SFC went through a strategic learning process that seeked to adjust to the incoming 
actors, power and resources. Their learning formed into a containment strategy which 
similarly had a strong network effect on the wide range of agreements. The SFC had a 
strong interest to formalize agreements on investment and planning rights around new 
environmental projects, but withdrew to informal and personal agreements where their 
economic interests would otherwise be compromised. As a result, the combination of the 
policy learning processes of both Advocacy Coalitions enhanced the effect of the 
broadened range of cooperation patterns in the network. Similarly, the SFC's policy 
learning contributed to the local institutional effects in that their containment strategy 
supported the gradual advances in order to be involved, and be able to contain, the 
punctuate activities. 
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Canada: Policy Learning as the Underlying Cause of Change 
In Canada, the policy learning of the CFC was essential in laying the grounds for 
significant network changes from a closed clientelist network to an open policy arena. It 
represents the actual underlying source of change, because the environmental movement 
created the necessary public pressure that pushed the new government towards reforms. 
The new NDP government brought a sudden shift of power that gave way for the reform 
momentum that had formed over several years. Thus, the British Columbian (BC) policy 
learning required an external event as a catalyst to trigger policy change. The increasing 
professionalization of the CFC also contributed to the growing number of community-
based forestry because it widely promoted grassroot development and local governance in 
the region. These local institutional effects were, however, also catalyzed by external 
events that gave way for the refined goals of the CFC.  
The SFC went through a buttressing learning process that seeked to downgrade the 
environmental criticism in order to maintain their economic structures as much as possible. 
Their policy learning had an effect on the arrangements of the government with the 
communities for more protected areas and funds, allowing to shift more benefits to the 
local level. The SFC's refined strategy also had an effect on the new negotiation patterns 
between the government and the communities, which led to an intransparent organization 
of authority in BC communities. The strategic accommodation of the SFC to 
environmental concerns made the set of negotiable options for local agreements much 
broader, giving in to local pressure where it could not be avoided. 
The increasing sophistication of aboriginal groups in the consolidation stage contributed to 
the policy learning of the CFC and supported it with an increasing legal recognition of 
indigenous and social issues. The policy learning had a limited direct effect on both the 
communities as well as the network, but the indirect effect was significant. The growing 
pressures of the aboriginal rights movement induced a counter-reaction of the SFC, which 
succeeded in promoting a down-scaled consolidation, rather than expansion, of the new 
community forestry concepts under the new government. Thus, the previous strategic 
learning of the SFC from the implementation stage continued to have an impact on the 
consolidation stage, given that the external events now allowed for a better implementation 
of the SFC's containment strategy. Again, external events provided the catalyst moment for 
the policy learning to unfold its causal potential.  
 
Mexico: Policy Learning as the Stabilizing Factor Against Adverse External Events 
In Mexico, the policy learning had its driving source in the emergence of one actor (Plan 
Piloto Forestal), before the CFC became diversified and broader in its policy discourse. 
The learning was central in overcoming the organizational obstacles that the hurried 
establishment of community forestry imposed, and lay the grounds for the profound 
structural change of the network which empowered the local communities almost instantly.  
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This important internal progress was not crucial in triggering the CF initially. The policy 
change was rather induced by external events such as the ending forest concession, new 
entering actors, and the new government. However, it is important to note that the end of 
the MIQROO concession was the political window of opportunity, not the cause of the 
policy change. It had to be skilfully exploited by the proponents of change.  
The change was made possible by the strategic approach of the PPF which focused on the 
political assets, e.g. the personal trust relationship of the new state government individuals 
with the small group of individuals who formed the PPF team. Thus, policy learning had 
little direct influence on the first local institutional effects and network effects, but strategic 
behaviour and the focus on politics was very important for the progress of the 
implementation stage. 
Policy learning developed into a strong factor that consolidated the community forestry 
process later on. The policy learning of the Mexican CFC appears as a stabilizing element 
against adverse external events. When the 1992 Agrarian Reform and the withdrawal of the 
PPF caused sudden problems for the stability of the introduced community forestry, it was 
the CFC's policy learning—specifically the growing institutional development of the forest 
societies—that stabilized the institutional organization of the forest societies and the ejidos, 
made them capable to adapt, and finally consolidated the new hierarchical structures. 
 
Table: Overview of the Roles of Policy Learning compared to External Events 
  
Implementation Stage 
 
 
Consolidation Stage 
 
Ecuador 
 
 
Policy learning is of secondary 
relevance for change and the main 
impediment to progress over time. 
- stage not reached - 
 
Mexico 
 
 
Policy learning is the strategic 
element that helps the proponents 
of change to skilfully exploit 
external events. 
Policy learning is the consolidating 
force that drives change and 
stabilizes the system against 
adverse external events. 
 
Canada 
 
 
Policy learning is the driving force 
of change but requires an external 
event as a catalyst moment.  
Policy learning is a consolidating 
force that is overrun by adverse 
external events. 
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5.1.2. Research Statement 1: The Role of Policy Learning for Policy Change   
Research question 1 explores the role of policy learning as a singular cause on particular 
effects during the policy process, as compared to its indirect or cumulative role to the 
overall progress of the policy development. As such, the question also reassesses the 
assumptions of the ACF if policy changes might be able to occur through its internal 
development without external events. 
 
 
Research Statement 1:  Policy Learning as a Cause of Change 
1.1. Policy learning alone cannot induce network effects without the influence of an 
external event. 
1.2.  Policy learning alone cannot induce local institutional effects without the influence of 
an external event. 
 
 
Table: Overview of the Effects of Policy Learning with or without an External Event 
 
 
Implementation Stage 
 
Consolidation Stage 
 
 
Ecuador 
 
 
Policy learning causes network 
effects as well as some local 
institutional effects in combination 
with external events. 
—stage not reached— 
 
Canada 
 
 
Policy learning causes important 
network effects as well as several 
local institutional effects in 
combination with external events. 
Policy learning causes indirect 
network and local institutional 
effects in combination with external 
events. 
 
Mexico 
 
 
Policy learning enhances some 
network effects as well as local 
institutional effects in combination 
with external effects.  
Policy learning causes important 
network effects as well as local 
institutional effects in combination 
with external effects.  
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ad 1.1.  Policy learning alone cannot induce network effects without the influence of 
an external event. 
All three case studies show that a network effect can be strongly enhanced by policy 
learning, but seems to require an initial stimulus through an external event. The latter, thus, 
can have a catalyst function which enables changes that the policy learning within the 
network has already prepared for. This supports the general assumption of the ACF that a 
major policy change requires an external event for its changing impact on the network 
constellation of actors. However, the case studies show that the trigger and the actual cause 
of change may differ: while an external event is required to initiate a change, it may be the 
policy learning that creates the momentum behind the shift and lays the grounds. 
The buttressing learning of the SFCs occurs through a policy learning process that re-
assesses the cost and benefit of network cooperation, but is usually induced by an external 
event that pressures the SFC to react to changed conditions in the policy system. 
 
ad 1.2.  Policy learning alone cannot induce local institutional effects without the 
influence of an external event. 
The case studies indicate that policy learning in general does not have a dominant 
influence on inducing local institutional effects. Policy learning rather enhances changes 
that are induced by external events.  
Where a strong learning process occurs that involves the communities themselves, a local 
institutional effect can be induced by policy learning. As the consolidation process of the 
Mexican CF system suggests–where the actors internally came to the conclusion that forest 
management needs to be sustainable to be successful in the long run—policy learning can 
indeed induce local effects, if the external conditions permit.  
 
Summary: Policy Learning in the Policy Process 
In comparison of both effects in the policy process, it is concluded that policy learning is 
more likely to induce network effects than to induce local institutional effects. This 
reaffirms the assumptions of the ACF, where network-related beliefs are more peripheral 
aspects of the policy beliefs and thus more likely to change. Issues that relate directly to 
community forestry such as local rights to forest use, are concerned with the more central 
policy beliefs and very resistant to change over time. 
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5.2. Changes of Beliefs among the Advocacy Coalitions  
5.2.1. Shifting Beliefs and Strategic Adjustments in the Policy Process 
Policy beliefs have been shown to change from the most peripheral to the more central 
beliefs, which reflects and reconfirms the assumptions of the ACF. It has also been shown 
that policy core beliefs change very rarely, even when major policy changes take place. 
Policy beliefs are very hesitant to change, which also reflects the assumptions of the ACF. 
Policy learning does not necessarily lead to a significant change of policy beliefs, and is 
more often related to a minor issue which influences the actor's tactical behaviour rather 
than his policy goals.  
a. Policy learning can have a stronger effect on policy change where it is related to a 
change of policy beliefs. 
b. The SFC has in all three case studies shown a change of their network-related 
policy beliefs, while the subject-oriented policy beliefs remained unchanged. The 
change was partly related to policy learning on operational issues and in a timely 
response to the new CFC. This indicates a mere change in the SFC's tactical 
behaviour. 
c. The CFC has in all three case studies shown a change of their substantive policy 
beliefs as a result of policy learning on environmental management issues. This 
indicates a change of the CFC’s policy goals. 
d. The empirical data show that policy learning does not automatically lead to a 
change of policy beliefs1. The new accumulated knowledge and know-how of the 
coalitions is not necessarily adopted into the set of substantive policy beliefs, but 
often remains operational know-how about strategic behaviour. 
The changes of policy beliefs in the three case studies show some similar patterns in the 
way the CFC developed their policy focus over time, as well as in the way the SFC 
adjusted to the new impact of the CFC on the network. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 while acknowledging possible limitations on the documentation of deeper changes of beliefs; please see chapter 4.3. 
about the scope and limitations of the research 
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Table: Overview of Changes of Policy Beliefs in all three case studies 
  
Implementation Stage 
 
 
Consolidation Stage 
Ecuador 
CFC shifts focus from non-use 
conservation to sustainable resource 
use   
SFC  re-assesses benefits and shifts 
from closed operations to partly 
accessible and cooperative with CFC  
—stage not reached— 
Canada 
CFC shifts from non-use conservation 
to forest benefit goals  
SFC cost-benefit approach shifts from 
government-oriented planning to more 
public access  
SFC shifts cost-benefit approach to 
include more community involvement  
Mexico 
CFC shifts focus from non-use 
conservation to local forest benefit  
 
CFC shifts focus from local forest 
benefit to sustainable resource use  
SFC (disintegrated, less organized 
now) 
 
CFCs shift focus from non-use conservationist to sustainable resource use 
The first common pattern found across the case studies is the shift of the CFC towards a 
more inclusive human-environment concept. In all three case studies, the CFC went 
through a change of focus in their substantial policy beliefs; from conservationist concepts 
that did not include human resource use in the ecosystem, to a refined view of human-
environment interaction that sees the local people as an inherent part of the ecosystem for 
its survival. In a way, this change suggests a development alongside the global policy 
discourse on sustainable land use, all applied and interpreted into the regional context of 
land use patterns and values. The phase of the non-use conservationist efforts preceded the 
CF in that it did not advocate community-based resource management, but was feasible 
under state-based policies towards protected areas.  
Therefore, the shift of the policy belief from non-use to local forest benefit marks the 
beginning of CF among the actors of the policy network. It shows the significant turning 
point that provided the grounds for devolution concepts. The Mexican case study shows an 
interesting step in between, where the policy belief initially focused on the local feasibility 
of CF before promoting ecological sustainability. It strategically prioritized the 
institutional implementation of the system, and waited for people to realize the need for 
sustainable resource use once it is consolidated.  
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SFCs adjust their cost-benefit analysis and open up for more network cooperation  
The second common pattern found across the case studies is the counter-reaction of the 
dominant SFC. In all three processes, the SFCs underwent peripheral changes in their 
policy beliefs, although their responses show a higher variation than the changes of the 
CFCs. All three coalitions adjusted to the changed actor constellation with new CFCs 
moving in, and responded strategically: Being confronted with the booming E activities, 
they seeked to transform the increasing political pressures into an economic benefit to 
secure their operations. This basically transformed the increasing political E pressures into 
their own benefit.  
Using the new sources of project funds, political contacts and expertise, the SFCs had an 
incentive to open up to some of the E group activities. Gradually, this refined their 
consideration of the cost and benefit of network behaviour, and changed their policy 
beliefs of how accessible their operations should be. This induced a network change 
towards more accessibility in all three examples, although the effects varied immensely. 
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5.2.2. Research Statement 2: The Role of Changes of Beliefs in the Policy 
Process 
Research question P2 seeks to understand the causal relationship between the changes of 
policy beliefs and the actual effects in the CF system, which determine whether a change 
of beliefs is substantial to the policy changes that have taken place over time2.  
 
Research Statement 2:  Change of Policy Beliefs 
2.1.  External events can affect the network or local institutional arrangements without a 
change of policy beliefs. 
2.2.  Policy learning can affect the network or local institutional arrangements without a 
change of policy beliefs.  
 
 
Both research questions of this chapter discuss the role of policy learning. While P1 
explored the relative role of policy learning compared to external events necessary for 
policy change, P2 focuses on the causal connection between policy learning and a change 
of belief that might be necessary to cause policy change. Combined, they provide an 
insight in the complex role that policy learning has within the CF policy process. 
 
ad 2.1.  External events can affect the network or local institutional arrangements 
without a change of policy beliefs. 
As detected across all case studies and policy development stages, local institutional 
effects can be induced by external events without any changes of beliefs involved. In fact, 
this has been shown to represent the most common cause to produce immediately palpable 
changes in CF systems. Whether a change of policy beliefs occurs alongside the changes is 
influenced by numerous factors. As the case studies show, a change of beliefs may occur in 
two different aspects, either network-related or CF-related regarding forest benefits and 
local rights. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 It is logically difficult to prove that a substantial policy effect necessarily depended upon a change of policy belief. 
Therefore, the research poses the opposite question whether such effects can occur without a change of policy beliefs. 
Since the ACF is based on the assumption that policy change occurs as a result of competing coalitions which act 
according to their policy beliefs, it can be assumed that if a change of belief occurred that relates to a particular issue, the 
related policy change is also causally related to the change of policy belief.  
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ad 2.2.  Policy learning can affect the network or local institutional arrangements 
without a change of policy beliefs.  
As discussed for research question 1.2, it is rare that policy learning alone causes local 
institutional effects. In the few cases where it does, a change of the policy beliefs has 
enhanced the momentum of change that policy learning generated in the system. This case 
has been found in the consolidation process in Mexico. Especially for the case of Canada, 
policy learning has been shown to play an essential role in advancing the policy process. 
However, the causal effect on the actual changes in the communities was rather indirect, 
and instead lay the grounds for policy change –whereas the change was actually triggered 
by external events that imposed a sudden perturbation on the system.  
Another learning pattern across all case studies is the buttressing learning of the SFC, 
which went through policy learning to form a strategic response to the growing pressure of 
the CFC. This policy learning did not occur alongside a central change of policy beliefs, 
only a peripheral shift of network-related policy beliefs. Since no other cause-effect 
linkage could be detected where policy learning would have such a singular role to 
enhance policy change, it can be concluded that, within the investigated cases, local 
institutional effects cannot be caused by policy learning without a change of policy beliefs. 
 
ad P2 c. Can network effects be caused by external events without a change of 
policy beliefs?   
The case studies show that a change of policy beliefs is not necessary to cause network 
effects. Network effects are often caused by external events in cases where a shift of power 
occurs in the network, forcing actors to rearrange to respond. This supports the 
assumptions of the ACF which state that an external event is required to cause a shift of 
power among the actors, otherwise the dominant coalition would hold the policy network 
in place as it is and prevent network changes. A change of the policy beliefs is of 
secondary relevance for this process. However, an external event might be causally related 
to a change of belief, although it usually takes a long period of time to develop after an 
external event has occurred. 
 
ad P2 d.  Can network effects be caused by policy learning without a change of 
policy beliefs?  
As outlined in research question P1a, a network effect seems to require an external event to 
catalyze the momentum that the policy learning provides the grounds for. It usually cannot 
be induced by policy learning alone. Apart from the need of an external trigger, policy 
learning has a substantial role in causing network effects. All three case studies show that 
these usually occur alongside a change of belief, which reflects the lessons that the actors 
have gone through in the policy process. The case studies suggest that a change of policy 
beliefs is a vital requirement to lay the grounds for the network effects. An exception has 
 222
been identified in the case studies for the case of buttressing learning for tactical reasons. 
The investigated policy processes thus suggest a twofold answer to the research question: 
Where the policy learning relates to a substantial issue of community forestry, it is unlikely 
that a network effect could be caused by policy learning without an actual change of the  
policy beliefs. A related case has not been found in the case studies. However, where the 
policy learning relates to a rather tactical issue as a strategic response of actors to changes 
in the network, policy learning has been shown to cause network effects without an actual 
change of belief, other than tactical side aspects of the actors' attitudes towards the 
network. 
 
Summary: Changes of Policy Beliefs in the Policy Process 
A change of policy beliefs is not a requirement for policy change in the early stages of CF, 
and cannot be indicated by occurring network or local institutional effects. These might 
reflect other adjustments of the actors to the changes, which do not affect their substantial 
policy beliefs. For the long-term development of the systems, this indicates that structural 
changes might be implemented well before the network actors would genuinely support the 
changes with their own policy beliefs. This suggests that newly established CF systems are 
especially vulnerable in the early phases of implementation and normal operation, until it 
can be confirmed that the policy beliefs of the involved actors have changed accordingly. 
Accordingly, a deeper structural change towards environmental devolution is assumed to 
be very slow and gradual. It requires a strong external stimulus to shift the actor 
constellation. The process is very slow in changing the actual policy beliefs of its actors, 
responding much later to changes that occurred earlier.  
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5.3. Further Policy Lessons: Advocacy Coalition Strategies 
The process analyses showed that the development of community forestry was influenced 
by a number of trends and factors that are beyond the control of the regional policy system, 
but which need to be interpreted by the regional actors to the best of their knowledge—and 
intent.  
Especially their intent has been shown to play a considerable role in the strategic behaviour 
of the coalitions when they compete over the outcome of policy change. The research 
suggests a significant influence of the specific strategies of the coalitions, and chapter 4.2.5 
has discussed the relative influence of each CFC strategy on the policy process.  
All three Community Forestry Coalitions (CFCs) represented a major new factor in all 
three policy processes, and actively tried to induce change. They started to influence the 
network strategically through different approaches. Based on the major assets that they 
focused on, the following three types of CFC strategies were observed: 
• RESOURCE-DRIVEN CFC STRATEGY: The Esmeraldan CFC shows a strong focus 
on resources, through which they attempt to reshape the forest sector’s economic 
incentives towards legal and community-based forestry3.  
• POLITICS-DRIVEN CFC STRATEGY: Quintana Roo’s CFC shows a strong focus on 
their political assets to promote their policy goals. Based on political approval from 
highest ranks and close personal linkages throughout the network, they managed to 
shortcut the institutional hierarchies and establish new authorities that undermine, 
and replace, the existing ones. 
• KNOWLEDGE-DRIVEN CFC STRATEGY: The British Columbian CFC shows a 
strong focus on the policy-related discourse that seeked to delegitimize the 
dominant SFC’s position by arguing over the substantive aspects of the BC forest 
economy, especially through the tenure debate of the 1990s.  
Their successes and failures offer a better understanding of the strategic interplay between 
the competing coalitions, and their prospects to induce change.  
From an ACF perspective, policy change results in new or changed governmental 
programs which introduce new impacts at the operational level. This makes policy change 
a slow and infrequent process, on which the actors’ strategies have a rather indirect 
influence4. However, it is the coalitions’ political leverage that determines whether a 
change takes place, or whether the existing policy is maintained. The analysis suggests 
some basic patterns in the power interplay between the coalitions that help understand the 
conceptual potentials of each strategy. The strategic responses of the State Forestry 
Coalitions to the CFC approaches have been analyzed in chapter 4.2.5. Some of them were 
voluntary, while others reflect the pressures that the CFCs had imposed on them to defend 
                                                 
3 see chapters 3.1.2, 4.1.2 and 4.2.2 
4 Elliott 1999 
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their stakes.  
As found across the case studies and in line with the basic assumptions of the Advocacy 
Coalition Framework, it can be stated that the Community Forestry Coalition is not likely 
to gain influence until the political position of the State Forestry Coalition is undermined 
or threatened to some extent.  
The three case studies suggest that this is most effectively the case where the political base 
of the SFC is targeted directly (politics-driven), as opposed to strategies of economic 
incentives (resource-driven) or public argumentation (knowledge-driven). While the latter 
provide indirect pressures to support policy change, it is the politics-driven approach that 
forces change by breaking the SFC’s dominance in the policy subsystem.  
The following table presents the general strengths and weaknesses of the CFC strategies 
that were identified from the political interplay of the Advocacy Coalitions over the three 
policy processes. 
 
Table: Advantages and Disadvantages of the CF Coalition Approaches  
          
 
 
BRITISH COLUMBIA 
 
Knowledge-driven 
CFC Strategy 
 
ESMERALDAS 
 
Resource-driven  
CFC Strategy 
 
MEXICO 
 
Politics-driven    
CFC Strategy 
advantage of the 
CFC strategy 
pluralist discourse 
that involves 
communities from 
the beginning, i.e. 
reflects bottom-up 
empowerment 
provides capacity 
building for weak 
communities and 
allows for elite 
strategic planning at 
the same time 
 
quick pressure on 
the SFC to change 
as soon as their 
power basis erodes 
 
disadvantage of 
the CFC strategy 
takes relatively long 
to pressure SFC 
takes very long to 
pressure SFC, if 
achieved at all 
elite strategic 
planning does not 
involve the public or 
communities, i.e. 
counteracts bottom-
up empowerment 
Transaction costs 
of the CFC 
strategy 
(to push towards 
community forestry) 
 
 
very high 
 
 
relatively high;  
very high costs for 
capacity building 
relatively low 
 
It is important to note that the interpretation of the coalitions’ strategies has been 
developed inductively from the empirical case studies and thus can only suggest these as a 
contribution to the conceptual discussion of Advocacy Coalitions and their theoretical 
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analysis. At the same time, the exemplary cases can offer an in-depth insight for policy 
practitioners to understand from a more conceptual perspective how political coalitions 
evolve in their position and competitive strategies over time.  
The case studies differ considerably with regard to the availability and economic value of 
the forest resources in the regional policy subsystem, and in the relative roles of the forest 
resources and employment for the local communities. The limitations of case study 
research apply as discussed in chapter 2.4.4. However, parallels have been found across the 
case studies that suggest certain comparability and conceptual findings within the applied 
framework. 
 
5.4. Methodological Review: Empirical Application and Utility of the ACF   
Generally, the empirical application of the ACF confirmed the conceptual strengths of the 
ACF that were the initial reasons to choose the ACF. With regard to some specific 
conditions of the regional application and the particular policy subsystem, however, 
several methodological challenges and incompatibilities occurred.  
Informal Interaction 
The ACF allows to take informal actors into account, i.e. anyone who has anything at stake 
or considers themselves involved in the CF system. However, based on a North American 
background with primarily formal policy decisions and interaction, the ACF's theoretical 
assumptions do not fully address the political dimensions of informal interaction between 
the individuals that represent the policy actors5. 
This issue has to be noted for the Latin American application because the more important 
informal interaction is in the policy subsystem, the more impact is likely to occur from 
policy-related activities on the informal stages. This might occur outside the existing 
administrative structures and, as the case in Quintana Roo, enable the actors to overcome 
(or avoid) intrinsic blocking mechanisms of the informally powerful actors against any 
transformative change6. Further research is suggested on this process. 
                                                 
5 The problematic decision between the focus on actor and individual is not new. Informal interaction, negotiation and 
bargaining should be important elements in policy network analysis, as Weiss (1982) already criticized the earlier 
textbook model. Cairney (1997, 891) similarly emphasizes the importance of informal activities for policy change and 
criticizes the ACF’s belief systems in that they are appealing to system-wide coalitions towards fundamental changes, yet 
do not mirror the dominant issues of day-to-day policy activity that are mainly comprised of administration and 
implementation (Cairney 1997, 891). 
6 The comparison of the policy process in Ecuador and Mexico suggests that a policy change is more likely to occur 
where the policy stimulus is directed against the current in some regard. Otherwise, it might be streamlined intrinsically 
from the start and be deformed in a way that it could not harm the existing structures, let alone achieve a structural 
change. With regard to the political tactics of introducing the stimulus, however, the findings suggests that the action 
would have more impact where well adapted to, if not infiltrated into, the existing structures. The findings from the case 
studies seem to suggest a higher effect where the actors act as innovative and provocative in the content, but well 
integrated in the informal networks of the policy community to do so.  
Elliott (1999) also found a pattern in which private sector initiatives managed to shortcut the extremely slowly changing 
public policy dynamics, and thus circumvented the existing institutional hierarchies. He suggests this as a modification of 
the ACF model towards a “fast track” to reflect rapid changes. His findings are from an empirical study of forest 
certification in Canada, Sweden and Indonesia. 
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Staff Fluctuation 
In the Ecuadorian and Mexican case studies, the fluctuation of staff was a challenging and 
issue among the policy actors. Short-time contracts, competitive changes of employment 
from one actor to another, and strategic hiring of certain individuals for a number of 
reasons were an essential part of the employment patterns that were not observed as 
equally central in the British Columbian case. This has several implications on the 
theoretical assumptions of the ACF with regard to the role of bounded rationality. Where 
staff is frequently replaced, the subjective perception and cognitive behaviour of the actors 
will change more frequently. Individuals have different education backgrounds, cultural 
values, and social skills. Thus, the ACF theory of bounded rationality receives a new 
dimension where the representatives of an actor are frequently replaced. 
Advocacy Coalitions 
The research found that all three cases were driven by a relatively polarized competition of 
two coalitions. However, in all three case studies, the coalitions were dynamic over time 
with regard to the involvement and absolute number of actors. Because of a strong 
influence of individual topics over the years, a third or even fourth advocacy coalition 
could have arguably been identified over a shorter period of time – mostly focusing on 
social or aboriginal issues. These dynamic groups were considered as part of the coalition 
they identified with, and their topic-related influence was discussed in the respective 
chapters.  
Another challenge was the notion of Advocacy Coalitions in Quintana Roo for the initial 
years of the policy process, because both coalitions developed from very few actors on 
each side. The SFC used to be a very small group around the government until the early 
1980s, and CFC emerged from the Plan Piloto Forestal since the early 1980s. Thus, they 
did not resemble a pluralist network for the initial moment of the CF policy process. By the 
mid-1980s, however, the number of actors had grown considerably, and forest societies 
diversified the network. 
Government as a Stakeholder 
As a significant landowner and receiver of forest revenues, the government is not only 
leaning far towards the dominating coalition, but often a strong stakeholder on its own 
behalf. Especially the British Columbian case shows that the inherent stakeholder position 
of the government can be quite strong. In community forestry processes, it is the core of 
policy change to devolve land ownership and resource benefits, thus threatening the 
government to lose its own authority and power. This makes the application of the ACF 
different from other environmental policy fields such as, e.g., forest certification or air 
pollution control, where the government is more or less an intermediary, mediator or 
moderator between the actors that hold benefits at stake.  
Conceptually, the assumptions of the ACF remain valid where the final policy decision is a 
result of the competition of the advocacy coalitions. Even in British Columbia where the 
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government maintains the strongest stakeholder position, the sovereign decisions were 
bound to other pressures, e.g., from the advocacy coalitions, voters and public, and from 
other policy fields. Besides, the governmental institution that holds forest benefit at stake 
and the actual sovereign of the decision may have different positions in the ACF policy 
network. Thus, the ACF remains applicable in this context, and the strong role of the 
government was taken into account accordingly7. 
Interview Data 
Based on the methodological approach discussed in chapter 2.4, the empirical data basis is 
subject to distortions where the interviewees prefer to give false information, particularly 
about project success or political tactics as these are politically sensitive issues, or for the 
protection of own benefits, or because interviewees interpret the question in a different 
context due to different education levels or cultural backgrounds. Both are acknowledged 
and reduced by using triangulation throughout the interviews, for which every response is 
cross-referenced by the interviewee’s fellow actors. The deeper policy beliefs of the actors 
are very difficult to determine by the chosen approach as discussed in chapter 2.4. As 
stated there, they have been included in the research to provide a systematic orientation 
within the ACF application. In order to approximate their true direction, they have been 
cross-examined by triangulation, but cannot be confirmed.  
 
5.5. Recommendations for Future Research 
Several lines of research can be suggested as a result of this thesis. The development of 
community forestry policy suggests a strong linkage to the global policy discourse. The 
ACF perspective on policy learning and beliefs provides a valuable approach to compare 
the evolving notions of community forestry on the global and regional level over time. It 
would be highly interesting to analyze the intricate relationships between the different 
levels to understand how policy discourse trickles down and becomes subject to a different 
interpretation in cultural and political contexts. Especially the role of international NGOs 
becomes increasingly interesting in this regard. 
The second field is the need for further comparative research across different community 
forestry policy processes. The sample of the research is too small to allow for conceptual 
conclusions on the internal processes under which community forestry is implemented in a 
regional policy system. A broader systematic study in the future could address this 
question, and should compare the process systematically with other cases such as India, 
Nepal, Ghana and Vietnam where the development of community forestry has encountered 
and overcome a number of significant problems. 
Third, it would be very interesting to look further into each regional policy subsystem to 
draw a link between the coalitions’ policy learning and beliefs on one hand, and the 
                                                 
7 see chapter 3.3.3 and 4.2.1 
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changing economic interests and stakeholders in community forestry over time on the other 
hand. This would allow for a fuller picture on the intricate relationship between long-term 
visions and economic outcome as they affect the motivations of community forestry actors 
to varying degrees. 
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ABBREVIATIONS 
 
General Terms 
 
AC   advocacy coalition 
ACF   advocacy coalition framework 
CF   community forestry 
CFC   community forestry coalition 
E   environmental 
e.g.   exempli gratia -  for example 
ENGO   environmental non-governmental organization 
i.e.   id est -  that is 
NGO   non-governmental organization 
NTFP    non-timber forest product 
SF   state forestry 
SFC    state forestry coalition 
 
British Columbia, Canada 
 
AAC   Annual Allowable Cut 
BC   British Columbia 
CFI   Community Forestry Initiative 
CFPP   Community Forestry Pilot Program 
CHN   Council of Haida Nation 
FL   Forest License 
GDP    Gross Domestic Product 
ICSI   Island Community Stability Initiative 
JTA   Job and Timber Agreement 
NDP   New Democratic Party 
TFL   Tree Farm License 
TSA   Timber Supply Area 
 
Esmeraldas, Ecuador 
 
AIMA  Asociación Ecuatoriana de Industriales de la Madera 
CARE  Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere  
COMAFORS Corporación de Manejo Forestal Sustentable 
CONAIE Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ecuador 
FECCHE Federación de Centros Chachi de Esmeraldas 
FEPP   Fondo Ecuatoriano Populorum Progressio 
FLACSO Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales 
INDA   National Agrarian Development Institute 
INEFAN National Institute of Forestry 
MFC-E  Manejo Forestal Comunitario Esmeraldas 
MoE   Ministry of Environment (Ministerio del Ambiente) 
SGS   Société Générale de Surveillance 
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UC   Unidad Coordinadora  
UONNE Unión de las Organizaciones Negras del Norte del Ecuador 
USAID  United States Agency for International Development 
 
Quintana Roo, Mexico 
 
AFP  areas forestales permanentes; permanent forest areas 
AMA  Acuerdo México-Alemania; Mexican-German agreement 
COCAFORQ Coordinadora de Organizaciones Campesinas Forestales de Quintana Roo 
CONAFOR Comisión Nacional Forestal 
CONANP Comisión Nacional de Áreas Naturales Protegidas 
CRASX  Consejo Regional Agrosilvopecuario y de Servicios de Xpujil 
CRIP  Centros Regionales de Investigación Pesquera 
CTCFQR Consejo Técnico Consultivo Forestal del Estado 
FONAFE Fondo Nacional de Fomento Ejidal; National Ejido Development Fund 
INAH   Instituto Nacional de Arqueología y Historia 
INEGI  Instituto Nacional de Estadística Geografía e Informática 
INI   Instituto Nacional Indigenista 
MIQROO Maderas Industrializadas de Quintana Roo 
OEPFZM Organización de Ejidos Productores Forestales de la Zona Maya 
PFE  Plan Piloto Estatal; State Forest Plan 
PPF  Plan Piloto Forestal; Forest Pilot Plan 
PROCAMPO Programa de Apoyos Directos al Campo 
PROCEDE Programa de Certificación de Derechos Ejidales 
PROFEPA Procuraduría Federal del Medio Ambiente 
PRONARE  Programa Nacional de Reforestación 
PRONASOL  Programa Nacional de Solidaridad  
QR  Quintana Roo 
SAGARPA Secretaría de Agricultura, Ganadería, Desarrollo Rural, Pesca y Alimentación 
SARH   Secretaría de Agricultura y Recursos Hidraulicos 
SDR   Secretaría de Desarrollo Rural  
SECOL   Secretaría de Ecología 
SECTUR  Secretaría de Turismo 
SEDARI Secretaría de Desarrollo Agropecuario e Índigena 
SEDESOL  Secretaría de Desarollo Social 
SEDETUR  Secretaría de Desarrollo Turístico 
SEMARNAT  Secretaría de Medio Ambiente y Recursos Naturales 
SPFEQR Sociedad de Productores Forestales Ejidales de Quintana Roo  
UAC   Universidad Autónoma de Campeche   
UEF   Union de Ejidos Forestales (en la región Calakmul) 
UNORCA Unión Nacional de Organizaciones Regionales Campesinas Autónomas 
UQROO Universidad de Quintana Roo 
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ANNEX 1 LIST OF INTERVIEWS 
 
1.1. Case Study I: British Columbia/Canada 
The empirical data from British Columbia was collected through 16 interviews (listed 
below) and a literature review that complements the process analysis. The BC case 
provided relatively transparent documentation from nearly all actors, including 
protocols, media statements, and research publications.  
 
Actor1  Representative Date of 
Interview 
 
Interviews  
 
  
Silva Forest Foundation Herb Hammond 29 June 2005 
West Coast Environmental Law Jessica Clogg 29 June 2005 
BC Coalition for Sustainable Forest 
Solutions 
Will Horter, Colin Campbell, 
members of steering committee 05 July 2005 
Dogwood Initiative Will Horter 05 July 2005 
Canadian Forest Service; 
First Nations Forestry Program 
Randy Butcher, First Nations Forestry 
Program Officer  07 July 2005 
Council of Haida Nation Guujaaw, President  07 July 2005 
Gowgaia Institute John Broadhead 12 July 2005 
ICSI  Island Stability Initiative Cindy Davis, Simon Davis 13 July 2005 
Council of the Village of Masset Trevor Jarvis, Chief Administrative Officer 15 July 2005 
Forest District of the Queen Charlotte 
Islands Leonard Munt, District manager  18 July 2005 
Community Planning Forum; 
(Ministry of Sustainable Resource 
Management, Resource Management 
Division) 
Stan Schiller (Weyerhaeuser 
contractor); Bob Brash (District 
Manager, now Husby's vice 
president) 
18 July 2005 
POLIS Institute for Ecological 
Governance  Michael M'Gonigle 21 July 2005 
British Columbia Community Forest 
Association BCCFA Marilyn Belleau 21 July 2005 
Ministry of Forestry,  Department of 
Resource Tenures  
Ron Greschner,  
Senior Timber Tenures Forester 21 July 2005 
Esketemc First Nation/Alkali Resource 
Management Ltd Marilyn Belleau 21 July 2005 
                                                     
 
 241
1.2. Case Study II: Esmeraldas/Ecuador 
The data collection is based on 23 interviews and additional informational visits to most 
actors for a systematic understanding of the actor network and their peceptions.  
Scientific publications and public statements of the policy actors were less available 
than for the Canadian case study. Thus, a wide range of actors was contacted in 
informational visits to receive a systematic overview of the network. The GTZ provided 
valuable internal reports and protocols as part of the MFC-E project documentation. 
 
Actor Interviewed Representative  Date of Interview 
 
Interviews  
 
  
MFC-E, GTZ Jörg Linke 23 Sept2003 
DED Volker Frank 29 Sept 2003 
Acción Ecológica Ivonne Ramos 03 Oct 2003 
Fundación Natura, ex-COMAFORS Xavier Bustamante  20 Oct 2003 
AIMA y Escuela Ingeniera Forestal Edgar Vasquez 22 Oct 2003 
COMAFORS Mauricio Teran 22 Oct 2003 
DED Maike Potthast 22 Oct2003 
CAIMAN Walter Palacios 23 Oct2003 
Jatun Sacha Nubia Jaramillo 23 Oct2003 
FLACSO, Fundación Natura Teodoro Bustamante 27 Oct 2003 
Fundación Forestal de Endesa Botrosa Fernando Montenegro 27 Oct 2003 
MFC-E, ex-Ministerio del Ambiente 
Esmeraldas 
Ramon Estupiñan  28 Oct 2003 
Unidad Coordinadora Eduardo Beltran 29 Oct 2003 
DED Edgardo Prado 01.Nov 2003 
Capulí  Luis Isaiah Añapa 06.Nov 2003 
Arenales Alonso Corozo 10.Nov 2003 
Fundación Altrópico Jaime Levy 17.Nov 2003 
PRODEPINE Pablo Minda 20 Nov 2003 
SGS, USAID Fred Corozo 21 Nov 2003 
FEPP Raúl Rojas 21 Nov 2003 
Endesa Botrosa, ex-Jatun 
Sacha,Altropico 
Andres Guarderas 23 Nov 2003 
Instituto Científico de Culturas 
Indígenas ICCI 
Fernando Sarango 29 Sep t2003 
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Informational Visits  
 
  
FECCHE Carlos Añapa 29 Sept 2003 
FECCHE Luis de la Cruz 29 Sept 2003 
Ministerio del Ambiente Quito Max Andrade 01 Okt 2003 
GTZ Quito Wolfgang Lutz 01 Okt 2003 
Acción Ecológica Juan Pablo Barragán 03 Okt 2003 
Endesa Botrosa / Bosque para siempre Rodny E. Garrido 21 Okt 2003 
MFC-E; Tecnico forestal en Arenales Marcelo Estevez 29 Okt 2003 
MFC-E; Tecnico forestal en Capulí Christian Teran 06 Nov 2003 
Mujeres de Capulí Carmen Perdomo etc. 07 Nov 2003 
Tecnico Forestal Capulí Alonso Pichota 08 Nov 2003 
Colonos cerca de Capulí Teodora y Natalie Medina 08 Nov 2003 
MFC-E; tecnico agroforestal Maria-Luisa Mina 08 Nov 2003 
ex-presidente de Capuli Francisco Largo 09 Nov 2003 
Arenales Presidente Carmelo “Alejo” Wila 09 Nov 2003 
Universidad Politécnica de Esmeraldas Alejandro Dila 10 Nov 2003 
Mujeres de Arenales Mariuxi Wila etc. 10 Nov 2003 
Arenales- cabildo Segundo Dila 11 Nov 2003 
Arenales- fincero Melanio Dila 12 Nov 2003 
intermediario Rio Onzole Carlos Corozo 12 Nov 2003 
Forestry Director; Provincial Ministry  Jorge Trujillo 19 Nov 2003 
Junta Parroquial Janner Medina 19 Nov 2003 
Endesa Botrosa/Bosque para siempre Angel Jacome 20 Nov 2003 
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1.3. Case Study III: Quintana Roo/Mexico 
Scientific publications and public statements of the policy actors were less available 
than for the Canadian case study. A range of actors was contacted in informational visits 
to receive a systematic overview of the network, especially in Calakmul in cooperation 
with the visited GTZ project. The GTZ provided valuable internal reports and protocols 
as part of the MFC-E project documentation. 
 
Actor Interviewed Representative Date of 
Interview 
 
Interviews  
 
  
UQROO-Proyecto Forestal Natalia Armijo 17 Mar 2004 
UQROO ex-PPF Sur René Förster 18 Mar 2004 
ECOSUR Chetumal Birgit Schmook 19 Mar 2004 
Florida International University, 
OEPFZM 
David Bray 19 Mar 2004 
CONANP, Reserva de la Biósfera 
Calakmul 
Fernando Durand 17 Apr 2004 
Bosque Modelo  Santiago Perez Oy 23 Mar 2004, 
15 Apr 2004 
CRASX Rosalino Villegas Carmona 23 Mar 2004 
CONAFOR Campeche Alberto Villa Señor 29 Mar 2004, 
15 Apr 2004 
Prestadores de Servicios Juan Manuel Herrera 23 Mar 2004, 
15 Apr 2004 
ex-PPF Sur Alberto Ehnis 16 Apr 2004 
Ejido 20 de Noviembre José Luis Mateo 21 Apr 2004 
Ejido 20 de Noviembre Daniel Zip, Ephraim Kavich Zip, Elias 21 Apr 2004 
CONAFOR Chetumal Tonatiu Flores 21 Apr 2004 
OEFPZM  Rosa Ledesma 28 Apr 2004 
Corredor Biológico Hugo Galletti, David Acopa, Adrean 
Lopez 
15 Apr 2004, 
28 Apr 2004 
CONAFOR Carrillo  José Luis Ureña Ramírez 29 Apr 2004 
Ejido Santa María de Poniente Candido Batun Kan  30 Apr 2004 
ex-PPF Zona Maya Ofelio Guatemala 01 May 2004 
ex-PPF Sur Alfonso Arguëlles 03 May 2004 
PPY - PRONATURA Neyra Silva Rosado 05 May 2004 
SEDARI, ex-PPF Zona Maya Marcelo Carreón 06 May 2004 
ex-PPF Sur Helmut Janka 29 June 2004 
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Informational Visits  
 
  
UQROO-Proyecto Forestal Francisco Xuluc 17 Mar 2004 
ECOSUR Chetumal Hans Vester 19 Mar 2004 
SAGARPA Luis Alfonso Gonzales 24 Mar 2004 
Promotores Campesinos Enrique tbc 25 Mar 2004 
Servidores Turísticos Fernando Sastre Mendez 25 Mar 2004 
Sociedad de Productores de Pimienta 
Indígenas de la Reserva de la Biósfera 
de Calakmul S.S.S. 
Luis Felipe, Maria del Carmen 25 Mar 2004 
Consejo Nacional de Agua  Juan Manuel Cabera Sanchez 29 Mar 2004 
SEMARNAT Ramón tbc 29 Mar 2004 
Secretaría de Turismo Jorge Luis Gonzáles Curi 30 Mar 2004 
Secretaría de Ecología, SEOPC, 
Secretaría de Desarrollo Rural 
Lisbeth García (proyecto estatal de 
ordenamiento territorial), Luis García 
(SDR), Gustavo Ramos Rodriguez 
(Secretaría de Ecología) 
30 Mar 2004 
INAH Instituto Nacional de 
Arqueología y Historia 
Carlos Vidal Angles 31 Mar 2004 
INEGI Instituto Nacional de 
Estadística Geografía e Informática 
Carlos Domínguez 31 Mar 2004 
CEDESU -Universidad de Campeche, 
Centro de Desarrollo Sustentable 
Miriam Sakason 01 Apr 2004 
ECOSUR Campeche Jorge Mendoza, Hans van der Wal, 
Pilippe Bovin, Rosann Hernández 
01 Apr 2004 
Consejo Asesor de la Reserva Fernando Duran (Reserva) Domingo Monteno (SEMARNAP) 
Valentino Morales Sanchez (Consejo 
Asesor) 
Hugo Galletti (Corredor biológico) 
Susanne Welz (GTZ) 
Alberto Ehnis (GTZ) 
Carlos (INAH) 
15 Apr 2004, 
22 Mar 2004 
CDI - Comisión Nacional para el 
Desarrollo de los Pueblos Indígenas 
Victor Ruck 31 Mar 2004, 
19 Apr 2004 
Prestadores de Servicios Abad Sidilo 21 Apr 2004 
CONAFOR Campeche Carlos René Estrella Canto, Atonio 
Javier Bani Kam 
26 Apr 2004 
Bosque Modelo, Corredor Biológico, 
Ejidos forestales, Prestadores de 
Servicios, GTZ 
Hugo Galletti, David Acopa, Adrean 
Lopez, Alberto Villaseñor, Santiago 
Perez Oy, Susanne Welz etc 
28 Apr 2004 
Prestadores de Servicios Franziska Abad 29 Apr 2004 
OEPFZM Ejidos – Asamblea de app. 30 personas; Marcelo Carreón, 01 May 2004 
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Delegados @ Santa María de Poniente Ofelio Guatemala, Eloisa Han Osalde, 
Gustavo Domínguez Montalvo, Luis 
Poot, José Luis Carreón Mundo, Rosa 
Ledesma Santos et al.  
Consejo Técnico Consultivo Forestal 
del Estado de QR (CTCFQR) 
Hugo Galletti, Marcelo Carreón et al.  03 May 2004 
Secretaría de Ecología Marcela Martinez 06 May 2004 
 
 
1.4. Overview: Interviews in the Coalitions 
Table: Interviews in the three case studies 
 
 
Canada Ecuador Mexico 
 
Actors from the Community Forestry Coalition (CFC) 10* 12* 15* 
 
Actors from the State Forestry Coalition (SFC) 8* 3* 1
2 
Interviews in total 16 22 22 
 
 
Table: Additional Informational Visits (to complement documentation in Ecuador 
and Mexico) 
 
 
Canada Ecuador Mexico 
among the CFC 0 5 7 Informational 
contacts  among the SFC 0 6 8 
* The sum of the interviews and the interviewed actors differs at some points because some interviewees represent 
more than one actor at the same time, or are not considered a coalition member.  
 
 
 
                                                     
2 The lower representance of SFC actors stems from the stronger orientation of most actors towards the 
CFC, as community forestry has been established more than two decades ago, and the size of both 
coalitions shifted immensely since the 1980s (see chapter 3.3.1.3 and Annex 2). The imbalance of 
interviewees from both coalitions causes possible distortions, which cannot be compensated by 
triangulation. 
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ANNEX 2 ADVOCACY COALITIONS  
2.1. Overview: Interviews in the Coalitions 
Table: Interviews in the three case studies 
 
 
Canada Ecuador Mexico 
 
Interviews with actors from the  
Community Forestry Coalition (CFC) 
10 12 15 
 
Interviews with actors from the  
State Forestry Coalition (SFC) 
8 3 1 
Interviews with other informants 0 7 6 
Interviews in total* 16 22 22 
 
Table: Additional Informational Visits (due to less available documentation in 
Ecuador and Mexico) 
 
 
Canada Ecuador Mexico 
among the CFC 0 5 7 Informational 
contacts  among the SFC 0 6 8 
* The sum of the interviews and the interviewed actors differs at some points because some interviewees represent 
more than one actor at the same time, or are not considered a coalition member.  
 
Table: Overview of the coalitions of all three case studies 
 
 
 Canada Ecuador Mexico 
Identified CFC members in 
total 19 19 33 
 
Community 
Forestry 
Coalition 
central members 
(identified by the majority 
of interviewees) 
13 11 17 
Identified SFC members in 
total 17 12 11 
 
State Forestry 
Coalition central members 
(identified by the majority 
of interviewees) 
10 6 7 
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2.2. Advocacy Coalitions in British Columbia, Canada 
2.2.1. Community Forestry Coalition (CFC) 
The interviews identified the below listed 19 actors as part of the community forestry 
coalition. Of the 19 members, 13 actors have a more central position. They were 
identified by more than two-thirds1 of the 16 interviewees (i.e. by more than 11 
statements). 10 actors of the state forestry coalition were interviewed. They were 
chosen by the regional relevance of the actors for the investigated communities in 
Esketemc and on Haida Gwaii. 
 
Table: Community Forestry Coalition in British Columbia 
 identified by most actors 
(i.e. at least two-thirds) 
identified by some actors 
(i.e. at least one-third) 
n = 16 11-16 statements 6-10 statements 
transregional CF 
actors 
• Greenpeace • n/a 
 
regional CF actors 
• Dogwood Initiative 
• Ecoforestry Institute 
• Friends of Clayoquot Sound 
• POLIS Institute for Ecological 
Governance  
• Sierra Club of Canada – BC 
Chapter 
• West Coast Environmental Law 
• CFAC Community Forest 
Advisory Committee  
• Western Canada Wilderness 
Committee 
• Silva Forest Foundation 
• Robin Clark Inc. 
• British Columbia Community 
Forest Association BCCFA  
• BC Coalition for Sustainable 
Forest Solutions 
• Community Planning Forum; 
affiliated with the Ministry of 
Sustainable Resource 
Management 
 
local CF actors 
• Gowgaia Institute 
• Council of Haida Nation 
• ICSI Haida Island Community 
Stability Initiative 
• Esketemc First Nation 
• Pacific Forestry Centre 
underlined:    actor has been interviewed (in depth);                   Italic:   informational visit with the actor 
                                                     
1 The interview statements are grouped according to their recurrence throughout the research as follows:  
• Prevalent statements are those that are identified by at least two-thirds of all interview statements 
because they are confirmed by the majority of interviewees, i.e. usually by members of both 
coalitions. They are presented in the left column of the tables below.  
• Those statements that recurred among at least one-third of the interviewees are also identified in 
the grouping, because they reflect the view of at least several actors within one coalition. They are 
presented in the right column of the tables below.  
• Those statements that were made by fewer than one-third of the interviewees are not addressed 
in the analysis because their interpretation would depend on the interpretation of singular actors, 
and exceeds the scope of the research. 
Please see Annex 3 and 4 for a continued use of the recurrence criteria. 
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2.2.2. State Forestry Coalition (SFC) 
The state forestry coalition is comprised of 18 actors, which were identified by the 16 
interviewees. 10 of the actors have a more central position, as they were identified by 
more than two-thirds of the interviewees (i.e. by more than 11 statements). 9 actors of 
the state forestry coalition were interviewed2.  
 
Table: State Forestry Coalition in British Columbia 
 identified by most actors 
(i.e. at least two-thirds) 
identified by some actors 
(i.e. at least one-third) 
n = 16 11-16 statements 6-10 statements 
 
transregional SF 
actors 
• Weyerhaeuser 
• Canadian Forest Service  
• National Network of Forest 
Practitioners 
 
• FPAC Forest Products 
Association of Canada  
 
 
regional SF actors 
• Ministry of Forestry, Resource 
Tenures and Engineering Branch 
• Council of Forest Industries 
• Forest Alliance BC 
• BC Forest Service  
• UBC 
• First Nations Forestry Program 
• ABCPF Association of British 
Columbia Professional Foresters 
 
 
local SF actors 
• Ministry of Forests – Forest 
District Queen Charlottes 
• West Fraser Timber 
• Husby Timber 
• Western Forest Products 
• Esketemc First Nation Forest 
Products Ltd. 
• Esketemc First Nation/Alkali 
Resource Management Ltd 
underlined:  actor has been interviewed (in depth) 
Italic:   informational visit with the actor 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
2 The numbers of the actors and the interviewed representatives differ at some points because some individuals 
represent more than one actor at the same time.  
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2.3. Advocacy Coalitions in Quintana Roo, Mexico 
2.3.1. Community Forestry Coalition (CFC) 
The Mexican case study—as the oldest and longest process among the three—shows a 
particularly complex development of the actors over time. The launch of the Plan 
Piloto Forestal in the early 1980s represented a major policy shift. It replaced the 
dominant state-based system in the region and introduced a quickly growing group of 
social forestry actors. It may thus be concluded that the policy process was initially not 
driven by a direct competition of coalitions as the ACF assumes. However, as most 
interviewees stress, the growing number of actors around the PPF did form a larger 
advocacy coalition once the process had been started in the early 1980s. 
Notwithstanding the complex emergence of coalition, the actors was acknowledged 
relatively clearly by the 22 interviewees, identified below. 
 
Table: Community Forestry Coalition in Quintana Roo and Calakmul 
 identified by most actors 
(i.e. at least two-thirds) 
identified by some actors 
(i.e. at least one-third) 
n = 22 15-22 statements  8-14 statements 
transregional actors • CONAFOR  • GEF 
 • CONANP • INAH 
 • Corredor Biológico • CONABIO 
 • ECOSUR • PROCAMPO 
 • GTZ • PRONARE 
 • PRONATURA • Unión de Comunidades y  
 • SEMARNAT    Ejidos Forestales 
regional D actors • PPF Sur • SECTUR Secretaría de Turismo 
 • PPF Zona Maya • Consejo Arte-Ecologa-
Agropecuario 
 • OEFPZM  • Mundo Maya 
 • SPEFQR • SEDARI 
 • Asambleas Ejidales • UQROO-Proyecto Forestal 
 • Consejo de Participantes de la 
Reserva de Calakmul 
• CRIP 
• Municipio 
 • Reserva de la Biósfera Calakmul • Fondos Regionales de 
Solidaridad 
 • CRASX • Consejo Técnico Consultivo 
Forestal del Estado de QR 
(CTCFQR) 
local E actors • Bosque Modelo Zoh Laguna • Forest Service Providers 
 • Proyectos de Ecoturismo  
underlined:   actor has been interviewed (in depth);                 Italic:  informational visit with the actor 
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2.3.2. State-directed and Private Forestry Coalition (SFC) 
When the Plan Piloto Forestal was implemented in the mid-1980s, the dominance of 
state-based forestry was busted virtually over night in the region. The smaller 
commercial actors in timber commercialization quickly found new role within the 
ejido-based community forestry and forest societies. Since then, privatization has 
received more political supporters, as described in chapter 7.  
As opposed to the previous state-based actors from the times of the MIQROO 
concession, the commercial opposition of social forestry is since the late 1980s mostly 
comprised of private and other non-community groups of forest users. Several 
commercial actors now call for reliable state support and more planning security in 
forest use to strengthen private forest users. This includes more state support, 
administration and subsidies, as a a state-directed framework—as opposed to stronger 
local control.  
The commercial actors do not form a strong coalition with a joint political 
representation, and are not identified by the interviewees as a strong coalition. 
However, they share a distinct policy belief, are known for their policy beliefs, and 
cooperate where necessary to support their interest in commercial forestry matters. 
Thus, they form a loosely organized group that fulfils the basic criteria of a coalition 
within the ACF framework. The interviews have indicated the following picture: 
 
Table: State-directed and Private Forestry Coalition in Mexico 
 identified by most actors 
(i.e. at least two-thirds) 
identified by some actors 
(i.e. at least one-third) 
n = 22 15-22 statements  8-14 statements 
transregional E actors • (MIQROO - before mid-1980s)3  
regional E actors • sociedad de promotores 
campesinos asesores 
• sociedad de productores 
ecológicos de chicle 
 • intermediaries • Amanecer en el campo 
local E actors • loggers • Forest Service Providers4 
(since mid-1980s) 
 • productores de chicle • productores de chile 
 • productores agroforestales • apicultores 
underlined:  actor has been interviewed (in depth) 
Italic:   informational visit with the actor 
 
                                                     
3 Two of the identified actors existed in different periods without overlap. This shows the loose character of the 
identified coalition. MIQROO is mentioned as a key actor before the mid-1980s, while the service providers came into 
existence no earlier than in the mid-1980s. Apart from these two, most other groups represent private forest users that 
constantly formed a source of opposition for the community benefit goals of the social forestry coalition.  
4 Some forest providers have been identified as part of this coalition by some interviewees, although other groups of 
forest providers have been assigned to the community forestry coalition (see previous section). The regional groups 
show different attitudes towards private forestry. This shows the ambiguous role of the service providers between the 
needs of forest management and support for the ejidos, which is resolved differently and by different people. 
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2.4. Advocacy Coalitions in Esmeraldas, Ecuador  
2.4.1. Community Forestry Coalition (CFC) 
Table: Community Forestry Coalition in Esmeraldas 
 identified by most actors 
(i.e. at least two-thirds) 
identified by some actors 
(i.e. at least one-third) 
n = 22 15-22 statements  8-14 statements 
transregional actors • GTZ Quito • CARE-Subir 
 • Ministry of Environment • Fundación Natura 
 • DED Quito • FLACSO 
 • CAIMAN  
 • Jatun Sacha  
regional  actors • MFC-E • FECCHE 
 • FEPP • UONNE 
 • DED Esmeraldas • AIMA 
 • Unidad Coordinadora5 • PRODEPINE 
 • Fundación Altropico  
local actors • forest technicians  
underlined:  actor has been interviewed (in depth) 
Italic:   informational visit with the actor 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
5 The UC coordination unit represents the regional platform for the CF actors and their SF counterparts, and was 
founded by members of both sides. It serves an important bridge function between the two advocacy coalitions, and 
thus suggests the function of a policy broker according to the Advocacy Coalition Framework (Sabatier 1993). However, 
more than two-thirds of the actors clearly identified the UC as a relevant actor of the community forestry coalition. For 
this reason, it has been acknowledged as a CF actor within the coalition. For the detailed conflict of interest around the 
UC's network position, please refer to section 6.3.3. 
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2.4.2. State Forestry Coalition (SFC) 
Table: State Forestry Coalition in Esmeraldas 
 identified by most actors 
(i.e. at least two-thirds) 
identified by some actors 
(i.e. at least one-third) 
n = 22 15-22 statements  8-14 statements 
national D actors • Endesa Botrosa • Fundación Forestal de  
 • COMAFORS     Endesa Botrosa 
regional D actors • Forestry Department, MoE6 
Esmeraldas 
• Escuela Ingeniera Forestal 
 • Forest Administration Unit 
Esmeraldas, MoE Borbón 
 
local D actors • colonos (non-community 
settlers on Río Onzole) 
• Junta Parroquial (district 
administration) 
 • intermediaries on Río Onzole  
underlined:  actor has been interviewed (in depth) 
Italic:   informational visit with the actor 
 
                                                     
6 Ministry of Environment (Ministerio del Ambiente) 
ANNEX 3 CAUSES AND EFFECTS – INTERVIEW RESPONSES 
 
The following tables present the prevalent causes and effects of each case study that were identified by the interviewees. Please refer to Annex 1 for a 
list of the interviewees, and to Annex 2 for the Advocacy Coalitions that they were identified to belong to.  
The presented causes and effects are based on qualitative data from a three-level process: a semi-structured interview with open questions (1); a 
second re-questioning to cross-examine and categorize the answer (2); and a grouping of the categorized answers according to the recurrence1 of 
statements with regard to the key content (3).  
Throughout the analysis, the statements were sorted according to their recurrence into three groups:  
• Prevalent statements are those that are identified by at least two-thirds of all interview statements because they are confirmed by the majority 
of interviewees, i.e. usually by members of both coalitions. They are presented in the left column of the tables below.  
• Those statements that recurred among at least one-third of the interviewees are also identified in the grouping, because they reflect the view 
of at least several actors within one coalition. They are presented in the right column of the tables below.  
• Those statements that were made by fewer than one-third of the interviewees are not addressed in the analysis because their interpretation 
would depend on the interpretation of singular actors, and exceeds the scope of the research. 
The interview methods are described in detail in chapter 4.3., and the interview questions are described in Annex 5. Annex 6 presents the comprised 
interview data from all three case studies, which are summarized for their prevalent statements below. 
 
 
 
                                                     
1 Throughout the analysis, the statements were sorted according to their recurrence into three groups: Prevalent statements are those that are identified by at least two-thirds of all 
interview statements because they clearly reflect the general view of the majority of interviewees, and usually combine the views of members of both coalitions. Those statements that 
recurred among at least one-third of the interviewees are also identified in the grouping, because they reflect the view of at least several actors within one coalition. Those statements 
that were made by fewer than one-third of the interviewees are not addressed in the analysis because their interpretation would depend on the interpretation of singular actors, and 
exceeds the scope of the research. 
3.1. British Columbia, Canada 
Table: Interview Responses on the Causes and Effects of Policy Change in British Columbia (number of interview statements in brackets) 
 Implementation Stage Consolidation Stage 
 
 
n = 16 
stated by the majority of 
actors 
(i.e. at least two-third) 
stated by several actors 
(i.e. at least one-third) 
stated by the majority of 
actors 
(i.e. at least two-third) 
stated by several actors 
(i.e. at least one-third) 
(A) External Events 11-16 statements 6-10 statements 11-16 statements 6-10 statements 
socio-economic 
change declining local benefit from the forest (16) 
shift towards large-scale forest 
corporations (10) 
rationalization of logging operations 
(9) 
debate over economic 
perspectives and returns 
(14) 
softwood lumber dispute affect 
industrial returns (9) 
dispute over BC forest employment 
after rationalization (9) 
legal change aboriginal title cases (13) 1997 Delgamuukw case (9) 
1992 Haida Gwaii protests and BC 
government response (6) 
--- adaptive legal changes over the years; 
no  clear reform (esp. tenure) (7) 
change in the 
political context change of BC government to NDP in 1991 (16) 
--- change of BC government to 
Liberals in 2001 (16) 
environmental groups and increased 
public attention have shifted the 
political focus since 1980s (8) 
new actors and 
funds Environmental movement (16) 
new urban awareness of forest 
clearcuts (6) 
International Rainforest Initiative in 
Clayoquot Sound  (10) 
Aboriginal rights movement 
(12) 
individual court cases of aboriginal 
land title with high media profile (8) 
environmental groups consolidated 
(6) 
First Nations form stronger political 
voice (8) 
(B) Policy Learning     
SFC Strategic Accommodation of 
Environmental Criticism 
Containment strategy to secure status 
quo (8) 
--- gradual adaption to BC deregulation 
process to take over more authority in  
(12) new low-impact logging techniques 
(6) 
management plans and logging 
operations (6) 
gradual adaption to address more 
community issues and prevent local 
opposition to logging (8) 
CFC Professionalization and 
Internationalization (15) 
Strategic campaigns towards urban 
groups (7) 
Refinement of political focus and 
argumentation (10) 
Sophistication of Aboriginal 
Rights Groups (13) 
environmental groups work closely 
with local communities (7) 
(C)  Local 
Institutional 
Effects on the 
Forest 
Communities 
    
institutional 
capacities for local 
forest-related 
decision-making 
community initiatives for 
CF planning and ecosystem-
based alternatives (14) 
local grassroot groups formed to 
oppose industrial logging  (7) 
local groups improve their 
knowledge on logging techniques, 
forest ecology, GIS, forest policy and 
administration (9) 
Authority and 
accountability shift from 
gov to industry (16) 
 
ICSI initiative on Haida Gwaii 
strengthened the local capacity to 
deal with forest management (8) 
dispute over tenure reform provided 
local knowledge about CF 
arrangements (6) 
Esketemc joint venture (Alkali Lake 
Ltd) established (6) 
Forest and Range Agreement fosters 
new arrangements with aboriginal 
communities (9) 
institutional 
capacities for local 
benefit distribution 
protected areas and funds 
assigned to communities to 
mitigate logging effects (11) 
local groups are supported by NGOs 
to oppose industrial logging; 
financially and for management of 
funds (8) 
shrinking forest-related employment 
community-based joint 
ventures supported (11) 
local benefit now depends more on 
individual arrangements with the 
provincial government (6) 
 
and local returns cause marginalized 
position (10) 
community-based 
organization of 
authority 
individual negotiation 
options of communities 
with government (12) 
strong local initiatives pressure 
Ministry of Forests to give in to local 
arrangements (by media and court 
decisions) (9) 
community forestry 
program expanded but 
restricted (13) 
CFPP encourages more than 30 
communities to initiate CF plans and 
apply (7) 
stronger local representation base 
after a decade of environmental and 
aboriginal rights movements (10) 
internal traditional authority 
struggles;  conflict with modern 
requirements of forest management 
(10) 
(D)  Network 
Effects                          
in the Policy 
Community 
    
Hierarchy Levels 
and Formality 
Formal framework of 
decision-making not 
reshaped (14) 
Ministry of Forests changes new 
policy too quickly to be able to 
reform the entire framework (8) 
Forest policy only one pressuring 
issue after election, and NDP afraid 
to lose support from industrial forest 
sector  (7) 
Deregulation process (14) 
 
 
 
 
 
Containment of CF in policy 
niche (11) 
Ministry of Forests withdraws in 
particular from legal responsibilities 
towards the communities, i.e. public 
consultation (7) 
Ministry of Forests reduces its costs of 
personnel and administrative tasks 
(6) 
Ministry of Forests shifts 
accountability and decision-making 
power to industrial forest sector (9) 
CFPP is treated as a separate program 
apart from Forest and Range Act, 
deregulation changes, and depens on 
individual arrangements (7) 
Accessibility of the 
Network  
policy arena opens to a 
multitude of new actors (16) 
local initiatives and urban 
environmental groups join the 
regional platform and connect (10) 
Clayoquot Sound case shifts media 
attention of the entire province to 
forest protection and industrial 
exploitation (10) 
Shrinking CFC activities 
(15) 
Environmental groups are frustrated 
about the limited change in the 1990s 
and see no future potential under the 
Liberals (7) 
Public attention for environmental 
conservation has leveled off; 
aboriginal land rights becomes more 
central (7) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.2. Esmeraldas, Ecuador 
Table: Interview Responses on the Causes and Effects of Policy Change in Esmeraldas (number of statements in brackets) 
 Implementation Stage 
 
 
n = 22 
stated by the majority of actors 
(i.e. at least two-third) 
stated by several actors 
(i.e. at least one-third) 
(A) External Events 15-22 statements 8-14 statements 
socio-economic change --- 
deterioration of forest; search for new community income; need for 
more local monetary income (9) 
increasingly intransparent logging practice and commercialization of 
the large companies (8) 
legal change National forest-related Reforms (20) 
INDA land adjudication process (13) 
SGS tertiarized forest control service (14) 
new Ministry of Environment and decentralization (10) 
change in the political context National uprise for indigenous land rights (16) 
Rio Conference and international attention on biodiversity (10) 
indigenous struggle of the Awá in northern Esmeraldas shows 
feasible success (8) 
an immense problem is discrepancy between legal and actual 
conditions in Esmeraldas, especially for rural indigenous people (14) 
new actors and funds Boom of international environmental activities (21) 
international GOs and NGOs press for change through resources on 
national government level (13) 
new CF actors compete over territories and approaches for their 
projects (12) 
international CF actors compensate and replace lacking state 
functions in Esmeraldas (14) 
 
 (B) Policy Learning 
 
 
state forestry coalition Strategic containment and utilization of 
environmental activities (18) 
Endesa Botrosa realized they needed to give in to the MFC-E quickly 
before jeopardizing their contract with Capulí (9) 
very strategic behaviour of Endesa Botrosa (EB)  to receive funds 
and know-how from GTZ without giving up conventional logging 
(14) 
Public Private Partnership of GTZ and EB provides a shining 
example on paper, yet fails to work in practice (10) 
intermediarios on Río Onzole learned quickly how to defend their 
informal commercialization system (8) 
community forestry coalition Diffusion of knowledge and interaction patterns 
(17) 
close cooperation between different levels of actors has brought a 
better understanding of priorities, i.e. environmental vs socio-
economic benefit (7) 
fluctuation of staff between the CF actors is confusing but spreads 
knowledge and contacts among the network (11) 
local community members and regional CF actors learn quickly how 
to cash in on the project, often more motivated than for an actual 
progress on the issue (13) 
(C)  Local Institutional Effects on the 
Forest Communities  
 
institutional capacities for local 
forest-related decision-making 
growing formalization and control of logging and 
timber trade (20) 
community-based logging has started, but lack of education to 
understand forest management plans makes legal forest use difficult 
(14) 
local people are trained as forest technicians or get training in 
agroforestry (13) 
forest zones were established, and people start to use the communal 
areas of the forest and not just the private fincas (8) 
 institutional capacities for local 
benefit distribution --- 
communal bank and administration of funds are trained in both 
communities; investment from micro-credit is encouraged within the 
community (8) 
forest benefit is still too intransparent and based on private or group 
use (9) 
SGS makes forest management plans more expensive (8) 
community-based organization of 
authority 
communities gain local control over their resources 
(19) 
INDA granted official land title in mid-1990s and MFC-E helped to 
solve boundary conflicts with colonos (12) 
internal organization is struggling with young community men or 
young elected leader for strong interest in own benefit (8) 
more people go to the community meetings than before the 
adjudication of land and project activities (8) 
Capulí's concession contract with Endesa Botrosa provides 
promising cooperation with community, but intransparent planning 
and keeps the community disempowered (9) 
(D)  Network Effects                            
in the Policy Community  
 
Hierarchy Levels and Formality network cooperation varies increasingly between formalized and personal (18) 
reliability on informal agreements is a problem (13) 
while the bigger actors enter formal agreements on paper, the 
smaller struggle with legal access and education and continue 
informally (15) 
forest communities have little access or education to consult the 
government authorities (13) 
Accessibility of the Network  policy arena diversified with CF actors and local initiatives (21) 
several smaller projects provide very local but in-depth support for 
forest communities, i.e. legal support, forest-related training (19) 
involvement of CF actors has become intransparent in Esmeraldas 
and difficult to coordinate;  communities are left out or overlap (14) 
3.3. Quintana Roo, Mexico  
Table: Interview Responses on the Causes and Effects of Policy Change in Quintana Roo (number of interview statements in brackets) 
 Implementation Stage Consolidation Stage 
 
 
n = 22  
stated by the majority of actors 
(i.e. at least two-third) 
stated by several actors 
(i.e. at least one-third) 
stated by the majority of actors 
(i.e. at least two-third) 
stated by several actors 
(i.e. at least one-third) 
(A) External Events 15-22 statements 8-14 statements 15-22 statements 8-14 statements 
socio-economic 
change Large-scale forest concession ends (20) 
-- -- heavy commercial competition on 
timber world market (8) 
legal change Forest Law Reform (19) -- Agrarian Reform : Deregulation 
and de facto Privatization (18) 
-- 
change in the 
political context Political interests shift towards more environmental profile (17) 
more environmentally oriented 
individuals in government (11) 
-- -- 
new actors and 
funds Small independent project team established (21) 
Acuerdo México-Alemania 
provides important funds (13) 
PPF project ended (21) 
Increase of environmental 
projects (17) 
environmental project boom in 
Calakmul offers additional funds 
(11) 
(B) Policy Learning     
SFC -- institutional and personal 
resistance against PPF 
implementation and Forest 
Societies (14) 
-- new work groups and liberalized 
forest services encourage new 
activities of SFC towards new 
private forest services (9) 
CFC Shift of focus from 
environmental conservation to 
local forest benefit (16) 
Institutional development of the 
forest societies (22) 
strong personal network 
established between Forest 
Societies and ejidos (12) 
Institutional Refinement of the 
Forest Societies (20) 
Shift of focus from local forest 
benefit to sustainable forest 
management (17) 
growing knowledge and research 
on ecological sustainability (13) 
more cooperation between ejidos, 
forest societies, and 
environmental researchers (11) 
(C)  Local     
Institutional 
Effects on the 
Forest 
Communities 
institutional 
capacities for local 
forest-related 
decision-making 
Impartial Forest Expert Services 
and Training established (21) 
Ejidos establish Permanent Forest 
Areas and improve forest know-
how together with Forest 
Societies (14) 
Environmental goals 
incorporated in forest 
management  (18) 
Forest certification projects, new 
ecological studies and forest 
inventories (13) 
institutional 
capacities for local 
benefit distribution 
Community benefits of logging 
increased and distribution 
system established (21) 
early stages bring conflict over 
benefit distribution within ejido 
(9) 
Privatization of forest activities 
into work groups (17) 
internal family struggles cause 
some imbalance in benefit 
distribution (8) 
community-based 
organization of 
authority 
Community-based logging 
immdiately established after 
end of the concession (19) 
Leadership conflict between ejido 
governance and forest business 
managers (12) 
Conflict of traditional ejido 
governance vs forest enterprise 
needs (20) 
strong internal set of rules 
continues based on internal clan 
structure and informal rules  
(D)  Network 
Effects                          
in the Policy 
Community 
    
Hierarchy Levels 
and Formality 
shortcut of institutional 
hierarchies through 
independent team (17) 
new meso-levels established that 
replace existing authorities and 
circumvent old bribery interests 
(13) 
added levels of organization 
between the ejidos and the state 
(17) 
formal levels of decision-making 
well consolidated (14) 
Accessibility of the 
Network  
diversification of the policy 
network through forest societies 
(18) 
stronger network representation 
of the local base (16) 
strategic leadership of PPF non-
participatory (14) 
forest societies create growing 
base of information access and 
ejido participation (13) 
rising political role of the 
sociedades (16) 
increasing internal organization 
issues in sociedades and with 
ejidos (19) 
increasing accessibility of 
information over state 
administration and internet for 
use by all actors (9) 
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ANNEX 4 POLICY BELIEFS OF THE COALITIONS – INTERVIEW RESPONSES 
The following tables present the summarized policy beliefs of the advocacy coalitions of 
all three case studies.  
The assessment of the policy beliefs is based on the data of all interviewees from each case 
study (listed in Annex 1). The data encompasses the coalition members' own statements, 
and also the triangulation statements from members of the the opposite coalition. This is 
done to reduce a possible distortion of the beliefs due to strategic responses.  
Throughout the analysis, the statements were sorted according to their recurrence into 
three groups:  
• Prevalent statements are those that are identified by at least two-thirds of all 
interview statements because they are confirmed by the majority of interviewees, 
i.e. usually by members of both coalitions. They are presented in the left column of 
the tables below.  
• Those statements that recurred among at least one-third of the interviewees are 
also identified in the grouping, because they reflect the view of at least several 
actors within one coalition. They are presented in the right column of the tables 
below.  
• Those statements that were made by fewer than one-third of the interviewees are 
not addressed in the analysis because their interpretation would depend on the 
interpretation of singular actors, and exceeds the scope of the research. 
Please refer to Annex 6 for a description of the interview process, how the questions were 
asked and grouped into categories. Chapter 3.4. explains the general methodological 
approach that the assessment of the policy beliefs is based on, and chapter 2.3. discusses 
the theoretical framework for the definition and significance of policy beliefs. 
 
 
4.1. British Columbia, Canada  
4.1.1. State Forestry Coalition 
Below listed policy beliefs are the results from the 9 interviewed SF actors, and 10 CF 
actors.  
The presented policy beliefs derived from the interviews are consistent with those found 
in the literature, especially publications and media statements from the immediate actors. 
No major controversies were identified for the issues within the coalitions that would 
indicate important subgroups. For a complete list of the identified members of the 
coalition, please refer to Annex 2. 
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Table: Compiled Interview Data on the Policy Beliefs of the State Forestry Coalition in 
British Columbia, Canada 
 State Forestry Coalition  
 
 
n = 16 
stated by the majority of actors  
(i.e. at least two-third) 
stated by several actors 
 (i.e. at least one-third) 
 11-16 statements 6-10 statements 
1. Deep Core Beliefs  
natural resources for economic use 
and entrepreneurial benefit (12) 
abundance of natural resources 
through territorial expansion (11) 
exploitation and economic profit are 
highly prioritized as opposed to 
biodiversity and old-growth forest 
(9)  
perceived superabundance and 
colonial frontier character of forest 
use (6) 
 
2. Policy Core Beliefs 
centralized governmental authority 
to coordinate exploration and 
resource use and to provide 
planning security for businesses (15) 
province depends on the forest 
resources and needs close authority 
to secure it (7) 
cost-efficiency requires strict 
framework and support from the 
state (6) 
 
 
 
3. Secondary Beliefs: 
Secondary Beliefs related to the local institutional organization of community forestry: 
3.1 forest decision-
making 
Conversion-Liquidation of old 
growth rainforest to more 
productive second growth forest to 
protect economy (14) 
local loss of forest employment 
requires strict changes and 
investment (7) 
local employees need better 
education to adapt to market needs 
(9) 
3.2 benefit 
distribution  
BC forests are 95% on Crown Lands, 
so there is no focus on communal 
rights (12) 
local forest benefit is employment; 
this depends on a stable forest 
economy with competitive large-
scale production (7) 
communal benefit decisions are 
often not best for competitive timber 
market (6) 
 
3.3 organization of   
authority 
Crown Lands Æ no communal 
rights; many indigenous groups 
have no legal basis so far (11) 
pragmatic view: aboriginal land title 
needs to be addressed where it is 
legally acknowledged (8) 
aboriginal and non-aboriginal land 
rights should be similar for forest 
communities (6) 
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Secondary Beliefs related to the structure of the policy network:: 
3.4 hierarchical 
structures and 
formality 
the provincial gov is the legitimate 
authority (15) 
regional sub-administration 
provides a faster approval of logging 
plans (14) 
 
the province needs to protect its top-
down decision-making structures to 
ensure an equal and controllable 
administration (6) 
 
3.5 network 
cooperation and 
information access 
closed efficient network between the 
only legally authorized decision-
makers: provincial gov and industry 
(13) 
Change in Phase II: participation of 
communities facilitates planning 
process and avoids resistance and 
delay of planning; public 
information reduces environmental 
concern and resistance (15) 
Change in Stage III: aboriginal 
rights need to be addressed and 
require community consultation to 
avoid costs and delay of operations 
(11) 
media campaigns and public 
initiatives can distort the policy 
issues and can do harm to the policy 
field (7) 
 
4.1.2. Community Forestry Coalition 
As described above, the policy beliefs are based on the data of the 16 interviews. Below 
listed policy beliefs are the results from the 9 interviewed SF actors, and 10 CF actors. The 
left column below (with at least 11 statements) thus reflects policy beliefs of the SFC that 
are confirmed by members of both coalitions. Again, the presented policy beliefs derived 
from the interviews are consistent with those found in the literature, and reflect a very 
transparent access among all actors.  
No major controversies were identified for the issues within the coalitions that would 
indicate important subgroups. For a complete list of the identified members of the 
coalition, please refer to Annex 2. Please note that three actors were represented by 
individuals who had overlapping positions across the actors. Annex 1 presents a detailed 
list of the interviewees and their positions.  
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Table: Compiled Interview Data on the Policy Beliefs of the Community Forestry 
Coalition in British Columbia, Canada 
  
Communnity Forestry Coalition 
 
 
 
 
stated by the majority of actors 
(i.e. at least two-third) 
stated by several actors 
(i.e. at least one-third) 
n = 16 
 
11-16 statements 6-10 statements 
1. Deep Core Beliefs  
ethic responsibility to spare and 
protect wilderness (14) 
humans are intruders if they exploit 
for economic profit (14) 
aesthetic value of nature; beauty of 
wilderness; pristine nature (8) 
spiritual value of nature and human 
role as part of it (6) 
2. Policy Core Beliefs 
decentralized local authority to 
secure long-term interests in 
sustainability and local employment 
(13) 
democratic civil rights movement to 
regain local control over resources 
(6) 
 
 
3. Secondary Beliefs: 
 
 
Secondary Beliefs related to the local institutional organization of community forestry: 
3.1 forest decision-
making 
protection of old growth rainforest 
to preserve pristine wilderness (12) 
Change in Phase II: … and to 
preserve biodiversity (13) 
 
community forestry is part of a 
bigger community development 
approach to struggle against rural 
unemployment (9) 
3.2 benefit 
distribution  
local benefit secondary to nature 
conservation (14) 
Change in Phase II: local benefit of 
forest use for environmental 
protection as well as for economic 
stability of communities (13) 
sustainable resource use as a means 
to protect nature; actual resource use 
secondary for urban E movement (6) 
3.3 organization of    
authority 
local authority more for nature 
conservation than for exploitation 
(15) 
Change in Phase II: vitally 
important as an element of 
community development and 
environmental justice (11) 
traditional authority is important to 
strengthen the local governance and 
identity (8) 
 
 
Secondary Beliefs related to the structure of the policy network:: 
3.4 hierarchical 
structures and 
formality 
 
local initiatives complements 
transparent administration (15) 
Change in Phase II: democratic 
participation rights of the public  
require a pluralist participation 
through diversified policy 
communities and strong local 
representation and rights (11) 
 
bottom-top participation of the 
public as a social responsibility, 
depending on each field of interest 
(6) 
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3.5 network 
cooperation and 
information access 
cooperation across local initiatives 
(16) 
Change in Phase II: strategic 
grassroot activism with more 
institutionalized action across the 
environmental groups (12) 
 
issue-oriented cooperation from one 
local group to the next (7) 
 
4.2. Esmeraldas, Ecuador 
4.2.1. State Forestry Coalition (SFC) 
The analysis of the policy beliefs is based on 22 interviews conducted across the policy 
network. The data acknowledges the coalition members' own statements as well as the 
triangulation statements from non-coalition members. This is done to reduce a possible 
distortion of the analysis due to strategic responses1.  
Below listed policy beliefs are the results from the interviewed SF actors, CF actors, and 
other non-coalition2 voices within the network. The left column below reflects policy 
beliefs of the SFC that are confirmed by members of both coalitions (with at least 15 
statements). The right column shows other statements that have been made by only 8-14 
interviewees, and may reflect more polarized positions of smaller groups.   
The presented policy beliefs derived from the interviews are consistent with those found 
in the literature, especially publications and media statements from the immediate actors. 
No major controversies were identified for the issues within the coalitions3 that would 
indicate important subgroups. The most palpable constraint to consistent policy beliefs 
was an immense fluctuation of staff among the actors due to short-term employment. 
However, the data pool across the network suggested a rather consistent picture of policy 
beliefs for each coalition. 
 
 
                                                     
1 For the detailed procedure of the semi-structured interviews and the triangulation approach, please refer to chapter 4.3. 
2 For a detailed list of the non-coalition voices, please refer to Annex 2 section 2.1.1. 
3 For a complete list of the identified members of the coalition, please refer to Annex 2 section 2.1.2. 
 268
Table: Policy Beliefs of the State Forestry Coalition in Esmeraldas, Ecuador 
  
State Forestry Coalition  
 
 
 
n = 22 
stated by the majority of actors  
(i.e. at least two-third) 
stated by several actors 
 (i.e. at least one-third) 
 15-22 statements 8-14 statements 
1. Deep Core Beliefs  
human dominion over nature; forest 
represents natural resource for 
economic use and entrepreneurial 
benefit (18) 
 
--- 
2. Policy Core Beliefs 
state-based: the government is the 
legitimate authority (16) 
private enterprises are needed for 
revenues and are thus central to the 
forest-related authority of a state; 
both need each other (14) 
 
 
3. Secondary Beliefs: 
 
Secondary Beliefs related to the local institutional organization of community forestry: 
3.1 forest decision-
making 
 
large-scale logging in valuable old-
growth areas is most cost-efficient; 
high price competition requires 
strategic relocation and expansion 
(20) 
abundance of old-growth areas and 
their high value make new 
plantations unnecessary as yet (11) 
3.2 benefit 
distribution  
private enterprise-driven forest use 
and benefit; monetary income (16) 
benefit should belong to the 
strongest; economic competition (12) 
no interest in local benefit beyond 
concession agreements (10) 
 
3.3 organization of    
authority 
the state is the legitimate owner of 
all lands unless private property is 
granted within legal recognition (16) 
traditional authority system is 
uncapable partner for logging, and 
inefficient with its own decision-
making (12) 
 
 
Secondary Beliefs related to the structure of the policy network:: 
3.4 hierarchical 
structures and 
formality 
centralist top-down structures (20)  
where state fails to enforce rules, 
there is no collective self-regulation 
but entrepreneurial exploitation of 
the business options (17) 
state has no resources/interest to be 
present in Esmeraldas; thus 
'decentralization' is irrelevant (14) 
tertiarized forest control services 
make forest industry less 
competitive for higher prices (13) 
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communities lack resources and 
knowledge for competitive and 
efficient decisions on forest use (8) 
lack of state enforcement protects 
current logging operations in 
Esmeraldas (10) 
3.5 network 
cooperation and 
information access 
maintain closed network for 
majority of operations, but open to 
EnvAC for information exchange 
and joint activities where cost-
reduction or marketing value are 
increased (20) 
lack of education and resources 
make information access difficult 
across the network, and nearly rules 
out public involvement (14) 
network needs to be efficient and 
thus focuses on those who are 
capable and knowledgeable (13) 
intransparent one-on-one interaction 
make logging operations less 
vulnerable to legal and marketing 
constraints (8) 
 
 
4.2.2. Community Forestry Coalition 
As explained above for the state forestry coalition, the analysis of the policy beliefs is 
based on 22 interviews conducted across the policy network. The CF coalition is mostly 
based on an environmental motivation which regards community forestry as a vehicle to 
strengthen the local interest in the forest. The local interviewees show a stronger 
orientation towards the socio-economic benefit of the forest communities than the 
transregional actors who stress environmental goals. Both conclude environmental 
sustainability as their main goal.  
Fluctuation of staff among the CF actors was a constraint to determining the policy beliefs 
of individual actors. However, the responses across the entire network suggested a 
relatively consistent picture of policy beliefs for the coalition. 
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Table: Policy Beliefs of the State Forestry Coalition in Esmeraldas, Ecuador 
  
Community Forestry Coalition  
 
 
 
n = 45 
stated by the majority of actors 
(i.e. at least two-third) 
stated by several actors 
(i.e. at least one-third) 
 15-22 statements 8-14 statements 
1. Deep Core Beliefs  
 
 
human benefits from rich values of 
nature; forest represents ecological 
value for biodiversity and as a 
carbon sink (16) 
 
global responsibility to protect 
Chocó region for its distinct 
environmental features (8) 
2. Policy Core Beliefs 
people-based: the local people are 
the day-to-day decision-makers and 
the state provides the rules (18) 
environmental protection cannot 
work without support of the local 
people; education is key (14) 
economic development should not 
transform indigenous community, 
but only reduce rural poverty (13) 
 
 
3. Secondary Beliefs: 
 
Secondary Beliefs related to the local institutional organization of community forestry: 
3.1 forest decision-
making 
ecological protection of the 
rainforest (18) 
Change in Phase II: sustainable 
forest use for long-term security of 
the local resource base (19) 
environmental protection is key in 
new education programs for 
communities (14) 
economic development should 
remain slow enough not to overrun 
the environmental goals (13) 
agroforestry used to release pressure 
on forest but maintain livelihood 
within the forest (9) 
 
3.2 benefit 
distribution  
local small-scale forest use and 
benefit; livelihood income (15) 
collective benefit needs to become 
stronger to motivate collective action 
(8) 
private fincas are important sources 
of income and need to continue (10) 
forest employment is less important 
than livelihood income and small-
scale logging in the community (9) 
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3.3 organization of    
authority 
indigenous groups have ancestral 
rights to their lands, but need to 
ensure that their forest use would 
not harm the ecosystem  to claim 
land ownership (18) 
traditional authority structures need 
to be built upon and be modified to 
make them capable of forest 
management (14) 
indigenous land title is an 
instrument to fight against timber 
companies on a new legal level (8) 
 
 
Secondary Beliefs related to the structure of the policy network:: 
3.4 hierarchical 
structures and 
formality 
the government is responsible to 
provide regulations to secure 
conservation and sustainable benefit 
(20) 
where the state fails to enforce rules, 
there should be collective regulation 
(19)  
 
decentralization is key in the long 
run, but falls into corrupt regional 
networks these years (8) 
communities need to become strong 
forest managers as their only chance 
against timber industry and lack of 
state intervention (10) 
 
3.5 network 
cooperation and 
information access 
as much as possible to optimize 
collective regulation mechanisms 
(18) 
as much information exchange as 
possible to strengthen knowledge in 
the region (17) 
 
immense lack of education and 
resources to access information 
needs to be overcome (12) 
 
4.3. Quintana Roo, Mexico 
4.3.1. State-directed and Private Forestry Coalition (SFC) 
As for the previous case studies above, the policy beliefs are determined on the basis of 22 
interviews (listed in Annex 1) across the coalitions4.  
The presented policy beliefs derived from the interviews are consistent with those found 
in the literature, especially publications and media statements from the immediate actors. 
No major controversies were identified for the issues within the coalitions that would 
indicate important subgroups. For a complete list of the identified members of the 
coalition, please refer to Annex 2. 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
4 For the interview data analysis, please refer to Annex section 4.1.1 above and the methodological chapter 4.3 and 4.4. 
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Table: Policy Beliefs of the State Forestry Coalition in Quintana Roo and Calakmul 
  
State-directed and Private Forestry Coalition  
 
 
 
n = 22 
stated by the majority of actors  
(i.e. at least two-third) 
stated by several actors 
 (i.e. at least one-third) 
 15-22 statements 8-14 statements 
1. Deep Core Beliefs  
human dominion over nature; forest 
represents natural resource for the 
benefit of the legal owner (15) 
--- 
2. Policy Core Beliefs 
state-based: the government is the 
overarching authority to regulate 
forest use (19) 
socio-economic stability of the 
people is most important goal (12) 
Network cooperation and 
desirability of participation by 
various segments of society: public 
vs elite, experts vs elected officials 
 
3. Secondary Beliefs: 
 
Secondary Beliefs related to the local institutional organization of community forestry: 
3.1 forest decision-
making  logging needs to be cost-efficient (22) 
management criteria need to address 
current problems and timber prices 
(10) 
3.2 benefit 
distribution  
private enterprise-driven forest use 
and benefit; monetary income (21) 
forest use is more efficient and more 
motivated for private users than for 
collective logging operations (14) 
forest employment needs to be based 
on expertise and know-how to be 
efficient (13) 
3.3 organization of    
authority 
communal decision-making can 
limit the capacities of communities 
to deal with forest management (20) 
collective logging operations 
provide too little motivation and 
accountability for the people (12) 
traditional ejido leaders are in-
adequate for competitive and expert 
decision-making in forestry (14) 
 
Secondary Beliefs related to the structure of the policy network:: 
3.4 hierarchical 
structures and 
formality 
state-based top-down structures for 
efficient administration from the 
state (19) 
forest use needs to be well regulated 
by the state to provide long-term 
planning security for private forest 
users (9) 
communities need to be supported 
by forest administration through 
expert advice and subsidy programs 
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3.5 network 
cooperation and 
information access 
closed network of the stakeholders is 
the most efficient (17) 
private forest user groups build their 
own networks for commercialization 
and expert support (8) 
forest service providers represent an 
important network hub between 
state administration and local level 
(11) 
 
4.3.2. Community Forestry Coalition (CFC) 
As in the previous sections, the policy beliefs are based on the 22 interviews across the 
coalitions. The two significant changes of policy beliefs are marked in bold; please refer to 
sections 7.3.2 and 7.4.2 for a detailed analysis. The coalitions are listed in detail in Annex 
2. 
Table: Policy Beliefs of the State Forestry Coalition in Quintana Roo and Calakmul 
  
Commercial Forestry Coalition  
 
 
 
n = 22 
stated by the majority of actors  
(i.e. at least two-third) 
stated by several actors 
 (i.e. at least one-third) 
 15-22 statements 8-14 statements 
1. Deep Core Beliefs  humans are part of nature; forests 
have a rich value for ecological 
balance and for the livelihood of 
humans (15) 
--- 
2. Policy Core Beliefs 
people-based: the local people are 
the day-to-day decision-makers and 
need to be directed by a higher level 
of authority (16) 
local forest benefit is key to motivate 
sustainable forest use (13) 
quality of day-to-day decision-
making needs to be ensured by 
experts (9) 
 
3. Secondary Beliefs: 
 
Secondary Beliefs related to the local institutional organization of community forestry: 
3.1 forest decision-
making 
Change of policy beliefs in Stage II: 
local forest benefit is essential (20) 
Change of policy beliefs in Stage 
III: but requires long-term 
sustainability of the forest 
resources (17) 
 
Change of policy beliefs in Stage II: 
local economic returns are most 
important criteria in the short run 
(10) 
3.2 benefit 
distribution  
local people should receive benefit  
because it is their ejido right (19) 
local people should receive benefit 
because local forest benefit is 
essential to motivate long-term 
ejidos need collective income to form 
a basis for their communal land 
structure (8) 
private income is an important 
alternative where collective use is 
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forest protection (12) too conflictive (10) 
forest employment should be 
organized within the communities 
(9) 
3.3 organization of    
authority 
indigenous groups have resource 
rights as ejido members; ejidos make 
them local decision-makers and thus 
key (18) 
traditional authority does not 
provide expert knowledge or 
capacities for forest management 
(14) 
 
Secondary Beliefs related to the structure of the policy network:: 
3.4 hierarchical 
structures and 
formality 
people-based forest use with strong 
institutional support to ensure 
sound decision-making (16) 
 
top-down directed expert support 
for the ejidos (8) 
strong local organization is 
necessary to stabilize the ejido in its 
rights and collective land use (10) 
3.5 network 
cooperation and 
information access 
small efficient circle of experts; 
ejidos need good exchange of 
information with top levels to make 
both sides work (17) 
 
tight networks of close personal 
contacts are most efficient (14) 
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Annex 5 Interview Questions 
 
The semi-structured design of the interviews followed a pre-determined set of core 
questions (listed below) which were embedded in a flexible structure: 
• The questions were asked in an interactive format which allowed the 
interviewer to verify and categorize responses1. This helped to create a 
systematic structure for each policy process, and the comparison across several 
case studies. 
• The formulation of the questions was adjusted according to the professional or 
informal background of the interviewees, in order to establish a setting in which 
they feel comfortable to open up. This was necessary because the interviewees 
ranged from high-ranking institutional representatives with excellent academic 
training to local forest users without any formal education. 
• Furthermore, the questions were asked in a flexible order which allowed to follow 
the interviewees' line of thought, discuss identified issues in detail, and to avoid 
an atmosphere of offensive questioning which could have generated a reluctant 
attitude among the informants2.  
 
In general, the order of the interview questions was structured as follows: 
 
Contact questions open the conversation, invite interest and create a level of 
trust 
Process-related questions core part of the interview; see list of questions below 
Grounded questions interactive cross-examining of the given answers to structure 
them into categories 
Personal questions determine the persons's professional background and beliefs; 
to be asked near the end of the interview to avoid an 
offensive impression 
Closing questions  finalizing aspects to end the interview on a positive note 
 
Most responses were surrounded by an in-depth discussion of the details, which provided the 
necessary context to the described issues during the interview and helped clarify the 
position of the interviewee3. This also allowed more room for the interviewee’s subjective 
perspective, which also reflects the actor-based approach of the ACF.  
 
 
                                                     
1 grounded research; see chapter 2.4 
2 given the political and social sensitivity of several issues such as project success and funding, local cooperation, 
personal conflicts, and corruption 
3 detailed methodological procedure of the interviews and the data collection in general see chapter 4.3. 
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The core questions that were addressed in every interview are as follows: 
 
1. Coalitions 
1.1. What is your position on the current community forestry process? What 'coalition' do you 
belong to, if you feel you do? 
1.2. Who else belongs to your coalition that supports community forestry / state-based private 
forestry? 
1.3. Who belongs to the other coalition; who has a differing opinion about your policy goals?  
1.4. Were there any other 'coalitions' or individual key actors important in the past? 
 
2. Policy beliefs 
2.1. What positions do you and your coalition have with regard to 
2.1.1. … (list all policy beliefs) 
2.2. What positions do the actors of the other coalition have with regard to 
2.2.1. … (list all policy beliefs) 
 
3. Changes of beliefs 
3.1. What changed in your own position and that of your coalition during the past years of the 
policy process? 
3.2. What changed in the other coalition's positions during the past years of the policy process?  
 
4. Policy learning 
4.1. When did you feel you and your coalition learned something important that shifted your 
views of community forestry, that improved your position in the policy network, or that 
contributed something new to your position? how did this happen? what impact did it have 
on the process? 
4.2. When did you feel this happened to the other coalition? how did this happen? what impact 
did it have on the process? 
 
5. External events 
5.1. What do you regard as important events that had an influence on the forest policy process, 
when was it and what happened? (give examples: legal reforms, political shift of power, 
socio-economic changes, new actors and funds) 
5.2. What impact did these events have on the policy network? 
5.3. What impact did these events have on the local communities? 
 
6. Local institutional effects 
6.1. What were the key effects that the policy changes had on the local communities? (list 
categories: forest management, benefit distribution, local authority) 
7. Network effects 
7.1. What were the key effects that the policy changes had on the policy network? (list 
categories: hierarchy levels and formality, accessibility of the network) 
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Annex 6 Interview Process 
 
The interviews were conducted based on the question catalogue listed in Annex 5. Between 
the key questions (process-related questions), open discussions were used to gain more 
detailed information on the issues. 
The responses were recorded in protocols or notes, which included the statements on the 
key questions as well as additional issues and details that the interviewees described as 
important. The responses were put down in keyword notes, which were based on the 
specific terms the interviewee used. Where necessary, the interviewer rephrased the 
question or asked back in a summarizing statement to clarify a response (grounded 
questions; interactive cross-examining). 
The statements were then grouped into categorized responses. This process was mostly 
done after the interviews when grouping all responses into similar statements (based on 
keywords). As the interviews proceeded within the case study, the categories started to 
shape and were sometimes tested on the later interviewees when summarizing a statement. 
Some interviewees addressed issues of the policy process before the specific question was 
asked, for example when explaining the development over a larger period of time (i.e. 
across different policy stages) or when identifying further causes and effects of the process 
(i.e. moving from one indicator aspect to the next). In those cases, the responses were used 
where the context was clear. Where the responses touched upon several issues at the same 
time and mixed them, the interviewee was asked for clarification of the point between 
different indicators. 
The following table presents an interview in detail to explain the questioning process and 
how the responses were transcribed into the data set. Since the interviewees were granted 
confidentiality, not all interview responses can be made publicly accessible in detail1. The 
responses would reveal their identity among fellow actors, even if the interviews remain 
officially anonymous. The presented example can be used because it is one of a number of 
interviews with similar responses and the same background, thus not revealing the 
individual behind the responses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
1 Due to the political sensitivity of several aspects, the interviewees were granted confidentiality for their individual 
statements to ensure a better responsiveness. For the same reason, the responses were noted on paper rather than through 
recordings. The interviewees would have been more reluctant to speak out their mind on policy beliefs, their critical 
position towards fellow actors, or personal linkages and conflicts. See chapter 2.3. 
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Interviewee: Representative of an environmental NGO in British Columbia;  
Background of interviewee: Professional training in forest management and law, over a decade of 
experience in the field 
Time and Location: June 2005 in British Columbia, Canada 
Question of the Interviewer Response of the Interviewee Use of responses             for data record 
Introductory statements: 
Title and purpose of the study, 
affiliations of the researcher, 
approximate time required for 
interview 
 -- 
Contact questions: 
Information on position of the 
individual and time at job 
 (noted for data record, see Annex 1) 
Process-related questions:   
1.1 What is your position on the 
current community forestry 
process?  
What 'coalition' do you belong to, 
if you feel you do? 
 
We built a strong community 
forestry network since the late 
1980s 
Need change in BC forestry 
before it’s too late; still 
outrageous compared to 
opportunities we had 
identified as member of 
community forestry coalition 
(CFC) 
2.1 What positions do you and 
your coalition have with regard to 
 
Community forestry is key 
solution to BC; allows the 
communities to protect their forest 
and forest employment in the long 
run 
(2) Policy core belief – Community 
Forestry Coalition 
decentralized local authority to 
secure long-term interests in 
sustainability and local 
employment  
 They are best advocates for local 
conditions, know local problems 
better than MoF (Ministry of 
Forests) experts, can control MoF 
decisions if informed 
(3.4) Secondary belief – hierarchical 
structures and formality - Community 
Forestry Coalition 
local initiatives complements 
transparent administration  
1.2 Who else belongs to your 
coalition that supports community 
forestry / state-based private 
forestry? 
  
 
• British Columbia Community 
Forest Association BCCFA 
• Dogwood Initiative 
• Greenpeace  
• Friends of Clayoquot Sound 
• POLIS Institute for Ecological 
Governance  
• Sierra Club of Canada – BC 
Chapter 
• West Coast Environmental Law 
• Gowgaia Institute  
• CFAC Community Forest 
Advisory Committee  
• Western Canada Wilderness 
Committee 
Used for Annex 2 
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1.3 Who belongs to the other 
coalition; who is working to 
maintain the current structures in 
BC forestry?  
 
• BC Ministry of Forestry and 
district offices 
• Weyerhaeuser 
• West Fraser Timber 
• Husby Timber 
• Forest Alliance BC  
Used for Annex 2 
2.2 What positions do the actors 
of the other coalition have with 
regard to 
 
Money;  
first come first serve; ambitious to 
cut as much as possible; 
leave clearcut and move on  
while community is left behind 
  
 
(1) Deep core belief – State Forestry 
Coalition 
natural resources for economic 
use and entrepreneurial benefit  
(1) Deep core belief – State Forestry 
Coalition 
perceived superabundance and 
colonial frontier character of 
forest use 
abundance of natural resources 
through territorial expansion 
1.4 Were there any other 
'coalitions' or individual key 
actors important in the past? 
 
Different groups on various levels 
from local to all of BC; most lined 
up with one or the other; most 
polarized in the 1990s 
 
(cross-examination about 
identified coalitions) 
 
4.2 When did you feel the other 
(i.e. state forest) coalition learned 
something important that shifted 
their views of community forestry, 
that improved their position in the 
policy network, or that 
contributed something new to 
their position?  
huge change after Clayoquot 
Sound among industry; 
international boycotts and 
negative image 
MacMillan Bloedel pressed for 
reform of stumpage-based revenue 
system to protect their name 
whole list of new voluntary 
environmental standards and 
public campaigns for PR to save 
markets and image 
 
 
(detailed facts used in text for  
analysis chapters) 
How did this happen? What was 
their intention and the impact? 
Tactical move to please public, 
strategy to get around deeper 
structural criticism 
(B) Policy learning- Implementation Stage  
Strategic Accommodation of 
Environmental Criticism 
 
 Growing new concerns among industry on aboriginal 
consultation after Delgamuukw 
decision, Nisga’a and TFL 39;  
 
adjusted their local planning 
where legally obliged by 
provincial gov (government), 
otherwise not – ‘why should 
they?’ 
(A) External event-Implementation Stage 
1997 Delgamuukw case  
(A) External event-Implementation Stage 
aboriginal title cases 
(3.3) Secondary belief – organization of 
authority - State Forestry Coalition 
pragmatic view: aboriginal land 
title needs to be addressed where 
it is legally acknowledged 
(3.2) Secondary belief – benefit 
distribution - State Forestry Coalition 
BC forests are 95% on Crown 
Lands, so there is no focus on 
communal rights 
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(3.4) Secondary belief – hierarchical 
structures and formality - State Forestry 
Coalition 
the provincial government is the 
legitimate authority 
 ‘just go ahead’; new plantations 
more productive; coastal old-
growth valuable but less gain per 
year 
(3.1) Secondary belief – forest decision-
making - State Forestry Coalition 
Conversion-Liquidation of old 
growth rainforest to more 
productive second growth forest 
to protect economy  
5.1 What do you regard as 
important events that had an 
influence on the forest policy 
process, when was it and what 
happened? (give examples: legal 
reforms, political shift of power, 
socio-economic changes, new 
actors and funds) 
Huge shift in province, opened 
opportunities for new faces in BC 
Social Credit Party protected 
forestry; closed discourse 
(A) External event-Implementation Stage 
change of BC government to NDP 
in 1991  
 Forests are degraded and 
disappearing, communities left 
with nothing 
Firms don’t give back to locals 
Increasing employment from 
outside communities, forest 
technicians flown in from other 
cities 
(A) External event-Implementation Stage 
declining local benefit from the 
forest  
(C) Local institutional effects – 
Implementation Stage 
shrinking forest-related 
employment and local returns 
cause marginalized position 
 People increasingly replaced by 
machines, larger logging 
equipment, rationalization 
Smaller firms replaced/bought by 
bigger corporations 
Race of takeovers, e.g. MacMillan 
Bloedel to Weyerhaeuser to 
Brascan 
(A) External event-Implementation Stage 
shift towards large-scale forest 
corporations  
 Small circle of insiders between 
large corporations and gov, used 
to keep information minimal;  
faster, more reliable, avoids 
criticism from public 
(3.5) Secondary belief – network 
cooperation and information access - State 
Forestry Coalition 
closed efficient network between 
the only legally authorized 
decision-makers: provincial gov 
and industry  
(2) Policy core belief – State Forestry 
Coalition 
centralized governmental 
authority to coordinate exploration 
and resource use and to provide 
planning security for businesses 
 
 
 
 
 
Outrageous that developed 
country has so little legislation to 
protect its natural heritage; should 
be much better; spectacular nature 
here 
(3.1) Secondary belief – forest decision-
making - Community Forestry Coalition 
protection of old growth rainforest 
to preserve pristine wilderness  
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responsible to protect for our 
children; came here 100 years ago 
and exploited it; look at it now; 
urban sprawl 
Would you say that is part of the 
core belief or motivation that 
drives your coalition? 
 
agrees (1) Deep core belief – Community Forestry 
Coalition 
ethic responsibility to spare and 
protect wilderness 
What is more important to the 
coalition, environmental 
protection or the local 
communities- employment, income 
security? 
Both belong together 
But views changed from 
conservation to community 
forestry / from small groups to 
general economic criticism in all 
of BC 
(3.2) Secondary belief – benefit 
distribution - Community Forestry 
Coalition 
Change in Phase II: local benefit 
of forest use for environmental 
protection as well as for economic 
stability of communities 
What happened; how did this 
start? 
Clayoquot Sound biggest event of 
a whole movement;  
Greenpeace, David Suzuki, 
grassroot uprise feel, everyone 
involved and watching – locally to 
internationally 
(A) External event-Implementation Stage 
Environmental movement  
(D) Network effects – Implementation 
Stage 
Clayoquot Sound case shifts 
media attention of the entire 
province to forest protection and 
industrial exploitation 
 Biggest event of civil 
disobedience in Canadian history;  
everyone from retired people to 
students, ordinary people arrested 
(A) External event-Implementation Stage 
International Rainforest Initiative 
in Clayoquot Sound   
 Clayoquot Sound: majestic, 
immoral to cut these trees; 
couldn’t let this happen;  
have to take care of our natural 
heritage, all of BC and 
communities locally 
grassroot feel started 
Really important and urgent Æ \ 
don’t need extra dollar when last 
tree is cut 
(1) Deep core belief – Community Forestry 
Coalition 
aesthetic value of nature; beauty 
of wilderness; pristine nature 
(3.3) Secondary belief – organization of 
authority - Community Forestry Coalition 
local authority more for nature 
conservation than for exploitation 
(3.2) Secondary belief – benefit 
distribution - Community Forestry 
Coalition 
local benefit secondary to nature 
conservation 
4.1 When did you feel you and 
your coalition learned something 
important that shifted your views 
of community forestry, that 
improved your position in the 
policy network, or that 
contributed something new to 
your position? how did this 
happen? what impact did it have 
on the process? 
Env groups got more donations, 
employed professionals 
(biologists, lawyers,..) Æ different 
resources and strategies 
Better linked to Greenpeace Int. 
after Clayoquot Sound, int. 
interest and support  
(B) Policy learning- Community Forestry 
Coalition - Implementation Stage  
Professionalization and 
Internationalization  
 People got emotionally involved; 
large campaigns with pictures of 
clearcuts; 
(B) Policy learning- Community Forestry 
Coalition - Implementation Stage  
Strategic campaigns towards 
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old-growth logging had ‘arrived in 
their own backyards’, now 
targeted to gain political voice 
urban groups  
3.1 What changed in your own 
position and that of your coalition 
during the past years of the policy 
process? 
 
No solution to put a fence around 
the forest, but create local interest 
to protect it 
People were losing jobs; ripoff; 
forests are backbone of BC 
(3.2) Secondary belief – benefit 
distribution - Community Forestry 
Coalition 
Change in Phase II: local benefit 
of forest use for environmental 
protection as well as for economic 
stability of communities  
5.1 What do you regard as 
important events that had an 
influence on the forest policy 
process, when was it and what 
happened? (give examples: legal 
reforms, political shift of power, 
socio-economic changes, new 
actors and funds) 
 
Big setback; instantly clear that 
window of opportunity was over; 
Old forest lobby back in place; 
ENGOs and communities 
withdrew; less resources and 
momentum; knew that they 
couldn’t achieve much more than 
under NDP 
(A) External events – Consolidation Stage 
change of BC government to 
Liberals in 2001  
(D) Network effects – Consolidation Stage  
Environmental groups are 
frustrated about the limited 
change in the 1990s and see no 
future potential under the Liberals 
(D) Network effects – Consolidation Stage  
Shrinking CFC activities 
 Haida Gwaii title case, 
Delgamuukw, TFL 39 and logging 
blockades great coverage  
Æ public pressure on 
Weyerhaeuser/Brascan,  
AND insecure planning - 
compensation payments, TFL/FL 
rights 
(A) External events – Consolidation Stage 
individual court cases of 
aboriginal land title with high 
media profile 
 
 
 Better organized, stronger voice, 
professionals employed  
Æ big potential impact on forest 
industry,  
couldn’t ignore it any longer 
(A) External events – Consolidation Stage 
Aboriginal rights movement  
(B) Policy learning- Community Forestry 
Coalition - Consolidation Stage 
Sophistication of Aboriginal 
Rights Groups 
4.2 When did you feel this 
happened to the other coalition? 
how did this happen? what impact 
did it have on the process? 
 
Voluntary community meetings, 
but without real voice Æ PR 
announcements and more local 
exchange, but also to get around 
legal action 
(B) Policy learning- State Forestry 
Coalition - Consolidation Stage 
gradual adaptation to address 
more community issues and 
prevent local opposition to 
logging  
5.3 What impact did these events 
have on the local communities? 
6.1 What were the key effects that 
the policy changes had on the 
local communities? (list 
categories: forest management, 
benefit distribution, local 
authority) 
aboriginals strong interest in land 
resources,  
NGOs direct support in 
communities,  
Haida logging blockades great 
instrument since Lynn Island 
Protests,  
Bamfield initiative,  
GIS mapping for land claims and 
traditional knowledge 
(C) Local institutional effects – 
Implementation Stage 
local grassroot groups formed to 
oppose industrial logging  
(C) Local institutional effects – 
Implementation Stage 
local groups improve their 
knowledge on logging techniques, 
forest ecology, GIS, forest policy 
and administration 
(3.5) Secondary belief – network 
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Very important to connect 
resources in this struggle though 
ENGOs, but also among 
communities for problems in the 
area 
cooperation and information access - 
Community Forestry Coalition 
cooperation across local initiatives 
(3.5) Secondary belief – network 
cooperation and information access - 
Community Forestry Coalition 
issue-oriented cooperation from 
one local group to the next 
3.2 What changed in the other 
coalition's positions during the 
past years of the policy process?  
Logging companies responded to 
communities that were now better 
prepared; pushed by provincial 
gov to cooperate closer; called for 
by general public 
Æ realized it had become easier to 
work with communities rather 
than against them 
Trend positive but insufficient 
(3.5) Secondary belief – network 
cooperation and information access - State 
Forestry Coalition 
Change in Phase II: participation 
of communities facilitates 
planning process and avoids 
resistance and delay of planning; 
public information reduces 
environmental concern and 
resistance 
 Lynn Island Protests Æ protected 
areas given by BC gov; trend 
continued 
No structural changes, more local 
give-ins where gov was pressed 
for change 
(C) Local institutional effects – 
Implementation Stage 
individual negotiation options of 
communities with government  
6.1 What were the key effects that 
the policy changes had on the 
local communities? (list 
categories: forest management, 
benefit distribution, local 
authority) 
 
Instead of changing structures, BC 
gov often offered protected area 
and money to buy out of pressure 
for change 
(C) Local institutional effects – 
Implementation Stage 
protected areas and funds assigned 
to communities to mitigate 
logging effects  
 Deregulation process – cost 
reduction in gov, shift to industry 
Gov = landowner for BC people; 
should be responsible for 
decision-making, not leave it to 
industry 
MoF big layoff and fear among 
employees, especially pro-
environment ones; ‘selective 
firing’ observed 
Defensive years 
(D) Network effects – Consolidation Stage  
Deregulation process  
(C) Local institutional effects – 
Consolidation Stage 
Authority and accountability shift 
from gov to industry  
(D) Network effects – Consolidation Stage  
Ministry of Forests reduces its 
costs of personnel and 
administrative tasks 
 CFPP case-based decisions by 
MoF Æ Depends on community 
skills whether they get it or not 
(C) Local institutional effects – 
Consolidation Stage 
local benefit now depends more 
on individual arrangements with 
the provincial government  
 Haida weakened themselves over 
who gets bigger piece; big 
question what happens after title 
case decision? 
Communities all try to get forest 
technicians, but funds for good 
(C) Local institutional effects – 
Consolidation Stage 
internal traditional authority 
struggles; conflict with modern 
requirements of forest 
management  
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professionals are problem 
 CFPP turned into CFAs but 
strictly MoF-controlled, not 
standard process;  
New: by MoF invitation only 
(C) Local institutional effects – 
Consolidation Stage 
community forestry program 
expanded but restricted  
 Since structural change failed, 
now more pragmatic focus on 
management success of individual 
communities  
 
7.1 What were the key effects that 
the policy changes had on the 
policy network? (list categories: 
hierarchy levels and formality, 
accessibility of the network) 
 
NDP didn’t touch on MoF 
structures or legislation, didn’t 
change gov role or revenue system 
 
(D) Network effects – Implementation 
Stage 
Formal framework of decision-
making not reshaped  
 Rural areas concerned about loss 
of forest employment Æ NDP 
feared to lose them  
Forest revenues and lobby support 
too strong to reject 
(D) Network effects – Implementation 
Stage 
Forest policy only one pressuring 
issue after election, and NDP 
afraid to lose support from 
industrial forest sector  
 Lots of people became involved, 
new ENGOs created, more 
researchers, more communities 
involved in policy discussions 
Under NDP different climate, 
much more open to get informed 
and involved 
(D) Network effects – Implementation 
Stage 
policy arena opens to a multitude 
of new actors  
 Grassroot initiatives connected 
over key individuals and ENGOs 
for support and coordination 
(D) Network effects – Implementation 
Stage 
local initiatives and urban 
environmental groups join the 
regional platform and connect  
 Today more small projects on 
CFAs and mostly aboriginal 
rights; see what happens on Haida 
Gwaii 
 
Personal questions: 
interviewee’s professional career 
and past experience in BC, 
personal impression of further 
development 
  
Used for interview lists and 
record, see Annex 1 and 2 
Closing questions:  
further contact addresses, 
availability for more questions, 
small talk 
  
 
 
The questioning process was designed as flexible to get access to the wide range of 
interviewees (from high-ranking professionals to marginalized community members), and 
chose a semi-structured interview structure to allow for an open discussion of all issues 
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that the interviewees identified as important. These interview procedures entail several 
limitations and possible distortions of the data: 
- Understanding of the questions: The questions were formulated according to the 
background of the interviewee, but therefore varied among the respondents. The 
questions may have been understood differently from one interviewee to the next. 
- Recording of the data: The responses were documented in keywords on paper, 
rather than through a full-text transcript. While this ensured a close interactive 
conversation and arguably better access to the interviewees, it limits the reliability 
of the responses as they were interpreted by the interviewer into short keywords. 
- Categorization of the responses: Although this process is an essential part of the 
data interpretation and synthesis, it carries a risk of misunderstanding on several 
levels. Especially the deep and policy core beliefs would require a more focused 
analysis to validate the categorized responses, which were documented for a rough 
orientation within the ACF framework (see chapter 2 and Annex 4). 
 
 
